

SCIPIO AFRICANUS
IN THE
SECOND PUNIC WAR

HOWARD H. SCULLARD

Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War

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PROBABLE SITE OF THE BATTLE OF BAECULA

PLATE I. View taken from near Jarosa, facing North-East.

Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War

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To
THE MEMORY
OF
MY FATHER

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P R E F A C E

WHEN I undertook this work, no book had been written in English for the past century on Scipio Africanus, whose career has received somewhat more notice at the hands of Continental scholars. But the bibliography below gives an idea of the paucity of modern material, especially in English. There has recently appeared a book which deals with Scipio's campaigns from the angle of modern war, but which is perhaps not based on a very critical use of the sources. The importance of Scipio's Spanish campaign has not always been adequately emphasised in recent literature or its difficulties discussed. Also, apart from the place which he holds in the annals of military history and his great influence on the development of the Roman army, Scipio's extraordinary personality, which combined the religious mystic and the man of action, together with his central position in the history of the Roman Republic, has been neglected. While the scope of this work is confined to the first part of Scipio's career (which was more military than political) and so precludes a detailed discussion of all these aspects, I trust that there emerges from the din of battle more than the mere fighter. 'Cedant arma togae.' Scipio realised more fully than have many soldiers that the aim of war is the establishment of a truer peace. Further, he was not merely the natural product of his age, but he was one of those outstanding personalities who stand like rocks in the stream of history and divert its course. He kindled a torch which caused the shadow of the Empire to fall athwart the Republic.

The subject, chosen by myself, was approved by the Adjudicators of the Thirlwall Prize, who deemed this work worthy of the Prize. Subsequently, in 1930, the substance of that part of this work which deals with the Spanish

campaign was submitted and approved as a Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of London. I have worked from the original authorities, and at the same time have tried to use both fully and critically all modern writers. As more literature exists on the African than on the Spanish campaign, my debt to previous writers is greater there. I would gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to the general histories of De Sanctis, Kahrstedt and Gsell, and to Veith on matters military, to Schur on matters political; also to the two writers named first, for source-criticism. I visited the most important sites in Spain in 1927, and there reached my conclusions as to the battle of Baecula and regarding the topographical difficulties at Cartagena.

I wish to express my gratitude to the Electors of the Craven Fund, and also to the Electors of the Taylor Fund, St John's College, for Grants which have enabled me to travel and so made this work possible. More especially would I pay my sincere thanks to Prof. F. E. Adcock, and to Mr M. P. Charlesworth of St John's College, for help and advice while I was engaged on this work, and to the former, an examiner for the Thirlwall Prize, for suggestions and criticism; to Dr Max Cary for helpful suggestions on the Spanish campaign; to Mr J. M. K. Hawton of St John's College, for reading part of this work in its earlier stages; to my colleague and 'compañero de viaje,' Mr J. L. Matthews, for topographical corroboration; and last, but far from least, to both Prof. and to Mrs W. A. Davies, for help in proof reading and in other respects more than I can adequately name. Finally I would add that no one can be more conscious than the author that history is 'enquiry, and not certainty.'

HOWARD H. SCULLARD

March 1930

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CHAPTER ONE

ANCIENT AUTHORITIES FOR THE PERIOD

A CHAPTER with such a title might follow one of two methods. It might present a short account of the chief extant writers who deal with this period, together with such facts as can be ascertained regarding the original sources which they used. Or an attempt might be made to concentrate minutely on the later writers to discover the precise source from which each section is drawn. Only the former method will be attempted. The latter field of enquiry, which has flourished chiefly on the Continent and cloaks its painstaking labours under the title of *Quellenforschung* or *Quellenkritik*, is fertile only within limits. If the labourers in this field had produced similar results, more weight could be accorded to them. "*Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus*"! This kind of criticism, which often produces more heat than light, has led to many contradictory statements, and tries to establish as fact some things which from the limited extent of our present sources should perhaps be set down, if not as unascertainable, at least as not admitting of definite proof. Further, its object is in part alien to the historian *qua* historian, and being purely literary, comes within the purview of the historian in a less fundamental manner. It is valuable only where our knowledge is scanty. But if, for instance, two contradictory narratives of the same event are extant, one by a historian of generally accepted authority and the other by a late and inferior writer, and if the former can be accepted on account of its author's reliability and its own inherent probability, it is profitless, except from a purely literary point of view, to seek to disentangle the varied strata and define the development

of the inferior account. Is a detailed study of Appian's account of the battle of Zama,¹ for instance, of much value in face of Polybius' narrative? Details supplied by late authors will for the most part be discussed in the following pages only when they seem to supplement rather than contradict the earlier and more reliable authorities. Dr Rice Holmes quotes E. A. Freeman's remark: "One begins to suspect forgetfulness of the truth that the final cause of a source is not simply to show our ingenuity in finding the way to it, but to draw something from it when found." He himself then sums up: "I doubt whether a historian who ignored *Quellenkritik*, if he were able to weigh evidence, would make more mistakes than the most industrious of *Quellenforscher*." In short, the ultimate test of any ancient account must very often be its inherent probability, and the criterion must be common-sense.

I. POLYBIUS

Polybius is the earliest and by far the most important extant source for this period. Born in 208 B.C. in the Hellenistic world, he spent the earliest years of his active life in close association with his father, who was the leading statesman of the Achaean League. He thus obtained an early training in political, diplomatic and military affairs. After the battle of Pydna in 168, he was taken with other hostages to Rome, where he was held for sixteen years. His early relations with Aemilius Paulus, in the campaign against Perseus, now won for him at Rome the position of tutor to the general's two boys, the younger of whom became by adoption Publius Scipio Aemilianus. Through his residence there, Polybius was drawn into the famous Scipionic circle, and enjoyed the exceptional oppor-

¹ For the sake of convenience the final battle between Scipio and Hannibal will be alluded to under its conventional name, Zama, though it was not fought there. To dub it Naraggara, is only to exchange one uncertainty for another.

tunity of moving in the best Roman society, and of studying at first hand the history and constitution of Rome. During his sixteen years there, he realised that his own country was destined to submit to Rome, and determined to write the history of Rome's conquest of the civilised world from 220-168. He saw that Fortune was moving towards one goal, and that Rome's conquests stamped history with a unity which it had never yet possessed (P. I. 4. 1). During his exile in Italy he actually wrote the greater part of this work, i.e. about fifteen books; and it is with these alone that we have to deal here, or more precisely, with the slightly incomplete books, x, xi, xiv and xv. His abilities were so recognised at Rome that, after his exile was completed, he played a considerable part in her affairs. He shared in the diplomatic discussions preceding the Third Punic War, and assisted Scipio at the siege of Carthage, and after the fall of Corinth was left by the Roman commission to settle administrative details in Greece. The last twenty years of his life were spent in travels in Spain, Egypt, Asia and Africa; and also in historical work. For as his life advanced, important events took place, which he felt must be recorded, and so he extended his original plan of work to the year 146. It then comprised forty books, and may have been completed by the year 134. After that, his extended travels and knowledge induced him to insert supplementary passages, which he did not live to harmonise completely in every case with their context.

His view of history contrasts with that of the numerous Greek historiographers of his day, who aimed at mere effect and sensationalism. Their chief fault was rhetoric, to which they subordinated all truth; the intellect gave place to the emotions and to aesthetic taste. The conquest of the Far East by Alexander and his successors opened up a new world of romance, where the writer could dally with fact

or fiction at will. On the altars of rhetoric and romance historical truth was often sacrificed. From all this Polybius reacted in his attempt at writing a universal history which should be pragmatic. It was not to please but to instruct; it was not enough merely to narrate events, but their causes also must be shown. In his earlier days Polybius believed, as did most men, that beside ordinary natural causes, there was a superhuman force, *Τύχη*, which controlled events—a belief such as was expounded by Demetrius of Phaleron (cf. I. 4. 5, XXIX. 21. 5–6). But later Polybius changed his views, and eliminated more and more the working of any external power, until ultimately he denied that Rome's greatness owed anything to Fortune (I. 63. 9), but was due only to natural causes. This change was largely due to his leanings towards Stoicism,¹ but it was not necessarily a change from gross superstition to pure naturalism. Laqueur however believes, for instance, that at first Polybius followed the popular superstitious belief, which saw in Scipio a favourite of Heaven, but that later he threw over this conception. Although Polybius may have assumed the workings of Fortune, it is unlikely that he ever was sufficiently credulous and superstitious to believe, for instance, that divine intervention would help Scipio out of an awkward situation at the siege of New Carthage.

His historical standards are the highest. He believed in a careful study and criticism of his sources; in personal knowledge of geography, topography and local conditions; and finally that the historian should be well versed in politics and war through his own experience. To fulfil this last requirement Polybius brought the highest credentials from both personal observation and experience, and he

¹ Cf. especially Bury, *Ancient Greek Historians*, Lect. VI (to which I owe much here), and also on Polybius' attitude to Fortune De Sanctis, III, pt I. pp. 213–15; Täubler, *Tyche* (1928); and Siegfried, *Studien z. ge chichtl. Auffassung d. Polybios* (1928).

would have realised the importance of the remark that Gibbon applied to himself, that "the captain of the Hampshire Grenadiers was not useless to the historian of the Roman Empire." The extensive travels, which took him to Spain and Africa, guaranteed his autopsy of the most important sites. He sifted his sources carefully, and refused to admit the authority of any man because of his near relation to the events described or because of his position (cf. III. 9). He aimed at the strictest impartiality and realised its difficulty (cf. I. 14. 4, XVI. 14). No partiality can be discerned in his attitude to Rome, to whose world mission he bowed, though traces may be found when he deals with the Achaean League. For Scipio Africanus he had an intense admiration which, as will be shown, led him to misrepresent in a curious way the hero whom he sought to honour. Although he did not attain to the objective impartiality of Thucydides, yet his aim was truth. His authority is acclaimed at times scarcely this side idolatry; one modern historian, De Sanctis, has to issue a warning against the modern worship of Polybius ("Polibiolatria"). But if at times Polybius errs, which is only human, it is not wittingly.

Much has been written on Polybius' arrangement of his material and on his method of composition. Attempts have been made to analyse the strata of his work, to give the relative date of the composition of each stratum when found, and thus to trace the development of the author's literary and intellectual growth. Such a method depends largely on the minutiae of style and arrangement, and finds its most extreme exponent in Laqueur.¹ This scholar believes that Polybius wrote his first edition, when ignorant and unable to consult many books, and so followed Fabius Pictor; then he enlarged his work to the form which Livy XXI followed; the third edition, for which he used Cato,

¹ *Polybius*, and in *Hermes*, LVI (1921).

brought the history down to 150 B.C., and so on, till the last edition embraced a universal history. Such a view has, according to Ed. Meyer,¹ transformed the figure of Polybius into a caricature, and the great historian into a mere rhetorician. It falls beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the problem in detail. This superfine analytic method has arisen, partly to cope with certain difficulties and inconsistencies which exist in Polybius. An attempt will be made in the following pages to deal with any difficulties as they occur. Their existence is unquestionable, but it is possible that they can be solved without recourse to the drastic methods which Meyer censures.

2. POLYBIUS' SOURCES: LITERARY

Polybius' sources were of three kinds, literary, oral, and material, the last naturally being the least important. The literary sources may be divided into Greek and Roman. For his account of the First Punic War, for example, he depended chiefly on the Greek Philistus and the Roman Fabius Pictor. But only those writers, on whom he drew in recounting the Hannibalic War, and those parts of it in particular in which Scipio Africanus participated, need be referred to here.

Many Greek authors narrated the history of Hannibal. Five at least are known to us by name, but there must have been others, unknown to-day, who contributed their quota to Polybius' knowledge of this period.² We know of a Xenophon's *ἱστορία Ἀννιβαϊκή* (Diog. Laert. II. 56) and the *περὶ Ἀννίβαν ἱστορίαι* of Eumachus of Naples. Polybius (III. 20. 5) mentions with disdain a Chaereas, who seems to have been a contemporary of Hannibal as he is linked with Sosylus. Sosylus himself, however, and Silenus are of

¹ pp. 334 sq.

² Polybius refers by name to historians whom he consulted (e.g. III. 6. 1, 20. 1, 36. 2, 47. 6, etc.) but he often leaves unnamed those authors from whom he differs (e.g. x. 2. 3, 5).

greater importance. These two Greeks were in camp with Hannibal and lived with him as long as fate allowed;¹ thus they must obviously have been in a unique position to record the Carthaginian side of the war.

Sosylus was a Lacedaemonian who, besides living with Hannibal, taught him Greek. The scope of his work is not known. It is often assumed that he only recounted the first part of the war, because he wrote in seven books (Diod. xxvi. 4) and his account of the naval battle fought off the mouth of the Ebro in 217,² an early incident in the war, occurs in the fourth book. But it is not known that his method was annalistic; he may have grouped events according to their geographical position. Yet, whatever the scope of his work may have been, it is clear from this fragment that it was not confined merely to Hannibal's exploits.

Silenus is probably to be identified with Σιληνὸς ὁ Καλλαιτιανός (a mistake for Καλακτινός) of whose Σικελία a few fragments are extant.³ The extent of his work cannot be determined, although it embraced the siege of New Carthage (for Livy, xxvi. 49. 3, quotes Silenus' estimate of the number of "scorpions" captured there) and was thus, like Sosylus' work, more than a history of Hannibal. He referred to the ancient history and position of Gades (Pliny, *N.H.* iv. 120; Strabo, iii. 5. 7) in connection perhaps with the attempt on it in 206, perhaps only with the founding of the Carthaginian power in Spain. He may have visited the town when Hannibal was in Spain. Nepos says that Silenus and Sosylus remained with Hannibal "quamdiu fortuna passa est"—a vague phrase which can hardly determine the length of their works. Does it mean until their deaths or till Hannibal's death, or until Hannibal

¹ Nepos, *Han.* 13.

² A fragment relating this has been recovered. See Wilcken, *Hermes*, xli (1906), pp. 103 *sqq.*

³ See Müller, *F.H.G.* iii. 101.

left Italy or fled from Carthage? No argument can be drawn from the fragment of Sosylus, because his method of composition is unknown. Perhaps he was older than Hannibal and died before him (cf. Meyer, p. 373). All is vague, except that they wrote from the Carthaginian point of view. It cannot be proved from Sosylus' interest in the Massilians and from Silenus' reference to the "scorpiones" that they did not. These facts rather show, as Meyer emphasises, that they were not mere pamphleteers but serious historians who had information from the enemy's point of view. Besides, Silenus was a Siceliot and the sympathies of the Sicilian Greeks were naturally on the Carthaginian side.¹ It is impossible to estimate Polybius' debt to these known and unknown Greek writers. In the one place where a parallel account of Sosylus is extant—namely the sea-fight—Polybius clearly did not use him. But he did use, or at least had read, Silenus, although he does not quote him by name—for he alludes (III. 47. 8, 48. 9) to the anecdote of Hannibal's dream which Cicero (*de Div.* I. 24. 49) relates and had received from Silenus. Cicero goes on to praise the latter in the phrase "is autem diligentissime res Hannibalis persecutus est." Polybius reacted violently from the method of the worst of these Greek historiographers, but he probably owed the better ones a large debt in using their material and facts, however critically he dealt with them. It will be shown later how there grew up around the figure of Scipio a mass of romantic legend and fiction, partly in the works of such writers, partly in oral tradition. Against this popular view of his hero Polybius sternly set his face.

Polybius also used Roman literary sources. Both Fabius Pictor and Cincius Alimentus wrote of the Second Punic

¹ On Sosylus and Silenus cf. Meyer, pp. 338 *sqq.*, 368 *sqq.* Dessau (*Hermes*, LI, pp. 364 *sqq.*) attempts to minimise the value of their information although he admits their unique opportunity.

War in Greek, though there was probably a later version in Latin of Fabius' work. Polybius made use of Fabius,¹ though to what extent, if any, in the Spanish and African campaigns, cannot be ascertained. Other Roman writers, as Cato, C. Acilius, A. Postumius Albinus and Cassius Hemina, were probably read by Polybius and followed or rejected according to his judgment; but none is quoted by name in his extant works. He must probably also have read Ennius' *Annales* (books ix and x of which recounted the Hannibalic War), and his panegyric on Scipio and also the works of other earlier poets. But there is no reason to suppose, as Delbrück and Lehmann seem to do, that he ever mistook Ennius for a strict historian. He would appreciate him at his worth, recognising the limitations imposed on a poet when treating a historical theme. Ennius may have had a vast influence on the growth of the Scipionic Legend, but probably had little on Polybius.²

The last Roman literary source is Scipio himself, who sent a letter to Philip of Macedon, explaining the calculations on which he based all his operations in Spain and in particular the siege of New Carthage (P. x. 9. 3). This letter Polybius followed. It was presumably written in Greek, and dispatched some time after the year 191 when Scipio had personal relations with Philip. Perhaps Philip was not satisfied with the popular accounts of Scipio's exploits and asked him for a true one; Scipio acceded to this request, and a copy of this manifesto was preserved

¹ See P. i. 14 f., 58. 5, III. 8 f.

² A. R. Anderson (*Harvard Studies in Class. Phil.* xxxix (1928), pp. 31 sqq.) following Elter suggests that Ennius who had succeeded in deifying Romulus attempted to deify Scipio in his *Scipio*. On Scipio's deification see Horace, *Od.* iv. 8. 15 sqq., Cic. *de Rep.* frg. inc. 6, Sen. *Epist.* 108. 34, and Lactantius, *Div. Inst.* i. 18, "Apud Ennium sic loquitur Africanus:

si fas endo plagas caelestum ascendere cuiquam est,
mi soli caeli maxima porta patet."

in the Scipionic house where Polybius could see it. The letter was not extant in Cicero's day, for he says of Africanus that "nulla eius ingenii monumenta mandata literis, nullum opus otii, nullum solitudinis munus exstat" (*de Off.* III. 4). Possibly this may imply that the letter was never published but remained the private possession of the Scipionic house. Scipio Nasica, who sent an account of the battle of Pydna to one of the kings (Plut. *Aem. Paul.* 15), affords a similar example. Such accounts, written in the form of letters, foreshadow the memoirs and commentaries of later Roman literature.

3. POLYBIUS' SOURCES: ORAL

Polybius' oral sources must have been many. Living in Rome from 167 to 150 B.C., he may have met men who played an active part in the Hannibalic War. His connection with the Scipionic house would bring him into contact with the whole tradition of the family. But he was a keen man of affairs, and would seek to disentangle the truth from the mass of panegyric which clustered around the family archives. One of his chief informants was the old Laelius. In criticising certain popular views of Scipio's character, Polybius followed the impression produced on him by Laelius "who from Scipio's youth to death shared his every word and deed," because Laelius' account is "probable in itself and accords with the actual doings of Scipio" (x. 3. 2). Laelius had been an intimate friend of Scipio, his close companion and trusted aide-de-camp throughout his career, and is the only officer whose life Polybius traces in any detail. At the siege of New Carthage he commanded the fleet, and alone shared Scipio's plan of campaign; he commanded one of the wings at Baecula; he was sent to capture Gades and on diplomatic missions to Rome and Africa; he defeated Syphax and finally took part in the battle of Zama. Thus

he was in a unique position to give Polybius information. But what information did he give, and how far is it reliable? Apart from two anecdotes, which Polybius ascribes to him, and the references to himself, the first question can hardly be answered in detail.¹ The second is very debatable. Ed. Meyer has shown that the two anecdotes of Scipio's youth, which Polybius definitely says he learnt from Laelius, are false, and belong in essence to the popular tradition, of which more will be said below. Although Laelius was contemporary with the events, he is anything but a satisfactory reporter of them. In fact, his account presupposes the popular tradition, which he accepts and alters to glorify his hero with full knowledge of its untruth. Laelius foolishly attempts to rationalise this popular tradition, which saw in Scipio a favourite of heaven, and so turns his hero's inspiration into a trick and his hero into a charlatan. This crass rationalism of Laelius is due to his Stoicism. But this theory, which abolishes Laelius' authority, is completely untenable, even assuming that the anecdotes referred to are false, which is by no means certain. When Polybius met Laelius, the latter must have been over seventy years old. So it is possible that he may have forgotten the details of Scipio's early life. Or possibly he did not know Scipio before the Spanish campaign, and

¹ Laqueur, with his minute analysis of Polybius' style, has no hesitation in deciding precisely what the historian owed to Laelius in his account of the capture of New Carthage. In his first draft Polybius knew nothing of the ebb but let higher powers intervene, and followed the account of someone who took part in the storming of the town. In his second draft he incorporated knowledge received from Laelius—the account of the deliberations in winter quarters, Scipio's knowledge of the ebb and the enemy's forces in New Carthage, Laelius' naval command, the correct reason for leaving the Roman camp unguarded on one side and the importance of the East hill for the defence, etc. For his third draft Polybius used Scipio's letter whence he learnt the real reason which induced Scipio to attack New Carthage, namely the *στάσις* of the Carthaginian generals. But the difficulties which this theory seeks to solve, may find their solution in other ways.

only recounted the popular reports of his earliest exploits. In any case deliberate falsification is only one of three possible explanations of stories which may not be as inaccurate as Meyer supposes. Apart from the historicity of these anecdotes, Laqueur has shown that it is unlikely that Laelius was a Stoic or a rationalist; and so this deliberate twist, which, according to Meyer, he gave to the tradition, is improbable. Laqueur argues (pp. 151 *sqq.*) that the early Stoics did not teach men to be rationalistic, or, for instance, to reject divine inspiration in dreams. The popular tradition that Scipio had dreams of his election to the aedileship and concerning the fall of New Carthage, would have appealed to Chrysippus who wrote *περὶ ὀνειρώων*. It was only in the person of Panaetius that the Stoics became rationalists, and he did not come to Rome till the year 150 when Laelius was dead or, if alive, over eighty, when he would hardly change his whole attitude to life. The rationalism in Polybius is due to himself and not to Laelius. Again, even if these anecdotes of Scipio's youth are false, it does not completely invalidate Laelius' authority. His account of any events which he shared with Scipio, especially military matters, is on a completely different basis from these anecdotes. His judgment on strategy and tactics might well be valid, while his anecdotes could be rejected. There is no ground at all for supposing that all the information which he supplied to Polybius on the conduct of the war is anything but valid. Polybius had many years of political and military experience behind him, for he was forty when he met Laelius, and was not likely to be deceived by any falsehood. In the main Polybius had a very valuable and reliable source of information in Laelius; to what extent he tapped this source can only be surmised.

Polybius also could doubtless get the enemy's point of view from Carthaginian ambassadors, hostages or prisoners

of war at Rome, or when he visited Africa itself. There he also met Masinissa, perhaps in the year 150.¹ The African prince, then an old man, had died when Polybius assisted at the siege of Carthage in 146. He must have proved a valued source of information for Scipio's African campaign, for he had fought in all the important engagements—at the battle of the Tower of Agathocles, at the burning of the camps, at the Great Plains, at the defeat of Syphax and at Zama. What other men Polybius met in Italy, Spain and Africa is not known, but we can be sure that he made the fullest use of all oral sources.

4. THE SCIPIONIC LEGEND AND POLYBIUS' ATTITUDE TO IT

By Polybius' day there had grown around the figure of Scipio a mass of popular tradition and legend, partly in literary form and partly oral. This popular view of Scipio's character (*ἡ καθωμιλημένη δόξα*) was very wide of the truth and produced an erroneous impression,² which Polybius attempted to balance by giving a more correct view. In doing so, he naturally gives a glimpse into the content of the tradition. It represented Scipio as favoured by fortune, owing his successes not to calculation but to the unexpected and to chance; his conquests were obtained by following the promptings of dreams and omens; in general his genius was believed to be due to the special inspiration and guidance of heaven.³ Polybius completely rejects this and emphasises calculation and foresight as the cause of Scipio's success. What writers were responsible for the literary form of the Legend is not known except that they were Greek historiographers. Many of these were consulted by Polybius, as we have seen, and may have been used as a source for facts, which Polybius tried to put into their

¹ P. ix. 25; cf. Gsell, p. 308 n. 3.

² P. x. 5. 9, 2. 3.

³ P. x. 2. 5-12.

correct relation to the whole truth. But it was not only fact that was embodied in the Legend, for these Greek writers aimed at interesting rather than instructing their readers, and to this end they concentrated their powers of rhetoric, and also of pure imagination and invention. The impetus given to this school by the conquests and personality of Alexander has been seen. He was recognised as the prototype of Scipio, who by his conquests established the power of Rome throughout the Mediterranean world, as Alexander had conquered in the East. Hence many of the legends or fictions which attached to him were transferred to Scipio.

The original form of the Legend, before it was rejected or corrected by Polybius, can be seen in later writers. It is summed up briefly in the *De viris illustribus* (49). "Scipio was believed to be the son of Jupiter; for before he was conceived, a serpent appeared in his mother's bed, and a snake crawled over him when an infant, without doing him harm. When he went late at night to the Capitol, the dogs never barked at him. He never commenced an action without having sat for long in the shrine of Jupiter as if to receive the god's purpose."¹ Similar stories are found in Oppius and Hyginus, according to Gellius (vii. 1). C. Oppius was a contemporary of Julius Caesar, and wrote his life (Plut. *Pomp.* 10). He also composed a *de vita prioris Africani* perhaps comparing him with Caesar to the latter's advantage. J. Hyginus lived later in the Augustan age, and wrote on a variety of subjects including the lives of celebrated men in Roman history. These two writers told how a snake appeared, while her husband was away, in the bed of Scipio's mother, who was till then barren, and how it mysteriously disappeared; the haruspices foretold the birth of a child which occurred in due season. Livy (xxvi. 19) gives a similar account: Scipio acted and

¹ Cf. Dio, frg. 57. 39.

spoke in public as if he were guided by dreams or divine inspiration; he sought to maintain this impression, for he never undertook any important business without sitting alone in the temple on the Capitol for a long time (cf. Val. Max. I. 2. 2). This custom gave rise to the belief in his divine birth, whether with his cognisance or not, and the story was told of him as of Alexander—"fama et vanitate et fabula par"—that he was begotten by an enormous serpent. These stories of his divine birth, his continued relation with Jupiter, which even the temple dogs recognised (cf. Aul. Gell. VI. 1), etc., formed the content of the Legend and were narrated as facts. Later Scipio's connection with Jupiter was officially recognised, for his "imago" was placed in the "cella" of Jupiter, and not in the atrium of his own house.¹

Such stories had their origin in Greek historiography. The snake episode, which Livy himself connects with Alexander, is quite an alien idea to the Roman mind but not to the Greek with his hero myths.² Although the writers, on whom we depend for the original form of the Legend, are late, and although even their immediate sources are not earlier than the first century B.C., the origin and form can safely be assumed. Scipio's connection with Jupiter must have been recognised during his lifetime. Livy (XXXVIII. 56) quotes Gracchus' speech against Scipio, which tells how Scipio prevented a decree from being passed, authorising his image to be carried in procession from the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus. Much of the speech bears a suspicious likeness to similar acts of Julius Caesar, but it shows the connection between the god and the hero. If this speech is thought to bear the impress of a later date, we can still find evidence earlier than Oppius and Hyginus. About 110 B.C. Cn. Blasio

¹ Val. Max. VIII. 15. 2. App. *Ib.* 23.

² Cf. Ed. Meyer, pp. 435 sq.

struck a coin portraying Scipio Africanus. On the reverse are three figures; a male in the centre, holding a spear and arrows or thunderbolt; on either side is a female figure, one helmeted and holding a crown over the central figure. These figures have been identified with Bacchus and Pallas with the third doubtful, but are more probably Jupiter, with Juno on his right and Minerva on his left, the three chief deities of Roman worship in the Capitoline temple.¹ In short, there is no reason to doubt that the content of the Legend as found in these later writers, though perhaps increased in detail, is essentially the same as when Polybius denounced it. Shaped by Greek historiography, and enhanced by Ennius' insistence on the divine right of his kingly patron,² it entered Roman tradition, despite the influence of Polybius, probably through annalists such as C. Acilius and A. Postumius Albinus. And it is well that it did so, for only thus can Polybius' one-sided portrait be balanced.

5. POLYBIUS AND SCIPIO

An account of Polybius as an authority would not be complete without reference to his attitude to Scipio. Polybius himself condemns on principle any attempt to give a complete portrait of any leading person of his history, because men are inconsistent. It is misleading to characterise a man when he first appears on the stage, or to infer his whole character from particular acts; the right method is to criticise his actions as they occur.³ But Polybius does give a preliminary account of Scipio, which refers to his youth, to correct the current mistaken opinions of him. So while Scipio's character as a whole can be judged better after his exploits have been described, it

¹ Cf. Mattingly, *Roman Coins*, p. 74, and S. W. Stevenson, *Dictionary of Roman Coins*—s.v. Cornelia.

² See above, p. 9 n. 2.

³ Bury, *Greek Historians*, pp. 213-14.

would be legitimate, even according to Polybius' own method, to criticise his estimate of Scipio.

Polybius had the most intense admiration for Scipio (*σχεδὸν ἐπιφανέστατος τῶν πρὸ τοῦ*, x. 2. 2), yet he gives a portrait of him which is little better than a caricature. Scipio is shown deliberately spreading a belief that he was divinely inspired, while disbelieving in it himself;¹ coldly rational and calculating, he appears virtually a charlatan and a cheat. He cunningly worked on men's superstitions and assumed the rôle of a prophet, false only to himself. This view has misled later historians into an unjust depreciation of his character, through it not being realised that Polybius had only given one side of the picture. Mommsen, for instance, considers him "a strange mixture of genuine gold and glittering tinsel...not naïve enough to share the belief of the multitude in his divine inspirations, nor straightforward enough to set it aside, and yet in secret thoroughly persuaded that he was a man specially favoured of the gods—in a word, a genuine prophetic nature."² A curious view of what constitutes a true prophetic nature! Such an attitude leads Mommsen to depreciate all Scipio's exploits, to assume their motive is self-seeking, and their cause pure chance. But it is a legitimate inference from Scipio's life-history to assume that he must have had greater qualities than mere cleverness. The man who captivated so many of his contemporaries by the brilliance of his genius and character, by his personal charm and manner, who revolutionised Roman military tactics, who beat Hannibal and won the Second Punic War, saving his country despite rivalry, bitterness and antagonism at home, who set Rome on her imperial course and founded her power in Spain, Africa and Asia, who championed a wider view of Rome's mission than

¹ Cf. x. 2. 12, 5. 7.

² Everyman edn. II. pp. 265 and 148.

did the Roman aristocracy as a whole with its purely Italian outlook, who headed that line of men who set themselves as individuals against the supremacy of the State, foreshadowing the Gracchi, Marius, Sulla, Pompey and Caesar, and who could still resist the last infirmity of noble minds, the supreme temptations of personal ambition and power when they were within his grasp, who could retire from his country when it could no longer find a place for his greatness, such a man must have been more than a clever charlatan.

Why did Polybius give such a portrait of his hero? The solution seems to lie in the Legend, which is in itself a historical fact of great importance. It represents the impression which Scipio made on his contemporaries, and as such cannot be lightly dismissed. With whatever extravagances and fictions the Greek historiographers embellished it, there lies at its root some truth. Scipio had a genuine prophetic nature; he was of exceptional genius, and felt that the secret of his power lay in some reality higher than his own, and that he had a mission to fulfil. It would seem that he was one of those few men who display two sides to their nature, two attitudes to life and reality, which are usually excluded in the same personality: mysticism and rationalism. It has been said that a rationalistic mystic will move the world; Socrates proved this, and in another sense did Alexander. "To be mystical and intensely practical, to dream greatly and to do greatly, is not given to many men; it is this combination which gives Alexander his place apart in history."¹ A similar combination seems to be at the root of the misunderstanding which Scipio has suffered. Those who looked to one side of his nature, through superstition or deliberate invention, wove around him fantastic tales of his divine origin and his continuous close relation with heaven. Polybius, the

¹ W. W. Tarn, *C.A.H.* vi. p. 425.

rationalist, saw only the rational in Scipio, and deliberately tried to show the falsity of the other view by building a portrait of the Stoic rationalist's ideal of the great man. Unfortunately, in attempting to glorify his hero, Polybius' reaction has been too strong, and has done him the gravest injustice. For Scipio emerges as a trickster who, knowing the widespread belief in his supernatural powers, in which he himself disbelieved, used it to trade on the superstitions of the credulous. Instead of the hero acting according to calculation and reason, there sometimes peeps out the charlatan acting with guile, and all because Polybius refused or was unable to recognise the existence of any part of man's nature which was not purely rational. He could not doubt that men had believed in Scipio's inspiration; but the enlightened hero could not have shared in the belief himself, and so must have nourished it to win loyalty and support.¹ The existence of the Legend itself is the best proof of Scipio's genius. A pure rationalist or a smaller man would never have gained such a romantic halo.

6. LIVY AND HIS SOURCES

Livy, our second extant authority, appears at an interval of nearly one hundred and fifty years after Polybius, a period which is bridged by the activities of various Roman annalists. Between these two writers, so different in method and outlook, there is often great similarity of material, a fact which raises many difficult questions as to their relation. Did Livy use Polybius directly or indirectly? Did he use one or more authors who had used Polybius? Were Polybius' sources used by Livy's sources? Such questions admit of no positive answer. No attempt will be made here to analyse minutely each chapter and line of Livy, and to assign it to its source. Such attempts,

¹ Cf. Schur, p. 96.

which in the works of Kahrstedt and Brewitz, for example, occupy about one-third of their space, lead to few positive results. For apart from the Polybian portions, when this section has been assigned to one annalist and that to another, little is gained unless the reliability of the annalist in question can be established. Often this is impossible; for not sufficient of their works remains. All that can be said is that some are better or worse than others, and in the long run any remark of Livy, which derives from a little known source, can only be tested by its inherent probability or improbability. Where Polybius, in those parts which Livy follows, is extant, the differences are generally minor ones. Difficulty only arises when it is a non-extant portion of Polybius which Livy is thought to be following. In the main, if Livy or any secondary source contradicts the primary source, it will often be found enough to dismiss them. In the following pages the chief differences will be noticed and discussed, if they contribute in any real way to a better understanding of the event; the minutiae of the *Quellenkritik* will be passed by. All that is necessary here is a short account of Livy's attitude to, and use of Polybius and the Roman annalists.

Those portions of Livy, xxvi-xxx, which recount the Spanish and African campaigns fortunately rest in the main on Polybius; there are additions, but the greater portion is Polybian. There can be little doubt that Livy had direct access to Polybius himself for the end of the Spanish and the whole of the African War, but it has not been established at what point in the third decade this relationship started. Who was the intermediary or intermediaries used by Livy when he did not make direct use of Polybius? Briefly, the Roman annalists, in particular Coelius.

The earliest group of Roman annalists, whom Polybius himself used, seems to have had little direct effect on Livy.

He quotes Fabius Pictor and Cincius Alimentus once only,¹ probably not having read them himself. The next generation of annalists, in Gracchan times, included C. Fannius, P. Sempronius Asellio and L. Coelius Antipater. The last named wrote a monograph on the Second Punic War in seven books, which was used extensively by Livy who refers to it eleven times in his third decade.² Coelius was praised by Cicero: "paululum se erexit et addidit historiae maiorem sonum vocis vir optimus, Antipater" and "paulo inflavit vehementius."³ But perhaps Cicero was regarding him purely in the light of an orator; for rhetoric seems to have been his chief fault, if one can judge from the extant fragments. He may be a Roman counterpart of those Greek historiographers of whom Polybius had so low an opinion, and may have found his model in the Alexandrine monographs on one historical character.⁴ If he showed any critical ability or love of truth,⁵ it probably gave place to his love of rhetorical ornament and exaggeration. He made use of Silenus, Fabius, other annalists, and Polybius, and was one of Livy's main sources. Where Livy used him, Brewitz would attribute to him rather than to Livy the greatest part of the speeches, external ornaments, arbitrary changes and imaginative touches, because Livy himself had not the time for these embellishments. The still later generation of annalists also contributed their quota to Livy—C. Licinius Macer, Q. Claudius Quadrigarius and Q. Valerius Antias. Macer's work

¹ XXII. 7. 4, XXI. 38. 3-5.

² XXI. 38. 6, 46. 10, 47. 4, XXII. 31. 8, XXIII. 6. 8, XXVI. 11. 10, XXVII. 27. 13, XXVIII. 46. 14, XXIX. 25. 3, 27. 14, 35. 2.

³ Cic. *de Orat.* II. 12. 54 and *de Leg.* I. 2. 6.

⁴ Cf. Brewitz, p. 3.

⁵ Prisc. VIII. 4. 18: "Coelius: ex scriptis eorum qui veri arbitrantur." Cf. L. XXI. 46. 10, XXVII. 27. 13. Other references to Coelius are: Cic. *Brut.* 26. 102; *de Div.* I. 24. 49, 26. 56, *Orat.* 69. 230; Val. Max. I. 7. 6.

started in early days, and though he studied his sources carefully, much was spoilt by his rhetoric and family pride.¹ Little is known of Claudius; he may have been the translator of the Greek annals of C. Acilius. He wrote from the burning of Rome by the Gauls, expanding his scope as he approached his own time. Livy quotes him ten times,² often to differ from him. He seems to have suffered from the usual faults of rhetoric and exaggeration. Finally, Valerius Antias, who wrote a historical work in at least seventy-five books, was used extensively by Livy, who quotes him thirty-five times in the extant books. At first Livy followed him blithely, notwithstanding his numerical exaggerations, though at times he has qualms (III. 5. 12). When he used better sources (e.g. Polybius), Livy threw over Valerius with some bitterness and denounced his exaggerations; e.g. "Valerius Antias, qui magis (quam Claudius) immodicus in numero augendo esse solet" (XXXVIII. 23. 8). An attempt, however, has been made to show that Livy used Valerius with caution throughout, and that he did not trust him at first, only to denounce him later when he realised his unreliability.³ Livy also had access to two authors from whom he derived his accounts of the events in Rome itself, to which Coelius did not refer in his history of the war. Further, there are the annual lists of legions, etc. He has also obviously used the same annalist as Dio. It is not known whether any of these three is identical with Claudius or Antias.

It cannot be said how much reliability can be placed on that part of Livy which depends on the Roman annalists. Their patriotism often overrode their duty as historians. Falsifications arise from the desire to glorify such and such

¹ Cic. *de Leg.* I. 2. 7, condemns him strongly. Cf. L. VII. 9. 5, IV. 20. 8, 23. 2.

² E.g. XXXIII. 10. 9, XXXVIII. 23. 8. Cf. Aul. Gell. x. 13. 4.

³ Prof. Howard, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, XVII, 1906.

a family or hero. They abound in anecdotes, legends, falsehoods and mistakes, but it is a grave injustice to reject an account merely because it is annalistic. There must be much sound material at the root of their accounts. Münzer¹ has recently shown that much of the annalistic tradition in Livy, concerning the rivalries of the leading Romans and the political life of Rome, is far more reliable than previously admitted. Annalistic and false are not synonyms, and the chief criterion once again is probability and common-sense.

It was originally through one of these annalists, Coelius, that Livy obtained his Polybian material. Coelius used Polybius and annalistic sources, as has been said; when he came to describe events which occurred in Magna Graecia, Sicily, and the Hellenistic world, he probably relied more on Polybius and less on writers like Silenus. Similarly in Spanish events, Polybius was used more. Kahrstedt thinks that as Livy had not time to sift out all the information he required on Greek affairs, he availed himself of Coelius' version of Polybius. But it was different for Sicily and South Italy, which were more relevant to Roman history; here beside the Coelian parts (recognisable through the admixture of good annalistic and the complete agreement with Dio) is pure Polybian matter without annalistic addition, and so different from Dio. Hence Livy determined to use Polybius himself also for Spain and Greece from 206. So in both these theatres of war in 206 the mixture of annalistic with Polybian matter ceases and gives place to the latter, while the chronology is suddenly adjusted; in short, the condition of the fourth and fifth decades sets in. For Africa, Livy used Polybius himself.² Brewitz holds that the precise point where Livy finds Coelius too romantic and casts him aside,

¹ *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien*, 1920.

² Cf. Kahrstedt, pp. 321-2, 360-1.

is later than Kahrstedt believes, that is in Book xxix and not in Book xxviii. It is not till the last chapter of xxx that Livy refers to Polybius by name, and then in very slighting terms considering his obligations—"haudquamquam spernendus auctor." Elsewhere he may refer to Polybius with other authors under some generic term like "quidam."¹ De Sanctis holds that the direct use of Polybius by Livy is much earlier, at least in Book xxiv if not before, in which case Livy must have consulted Coelius as a secondary source and borrowed only additional matter from him. For instance in Book xxvi we know Livy used Silenus only through Coelius, and so with the latter's help he has introduced certain glosses into his version of Polybius. This contamination was more probably due to Livy and not to Coelius, because we cannot assume a large use of Polybius by Coelius, and the passage on New Carthage is too faithful a reproduction to be attributed to a writer so imaginative and unconscientious as Coelius. So De Sanctis. But as long as the precise use of Polybius by Livy can be traced, it is of less importance whether it is direct or not.

Such were the sources from which Livy drew and composed a history worthy of the Roman people whom he celebrated. But admirable though he is from a literary point of view, his ideas of historical criticism were far removed from those of Thucydides or Polybius. He suffered much from the rhetorical faults of the annalists. Sometimes he disregarded primary sources like inscriptions and had nothing of Polybius' desire for autopsy. His knowledge of geographical and military matters is scanty. Where his sources agreed he followed blindly unless a matter was most improbable. Where they disagreed he follows the majority, or withholds his judgment, or favours the earliest writers, or the most favourable to Rome, or

¹ xxix. 29. 4, 35. 2, xxx. 16. 12, 35. 5, 43. 2.

the most reasonable, or the one which impresses him most. His criticism is shallow and often careless but there is no question of his honesty. Whatever his faults from modern standards of historical criticism, whether he was "verbosus et negligens" as Caligula thought, he gives the impression of the greatest straightforwardness and candour.

Livy's method differs widely from the Polybian and his treatment of Scipio forms a good example of this divergence.¹ Livy's method is objective and generally he is hidden by his material, as is the poet in the heroic epics, while Polybius' method is subjective, as in the didactic epics. Livy in epic form works his judgment into his narrative so that it partly becomes the narrative, while Polybius appears in his own person as critic and shows us how he forms his judgments. Livy constructs artistically, where Polybius analyses scientifically. Livy's attitude also towards Scipio is very different from the Polybian, which he must have known. He does not assume that the mystical side of Scipio was a cloak and used merely as a tool, but he allows room for real piety in Scipio's attitude to life. He quotes much of the Legend, though apparently with misgivings. Further, he also stresses the extraordinary self-confidence, the un-Roman enthusiasm of Scipio, and also his ability to understand men sympathetically. "Scipio's rich humanity," as Prof. Conway calls it, which is part of Livy's conception of Scipio, overshadows the superhuman figure drawn by Polybius.

7. APPIAN, DIO AND MINOR AUTHORITIES

Appian of Alexandria was a Roman citizen of equestrian rank, who flourished in the time of Hadrian. His history of

¹ See Brun's *Die Persönlichkeit i. d. Geschichtsschreibung* and Klotz's article on Livy in P.W. (col. 831). Cf. especially P. x. 2 and L. xxvi. 19. 3-9, P. x. 40 and L. xxvii. 19, P. xv. 15. 3 and L. xxx. 35. 5.

Rome was set out under geographical headings and did not follow the usual chronological arrangement. The books here relevant are (excluding VII on the Hannibalic War in Italy) Book VI on the Wars in Spain (*Iberica*) and Book VIII, part I of the Punic Wars (*Libica*). Compared with the earlier sources, Appian falls far short; but it is perhaps rather discourteous to depreciate his value unduly, as is often done, when in the absence of other authorities his witness has to be accepted, for instance in the Third Punic War and parts of the Spanish and Civil Wars.

Much has been written on his sources, but with little positive result. Prof Schwartz, for instance, in Pauly-Wissowa is "more successful in demolishing the conclusions of his predecessors than in pointing out the true sources himself."¹ There are some traces of Polybius in the books here relevant, but they appear to be indirect. Coelius and Livy also shine through Appian's account. In the *Iberica* the tradition though inferior is by no means bad; it is free from many of the worst inventions of the later annalists and preserves bits of earlier ones. Appian may have supplemented Coelius from better writers here than elsewhere, or more probably Coelius himself used better sources for the Spanish campaigns than he did for Africa. That is, Appian deteriorates where Coelius deteriorates. He had access directly or indirectly to the sources of Diodorus² but does not appear to have made much use of Valerius Antias.³ It is unlikely that he made any use of King Juba's history, of which too little is known to allow of any definite conclusions.⁴

¹ So Dr H. White, in his introduction to the Loeb edition of Appian, p. x.

² Cf. for example Diod. xvii. 10 and App. *Lib.* 33.

³ Cf. Gsell, pp. 202-3. He does not give certain indications attributed by Livy to Valerius. Cf. Kahrstedt and Schwartz.

⁴ See H. Peter, *Ueber den Werth der hist. Schriftstellerei von König Juba II. von Mauretanien* (1872) and Keller's *de Juba Appiani Cassique Dionis auctore* (1879).

In the *Libica*, Appian's account resembles Dio's very closely, especially in the bad tradition on Zama. The cause of this is undoubtedly the common use of Coelius.

Appian has emphasised strongly the religious aspect of the Scipionic Legend. Scipio speaks and acts ὥσπερ ἔνθους (*Ib.* 18 and 26) or θεόληπτος (26) or κατὰ θεόν (19, 23, 26) or πειθόμενος θεῷ (19). At every opportunity he sacrifices and seeks omens. Before the battle of Ilipa (Appian's Carmona) he offered sacrifice with the look and appearance of one inspired, saying that the usual δαιμόνιον had appeared to him and that it was better to trust in God than in the size of his army; his former victories had been gained κατὰ θεόν, οὐ κατὰ πλῆθος. He pointed out some birds which the gods had sent as a sign of victory, gazing at them ἐνθέως. At New Carthage he rushed into the lagoon with the cry Σύμμαχος μοι θεός. After the capture of the town he was still more assured of his inspiration, and Appian repeats the story of his frequenting the Capitoline temple. Appian has undoubtedly stressed correctly the point where the Legend was born and where the mystical side of Scipio's character first made a wide impression—that is, at the capture of New Carthage. Brewitz¹ thinks that the tone of Appian is priestly rather than historical, and so can be attributed to the Roman Pontifices. He refers to Appian's remark that Scipio's imago was καὶ νῦν ἔτι carried in the funeral processions of the Cornelii Scipiones. The chief line of the Scipios had died out at the end of the Republic, and only the Scipiones Salvidieni Orfiti survived, who probably would not still carry the mask. Indeed the mask may not have survived or been renewed, for the temple had been burned three times before Appian's day—under Sulla, in the Vitellian confusion and under Titus. So, concludes Brewitz, the νῦν ἔτι does not refer to Appian's time, but has been copied verbally from his source. The

¹ Pp. 26 sqq.

mask would not be hung in the temple when Scipio died in exile, but later when the Scipionic house was again flourishing. What better opportunity than in the time of Scipio Aemilianus, when at the end of the Third Punic War the roof of the temple was gilded and a mosaic floor laid?¹ Then Appian's priestly account comes from the time of the younger Scipio, and may be attributed to the author of the *Annales Maximi*, the Pontifex Maximus, Mucius Scaevola, who wrote soon after 120. Whether or not Brewitz's ingenious theory is correct, the value of Appian's account is the emphasis which it lays on the Legend and on the non-rational side of Scipio's character.

Dio Cassius' account of the Second Punic War is very incomplete², but the gaps can be filled by Zonaras' abridgment. The latter's work is very uneven; at times he busies himself with trifles, and at others omits whole periods. The account of Dio himself is usually depreciated, though he is a valuable source for the history of the Empire. It is not fair to judge him as a first-class author, but if taken for what it is worth, his account is of some value; for he aimed at truth, however far short he fell of his ideal. His narrative is similar to that of Livy, but dissimilar enough to make it probable that he used Coelius rather than Livy as his chief source, though Livy may have been used in a subsidiary way. In addition, Dio used one or more of the annalists. He did not follow his source, Coelius, blindly, but tried to correct and amplify him and bring him into line with other sources. His intentions were good, but he suffered from poor material. His account of the Hannibalic War falls into two sections, the first ending with the preparations for the African campaign. When dealing with Africa, Dio deteriorates, and diverges more from Livy, who had thrown over Coelius in preference to Polybius. It is very

¹ Pliny, *N.H.* xxxiii. 57, xxxvi. 185.

² The part here relevant is fragment 57, Books xvi and xvii.

probable that Dio still kept to Coelius, although the only proof is that Livy (xxix. 35. 2) says that Hanno was killed (presumably Polybius' account), but that according to Coelius and Valerius he was only captured; Dio and Appian give the version of Coelius. Since there are hardly any traces of Polybius in Dio's account of the end of the war, perhaps Coelius diverged more from Polybius and followed a worse tradition, although it is difficult to see why he should have done so. Thus in Dio is found the Coelian tradition, which either from direct use or through use of Livy, takes the place of Polybian or late annalistic accounts. Dio's value is not only intrinsic, for he also shows up the worth of Livy, who, when he might have followed this inferior tradition, kept closely to Polybius.

Some fragments of Books xxv-xxvii of Diodorus contain references to the Second Punic War. He lived in the time of Julius Caesar, and compiled a huge world history from legendary times to Caesar's conquest of Gaul, taking thirty years to gather his material. He is of less value in recounting the Second than the First Punic War. There are some traces of Polybius in his work, but they are probably indirect. In his account of the conduct of Pleminius at Locri (xvii. 48) he may have inserted extracts from Polybius or he may have given the *résumé* of an annalist whom Livy contaminated with Polybius (cf. De Sanctis, p. 668, and below p. 173 n. 1). His account is very similar to Appian's, for instance, in the honour paid to Syphax by Scipio, the death of Sophonisba and especially on the violation of the truce, in which Diodorus diverges from Livy and Dio, and resembles Polybius, yet not without differences. There is no doubt that Diodorus' chief source is Appian's chief source. It is not Juba, as has been said, who is excluded in the case of Diodorus on chronological grounds. De Sanctis says that it is pre-Livian and that the similarities of Appian and Diodorus to Polybius are

explained by the use which their source made of the same source used by Polybius—namely Fabius Pictor.

Many other authors, whom it is necessary only to name, contribute their quota to our knowledge of Scipio. Cornelius Nepos, Cicero's friend, although not reaching a high standard of historical accuracy, gives some information in his *Lives*. Again, the works of Valerius Maximus and Aulus Gellius are useful sources of information. The former, who perhaps lived in the age of Tiberius, compiled a collection of "facta et dicta memorabilia" for the use of rhetoricians. He drew from Coelius, Livy, and Cato, amongst others, but his outlook was uncritical. Gellius shows in his miscellany, the *Noctes Atticae*, considerable accuracy and admiration for the authors whom he quotes, and is valuable for preserving fragments of earlier writers. Florus, the African of Hadrian's reign, wrote a history based on Livy, to glorify Rome. One of the few incidents that aroused his sluggish enthusiasm was Scipio's victories in Spain. Frontinus, who lived in the second half of the first century A.D., wrote four books on military stratagems, which are mainly a collection of anecdotes; Livy is one of his chief sources. The Livian tradition is still strong in later writers, as Orosius and Eutropius. The Roman Southey, as he has been named, Silius Italicus, is of little historical value. He composed an epic history of the Second Punic War in seventeen books. In the thirteenth book the catastrophe of the two Scipios is told, while young Scipio, the official hero, true to the epic tradition, descends to the underworld to consult the shades of the dead. In Book xv, the fabled choice of Hercules is re-enacted for Scipio's benefit; Virtue and Pleasure strive for mastery over him. Silius' account of his campaigns ends in a panegyric, and is of little value, for Scipio is a lay figure and his significance is not understood. The grandeur as well as the meaning of the war is drowned by the noise of the epic machinery

handled by one of the most mediocre of poets. A source of far greater value would be the lost life of Scipio by Plutarch, for which one would readily exchange many a Silius. It would be tedious to spend longer with these minor authorities, for they add but little to their predecessors. Most follow the Livian tradition, which although in its championship of Scipio and Rome is "sans peur," yet is not entirely "sans reproche."

CHAPTER TWO

ROME, SCIPIO, AND SPAIN

I. ROME'S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY

SCIPIO'S heritage and environment played a large part in directing his political and military life, and they must now be briefly considered. The struggle of the orders, which cast its shadow over the early internal history of Rome, had resulted in the infusion of another class into the state, but these new men were of much the same social standing as the old ruling classes. So the Gens remained at the heart of Rome's power, the Patrician families were supreme in the Senate, and the more important families of Plebeian nobles were attached to one of the chief houses. In recent years Münzer has emphasised the great power of the leader of each house, and how the man, who in early days as paterfamilias only asserted his authority over his family, came to assert the supremacy of his house in the State. This leading place was handed down from father to son; if the succession was temporarily broken through uncontrollable circumstances, the leadership tended ultimately to revert again to the legitimate heir, and thus the continuity of the family was preserved. The five great families of Rome were the Fabian, the Claudian, the Scipionic, the Aemilian, and the Valerian. The interplay of these parties¹ in the history of Rome has been emphasised by Münzer, and in the period under consideration more particularly by Schur, who has

¹ "Party politics" is a misleading phrase in Roman history, unless it be understood not in a modern sense, but as the successive predominance of the leading noble families.

worked on Münzer's methods and has elaborated his material.¹

Between the Scipios and the Aemilii there was a close alliance dating from the First Punic War. Scipio Africanus himself married the daughter of Aemilius Paulus who fell at Cannae,² while his mother, Pomponia, was the sister of the two Pomponii Mathones, the consuls of 233 and 231, who were in the circle of the Aemilii.³ This coalition party came into conflict with the Fabii, who had been the leading house since the middle of the fourth century, and flourished especially under the leadership of Q. Fabius Maximus who had been consul in 233, censor in 230, and consul again in 228. But the Fabii suffered a temporary eclipse at the hands of the Aemilian and Scipionic party. The three sons of the two Scipios who lived during the First Punic War held the consulship in close succession, Cnaeus Cornelius Scipio in 222, P. Cornelius Scipio Asina in 221, and P. Cornelius Scipio (father of Africanus) in 218. In 220 the consuls had been the friendly M. Livius Salinator and L. Aemilius Paulus. Scipio Asina's colleague was M. Minucius Rufus, whose house was connected with the Aemilii, but who later became Fabius' Master of the Horse. P. Scipio's colleague was Ti. Sempronius Longus, whose son was consul with Scipio Africanus in 194. In 217 Cn. Servilius Geminus, whose house was linked with the Aemilii, was consul. But after the first years of the Hannibalic War the pendulum began to swing away from the Aemilii and Scipios. Fabius was elected dictator in 217 and held the consulship in 215 and 214, so that Aemilius Paulus only gained the consulship of 216 with great

¹ See F. Münzer, *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien*, and W. Schur, *Scipio Africanus*, especially pp. 9-24, 105-41, and in *Hermes*, LIX (1924), pp. 464 *sqq.*

² A worthless anecdote is recorded about Aemilia by Val. Max. I. 6. 7.

³ Sil. Ital. XIII. 615 *sqq.* for the name Pomponia. Cf. Münzer, p. 162.

difficulty. In 216 the disaster of Cannae fell and Aemilius Paulus was killed, leaving the way completely open to the Fabii, and checking temporarily the Aemilian-Scipionic party. But Fabius did not hold the regained supremacy for long; the way he thrust his son over others' heads made him unpopular. Thus by 212 the way was clear for the third great family, the Claudii, and the consuls for that year were Ap. Claudius Pulcher and Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who had deserted the Fabian cause for the Claudii. In 211, when the two Scipios were killed in Spain, the Claudii were at the height of their power, which however suddenly received a severe blow by the death of Claudius at Capua. But Flaccus held on till 209, supported by C. Claudius Nero, who took the place of the Scipios in Spain and later won fame at the Metaurus, and also by M. Valerius Laevinus and P. Sulpicius Galba, who held commands in Greece. The question at stake was, would the Fabii or the Claudii win the elections of 210; the balance lay with the remains of the Aemilian-Scipionic party. Such was the political situation when the young Scipio came forward and turned the scales in an unexpected manner.

The Roman nobility was divided not only in personal opposition but on the question of foreign policy. Till the time of the First Punic War, the interests of the Roman aristocracy had been purely agrarian, and limited by the shores of Italy. Expansion in Italy had proved inevitable and the only way of maintaining Rome's existence, but foreign expansion with imperial or commercial motives was totally alien to her mind. When the Mamertines appealed to Rome for help, few can have seen that on Rome's answer hung the fate of her imperial future and of the civilised world. The war started because the Senate could see little objection to granting the help, and because it was losing complete control, and the people could be swayed by the jingoism of popular leaders. Besides,

Carthage, with her exploiting commercial imperialism, could not be disregarded for ever. There is no reason to suppose that a large class of merchants existed at Rome at this time who forced the government's hand, yet it was perhaps the popular party which succeeded in entangling the State in a war, which compelled Rome to build a fleet—the first step to expansion abroad. This fleet was destroyed more than once, and a general reaction followed to the views of the party who saw Rome's future in Italy alone. But, again, the popular party found a leader in Q. Lutatius Catulus, made the necessary effort to win the war, and stiffened the terms of the peace. Undoubtedly, there was a strong clash of interests in Rome between a purely continental policy and a popular expansionist policy. Ed. Meyer¹ sees in the latter a "Welt-politik" advocated by the merchants of the common Italian capital. Strong commercial interests at this time may be doubted, but not that there was a popular party which looked beyond the coast of Italy for Rome's future. After the war Sicily was left on Rome's unwilling hands, little effort was made to exploit it, and a reaction again followed to the agricultural interests of the peasants. The effect of the war was even greater on Rome than on Sicily, for contact with Sicily meant contact with Greek culture and Greek ideas of trade. But the period between the two Punic Wars is chiefly marked by purely Italian interests. C. Flaminius, the forerunner of the Gracchi, urged the distribution of the *ager Gallicus* and expansion in Northern Italy—a policy supported by the leaders of the extreme aristocracy, Fabius and Marcellus. The Senators, who were forbidden to trade, looked only to Italy. The unprincipled annexation of Sardinia, which balanced the Carthaginian expansion in Spain, the freeing of the Adriatic from

¹ "Die Römische Politik vom Ersten bis zum Ausbruch des Zweiten Punischen Kriegs" in *Kleine Schriften*, II. pp. 375 *sqq.*

pirates, and the checking of Carthage in Spain, were for them secondary considerations. In fact, when Hannibal arrived in Northern Italy, Rome was busied settling the peasants there. Imperialism in the modern sense was only coming into being, but voices could be heard, which would shout down the old slogan of "Agriculture and Italy for the Italians." It is probable that the Scipionic party was favourable to the wider outlook. Cn. Cornelius Scipio Asina was consul with Duilius when the Roman navy was first built, and Cn. and Publius Scipio saw that the Hannibalic War must be won in Spain and not in Italy, as a Fabius thought. It was in this wider tradition of the Scipionic house that young P. Cornelius Scipio grew up.

2. SCIPIO'S YOUTH

P. Cornelius Scipio, later surnamed Africanus, was born in the year 236/5 into one of the great Patrician families of Rome.¹ His father, also named Publius, was consul in 218, and in the following year joined his brother in Spain where he remained till his death in 211. Around Scipio's birth there later clustered a mass of legend, as we have seen, formed largely on the analogy of the legends of Alexander's birth.² Nothing is known of his boyhood

¹ At the battle of Ticinus (autumn 218 B.C.) Scipio was, according to Polybius, seventeen years old, hence he was born in 235. Livy (xxvi. 18. 7) says Scipio was twenty-four when elected to the Spanish command; but he dates this incorrectly in 211. If the correct date, 210, is assumed, Scipio's age would be twenty-five. Polybius (x. 6. 10) says he was twenty-seven when about to march on New Carthage (209). Hence he was born in 236/5. On his personal appearance, see L. xxviii. 35; Sil. Ital. viii. 561-2. Scipio was the first Roman to shave daily—Pliny, *N.H.* vii. 59. 211. J. J. Bernoulli, *Über die Bildnisse des alten Scipio* (1875), and *Röm. Ikonographie*, i. pp. 32 sqq. Also W. Dennison in *Amer. Journ. of Arch.* ix. pp. 11-43, who rejects the view that the series of so-called Scipio busts (of which the most famous is perhaps the Capitoline) represents Scipio Africanus; he believes them to be priests of Isis.

² He was the first born child notwithstanding Polybius' evidence to

before the war broke out in his father's consulship. Concerning his youth three anecdotes are told, about his part in the battles of Ticinus and Cannae and about his election to the aedileship.

Polybius learnt from Laelius that at the Ticinus the elder Scipio placed his son in command of a picked body of horse to secure his safety. But when young Scipio saw his father cut off by the enemy and wounded, failing to urge those with him to go to the rescue, he charged forward alone; the others followed and Publius Scipio was saved and greeted his son as his rescuer. Polybius, the pragmatist, adds that Scipio thus gained a reputation for bravery and in the future did not expose himself unnecessarily. Livy gives the same account but mentions Coelius' version that Scipio was rescued by a Ligurian slave. Macrobius says that a slave placed the father of Africanus on a horse when he was wounded, and as all had deserted, alone brought him to the camp.¹ It is to be noticed that Polybius

the contrary (x. 4. 1). The Legend supports this view, as Oppius and Hyginus told how the snake appeared to his mother who till then had been barren; whence it would appear that Lucius was younger than his brother Publius. Little is known of the mother, but perhaps Publius owed her his mystical approach to life; for Polybius' anecdote (x. 4) tells how she visited the temples and sacrificed to the gods when her sons were standing for the aedileship.

¹ See P. x. 3; L. xxi. 46; Val. Max. v. 4. 2; Sen. *de Benef.* iii. 33. 1; Sil. Ital. iv. 456; Florus, i. 22. 10; Oros. iv. 14. 6; Dio, 57. 38; Zon. viii. 23; *de vir. illustr.* 49. 4; Macrobi. *Sat.* i. 11. 26; Pliny, *N.H.* xvi. 14. Servius (comm. in *Aen.* x. 800) even states that Scipio received twenty-seven wounds! E. Wölfflin (*Hermes*, xxiii (1888), pp. 307, 479) thinks that the slave tradition is the more reliable, because it would not have survived if the other version was true. This is supported by Pliny who says that Scipio would not accept the "corona civica" as a reward. Meyer thinks that the father greeted the son as his saviour because he had come to help quickly and perhaps sent on a slave. De Sanctis suggests the slave story may come from the same source as that of the slaves of Formiae and Sidicinum before Cannae (L. xxii. 42), or may be the malevolent alteration by Coelius or someone else of an anecdote current among Scipio's friends, or more likely the original account

himself does not vouch for the literal accuracy of the anecdote; he only says that Scipio seems to have charged (*αὐτὸς εἰσελάσαι δοκεῖ*). It is impossible to ascertain the truth. Considering the enmity which Scipio suffered in his last years, it is as likely that the slave version was invented to his detriment as that Polybius' version was composed to his glory; Coelius is not usually preferred to Polybius. Most generals, who win the affection of their troops, have displayed personal courage when the need arose, so there is no need to deny this to Scipio. A false anecdote, it has been said, may be good history. But even granting its falseness, it does not as Meyer supposes undermine Laelius' authority for later events in which he himself participated.

Scipio next appears on the scene after the battle of Cannae. A few thousand survivors had reached Canusium, where the younger men formed a conspiracy to leave Italy altogether. At a council Scipio, flourishing a naked sword, took command and swore never to desert Rome, and thus forced the others to take the same oath.¹ This story is probably a late invention, as otherwise Polybius would hardly have omitted it.

Polybius follows Laelius in his account of Scipio's election to the aedileship, which is the next notice we have of Scipio's career. His elder brother Lucius was standing for the office with several other candidates, but had little chance of election and so Publius decided to help him. By telling his mother that he had twice dreamt that he and his brother would be elected, he obtained from her in jest the white toga worn by candidates. On the day, Publius appeared himself as a candidate with his brother, from Silenus when the anecdote was not known in the Carthaginian camp or had not yet been invented. Cf. Ed. Meyer, pp. 428 *sqq.* and Sander's *Quellen Contamination*, pp. 112-13.

¹ L. xxii. 53; Dio, 57. 28; Zon. ix. 2; Val. Max. v. 6. 7; *de vir. illustr.* 49.

and both were elected through the popularity of Publius. Hence he won the aedileship and the reputation of communing with heaven in his sleep and also by day. The only certain fact which emerges from the anecdote is that he held the aedileship in 213.¹

Three years after his aedileship, Scipio suddenly sprang into prominence and was elected to the Spanish command. In 211, as has been seen, the Claudian party was at its height, with only two foreign commands in other hands—the Spanish under the Scipios, the Sicilian under the Fabians, Marcellus and Ot. Crassus. The death of the two Scipios meant a further victory for the Claudii, who got C. Claudius Nero appointed to the Spanish command. Then the party suffered sudden loss, and the Fabii began to revive with Marcellus' success at Syracuse. The death of the Scipios had involved the temporary eclipse of their house. There were left only the old L. Veturius Philo and the useless Scipio Asina, for M. Livius Salinator was still in exile. The younger generation was yet too young; the

¹ The date was, according to Polybius, when τὸν πατέρα τότε πλείν συνέβαινεν εἰς Ἰβηρίαν. This, Meyer says, refers to 217 and may merely be due to Polybius' bad expression and not to a mistake of Laelius. For the official lists, quoted by Livy (xxv. 2. 6), show that Scipio was aedile in 213/12 with M. Cornelius Cethegus, not Lucius, as his colleague. It must have been in 213, because for that year the aediles must be Patricians, and in 212 Plebeians. More serious than the date, where Polybius' remark might be twisted to refer to a later date, is his error about Lucius, who was not Publius' colleague and who was the younger brother, as his whole career shows. Livy adds that Publius' election was opposed by the tribunes because he was not old enough. At this Scipio displayed his usual self-confidence and superiority, and replied that if all the Quirites wished him to be aedile, he was old enough. The people eagerly voted for him and the new aediles celebrated the games with great grandeur. Polybius' anecdote is quite unreliable, for the younger brother could hardly have enough political weight to help the other; and if his date is corrected to 213, it is doubtful whether the mother, Pomponia, was still alive, for it would appear from Silius Italicus (xiii. 613 *sqq.*) that she had died some time before 212.

son of Cnaeus, later known as P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, was only twelve or fifteen, while Publius' son was twenty-four. The latter suddenly became, with his father's death, the head of the house, and strengthened the connection with the Aemilii by his marriage to the daughter of Aemilius Paulus. Also the censors elected for 210 were Veturius Philo and Licinius Crassus (L. xxvii. 6), who proceeded to rehabilitate Livius Salinator, thus giving the Scipionic-Aemilian party a member of consular rank. Then came the day when a proconsul was to be elected for Spain. Polybius' account is not extant, but Livy¹ tells how all declined this difficult post, when suddenly Publius Scipio, aged only twenty-five, came forward and announced himself ready to stand. The popular surprise was only equalled by the enthusiasm with which he was elected. After his election, doubts assailed some, but were dispelled by Scipio in an enthusiastic speech. This account bears a suspicious likeness to the situation of 151 B.C. and the election of Scipio Aemilianus. The real cause of Scipio's election was not a sudden burst of enthusiasm, but the state of the parties. The Aemilian-Scipionic party, instead of merely holding the balance between the Fabii and the Claudii, gathered strength to assert its rights. Further, P. Scipio had much in his favour, notwithstanding his youth and lack of military experience. His un-Roman enthusiasm and confidence must have impressed his contemporaries and it was fitting that the son should be sent to avenge his father and uncle. But behind this was probably the desire that the offensive strategy of the Scipios should be renewed. Nero had been sent out merely to hold the line, but it was hoped that Scipio would revert to the bolder method of his house. This election

¹ L. xxvi. 18, 19. Cf. Val. Max. iii. 7. 1; App. *Ib.* 18; Zon. ix. 7. Scipio was twenty-five, not twenty-four as Livy says, because the election was held in 210, not 211 as Livy thinks.

marks an important step in Rome's constitutional development. For Scipio, who had only been aedile, and not praetor or consul, was the first "privatus" to be invested with the proconsular imperium,¹ on which later there rested the emperors' military rights. The Empire is foreshadowed. Thus Scipio suddenly sprang into the limelight and set his feet on the ladder of fame. Whether he would climb or fall, rested on his attainments in Spain.


3. SPAIN²

While Hannibal was marching to Italy and undertaking his famous passage of the Alps, the Romans were making desperate counter-efforts. On learning that he had crossed the Pyrenees, P. C. Scipio, to whom the command of Northern Italy had been entrusted, sailed to Massilia to thwart him. He arrived too late, as Hannibal had slipped past, and it only remained for him to return to his northern command, ready to meet Hannibal when he reached Italy itself. He sent his brother Cnaeus with his army to Spain and was able to join him the next year.

The two Scipios—"duo fulmina belli"—had greater

¹ Marcellus' election in 215 is very doubtful—see De Sanctis, p. 329. The details of Scipio's election are not clear, whether he was nominated by the Comitia Tributa (L. xxvi. 2. 5) or in the Centuriata under the Consuls (L. xxvi. 18). The former is the more likely by analogy. Cf. Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, II. p. 659 and De Sanctis, p. 454 n. 18. With Scipio was elected M. Junius Silanus, "adiutor ad res gerendas datus." Whether or not it was thought that Silanus' age would check Scipio's youth, it is clear that Silanus only had "imperium minus", praetorian not proconsular (L. xxvi. 19. 10; Dio (Zon. ix. 7)). This is not contradicted by L. xxvi. 20. 4 that "successit inde Neroni Silanus," because Silanus took over Nero's troops, and Scipio Marcius'. Polybius' *συνάρχων* is not precise. Cf. De Sanctis, p. 455 n. 19. It is also probable that Scipio was married and that his first son was born before he started on his Spanish campaign. Cf. Münzer, *op. cit.* p. 107.

² On Spain at this period see Feliciani, "L'Espagne à la fin du 3me siècle av. J.-C.," *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia*, XLVI.



insight into the meaning of events than was given to most of their contemporaries. They saw clearly that Spain was the key to the whole war. This was the legacy they bequeathed to Publius' son, who, by his victories in the Peninsula, vindicated this judgment of his father and uncle. They realised that Hannibal was counting on being able to draw reinforcements and supplies from Spain, and they set themselves to prevent this, by holding the Pyrenees or Ebro at all costs and stopping any leakage of strength through to Hannibal in Italy. But they had a wider object than this. Probably they were sympathetic to the new movement in Rome which caused men to look beyond the shores of Italy for Rome's future. They went beyond the cautious defensive and agricultural policy of a Fabius, and saw that Spain must be won for Rome, and that unless the Carthaginian power there was broken, Rome would never be safe from her enemy. So when their strength seemed adequate they determined to take the offensive. They worked to make Spain not so much Roman as non-Carthaginian, but must have realised what this would involve. To limit their aim merely to cutting off Hannibal from his base is to do them as little justice as to assign to them purely imperial designs.

Their campaigns may be considered in some detail, because of the light they throw on the methods as well as the aims of Scipio Africanus. This is inevitable, for the country itself, no less than the character of its inhabitants, forces an invading army to adopt certain methods and routes. The interior of Spain is very mountainous and contained few large towns, so that years of guerilla warfare were needed before the Romans mastered the highlands of Celtiberia and Lusitania. In the campaigns under review, the interior was for the most part left severely alone. The districts involved are the rich fertile valley of the Baetis (Guadalquivir) in the south, whence so much of the

Carthaginians' wealth derived, and the valley of the Ebro in the north. These two districts were linked by a coast road which in turn embraced two fertile regions, namely, the neighbourhood around Saguntum, Valencia and the mouth of the Sucro, and that near New Carthage, the Carthaginian base in Spain. Although the Romans cannot have had very exact information about the lie of the land, the two Scipios evolved a strategic plan which succeeded, one which seems generally to have been applied in attacking the country, and which was followed by Pompey as well as by the younger Scipio. The root of the whole problem is that no successful attempts could be made against the interior or the south, unless two factors at least were secured. It was absolutely necessary to secure the coast road and to secure an adequate base. Further, the command of the sea was an invaluable asset, as otherwise the communication lines could be cut in an invading army's rear. The Peninsular War taught the same lesson, though naturally a close parallel cannot be drawn, because the British were attacking from Portugal, not from the north-east. When Napoleon was "about to carry his victorious eagles to the Pillars of Hercules, and drive the British leopard into the sea," Sir John Moore advanced into Spain in an attempt to cut Napoleon's communications, but with his forces unconcentrated, and relying on the Spaniards. The further he advanced, the further away seemed the Spanish armies, all but one of which had been routed by the French. Ignorant of the plans of the Spanish generals, the British army found itself isolated, having advanced on a fool's errand. Only the genius of its general saved it from disaster in retreat, and covered its embarkation at Corunna. On the other hand, Wellington had a strong base at Lisbon behind the lines of Torres Vedras. Outside these lines the French could not maintain themselves indefinitely, for they lived largely on the country;

they must move or starve, for the British held the seas. From Torres Vedras, Wellington could advance when the French retired and harass their retreat. If he did not succeed in manœuvring them into a favourable position for battle, he could himself retire again behind his lines. A base was essential. The situation in 218 was very similar to that faced by the young Scipio eight years later, and also to that which confronted Pompey on his arrival in 76 B.C. Pompey tried to force the line of the Ebro and to conquer the coast road by pushing out of his way the lieutenants of Sertorius. But Sertorius himself had taken up a position on the upper Ebro, whence he descended to thwart Pompey. By land Pompey and Metellus were fairly successful along the coast, but ultimately failed because they lacked an adequate base, and because their convoys were threatened by Sertorius' guerilla bands, and their supplies by sea were liable to be attacked by the naval forces of Sertorius, who was allied to Mithridates, the patron of the pirates. Pompey succeeded only when he gave up the coast road and took to the highlands. But had he had a base and command of the sea, his first method, that of the Scipios, might have succeeded.

In the late summer of 218 Cn. Scipio landed at Emporiae, which he made his first base from which to march south. He tried to secure the coast down to the Ebro by land and sea, and succeeded in winning certain towns. Some of the Spanish tribes joined him as he had hoped, and these he treated with great kindness. Hanno, the Carthaginian general in command of the district north of the Ebro, was busy in the interior settling the territory which Hannibal had just conquered. Scipio wisely persevered down the coast, securing his line of retreat before turning to the interior. When he reached Cissa, near Tarraco, Hanno came down and gave battle but was defeated. The town itself, which was probably the Carthaginian base in

Northern Spain, fell into the hands of the Romans.¹ Scipio then moved his fleet to Tarraco. Here Hasdrubal arrived from the south and, being too late to help Hanno, attacked the Roman naval camp, and then retreated back over the Ebro to his base, New Carthage. Scipio, having skilfully beaten Hanno before Hasdrubal's arrival and forced the latter to withdraw, established his winter quarters at Tarraco. Thus in the first year he had won a base and started to conquer the land north of the Ebro, effectively preventing any reinforcements getting through to Hannibal².

The year 217 was an important one for Spain. Hasdrubal approached the mouth of the Ebro with his land forces and fleet, and was here surprised by Scipio who won a great victory in which the Carthaginian sea power on the Spanish coast was broken.³ The way was open for Scipio to cross the Ebro and to advance further southwards, as he could protect his communication lines by sea, while penetrating down the coast. He was also strengthened by the arrival of his brother Publius with reinforcements. The two brothers advanced to Saguntum and encamped near the temple of Aphrodite about five miles from the town.⁴ Through the treachery of a Spanish chief, they got

¹ P. III. 76, and L. XXI. 60, say that Hannibal's troops had left much of their property at Cissa before going to Italy. This story probably points to a Carthaginian base at the town. Cf. De Sanctis, p. 240 n. 58. The importance of Cissa is also shown by the extraordinary variety of its coinage—see Antonio Vives y Escudero, *La Moneda Hispanica*, II. pp. 65–84, and Schulten in *Phil. Wochenschrift* (1927), pp. 1578 sqq.

² P. III. 76; L. XXI. 60–I. 4. Scipio's second campaign (L. XXI. 61. 4–11) against Hasdrubal and the northern tribes is a doublet of the previous one; cf. Keller, p. 93; Kahrstedt, p. 170; De Sanctis, p. 241. Cf. also Front. II. 3. 1, and Pliny, *N.H.* III. 21: *Tarracon Scipionum opus sicut Carthago Poenorum*.

³ P. III. 95–6; L. XXII. 19–20. 2. Front. IV. 7. 9 and a fragment of Sossylus (see *Hermes*, xli. pp. 103 sqq.).

⁴ Schulten has recently found traces of the Roman camp at Almenara, 8–9 km. north of Saguntum near the temple of Venus marina.

possession of all the Spanish hostages whom the Carthaginians were holding in the town—naturally a very severe blow to the Carthaginian cause.¹ The hostages were restored to their homes; an act which foreshadows Africanus' similar clemency towards the natives. Both sides retired then to winter quarters.

Next year Hasdrubal had to face a serious rising in South Spain of the Turdetani who were at first too powerful for him. He wisely acted on the defensive until the enemy scattered to plunder. For Spanish armies seldom remained long in the field without external pressure—when their own masters, they soon broke up to follow their own devices. Carefully biding his time, Hasdrubal attacked and won a complete victory. He was also reinforced by the arrival of Himilco, whom the Carthaginians had sent in their desire not to let Spain slip from their grasp without a fresh effort. With this enlarged force, Hasdrubal marched to the Ebro and met the Roman army near Ibera, which lay opposite Dertosa (Tortosa) on the south bank of the Ebro, and was an important strategic point, controlling the coast road and the passage of the river and also the valley up to the interior. It was a critical moment, and Rome's fate hung in the balance. If Hasdrubal broke through and joined Hannibal in Italy,

See *Philologische Wochenschrift* (1928), no. 7, p. 222, and *Archaeologischer Anzeiger* (1927), p. 233. Thus the accuracy of Polybius' description of the site of the Roman camp is confirmed.

¹ This story is rejected by Frantz, as it is unlikely the Carthaginians would keep hostages in Saguntum rather than in New Carthage, and because the freeing of these hostages by the Romans does not seem to have had the effect one would expect, for the Romans are still found by the Ebro. Beloch (*Hermes*, L, 1915) thinks it a duplicate of the story of Scipio Africanus and the hostages he won in the capture of New Carthage. De Sanctis (p. 244) supports the rejection. Yet none of these reasons is final. Neither party was strong enough for a decisive offensive, and so the Romans would naturally winter north of the Ebro. It was not as if they had won Saguntum itself, and the hostages may not have been numerous.

Rome could hardly withstand the double force; while Spain would surely be lost, as a Carthaginian victory would involve a change of feeling among most of the wavering and even pro-Roman tribes. Hasdrubal used the same tactics as his brother did at Cannae, but his centre of Spanish troops broke up before his wings could bring about a decision and his army was routed. Five years later his opponents learnt how much faith to put in the native troops. But for the time, the situation was saved and Rome was freed from a grave danger. The Scipios had accomplished something which might brighten the heart of the home government even in the gloom caused by Cannae; all was not lost. As a natural result of the Roman victory, more Spanish tribes revolted from the Carthaginians.¹

The Scipios had gloriously held the line of the Ebro and could think next of offensive measures. But there were difficulties in the way. Their strength was exhausted no less than Hasdrubal's and they could not make fresh demands on the home government at so critical a time. Further advance meant, as before, securing a new base and the coast road. This would involve longer communication lines which in turn needed more men to guard them. The further they penetrated to the south, where the Carthaginian power was deeper rooted, the less hope was there of winning the support of the natives. If they won this support by force, they would become the aggressors and so alienate the sympathy of the Spaniards, while if they neglected it, their communications would be endangered. They hesitated to take the offensive until they had sufficient strength, and so the next years, 215-13, were comparatively uneventful. The Romans gradually occupied more territory south of the Ebro, garrisoning smaller

¹ The victory may have been late in 216 (Kahrstedt), or in 215 as Genzken (pp. 32 *sqq.*) and De Sanctis (p. 246) think.

towns till they could win a real base in Saguntum, and recruited their strength for the coming offensive.¹

By 212 the gradual advance of the Scipios was crowned by success; they had won over many tribes south of the Ebro, and also obtained the base which they had so urgently needed, by gaining possession of Saguntum. This town had an important strategic position, as it commanded both the coast road at the head of the main fertile plain of the east coast and also the passes to the south. And so they could now plan a more extensive advance for the next year, venturing perhaps to pass the winter further south. Unfortunately for Rome, Carthage was able to think more of Spain, as she had just quelled a Libyan rebellion and now maintained three armies in Spain under Hasdrubal Barca, Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, and Mago. The superior numbers of the enemy meant that a Roman offensive would be risky; further penetration meant increasing the distance from the centre of supplies, even though Saguntum was now held. Yet to revert to a defensive policy involved the sacrifice of their previous conquests and of their new Spanish allies. These they trusted and, confident in that trust, advanced in two divisions against the enemy, Publius with two-thirds against Mago and Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, Cnaeus with the other one-third against Hasdrubal Barca. This division may have been a mistake, as the united force would probably have crushed Hasdrubal

¹ Livy's accounts of the Scipios' victories in South Spain during these years derive from an annalistic source and may safely be rejected, e.g. XXIII. 49 *sq.* and XXIV. 41 *sq.* Yet mixed with this bad tradition there are traces of a better one (i.e. Coelius and Silenus). The references to Ilturgi may not originally have referred to the town in Andalusia, but to an Ilturgi in Catalonia, situated at Cabanes, west of Oropesa, and the Intibili of L. XXIII. 49 may have been just west of Benicarlo. (See Schulten, "Ilturgi," *Hermes*, LXIII (1928), pp. 288 *sqq.*) Thus after crossing the Ebro in 217, the Scipios won over and garrisoned these two northern towns, Intibili and Ilturgi, and repelled Carthaginian attacks on them in 215 and 214.

Barca—a blow which a third of the army could hardly expect to inflict. They divided perhaps to put less strain on the natives from whose territory they must in part derive supplies, and to facilitate the obtaining of these by widening their area. But they were to learn the truth of the dictum of Henry IV of France that Spain is a country where large armies starve and small armies get beaten. In avoiding the former danger the Scipios divided their forces and ran the latter risk. The commissariat difficulties of the French in 1807 and the following years illustrate the danger of starvation in Spain. Cnaeus was the first to learn how vain had been the trust in their Spanish allies, for he now saw those in his own detachment deserting to the enemy. Robbed of his strength, he determined to retire. But his retreat was fatally harassed by the Carthaginian cavalry who retarded him till the infantry came up and destroyed his force. Meanwhile Publius was prevented from leaving his camp freely by the enemy's cavalry, and at length made a dash out against the Spanish prince, Indibilis, who was threatening his rear, but was caught and his army cut to pieces. Only a remnant under Fonteiis at length reached the Ebro. Thus the offensive, which the two Scipios had undertaken so hopefully, met with complete disaster, and they met their deaths, while the whole Roman cause in Spain seemed for the moment lost.¹

The cause of the disaster was evidently the treachery

¹ The date of the disaster seems to have been 211; cf. L. xxv. 36. 14, though elsewhere he puts it in 212. This, however, corresponds to his false dating of the fall of New Carthage in 210 instead of 209. We know from Polybius that this was in 209 and so may suppose the catastrophe of the Scipios to have been in 211. See Genzken, pp. 36 *sqq.*; Jumperz, p. 6; Soltau, *Hermes*, xxvi (1891), pp. 411 *sqq.*; Kahrstedt, p. 495; De Sanctis, p. 446. Frantz, pp. 42 *sqq.*, however, votes for 212. The topography is less certain. Amtorgis, which Livy (xxv. 32. 10) names as the place where Cnaeus remained while Publius advanced, is unknown. Ilorci, the "rogum Scipionis" where Cnaeus met his fate (Pliny,

of the Celtiberians and the separation of the Roman armies (P. x. 7. 10). Wellington's bitter experience with his Spanish allies at Talavera was anticipated by 2000 years. Behind these causes lay the fact that the Scipios had perhaps undertaken more than their strength permitted, possibly relying too much on rumours of dissension among the Carthaginian generals. Instead of the gradual advance of the last few years they attempted an offensive which overtaxed their strength, especially when they acted independently and could not trust their Spanish allies. A good base and the control of the coast road were essential. They had obtained both of these, but not far enough south. To advance inland, unless they held the coast and consolidated their advances as they went, was dangerous and in the circumstances proved fatal. This lesson, which the death of his father and uncle emphasised, was taken to heart by the young Scipio. It was only after winning New Carthage as a base that he could feel safe in penetrating to the Baetis and the south.

But though the Carthaginians were enabled by their

III. 9), is rightly shown by Ed. Meyer (p. 445), who corrects the punctuation of Pliny, to lie near Cartagena. Unfortunately Meyer identifies it with the modern town of Lorca. All the evidence, however, points to the village of Lorqui (see below, p. 143 n. 1) which lies in a barren plain surrounded by the most arid and bleak mountains, which suits Livy's description of the "hill which was so bare and the ground so rocky that there was no brushwood to cut for a stockade or earth for constructing a rampart." It is a scene of great grandeur but of the utmost desolation, the hills being denuded of all vegetation. As I passed through the valley two carrion crows were flapping overhead. Truly a fit stage for the destruction of Cnaeus Scipio and his army. Perhaps Appian (*Ib.* 16) is correct in stating that Publius camped at Castulo in Baetica, though Cnaeus can hardly have reached as far as Urso (Osuna). Perhaps indeed Ilorci, which in his source may have been *Δορκῶνι*, is at the bottom of Appian's *Ὀρσῶν*; cf. Schulten, p. 300 n. 1, who keeps to Meyer's identification of Ilorci with Lorca. Probably the two Scipios advanced from Saguntum, Publius penetrating to the upper courses of the Baetis, Cnaeus to the hinterland of New Carthage.

victory to extend their influence northwards again and get a fresh hold on the country: though they raised the taxes, which they levied on the natives, and collected from them hostages whom they sent to New Carthage, yet they failed to make full use of their success owing to their internal dissensions. The old quarrel between the Barcid family and the representative of the government had broken out again, and each of the three generals wished to exploit the success for his own advantage and would not co-operate with his colleagues. This saved Rome. For the Carthaginians did not drive home their victory in the succeeding months when the Roman cause was so precarious. They lost the opportunity of sending help to Italy—an opportunity which was never to recur again in the same measure—and Hannibal was left to fight his way to Rome's overthrow alone. With the defeat of the Scipios the way had been opened to inflict a mortal blow at the enemy's heart, but the selfishness of the three Carthaginian generals prevented them from taking the road which was soon barred by the arrival of Nero, and then barred more effectively by Scipio who would not merely hold the line of the Ebro, as Nero had tried, but strike out strongly against his opponents, true to the traditional policy of his house. The cowardice and folly of the Carthaginians is thrown into still greater relief when set against the gallant attempt of the Scipios with their lack of any adequate base, supplies or money, and with their small armies. Possibly the selfishness of the Carthaginian generals led indirectly to the disaster of the Scipios, because the latter may have heard of and trusted in it too much, but it certainly destroyed their country's cause.

The events between this disaster and the arrival of young Scipio are clear in outline, if not in detail. All south of the Ebro was lost and no fortress beyond the river remained in Roman hands, unless indeed they retained

Saguntum.¹ The Carthaginians even made some headway to the north of the river,² but in the main, the remnant of the Roman armies, some 9000 men, held the line of the Ebro, thus confirming the policy of the Scipios, who, though they met with defeat and death, had prevented any reinforcements reaching Hannibal from Spain, where alone they believed the war must ultimately be fought and won. Even after their death, when their offensive policy seemed for the moment to have failed, the Spanish frontier was held and Hannibal was still left without the help he so urgently needed.

The detail of this intervening period is less certain. A remnant of the Roman troops escaped under T. Fonteius and L. Marcius to the Ebro, but Livy's story (xxv. 37-9) of how the latter won a great victory over Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, is obviously an annalistic fiction designed to compensate for the loss of the two Scipios. How it was embroidered by the patriotic Roman annalists is seen in Livy who says that the number of the dead was, according to Piso 5000 men, according to Valerius Antias 17,000, while Claudius gave 37,000.³

After this Cl. Nero was sent to Spain with some recruits, his whole force there probably being only one-third⁴ as

¹ Meyer (p. 451) believes they did, because if it had been lost we should have heard of its recapture in the next year or two. But this argument from silence can hardly outweigh the general impression given by the authorities that everything beyond the river was lost—see P. x. 6. 4; L. xxvi. 20. 1 *sq.*

² Polybius (ix. 11. 3) in recounting the aggressive conduct of Hasdrubal, mentions that "Indibilis, the most faithful friend the Carthaginians had in Spain, who had formerly been deprived of his rule owing to his attachment to them, had recently (i.e. after the disaster of the Scipios) been restored to it for the same reason."

³ To his credit Appian is silent on Marcius whom the later annalists praised so excessively.

⁴ 13,100 according to Livy, who also says that he took these from his legions at Capua. Kahrstedt (pp. 290 and 499) points out that the army at Capua could not possibly spare two-thirds of its strength,

large as the Carthaginian which had increased to some 45,000 men. What then could Nero accomplish with this force? He cannot have planned an offensive south of the Ebro, for he had not the strength. Besides, the offensive policy in Spain adopted by his rival party, the Scipionic, was now discredited. What he did was of more importance; he tried to secure the land north of the Ebro, possibly throwing Hasdrubal Barca into difficulties, and to hold the river itself with his own and the remains of the Scipios' army. He could only think of defensive measures which might be effective because of the dissensions of the Carthaginian generals. Even in this he was not completely successful as some of the tribes north of the Ebro revolted. For among the hostages which the Carthaginians held in New Carthage in 209 are found representatives of the good faith of the Ilergetes, the most powerful tribe between the Ebro and the Pyrenees. So Nero could not be sure of the interior, and the Roman hold on the coast was threatened by an unfriendly hinterland. Appian (*Ib.* 17) gives a much truer account than Livy when he says, "As nothing of importance was accomplished by Marcellus (a mistake for Marcius) and Cl. Nero, the Carthaginian power increased until it embraced almost the whole of Spain, and the Romans were restricted to a small space in the Pyrenees."¹ Nero held on, possibly somewhat

while the figure 13,100 is absurd, as Nero's total force in Spain could not have been more than 15,000 (as Scipio Africanus brought 11,000 and recruited 5000 Spaniards, having in all a force of 31,000). So he arbitrarily, but perhaps correctly, alters Livy's figures to 5000-6000. Appian (*Ib.* 17) gives 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry and falsely says that Marcellus was sent with Nero.

¹ This, however, is not a good tradition, according to Kahrstedt (p. 280), but the correct tenor is due to chance; for, as the foolish account of New Carthage derives from the same annalist, we cannot suppose a "good tradition" here. Yet whether good or not, it accords with and summarises the historic facts as we can reconstruct them.

precariously as far as the Ebro, but certainly no farther south.¹

Such was the situation when Publius Scipio arrived.

¹ Livy (xxvi. 17) tells how Hasdrubal Barca was trapped by Nero at the Lapides Atri, "a place in the country of the Auretani between the towns of Iliturgi and Mentissa." Here Hasdrubal offered to surrender, but prolonged the negotiations for several days, while part of his army slipped away each night; the last part managed to do so owing to a morning fog, and when at last it cleared, Nero saw the valley empty and realised that he had been tricked. As the Auretani lived near the Pyrenees and the two towns mentioned lay on the Baetis, the story is often rejected as worthless, the geographical absurdities balancing the numerical ones of Marcius' exploits. De Sanctis (p. 451 n. 15), however, following Jumperz, believes that the incident is true and that the errors are only due to a confusion by Livy who muddled two accounts, the true one in which the action took place north of the Ebro and another which placed it in South Spain. De Sanctis does not follow Jumperz in recognising Ilerda and Mashna in the towns mentioned, but thinks the names come from the worse tradition. Schulten, however, finds the topography correct (for annalistic accounts in the long run may go back to military dispatches to the Senate), yet he rejects the incident as unhistorical. He alters the Auretani to Arsetani (near Saguntum) and believes Iliturgi to be the northern town of that name (= Cabanes, see above, p. 49 n.). The defile of the Lapides Atri (the name survives still as "Monte Negro"; cf. Schulten, *Arch. Anz.* (1927), p. 235) runs thence to Barriol, near which must have been Mentissa. But, as such an incident cannot have taken place south of the Ebro, it must still be rejected, however correct its topographical details. Possibly Livy may have had in his mind similar incidents in the later history of Spain, for the second-century wars there were rather full of capitulations. For instance, in 141 Q. Fabius Maximus Servilianus was caught in a defile near Erisane and was only released by agreeing to a humiliating treaty which his brother proceeded to break. Again, in 137, Mancinus was cut off and submitted to a shameful surrender, which the Senate promptly repudiated, making Mancinus the scapegoat. But whatever the origin of these exploits of both Marcius and Nero, if they are placed to the south of the Ebro they must be rejected, because the victories described are fruitless and have no effect. If some definite results had been postulated for them, we might have been led to believe in them, but as the situation appears exactly the same before and after them, they can only be "foolish inventions," as Meyer calls them, not the proved facts that Mommsen supposes.

CHAPTER THREE

NEW CARTHAGE

SCIPIO set sail for Spain from the mouth of the Tiber with reinforcements amounting to 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, with M. Junius Silanus as his aide-de-camp, and with a fleet of thirty ships, to take over the command from Claudius Nero. Coasting along Etruria and the Gulf of Lyons, he disembarked at Emporiae and marched by land to Tarraco which he made his headquarters. He was met by deputations from friendly tribes to whom he replied with superb self-confidence, yet with perfect dignity and sincerity.¹ During the winter he visited some of these tribes themselves, doubtless winning their support as much by his ready sympathy as by his confidence, for he had come to Spain to conquer the Carthaginian, not the Spaniard. He inspected the winter quarters of the army, whom he congratulated for holding on to the province after two such terrible blows, and also for keeping the enemy south of the Ebro, which robbed them of the fruit of their victories and also protected the allies of Rome. Marcius he treated with such honour that it was quite obvious that Scipio had no fear of his reputation being dimmed by anybody. The winter was spent in preparing for the next year's campaign, while among the enemy, according to Livy's dramatic statement, "there was a foreboding, a vague sense of fear which was all the stronger because no reason could be given for it." "Scipio's appreciation," comments Capt. Liddell Hart, "of the moral factor and of the value of personal observation, two vital

¹ L. xxvi. 19: "ita elato ab ingenti virtutum suarum fiducia animo, ut nullum ferox verbum excideret."

elements in generalship, was shown in his earliest steps. Napoleon's jealousy of Moreau, his deliberate overshadowing of his own marshals, is in marked contrast with Scipio's attitude."¹

Thus Scipio spent the winter encouraging and re-organising his troops, trying to blend the varied elements into a homogeneous whole, strengthening his hold on the land north of the Ebro, and preparing for the offensive which he was planning for the next year. This was one of

¹ L. XXVI. 18-20. 6, on Scipio's landing in Spain, his organisation and preparations during the winter, no doubt derives mainly from Polybius who is not extant here. The similarity of Livy's next section on Spain (ch. 41 *sq.*) with Polybius is so great that we may suppose an indirect use of Polybius here also. Kahrstedt (p. 280) gives further reasons, e.g. the continued loyalty of the tribes north of the Ebro after the disaster of the Scipios is found in both Livy and Polybius (x. 7. 3). But, as in the preceding chapter on Nero, De Sanctis (p. 375 *sq.*) here recognises two strata in Livy. One, the late annalistic source, which places Nero's campaign south of the Ebro and from which derives Scipio's honouring of Marcius (20. 3). The other, perhaps Coelius or the Polybian annalist, which puts Nero to the north, is the better. Kahrstedt feels the difficulty of Livy when he says (1) that Marcius appears a greater hero and is correspondingly honoured by Scipio, which contradicts the course of events and the Polybian view; (2) that Livy sets aside the reason given by Polybius for Scipio's confidence (the dissension of the Carthaginian generals) and assigns it to trust in the support of the tribes north of the Ebro, i.e. to Marcius and his supporters. Yet Kahrstedt himself draws attention to P. x. 7. 3 where Polybius gives the other reason for Scipio's confidence as the loyalty of the natives. The contradiction may not be so strong. Scipio may have honoured Marcius, not indeed for his fictitious victory, but for his general conduct in holding the line with Cl. Nero; partly perhaps because he deserved it, partly with a moral aim, to inspire confidence in his subordinates and in the men who had been under them. The Roman annalists may have emphasised the incident too much, but why should we deny any merit in Marcius or generosity in Scipio? Further, even in Livy, implicitly if not explicitly, the attitude of the Carthaginian generals is the underlying cause of Scipio's confidence; for it was owing to their rapacious conduct that so many of the Spaniards were alienated and so Scipio could rely more on the native troops. In the main, we may accept Livy's account, while allowing for some non-Polybian, i.e. annalistic, exaggeration.

the most daring exploits accomplished in the whole Hannibalic War, a dash and surprise attack on the Carthaginian base in Spain, New Carthage (Cartagena). Its capture would naturally be of extreme value, for during the war it had proved of great service to the Carthaginians, and was a cause of great damage to the Romans. It was the only Spanish town with a harbour adequate for a fleet, and favourably situated for the Carthaginians to make the direct sea crossing from Africa. The Carthaginians kept the bulk of their money and war material in the city, as well as their hostages from the whole of Spain (P. x. 8).

How did Scipio come to form such a hazardous plan? The key to the situation was that none of the three Carthaginian armies was within ten days' march of New Carthage. They were acting on the defensive and had to spread rather than to concentrate their forces for many reasons. The general dissatisfaction and restlessness of the Spaniards forced the Carthaginians, who were victorious invaders in a foreign country, to display their strength widely, hold what they had, and subdue any sedition. Their grip on the natives was not yet strong enough to allow an assumption of loyalty; indeed it was chiefly maintained by the holding of hostages. And because Spain is a country where large armies starve, difficulties of commissariat and supplies would necessitate the spreading of their forces as widely as possible, while they would not want to throw the burden of supporting the three armies on any one district which was still loyal. In case of attack, though perhaps they scarcely anticipated a Roman offensive, their separation would protect more of the country from surprise. And, as each of the generals was out for his own good and at loggerheads with his colleagues, he would be glad to keep them at arm's length. So Hasdrubal Barca was in the centre of Spain in the territory of the Carpetani, the other Hasdrubal on the Atlantic coast by the mouth of the Tagus,

while Mago was not far from Gibraltar.¹ Each was ten

¹ According to P. x. 7. 5 "Mago was on this side of the Pillars of Hercules, in the country of the people called Κόνιοι; Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, was in Lusitania near the mouth of the Tagus; the other Hasdrubal was besieging a city in the territory of the Carpetani." The Κόνιοι are usually identified with the Cynetes, but this tribe lived outside the Pillars of Hercules near Cape St Vincent, and so either Polybius' geography or the identification is wrong. Brewitz (p. 56) suggests they are the Κούνιοι, against whom Galba marched from Carmona in 151 B.C. (App. *Ib.* 58). He points out that Galba would hardly march from the fertile neighbourhood of Seville to the south-west part of Spain, which is an unfruitful region, but that the Κούνιοι are more likely to be found on the lower course of the Baetis which is within the Pillars, as the term originally extended to Gades, and so it is in this neighbourhood that we must suppose Mago to have been. L., xxvi. 20. 6, places them differently: Hasdrubal Gisco is at Gades, Mago near Castulo, and Hasdrubal Barca near the Ebro in the neighbourhood of Saguntum. Apart from the fact that Saguntum is about 110 miles from the Ebro, the position is impossible, as Scipio could not have marched to New Carthage without coming into contact with Hasdrubal Barca. Kahrstedt (p. 280 n. 1) suggests Livy's source put Hasdrubal at Saguntum, i.e. on the route to New Carthage, merely to increase Scipio's difficulties. Jumperz, followed by Schulten (*Numantia*, I. p. 320 n. 6), alters Livy's Saguntum to Segontia, which makes it agree with Polybius; this is not necessary, as Livy was probably following a different source—the differences are too great to suppose merely a careless use of Polybius. Frantz (pp. 64 *sqq.*) ingeniously supposes that Livy's account refers to the position in the winter before Scipio's arrival, i.e. 211/10, and Polybius' to 210/9. This change in the Carthaginian winter quarters indicates a deliberate withdrawal from east to west. The offensive position of 210 was totally abandoned in 209, and the Carthaginians retired as far as possible into pro-Carthaginian territory. The reason was that they had determined to send Hasdrubal Barca to Italy and so must act on the defensive in Spain. This plan was upset by the capture of New Carthage, after which Scipio could penetrate further south. Appian (*Ib.* 24) finds four Carthaginian armies, the fourth consisting of Mago and 10,000 men at New Carthage, which is impossible. He correctly places Hasdrubal Barca among the Celtiberians (= Polybius); Hasdrubal Gisco is recruiting in the towns which were faithful, and Mago is in the neighbouring country also recruiting. Brewitz, assuming the only big and important towns are in Baetica, thinks Appian means Hasdrubal Gisco was on the lower Baetis, Mago on the upper. The exact position of the Carthaginian armies is not very important (though there is no reason to question Polybius) as long as their distance from New Carthage is recognised.

days' march from the base at New Carthage and badly out of position strategically. By analogy, if a wing three-quarters is too far from the touchline, no amount of support from his centres will help him; here the Carthaginians seem to have got into isolated positions.

The situation was in some respects similar to that of 1812, one of the most critical years of Napoleon's career. He was tired of guerilla warfare, which cut his long lines of communication, involved numerous troops and endangered any serious operations against the British. He decided to subjugate East Spain and Andalusia, but he failed because "he did not make sufficient provision for unity of command nor for ensuring concerted action among his jealous and subordinate generals, and he overlooked the possibility of an English offensive."¹ The result was that Wellington struck suddenly, captured Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, and followed up his success by defeating Marmont at Salamanca. In the same way the dissension of the Carthaginian generals opened the way for a Roman offensive.

Turning to Polybius' account of the reasons which led Scipio to decide to attack New Carthage, we find in a speech to his men the statement (x. 6. 3) that "the enemy are encamped far apart and have estranged all their allies by their tyrannical treatment. . . . (§ 5) But the chief point is that the enemy's commanders are quarrelling (στασιάζοντας) and are unwilling to engage us with their united forces, while if they attack us separately it will be easy to handle them." In 7. 1 we hear that Scipio had learnt, by careful enquiries at Rome, about the treachery of the Celtiberians and the separation of the Roman armies; so concluding that his father's defeat was due to these causes, he did not fear the Carthaginians. (§ 3) When later he heard that the allies on the Roman side of the Ebro remained friendly

¹ Sir John Fortescue, *Six British Soldiers*, p. 253.

and that the Carthaginian commanders were quarrelling and treating their subjects tyrannically, he felt full of confidence. On arriving in Spain he made enquiries about the position of the enemy and learnt that none was within ten days of New Carthage, in the position described above. (§§ 6–7) He thought then that if he decided to engage the enemy, it would be very dangerous to risk a battle with all three at once, both because his predecessors had been defeated and because the enemy were greatly superior in numbers, while if he made a dash at one of the three and upon his refusing battle found himself shut in somewhere by the other hostile forces coming up to help, he feared he might meet the same fate as his uncle and father. He therefore rejected any such course, and planned his attack on New Carthage.

Laqueur has pointed out the contradiction in the passage. In Chapter 6 he finds what he calls the *στάσις* motive of § 5 (the dissension of the Carthaginian commanders) opposed to the other two motives of § 3; and also in Chapter 7 the *στάσις* motive of § 3 contradicts §§ 6, 7, where it is assumed the Carthaginians will co-operate. Again, in the text of Polybius as it stands now, Scipio got information concerning the position of the Carthaginians when he entered Spain (7. 4) and then wintered there before crossing the Ebro. This is unlikely, as it was the momentary position of the Carthaginian armies which made an attack on New Carthage possible. If this plan was formed one year, Scipio could not count on it for the next year, because, for instance, in the interval Hasdrubal could have defeated the Carpetani and camped before New Carthage, and the other Carthaginian generals could have changed their positions and so upset Scipio's plan for the next year. Hence the information of 7. 5 on the position of the Carthaginians must refer to just before the attack on New Carthage. The difficulty is solved by supposing

6. 7 *b*—7. 4 *a* is a later addition, and then Scipio, according to Polybius' first view, made his plan south of the Ebro when it was possible to attack quickly before the Carthaginians moved, in fact when seven days' march from New Carthage—that is, Scipio crossed the Ebro without a definite plan, but with a general view of the strategic situation and of the feeling in Spain. He had probably hoped to attack one of the armies separately, but more accurate information showed that this would probably have no lasting results, and the enemy were too strong to be attacked collectively. Then, as an alternative plan, he thought of New Carthage, which was possible owing to the temporary position of the Carthaginians. After committing this view to paper, Polybius learnt from Laelius that Scipio had planned to attack New Carthage and even heard of the ebb there, while he was still in winter quarters. To make an agreement between these two conflicting views of his sources, Polybius let the news of the position of the enemy be gained a year earlier, when Scipio was north of the Ebro, not realising that, as it stands, 7. 5 has no strategic importance, if it is put in the previous year. But if it was in the winter that Scipio determined to attack New Carthage and if he crossed the Ebro with that object, he must have had some grounds for believing in the feasibility of his plan. The cause of this trust was found by Polybius, according to Laqueur, in Scipio's own letter from which he learnt of the real *στράσις* motive and concluded that it was because of the dissension, not because of any momentary position of the Carthaginians that Scipio could determine on his attempt.

Whether or not Laqueur is correct in his minute analysis of the strata of Polybius' work, he has undoubtedly stressed the right factor in the situation, the lack of co-operation between the enemies' commanders which enabled Scipio to risk a dash on New Carthage. It is not necessary to

suppose that the position of the three armies has been transposed from a later date, for Scipio may well have learnt they were in that position when he arrived in Spain, and hoped they would remain there (as they well might, if those were their winter quarters, as Livy says), and that he could anticipate their movements in the next spring; but he must have based this hope on their *στράσις*. Obviously they were all ten days' march from New Carthage when Scipio actually launched his attack and so his hopes were justified. It is idle to speculate as to what he would have done (for he must have faced the situation) if one of them moved, or if they patched up their quarrels before Scipio himself left his winter quarters or while he was actually moving. The fact remains that, when he did cross the Ebro, they were in the same places which they had occupied during the winter, and all were out of position.

Not only, however, were all the Carthaginian armies ten days' march from New Carthage, but the trained soldiers who garrisoned the city were only about 1000 strong, while the remaining population, though large, consisted mainly of artisans, tradesmen, and seafaring men, all with little military experience. Scipio knew also the position and plan of the town and its lagoon. In the event of failure he could, since he was master of the sea, withdraw his troops safely.¹ Such were, according to Polybius, Scipio's reasonable chances. Further, the command of the sea was indispensable to him not only in case of disaster, but as a means of securing communications with his base near the Ebro, of obtaining adequate commissariat and reinforcements if necessary, and of ensuring the arrival of his fleet at New Carthage at the same time as the army—a vital part of his plan. Negatively, it obviated any possibility of Carthage putting supplies into New Carthage by sea, if

¹ P. x. 8. 4-9.

by any chance the siege should be prolonged. The attack must be sudden and unexpected, if it was to succeed; this Scipio realised and took the precaution of keeping the whole plan secret, sharing it only with his friend Laelius, lest any rumours should leak through to the enemy or to the threatened city. Thus all was in his favour, while the value of New Carthage to the Romans was beyond doubt.

We do not know precisely what first turned Scipio's thoughts towards this city, though he had similar examples of daring before him. Even apart from the strategy of his house, he may have called to mind Hannibal's famous dash into Etruria in 217, when the Romans miscalculated his movements, and thus had their flank turned. But we may be sure that he acted from the cool determination which Polybius praises rather than as the result of any sudden idea, as the annalistic tradition implies. The chief factor in his decision must have been the realisation that he could never master Spain without a base towards the south. Some means was necessary to make any advance permanent. During the last few years of his father's and uncle's command, the situation had altered but little; a kind of ding-dong warfare was waged till they determined on an active offensive, which had failed partly because Saguntum was not far enough south to be an adequate base. Unless he was to work down the coast and secure a base, Scipio could never hope to subdue the interior. Besides, he could never really secure a firm hold on South Spain while the Carthaginians controlled the actions of the natives through their hostages. So realising the need and the possibility, what better base could Scipio look for than the enemy's?

It was a deliberate, if daring and brilliant plan. Scipio had every hope of success if he had the courage to make the attempt. Courage was undoubtedly needed to revert to his father's policy and carry it out with even greater vigour and daring. The home government, which had

elected him, knew the strategic aims of his house and probably expected him to follow them. But with the shadow of his father's death still before him, Scipio's daring is all the more remarkable—a daring which was not mere recklessness, but based on a calm realisation of the means and chances as well as of the value of the goal, needing the resolute determination of the general, and not least, of his men, whom he so remarkably inspired. He hoped to be able to storm the town with his 27,500 men quickly. The only danger was the arrival of a Carthaginian army before he could do so, which was, of course, impossible within ten days. Even if one did arrive before he succeeded, all was not lost, as none of the three Carthaginian armies can have numbered more than 20,000 men, and he might be able to hold off or defeat the one, and still take the town now weakened by ten days' siege. The greatest danger was that the Carthaginians might co-operate once more and two of their armies arrive; then would his chances have been small, none in fact, unless he could cover his men while they embarked. That was a risk and a great one, but it was unlikely to occur. Finally, let us hear Capt. Liddell Hart's comment (p. 42) on Scipio's strategy. "Those who exalt the main armed forces of the enemy as the primary objective are apt to lose sight of the fact that the destruction of these is only a means to an end, which is the subjugation of the hostile will. In many cases this means is essential—the only safe one, in fact; but in other cases the opportunity for a direct and secure blow at the enemy's base may offer itself, and of its possibility and value this master-stroke of Scipio's is an example which deserves the reflection of modern students of war."

Early in the spring of 209 Scipio ordered the allied contingents to muster at Tarraco. With 5000 of these he marched to the mouth of the Ebro, where he had ordered the legions to concentrate from their winter quarters and

where he also brought his fleet and transports. After pointing out¹ to his men the causes of his father's defeat and the disadvantages the Carthaginians were now suffering; and giving, according to Livy, a general and hopeful sketch of the Roman position in the whole war—how the courage of the Roman people was unshaken in defeat, the necessary precursor of victory—Scipio crossed the Ebro with 25,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry. He left M. Silanus with 3000 infantry and 500 cavalry to guard the line of the river and protect his rear and communications.² Thus

¹ The speech is in substance the same in Polybius (x. 6. 1-6) and Livy (xxvi. 41), though much expanded by the latter, in whose high-sounding rhetoric Brewitz sees the hand of Coelius.

² These numbers, except those of the allies, are given by both Polybius (6. 7 and 9. 6) and Livy (42. 1). This makes the total of the forces at Scipio's disposal in Spain, 31,000 men. Livy (41. 2), but not Polybius, mentions 5000 Spanish allies. Can they be included in the total or not? Scipio had brought to Spain 11,000 men (L. 19. 10); he had Nero's army, the remains of the armies of his father and uncle of 211, and any recruits who had been raised in the meantime. Kahrstedt (p. 290), who accepts 5000-6000 as the total of Nero's troops as against the absurdly high Livian figure of 13,100, deducts these, the 5000 allies and Scipio's 11,000 reinforcements (a total of 21,000-22,000) from the Polybian 31,000, thus getting 9000-10,000 for the remains of the army of 211 and any natives recruited since. If we reject the 5000 allies, the remains of the Scipios' army would be 14,000-15,000, i.e. of the 35,000 men who fought between half and one-third survived, which does not agree with the general tradition. The alternative is to suppose the survivors to be few, and that many natives were recruited after the disaster, which is improbable as the Roman cause would be weakened not strengthened in the eyes of the Spaniards. De Sanctis (p. 455 n. 21) accepts Livy's figure of 13,100 for Nero's force. By 209 these may have lost in battle or through illness one-tenth of their strength, Scipio's reinforcements one twenty-fifth. So together in 209 they would total 22,350 (= 11,790 + 10,560). This leaves roughly 8500 (31,000 - 22,350) for the remains of the old army who may have lost one-eighth of their strength since the defeat when they numbered 9600. Thus he reaches the same total as does Kahrstedt for the survivors of the disaster, but rejects the 5000 allies, because it is unlikely that the tribes beyond the Ebro could supply as many, and because the survivors of the disaster would then number 400-500, which is too small. But if the Livian figure for Nero's

Scipio started his march to New Carthage, revealing his plan to no one. Livy (ch. 42) describes a council of war after the crossing of the Ebro, in which some of his staff urged Scipio to attack the nearest of the Carthaginian armies, but he himself decided to march on New Carthage. This view, by which Scipio led out his army without being clear against whom he was leading them, is clearly untenable and contradicts the Polybian account by which Scipio formed his plan of campaign during the winter. Yet as that plan could only operate if the same conditions held during the spring as in the winter, Scipio's decision may well have been confirmed at this point. At the same time Scipio gave secret orders to Laelius, his only confidant, to sail with the fleet along the coast to New Carthage and synchronise his arrival there with that of the land army. The co-operation of the navy with the army proved excellent, and stands in strong relief against the lack of it and the ill-feeling shown between the two services in, for instance, the ill-fated expedition of 1741 against Cartagena's namesake on the Spanish Main. The land army also, after a rapid march, reached New Carthage, before the enemy could move.¹

reinforcements is reduced, we may, with Kahrstedt, accept the 5000 allies, while still keeping a reasonable figure for the survivors of 211. In this case Livy is following a good source, perhaps Polybius himself, and not a bad annalistic one. The question is not important as it is only the composition, not the total of Scipio's force which is questioned.

¹ On the seventh day according to Polybius (x. 9. 7) and Livy (42. 6). Polybius does not expressly give the starting-point but the context implies the Ebro, while Livy says "ab Hiberno." A march of this speed is very improbable. The distance from the Ebro to Cartagena is, according to Polybius (III. 39. 6), 2600 stades, i.e. about 324 miles. This distance is doubtless very accurate, although in a straight line it looks some 100 miles less. Actually the direct route to-day by rail from Tortosa to Cartagena (via Carcagente, Denia, and Alquerias) is 500 km. (312 miles). Such a distance would involve a march of 45 miles a day for the seven days without any rest day. If this is physically possible, it would mean that the army would arrive very seriously fatigued, which was to be avoided, as the attack must be

Scipio had reached his objective. We must now consider his capture of the town and the difficulties of Polybius' commenced at once. If a march be kept up for several consecutive days, 12-15 miles is a good average day's march, while 25-30 might be reckoned for a forced march; but 45 seems impossible. For instance, in the year 49 B.C. Caesar made a hurried march from Corfinium to Brundisium at the rate of 20 miles per day. In the same year Curio marched up country to the Bagradas at 22 miles a day (on the marching power of Roman troops, see Rice Holmes, *Roman Republic*, III. pp. 375 *sqq.*, 424 *sqq.*; Riepl. *Das Nachrichtenwesen*, pp. 129 *sqq.*; Kromayer-Veith, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung*, pp. 350 *sqq.*, 420 *sqq.*). Droysen (*Rhein. Mus.* xxx (1875), p. 62) raises three objections to Polybius' statement: (a) there was no proper road, (b) in the spring the rivers would be swollen, and (c) the army had to carry its own baggage and siege weapons. Probably there was a road as far as Saguntum; but its condition, especially if it went beyond this point, is an uncertain quantity. We know that the track was cut by five streams of considerable size, which would be swollen with melted snow, and cause some delay. But, as Brewitz suggests, as much as possible of the baggage and siege weapons would be carried by the fleet. Droysen suggests that the short time was reckoned to glorify Scipio, but Brewitz rejects this because such gross flattery, the improbability of which must be patent to all, would not have been trusted by a soldier and writer of the rank of Polybius. Two other methods of solution seem possible: (a) a textual corruption can be assumed, i.e. 17 should be read for 7; cf. Kahrstedt (p. 509 n. 1). In the conditions it seems unlikely the army could march, even *μετὰ σπουδῆς*, more than about 20 miles a day; this would involve a journey of 15 or 16 days, or with a day or so for rest, 17 days. De Sanctis (p. 465 n. 35) rejects this, because *δεκαταῖος καὶ ἑβδομαῖος* would be too barbarous a phrase. (b) We can assume Polybius did not mean 7 days from the Ebro. Appian (*Ib.* 20) says, "Scipio led his army out at sunset and marched the whole night towards New Carthage, arriving there the next morning...", which shows that, in the annalist whom Appian followed, the starting-point was certainly not the Ebro. Meyer reckons the 7 days from Saguntum, which is 140 miles from New Carthage, and which he believes the Romans held after 211, as otherwise we should have been told of its loss and recapture. Whether or not this *argumentum ex silentio* is valid, Polybius may have made some reference to the town, and the 7 days can be reckoned from here. De Sanctis suggests the Sucro, which is about 110 miles from New Carthage. Laqueur's theory of the composition of Polybius avoids the difficulty neatly, by supposing that in Polybius' first draft the decision to attack New Carthage was first formed when Scipio was marching south into Spain and was 7 days from New Carthage. It is perhaps better to suppose an error in the

narrative. These are bound up with the general problem of the historian's sources, reliability and judgment of Scipio's character. The account runs in outline as follows (x. 9. 5 *sqq.*):

On his arrival Scipio encamped on the isthmus to the east of the city (we may reject Polybius' false orientation),¹ throwing up earthworks on the outside of his camp but none on the town side, where the nature of the ground protected it or because he wished to intimidate the enemy and to leave freedom of movement for his own troops (Polybius' two alternative reasons). When the fleet arrived, Scipio addressed his troops, promising crowns to those who first scaled the walls, and saying Poseidon had promised his divine help in a dream. Next day, he encircled the city from the sea with his fleet, and drawing up his troops in battle array, attacked at the third hour of the morning. Ladder bearers were included, therefore clearly an assault was intended. As soon as Mago, the Carthaginian commander of the town, heard the Roman call to attack, he sent out a sortie. A sharp engagement ensued, but at last the Romans prevailed; the Carthaginians fled into the town and the Romans almost got through the time than in the distance, i.e. than in the starting-point. The start must have been made far north, as otherwise New Carthage would surely not have been left so unprotected. If Scipio had been near so would one of the Carthaginian generals. It was the suddenness with which Scipio pounced from a distance that paralysed the Carthaginians. Yet the time can hardly have been greatly exaggerated, for would Polybius have referred to it, if it had not been in some way exceptional? It is natural to decrease the time of a march to glorify a general, but such diminution must be within reason to be accepted by a Polybius. Nero's march up Italy to thwart Hasdrubal at Metaurus was traditionally exaggerated into 6 days for 240 miles (L. XXVIII. 9, 12)—an exaggeration probably originating from a confused memory of Nero's return with only a cavalry escort to the South (c. 200 miles) in 6 days; cf. De Sanctis, p. 570. Can the memory of some other movement of Scipio have confused Polybius or his source?

¹ On this and other numerous topographical questions, see Appendix I, "The Topography of New Carthage," pp. 289 *sqq.*, and Plan, p. 290.

gate with them. Failing this however, they set up their ladders and delivered a vigorous assault—"nothing could restrain their dash and fury,"—but without success. When his men were at last worn out, Scipio recalled them, for the day was already advanced. The town seemed saved. But Scipio, who was waiting for the fall of the tide, sent 500 men with ladders to a lagoon at the north of the town, and then began a new frontal attack on the walls. When the assault was at its height, the tide began to ebb, and all to whom it was unexpected thought it the work of a god. The frontal attack on the gate was continued with fresh courage, while the 500 men waded through the lagoon, reached and scaled the deserted walls, where the enemy was not expecting an attack. Sweeping along them till they reached the gate, they caught the Carthaginians in the rear and so the town fell.

This account presents serious difficulties. If Scipio had learnt the nature of the ebb while he was in winter quarters, as Polybius says, why did he not wait till it started before he commenced to attack? If he knew, that is, that the ebb did not take place till evening why did he attack in the early morning? Granting that one of the main objects of the frontal attack was to distract the enemy's attention and to allay any suspicion, why did Scipio deliver such a strong attack, which apparently caused him considerable loss, when he knew that if he waited the ebb would take place and he could effect the plan which he had formed? In other words, assuming he knew that the ebb took place in the evening, the strength of the morning attack is out of all proportion to the need. Another difficulty is presented by the attitude of Mago and the Carthaginians. Is it likely they would neglect the possibility of Scipio utilising the ebb? If fishermen at Tarraco could tell Scipio all about it, surely the Carthaginian commander would be only too conscious of its existence and of the

consequent exposure of the walls to the north of the town when it took place. Further, before the assault Scipio announced Poseidon's help—yet if the morning attack had succeeded (as it nearly did) the god's help would have been unnecessary and Scipio's prophecy unfulfilled.

Some such doubts as these have led modern scholars to question whether the ebb played quite the part which Polybius assigns to it in the capture of New Carthage, and whether Scipio counted on it as a critical part of his strategic plan. Ed. Meyer even considers that the ebb in Polybius' narrative is the rationalistic interpretation of a miraculous account. The logical conclusion of this theory is surely that the ebb must then be abolished as a historical fact, yet Meyer does not go as far as this. But such a theory would automatically solve the difficulties which Polybius' account raises. For if there was no ebb in which Scipio was trusting, the first difficulty of the strength of the morning attack is obviously eliminated. Meyer and Kahrstedt say that Scipio could not have reckoned on the ebb as strategically critical, but only used it to the full when it occurred, i.e. they recognise that Scipio hoped to take the town by pure storming, even if the ebb had not occurred, because he was not counting on it seriously. Obviously there is still more excuse for the strength of the attack if the ebb was never going to take place. The second difficulty of the carelessness of Mago and the inhabitants in overlooking the possibility of an attack from the north side when they must have known of this daily tidal ebb, and their inexplicable surprise at Scipio making use of it, is also solved if there was not a tide at all. But such a solution depends on Meyer's premises and before it can be accepted we must consider in more detail the growth of the account, when it will be seen that its foundations are too insecure to support such a theory.

Later there were current in Rome, as has been said,

various stories about Scipio, the chief tenor of which was to see in him a favourite of heaven, inspired by higher powers. How would this popular fiction treat Scipio's action at New Carthage? It would, as usual, stress his inspiration and favour from heaven. After describing how he reached the town and announced Poseidon's help, it would show his early fruitless attacks. When he is in an awkward position, the god interferes as promised, and causes the water to ebb in the lagoon, so that a rear attack on the town is possible. Thus Scipio's success is put down to luck, and to the intervention of heaven.

How would a rationalist treat this miraculous account? There must, he might think, be some basis for the story of the sinking of the waters, which, as the divine is rejected, must be some natural phenomenon, an ebb of the tide. Hence the glory of the exploit falls not to the gods and chance, but to Scipio and his careful plans. For obviously if there was an ebb, Scipio would get to know of it, and work it into his strategic plan; and so, we find the story of his early enquiries while still in winter quarters. The rationalist takes the popular miraculous account, assumes there must be a basis of fact behind it, and finds it in an ebb which is in fact as untrue as the divine element, but which is more acceptable to man's reason.

Now can something of this sort have happened in Polybius' account? If so, it is obviously due to himself or his chief source, Laelius. According to Ed. Meyer, Laelius was a Stoic rationalist who accepted popular stories about Scipio which he knew to be false and deliberately repeated them, after giving them a rational twist, *ad maiorem honorem Scipionis*. He clearly knew the real course of events at New Carthage, as he was present and shared Scipio's plans. Is it possible that later, when the divine story grew up and Laelius heard of it, he rationalised it and combined it with his own knowledge to

glorify his hero? This raises the question of what his own knowledge was, i.e. how was New Carthage taken, if the ebb is fictitious? It must have been due to the strength of Scipio's storming, and we may adopt Laqueur's view (excluding the part played by the ebb) that, after a preliminary skirmish which weakened the enemy, the severity of the attack on the walls, combined with the naval operations, which were much more important than Polybius makes out, forced the enemy to lengthen his front and thus to weaken it throughout. Instead of this simple storming, Laelius gives the rationalised version of a popular fiction, to glorify Scipio and to emphasise his strategy and calculation, instead of his inspiration and divinity. Scipio's whole portrait is altered to one more akin to the rationalistic Stoic's ideal of the man acting according to reason, spreading the belief in his own divinity though disbelieving it himself, to encourage his troops—a trickster not a semi-divine figure.

The alternative is that it was Polybius who rationalised the story. He learnt from Laelius both that Scipio had got information during the winter on the general topography of New Carthage (not necessarily the ebb) and also a general account of the capture by storming. Then he tried to combine this with the popular miraculous version, i.e. he rationalised the latter and worked it in with Laelius' account. Such a view is, of course, completely untenable, as then Polybius would be little better than the Greek historiographers whom he despised—no better, except that his account is reasonable and false, while theirs is irrational and false. He would never for a moment place a popular account against the weight of Laelius' view.

Can we then abolish the ebb and, while exculpating Polybius, accept the view that Laelius was a stupid perverter of the truth, who perverted merely to the greater honour of Scipio? Such a view is untenable for three

reasons. First, Laelius may have passed on anecdotes about Scipio's youth which are incorrect in detail, but this does not vitiate his value, as has been said, when he is dealing with military matters. Secondly, he was not a Stoic or a rationalist. Thirdly, it is inconceivable that the whole incident is without some basis of fact. If it is the rationalistic interpretation of a miraculous account, what of the latter? Could the whole incident have been invented to show Scipio's connection with the divine? But this is more emphasised if the ebb was a fact, and shown by the popular account to be the work of a god. In short if the ebb did not exist, how could the story have arisen?

The attempt to solve the difficulties by abolishing the ebb incident has only led to further difficulties, and will not square with the view taken of the sources. Apart from any consideration of Laelius' authority, it must be rejected on the strength of Scipio's letter. The authority of this must be final, and if Polybius says that in it Scipio "explained clearly that it was after making the calculations, which I have just recounted, that he undertook all his operations in Spain and especially the siege of New Carthage," and we remember that these calculations included his learning of the ebb while he was still in winter quarters, then we must accept the ebb as historic fact and seek to explain the difficulties by other means.

If the ebb must be accepted as a fact, what explanation of the difficulties can be offered? Laqueur suggests that the strength of the attack was over-emphasised by Polybius' source, who actually took part in the storming of the walls; and that Scipio wanted an early skirmish on ground favourable to himself, which would weaken the enemy by casualties—they were short of men already—and might mean the fall of the town through his men being able to force their way in with the fleeing Carthaginians. This, of course, rests on Laqueur's view of Polybius'

sources. There is another possible explanation, namely, that it was the Carthaginians who really took the offensive. Scipio would draw up his men outside the camp, in case the ebb might occur any time (yet, why did he not take the trouble to learn the exact time?). "As soon as he gave the signal to attack," says Polybius, "Mago issued from the gate." But perhaps this is a reversal of the truth; actually it may have been Mago who took the offensive, and when once Scipio was involved in a battle he decided to throw all his strength against the town in the hope of storming it. That is, though not intending to fight till just before the ebb started, he was forced to give battle and so continued to allay suspicion. When there was no sign of the ebb, and the attempt to storm did not succeed, Scipio called the retreat. It was derogatory to Scipio's dignity that it should be Mago who started the offensive, and so Laelius, in repeating the story to Polybius, would naturally assign the offensive to Scipio. But it is unlikely *per se* that Mago would take the offensive against troops drawn up on a strong hill. His sortie was a desperate venture, when the Romans were advancing to battle. Such a theory, built to preserve Polybius' literal statement that the ebb occurred daily, may explain one difficulty, but it cannot explain all. The second difficulty of Mago's negligence may be explained, because it may not have been voluntary, but he may have been forced by circumstances. He must have thought of the ebb, but could not spare men to post them there all the time, relying on the strength of the position except at low tide. He may have intended to send a detachment at the critical moment, but did not do so in time. This is supported by Polybius' remark that although the escalading party "occupied the wall without striking a blow...they marched along it sweeping the enemy off it." May "the enemy" have been some men sent by Mago too late? Alternatively we may suppose

Mago to have been very incompetent, and that neither he nor any of the inhabitants thought of the possibility of an attack through the lagoon; yet this seems hardly credible if Scipio could learn about it even at Tarraco. Or, the speed with which Scipio acted may have confused Mago, who would have his hands too full to worry about every possibility. But these sound more like excuses than explanations.

If, however, we examine the nature of the ebb tide more closely, perhaps some explanation will be found. According to Polybius, Scipio learnt that "the whole lagoon was shallow and in most parts fordable, and that usually the water in it receded every day towards evening." We also hear that "when the tide began to ebb, and the water gradually receded from the edge of the lagoon, a strong and deep current set in through the channel to the neighbouring sea." It seems to be generally assumed that this was a regular daily tidal ebb. Polybius says it occurred every evening; this is, according to Meyer, because he falsely generalised the time which was correct for the decisive day, but which must alter on other days. This is, of course, possible. For, although the Mediterranean is often said to be tideless, this like most generalisations is only partly true, as the cases of Venice and Tarentum show. Whether there was a tide at New Carthage is purely a matter of conjecture, but a matter of fact, if we accept Polybius at his face value with this slight correction. Yet this does not help to solve our difficulties, because if it was regular, why could not Scipio count on it, and why did not the inhabitants fear attack from that quarter? The other alternative is that it was not a regular tidal action but an irregular one, something extraordinary. If so, what was its nature? Was it due to some exceptional wind, which may have blown at certain times of the year and of which Scipio may have learnt? Livy says that a strong northerly wind, which had sprung up, was driving the falling tide

in the same direction, i.e. seaward.¹ His source for this is quite probably reliable (see p. 85). We have the well-known Old Testament parallel for this in the story of the Israelites crossing the Red Sea.² "And the Lord caused the sea to go back by a strong east wind all the night, and made the sea dry land, and the waters were divided" (Exodus xiv. 21). "The fact of the passage of the Red Sea," says Dr Driver, "can be questioned only by an extreme and baseless scepticism." Other parallels are given by J. Rendel Harris (*Dict. of Bible*, i. 802), "The action of wind upon shallow waters has been constantly the cause of phenomenal effects which are not far removed from the miraculous statements in Exodus. E.g. the Russians in 1738 entered the Crimea, which was strongly fortified against them by the Turks, at the Isthmus of Perekop, by a passage made for them by the wind through the shallow waters of the Putrid Sea at the north-west corner of the Sea of Azov. And Major-General Tulloch has recorded an instance even more to the point when, as he himself observed, under a strong east wind the waters of Lake Menzaleh at the entrance of the Suez Canal receded for a distance of seven miles (*Journal of Victoria Institute*, xxviii. p. 267). Other instances of the same effect which would have been counted miraculous if they had been biblical may be found in a paper by Naville (*Journal of Victoria Institute*, xxvi. p. 12)." For instance, we are told that a book, *Le Fardelet hystorial*, was "printed in Geneva in 1495, in which year there was such a very strong wind on the ninth day of January that it drove back the

¹ If it is assumed that Livy's source followed a false orientation like Polybius, it would be an east wind. This however makes but little difference, as either of these winds would tend to force the water out of the lagoon.

² How, in the three later versions of the story, the miraculous element has grown round the early story of the wind as the natural cause, is shown by Prof. J. E. M'Fadyen in the *Hibbert Journal*, July 1923, pp. 743 *sqq.*

Rhone into the lake as much as one fourth of a league above Geneva, and it looked like a wall of water, and it lasted nearly an hour before the water could flow." And again "on the Nineteenth of January 1645, owing to a very strong wind, between seven and ten in the morning, the inhabitants could go down on dry ground between the bridges and pass from one bank to the other."¹ Or to take an example from ancient history, one which Josephus (II. 16. 5) compared to the Red Sea episode; when Alexander was in Pamphylia and wished to get past the cliffs of Mount Climax which came down to the sea, he learnt that it was only possible to go by the beach when a north wind was blowing, and quite impossible with a south wind. The wind, which had been blowing south, changed at the critical moment and he got through quickly, although his men had to wade. This change of wind was naturally regarded as a sign of divine favour. Similarly, the exceptional lowness of the water, when Cyrus wanted to cross the Euphrates, was taken as a sign of divine favour.² Finally, there is the evidence of modern conditions. There are tides on the south coast of Spain, but not apparently at Cartagena. But what is of equal, or more, importance is that near Cartagena the north or north-east winds can lower the level of the water by one to one and a half feet.³

¹ Such occurrences are not uncommon. "The Lake of Geneva is subject to arbitrary fluctuations of level known as *Seiches*...these are apparently caused by sudden changes in the wind and atmospheric pressure. The longitudinal seiches have lasted as long as 1½ hr. and reached a height of 6 ft." Muirhead's *Switzerland*, p. 58.

² Cf. *C.A.H.* VI. p. 364 and p. 6.

³ See the *Mediterranean Pilot*, I. 6th ed.: In the Western Mediterranean, "the sea level varies with the direction of the wind, and is much influenced thereby. The water rises with west winds and falls with east winds, the greatest difference due to these causes being two and a half feet. These rising and falling movements often precede the coming of the wind" (p. 22). At Cartagena, "with westerly and south-westerly winds, heavy squalls rush down from the hills which

Such *καταιγίδες* are common in the Mediterranean on coasts facing south or south-west, as is seen in Dalmatia, the Euripus and Cilicia. This then is a possible explanation, resting on conditions which prevail to-day and on Livy's authority which will be discussed below; and such an incident would be far from unique.

Again, the ebb may have been caused by some volcanic action. Changes in the level of the water, due to volcanic disturbances, are seen, for instance, at Baiae, where, owing to the subsidence of the ground, many of the ruins of the ancient town now extend some distance beneath the sea. There would then be a close parallel in the incident recorded by Herodotus of Artabazus' blockade of Potidaea; after a three months' siege there was an unusual ebb of the tide which lasted a long while. The Persian troops pushed across into Pallene, but were late starting and so only two-thirds had got across when the sea returned. The Persians assigned the cause to the profanation of the temple and image of Poseidon, but the real cause was a volcanic disturbance.¹

border the western and southern sides of the basin" of the harbour (p. 68). "There are no tides in Cartagena harbour but with winds from south to south-west the level rises from one to one and a half feet and north to north-east winds have a contrary effect" (p. 69). Strachan-Davidson (p. 635) comments: "the presence of the wind would act not only in forcing the waters of the lake towards the harbour, but in sweeping out the waters of the Bay to seawards, thus causing temporary depression of level in the harbour itself."

¹ Hdt. VIII. 129. The incident is accepted without hesitation by modern historians, e.g. Munro in *C.A.H.* IV, p. 316 and Grundy, *The Great Persian War*, p. 430. The latter merely comments that it was due to one of those volcanic disturbances for which the Aegean has been ever noted. But even in face of the explicit reference to the wind in the story of the crossing of the Red Sea, an eminent Old Testament scholar, H. Gressmann, maintains (*Mose und seine Zeit*, pp. 109 sqq.) that volcanic action was responsible for the crossing, as well as for the account of the pillar of cloud and pillar of fire; he quotes further examples of the effect of volcanic action on the sea. This theory, however, has been rejected by Kittel (*Geschichte des Volkes Israel* I⁶, p. 310) because of its topographical implications.

But such an explanation, which lacks specific literary support, is less likely than the wind-theory, though, of course, they are not mutually exclusive.

Thus the ebb may have been a phenomenon, a happy coincidence, an example of *Τύχη* or Divine Providence, according as the individual interpreter reads the meaning of history. Scipio may have learnt that some disturbance occurred occasionally, due to squalls or less likely to volcanic action; he could not, of course, count on it, but when by a curious coincidence it took place, he used it to the full. Polybius, the rationalist, would tend to under-emphasise the *τύχη* element of the incident, and has perhaps made a false generalisation not of the time or day of the phenomenon, as Meyer suggests, but of its regularity. Further, the wind would not have to be of much strength, as Scipio already knew, according to Polybius, that "the lagoon was shallow and in most parts fordable"—a sentence of which perhaps the real importance has not been stressed in modern discussions of the problem. If the tide was regular, the difficulties of the whole account remain, unless we can suppose that Scipio had not precise information as to what time of the day it would take place, and so could not count on it. But this is unlikely, because he had arrived there the previous day and could have observed it; or even if he had not, one would have expected him to send on scouts to get the information, if it was to be a vital part of his strategic plan. Thus we must suppose the sinking of the waters to have been due to some exceptional cause; in which circumstance, of course, the story of divine intervention would receive far greater support.

But even so, the statement that Scipio hoped to send a detachment through the lagoon need not be rejected. Not necessarily because he was hoping a wind might arise to make this possible—that is merely subsidiary—but because of the plain statement of Polybius (x. 8. 7), which, as was

said, has been overlooked—"the lagoon was shallow and in most parts fordable" (*βατὴ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον*). Scipio learnt this when he was in winter quarters, and formed the idea of sending a detachment through the shallow lagoon. He also knew, if the above hypothesis is correct, that a wind did blow occasionally, which made the level of the lake sink even lower. Thus an attack from the lagoon side of the town was probably included in his plans, though it could not be reckoned on as critical. When he reached the town and commenced the siege, he detached 500 men, with ladders, in the hope that they might be able to wade through, when the attack was at its height. This was helped by the occurrence of what he had hardly dared to expect. Such a coincidence as this would easily lead to the growth of the idea of a divine intervention. At a moment when all seemed doubtful, something happened which most of the troops would not understand clearly. They would only know that a wading detachment had received some obscure help, which led to the fall of the town. In the camp talk, in an atmosphere of mystery, the event began to be distorted, and the belief that Scipio was a favourite of the gods was born.

We may, with Meyer, reject Polybius' statement that before the attack Scipio announced his dream and Poseidon's promised help, as being part of the popular tradition taken over by Polybius in his desire to emphasise Scipio's calculation and methods of inspiring his men. But as in Livy's narrative the promise is given just before the actual fording of the lake (see below, p. 84 n. 1), the announcement may go back to his original source, Silenus, and so be reliable. In that case Polybius will have put it earlier to emphasise Scipio's calculation—according to this arrangement the expectation of an ebb is implied, whereas in the earlier arrangement they were only simple words of encouragement before the fording of the shallow lagoon.

The promise therefore may be retained as a last-minute exhortation, or it must be rejected if it is put earlier, unless we can believe in a Scipio "lifted so high on his consciousness of himself" (as Prof. Conway translates Aulus Gellius' "conscientia sui subnixus") that he had some real hope and mystical belief that something would occur to help him—an inspired figure like the prophets of old.

Polybius' account also raises two smaller contradictions. In 9. 7 it is said that Scipio defended the outside of his camp by a palisade and double trench, stretching from sea to sea, but erected no defences on the side facing the town, where the nature of the ground sufficiently secured his position. In 11. 2 "the intervening space, which connects the city with the mainland and which lay in the middle of his camp, was also left untrenched by Scipio either to intimidate the enemy or to adapt it to his own particular purpose, so that there should be no impediment to sorties from his camp and subsequent retirement into it." Laqueur assigns the latter to Polybius' first draft, and the former to the Laelian stratum. But these statements may be taken as complementary, as they are not mutually exclusive. The Castillo de los Moros did not need much artificial defence.

The second contradiction raised by Laqueur is more serious. We may dismiss his objection that the existence of 1000 μάχιμοι in New Carthage contradicts the fact that the Carthaginian army was divided into three sections (7. 4-5); this is too fine a distinction, as surely a comparatively small garrison would not be reckoned as a fourth part of the army. But in 12. 2 we are told Mago placed half of these 1000 soldiers on the Citadel Hill, half on the East Hill. "As for the rest, he armed two thousand of the strongest with such arms as were to be found in the town" (perhaps even the spoils and votive offerings in the temples were used, as after Cannae) "and posted them

near the gate leading to the isthmus and the enemy's camp; the others he ordered to do their best to defend the whole of the wall." But the Citadel and East Hill (actually the South Hill) are central and not vital for the defence of the walls; in fact, when Mago saw the town in the hands of the Romans, he soon realised the impossibility of defending the citadel (15. 7). Mago is thus thought capable of putting his really useful Carthaginian troops where they could be of no use. But in 12. 8 Polybius says the battle at the isthmus was hotly contested "as both sides had picked out their best men." Laqueur concludes from this that 8. 4-5 and 12. 2 must be later additions.

This deduction regarding the strata of Polybius' work is not necessary. Mago may have put 500 men on Mount Concepcion and 500 on Mount Molinete, because they were usually quartered there; and Polybius may have erroneously conveyed the impression that they were sent there, instead of that they happened to be there, as his source implied. For Mago would naturally live on Mount Molinete in the palace built by Hasdrubal, and would keep half of his best troops there as a bodyguard; he might also station the other half on the most important and largest hill of the town, Concepcion. Perhaps he sent out the inferior troops first, and the 1000 μάχιμοι made up the "reinforcements" in 12. 6, so that the best troops were ultimately engaged on both sides, as Polybius says in 12. 8. Alternatively, we may imagine that as the city was encircled from the sea by the Roman fleet, Mago sent some troops to hold the two most important hills on the sea side of the town, but, finding they were more necessary at the isthmus, he withdrew them for the land battle. The distances in Cartagena are short, and a body of men could be hurried very quickly from one point to another. If the best troops occupied these two hills in the early part of the day, they cannot have been retained there during the whole of the siege.

Do the other sources throw any light on the difficulties of Polybius' narrative? Livy's account of the capture of New Carthage corresponds in the main with that of Polybius, sometimes even verbally. There can be no doubt that he used Polybius; the only doubt is whether he used him directly or not. It is generally agreed that Livy's divergences and additions show that another author has been used, whose tradition is good, and who may have been used by Polybius himself—namely Silenus—and that Livy's account is based on Polybius mixed with Silenus, and that this synthesis was due not to Livy himself but to a middle source—Coelius. These divergences are in the main unimportant.¹

¹ The minor differences in the two descriptions are as follows: the promise of Poseidon's help is put by Polybius (11. 7) before the general attack, by Livy (ch. 45) before the crossing of the lagoon. Scipio's speech before the attack (ch. 43), which is a shorter repetition of the Ebro speech (ch. 42), is only hinted at in Polybius (11. 5). The hill on which Scipio camped is named Mercury Hill by Livy (44. 6), while Polybius describes it only by *ὑπερδεξιούς τόπους*. Livy says (44. 4) that in the first engagement the Romans would in all probability have burst into the city with the fugitives if the retreat had not been sounded; Polybius (12. 11) only says that they nearly succeeded in entering. In Livy two retreats are sounded (44. 4 and 45. 4), once when the Romans would have burst in with the fugitives had it not sounded, and secondly when the escalating attack was failing; in Polybius there is one signal (13. 11). We can dismiss Livy's first signal, with Kahrstedt, as due to a misunderstanding or carelessness on Livy's part. Scipio's information on the lagoon of New Carthage was obtained, according to Polybius (8. 7), when he was in Tarraco, from some fishermen who plied their craft there; Livy (45. 7) does not refer to the information which Scipio got from the fishermen of Tarraco, until he is about to describe the ebb during the actual attack. Kahrstedt suggests that it was Polybius who altered the position from his original source, rather than that Livy altered the position of the event when it was in its correct position chronologically. Meyer thinks that behind Livy's version was originally one which did not include the previous enquiry, but according to which Scipio first learnt of the ebb when it took place (cf. Appian); and that in this is inserted a statement borrowed from Polybius that Scipio had already learnt of it and awaited the event. "The changing of Polybius' *ἀλιεῖς τινες* to 'piscatores Tarraconenses' with the suggestion of the manner how they knew

But there are two serious differences, the action of the wind and of the fleet. In Livy (45. 8), as has been said above, we hear of a north wind which, suddenly springing up, helped the ebb. This is not mentioned by Polybius, but it cannot be lightly dismissed, with Kahrstedt, as an invention to show Scipio's luck, and as no real addition. De Sanctis (p. 373) says it cannot be resolved into a rhetorical bloom of Livy or of another annalist, because the observation on the effect of that wind on the lake is from one who knew the topography of Cartagena well. Is the wind then to be rejected because Polybius does not mention it? But Polybius got his information from autopsy, from Scipio's letter, and from Laelius. The first source is obviously not reliable in the case of the ebb, for he falsely said it occurred every evening, which is impossible if it was a tidal ebb. Scipio, in his letter to Philip, may not have gone into details, but merely referred to such an ebb without giving its cause. Laelius, as we have seen, may have believed in some kind of supernatural occurrence, and not realised the action of the wind, or if he did mention it to Polybius, the latter's rationalism might reject such an example of *τύχη*. As the Scipionic Legend sought to find parallels between Scipio and Alexander, it might be argued that the reference to the wind is merely the assigning to Scipio of the similar occurrence to Alexander in Pamphylia. But this is very improbable, especially in

about the lagoon, is hardly historical, and borrowed from Polybius' source; for it is unlikely that fishermen from Tarraco would hang about New Carthage, and have exact knowledge of the situation there in the tenth year of the war; Polybius would perhaps have thought of prisoners or deserters, as they come and go between hostile neighbourhoods at all times." Livy's additional remark (46. 2) that the north side of the town had not been fortified because it was considered to be sufficiently protected by the lake and the nature of the ground, is not in Polybius. Finally, in Livy (ch. 46), after the capture of the town the Romans marched in close order to the market place and divided there; in Polybius (ch. 15), Scipio goes straight against the citadel.

face of the evidence of the winds prevalent at Cartagena to-day. So it is not impossible that the wind may have played a part, the importance of which is not found in Polybius, but was preserved by Silenus and Livy.

The same appears true of the action of the fleet. Polybius (12. 1) says: "encircling the city from the sea by ships furnished with all kinds of missiles under the command of Laelius...he began the assault about the third hour." Livy (chs. 43, 44) says that, after encamping, Scipio "drew up the ships in the harbour as though he were going to blockade the place by sea." He then was rowed round the fleet, advising the captains to keep a careful look-out by night. Next day, during the storming of the walls, "the ships commenced an attack upon that part of the city which faced the sea. Here, however, there was too much noise and confusion to admit of a regular assault." Kahrstedt (p. 290) derives this from Polybius' source, saying that it cannot be inserted from another source, as it continues the use of the fleet, which had been followed hitherto alike by Polybius and Livy. It is less probable that the original source let the fleet start and then do nothing, than that Polybius, who always put the figure of the great Scipio in the centre, left out the subordinate part of the scene in which the great man himself was not active. De Sanctis (p. 373) also assigns this part to Silenus. But even if it comes from an annalistic source (as Meyer thinks, owing to its similarity to Appian, *Ib.* 20), its reliability and importance is corroborated by the story of the rivalry for the *corona muralis* (L. ch. 48).¹ Livy tells how the *corona muralis* was awarded to him who first scaled the wall; that two claimants came forward, a centurion, Q.

¹ The reliability of this story has been strengthened, if not established, by Münzer's emphasis on the friendly relationship of Scipio to Sextus Digitius throughout his career (see *Röm. Adelsparteien*, pp. 92 sqq.).

Tiberilius, and Sextus Digitius, one of the marines. This led to a dispute and open mutiny, so it was decided to appoint three men to arbitrate; confusion still continued till Scipio judiciously decided to award one crown to each. Also Laelius, the commander of the fleet, was singled out for special distinction by Scipio. Both these facts indicate that Livy or his source thought that the fleet played an important part in the capture of the town. It is curious that it should be Livy rather than Polybius who stressed the importance of the fleet, considering Laelius himself was one of Polybius' sources and, as far as we can see, was not the man to hide his light under a bushel, for he is the only officer of whom we hear much in Polybius' account. Perhaps he was not actually in command of the fleet, and the tradition of Livy (ch. 49) which names M. Junius Silanus is correct, and Laelius held a more important position as Scipio's right-hand man, and was sent to supervise any department, as Laqueur suggests. Polybius, notwithstanding the personal influence of Laelius, has determined to keep his hero in the centre of the canvas, and so has not given the fleet its due.¹

¹ The other authorities give little fresh information. In Dio (57. 42, 43; Zon. ix. 8) the military side is dealt with very briefly. He follows Livy closely, keeping Polybian matter in the background and emphasising the non-Polybian episodes of the quarrel for the crown and the anecdote of Aluccius, which are probably Coelian. He doubtless had access to Coelius direct, for he gives the correct date of 209, not Livy's erroneous one. Appian (*Ib.* 19 *sqq.*) diverges completely from the Livian account. For the annalist whom he follows does not agree with Coelius; yet it was not Valerius Antias, because the latter names the Carthaginian commander Arines (cf. L. 49. 5), while Appian correctly names him Mago. Kahrstedt calls Appian's account of New Carthage "extraordinarily foolish," but Brewitz prefers to see in it the childlike naïveté of the older or middle annalist, which is still unspoilt by Coelius' phrases and Antias' unmeaning exaggerations. The episode is worked up in a very superficial manner, being full of noise and shouts and Scipio's personal exploits (Brewitz points out fifteen words referring to noise), while the real meaning of the events and Scipio's skill is not perceived. The surprise through the lagoon

We must now revert to the storming of the town. On arriving at New Carthage, Scipio encamped on the isthmus in the east, his lines stretching from the sea on the south, over the Castillo de los Moros to the lagoon in the north, thus effectively blocking the connection of New Carthage with the mainland. He protected the outer side, i.e. the east, with a palisade and double trench, reaching right across the neck of land, in view of the possibility of the arrival of one of the three Carthaginian armies. The side facing the town was left unprotected, because the position on the hill was quite strong enough in itself, and it would leave greater tactical freedom. The fleet under Laelius arrived at the right time, and after drawing it up as if to blockade the town by sea, and reviewing it, Scipio addressed his troops, inspiring his men with the self-confidence and courage which he so obviously felt. He also promised golden crowns to those who should be the first to mount the walls, and the usual rewards for conspicuous courage.

The next day, encircling the city from the sea with ships furnished with all kinds of missiles, round from the south of his camp to the bridge in the west (now the Puerta de Murcia), Scipio drew up his men outside the camp at the third hour of the morning. It is clear that he did not launch a strong attack at first, because if he had wished to storm the town he would have tried a surprise attack earlier. Actually he tried to provoke the Carthaginians to a sortie, which if successful would mean a fight on ground favourable to himself; considerable loss to the already numerically small garrison; while he might even force his way into the town with the fugitives. He may also have hoped to draw the best Carthaginian troops from their position on the hills, which would then be exposed to

is thought to be a sudden inspiration of Scipio, not a deliberate plan, as is the burning of the enemy's camps in Africa in 203. The Legend has triumphed over rationalism.

attack by his fleet. It is clear that he did not wish to take the offensive, as is shown by Laqueur, who further points out that this move was a preliminary to the second and more important part of Scipio's plan, namely a regular assault with all his strength. The preliminary move cannot have been a vital part of Scipio's plan, as it was very doubtful whether Mago would attack, and whether Scipio could force his way in, if he succeeded in beating the Carthaginians back. However, Mago fell into the trap, and we can only wonder at his folly, and by what hopes he was inspired. As soon as Scipio's troops were drawn up and appeared about to attack, Mago sent out his 2000 armed citizens from the gate by the isthmus, "feeling sure", according to Polybius, "of striking terror into the enemy and entirely defeating their design." Surely a forlorn hope when we consider Scipio's 27,000 men! Mago then sent out as reinforcements his 1000 regular troops, who were posted on the hills Molinete and Concepcion (which respectively protected the lagoon and overlooked the sea), but whom he now thought were more necessary for the land battle. So Scipio's object of drawing these troops off from that side of the town was accomplished. But the engagement was unequal. For Carthaginian support had to come through a single gate a quarter of a mile away and then attack on unfavourable ground and uphill,¹ while the Roman supplies were immense and at hand. "Yet the battle was hotly contested as both sides had picked out their best men"—so we must assume Mago's regular troops were engaged. At last, the Carthaginians were forced back by sheer weight, receiving many casualties in the actual fight and retreat, while many more of them were trodden down in the rush through the gate. The Romans very nearly forced their way in with the fugitives, but not

¹ The two stades, P. x. 12. 6, show the battle was fought practically on the slopes of the Castillo de los Moros.

quite. Thus Scipio's hopes had been more than justified, though not of course completely successful. He had seriously weakened the enemy's strength and morale. As he had now been drawn into battle, Scipio tried to convert his partial success into victory, and turned to the second more serious part of his plan, namely an assault on the walls from as many sides as possible. He wisely consulted his own safety by having three men with him carrying large shields to protect him, knowing well the value of his leadership. He kept on the higher ground where he could see to direct operations, and where he could pass along his lines to inspire his men, rather than risk all by dashing into the thick of the battle.

Then the real storming started. The fleet beleaguered the town from the south, while Polybius (ch. 13) gives a vivid picture of how detachment after detachment was hurled against the walls facing the isthmus, until, as the hour was advanced, Scipio recalled his wearied troops. Laqueur, assuming Scipio could count on the ebb to take place later, thinks this description to be exaggerated and to apply only to the later assault, and that Polybius got his information from a man who took part in the storming and who did not know the real meaning of the events. But as Scipio could not count on the ebb, the assault was probably made with all his strength and had failed. He had spent the greater part of a day now, without success. After allowing his men to rest awhile, he distributed still more ladders, and recommenced the assault with such energy that "the whole extent of the wall was covered with escaladers." The defenders, who had hoped the danger was averted for the time and were short of ammunition, were thrown into confusion. At the same time the wading detachment prepared to start through the shallow lagoon on a desperate adventure, to try to retrieve the fortunes of the day. Suddenly as the sun began to decline, a squall from

the north sprang up which forced the water from the lagoon to the sea. Scipio, who had learnt in Tarraco of the possibility of such a wind, was less surprised than the men who were about to start through the lagoon; in his extraordinary confidence and exultation of spirit, he may even have anticipated some such external help, like the prophets of old. "And the Lord said unto Moses, Lift thou up thy rod, and stretch out thine hand over the sea, and divide it: and the children of Israel shall go into the midst of the sea on dry ground. And Moses stretched out his hand over the sea; and the Lord caused the sea to go back by a strong east wind all the night, and made the sea dry land, and the waters were divided" (Exodus xiv. 15, 16, 21). To the fearful, Scipio proclaimed it as the work of Poseidon, who had promised his help in a dream, thus allaying any superstitious terror. Astonished and inspired, the 500 men raced with their ladders through the sinking waters of the lagoon. At the same time Scipio urged the frontal attack still more strongly, to divert the enemy's attention away from the lagoon to the gate, where the Romans redoubled their efforts. The wading party soon reached the wall through the now shallow water, and ascended the deserted battlements, probably between Mount Molinete and Mount Sacro.¹ Mago was in a desperate situation; his front was now widened still further. He was attacked on all sides, on the south by the Roman fleet, on the east by the even more vigorous assaults of the enemy's main force, and lastly by this new danger from the north. With few troops originally, and these now weakened by casualties, he could do little. The Roman escalading party swept along the north wall and, reaching the gate, attacked the enemy in the rear, and thus were able to cut through the bolts, so that those outside could force their way in.

¹ See topographical note, pp. 298 *sq.*

At this moment the whole defence was crumbling up. The escaladers at the isthmus were establishing themselves on the battlements, and men from the fleet were scaling the walls on the south. So the city fell. Those who defended the southern hill, Concepcion, were dislodged, and a massacre began. Scipio went with 1000 men to the citadel (Mount Molinete) against Mago, who surrendered after an attempted resistance. Then the massacre stopped and pillaging began. At nightfall some slept in the camp, Scipio bivouacked on the citadel, doubtless in Hasdrubal's palace, with his 1000 men, while the pillagers were ordered to collect the booty in the market place and sleep there; the light-armed troops were withdrawn from the camp, and stationed on Mount Concepcion.

On the next day, the booty was divided among the troops in the regular Roman fashion. Of the 10,000 prisoners, the citizens with their wives and children were dismissed to their homes, and received complete freedom; these would be, in the main, Carthaginian colonists with a mixture of native Spaniards.¹ The 2000 workmen, mostly Spaniards, were made public slaves of Rome, but were promised their freedom, if they were diligent in their work, when Rome won the war. Scipio incorporated in his fleet the strongest of the rest (Carthaginians, Libyans and Spaniards) and thus manned eighteen captured vessels, almost doubling the crew of each ship; he now had a fleet of fifty-three ships. He promised these men also their freedom on the final defeat of Carthage if they did their duty. He committed Mago and the leading Carthaginians to the care of Laelius, and treated the 300 Spanish hostages with the greatest courtesy, assuring them of their safety and their restoration, if their tribes would become allies of Rome. He gave presents to the children, we are told, and Polybius further repeats two anecdotes to illustrate his

¹ Cf. Kahrstedt, p. 511.

humaneness. At the request of the wife of Mandonius, brother of Indibilis, king of the Ilergetes, Scipio was made to realise the dangers with which the beautiful young hostages were threatened in the captured city. So "grasping her by the right hand he bade her and the rest be of good cheer, for he would look after them as if they were his own sisters and children." Again, when some young Romans brought a very beautiful girl to Scipio, knowing he was φιλογύνης, he showed himself a pattern of moderation by giving her back to her father. Livy tells the story at far greater length, and weaves into it the love story of the young girl and a young Spanish prince, Aluccius by name.¹ These stories, invented to illustrate Scipio's character, perhaps by Laelius or Ennius, probably give a true picture of Scipio's policy and treatment of his prisoners. "A false anecdote may be good history"! What a difference between Scipio and Marcellus and Fabius, as Kahrstedt points out, not only in their tactics but also in their use of victory!

Beside this great accession to his strength, there fell into Scipio's hands a vast quantity of material booty, including the public funds of the Carthaginians, more than 600 talents; these, with the 400 he had brought from Rome, gave him a reserve of about 1000. He secured an immense quantity of war munitions, whether or not Livy's actual list (ch. 47) can be accepted; the Carthaginians must have accumulated a very great store of supplies in their Spanish headquarters.

Laelius was sent by sea to take home the chief prisoners with news of the victory, which would encourage the home government and win even greater support for Scipio, who now spent some time in New Carthage reorganising. He kept his troops up to their standard by a series of regular

¹ An untitled sketch of A. Dürer's has been identified as depicting this scene, see *Monatshefte für Kunstwissenschaft*, VII (1914), pp. 6 sqq.

exercises, a real necessity, for though he had captured the enemy's base, there were still three Carthaginian armies in the field. On the first day he made them double thirty stades in full armour; on the second they saw to their equipment and were reviewed; the next was a rest day; then arms drill, and so on. Such is Polybius' description of the army exercises, but probably Scipio was engaged not merely in keeping his men keyed to concert pitch, but in training them in his new methods. For he had realised the essential weak points of the Roman army of his day, and had planned how best they might be remedied; what these were, and what brilliant developments Scipio introduced, will be considered later when they have been seen actually put into practice on the field of Baecula. But it was doubtless now and throughout the coming winter that Scipio found time to train and discipline his army to that revolution in tactical method which was to win the Punic War and place him among the world's greatest generals.

Apart from the drill necessary to carry out his tactical reforms, it is significant that Scipio spent part of his time in training his men in arms drill. Also in order that there might be no shortage of weapons for practice and for real fighting, he gave special attention to the artificers. He had appointed skilled supervisors in the different branches, and saw personally to the manufacture and distribution of weapons, visiting the workshops. The town became an *ἐργαστήριον πολέμου*.¹ It is very probable that a revolutionary change was made in the type of sword employed, by

¹ P. x. 20. 5-7. The four days order of exercises seems to have been introduced by Scipio. According to W. Fischer (*Das Römische Lager*, p. 134 n. 1) it is not mentioned by later writers, and only one trace of it is found in the Empire. But a connection may be supposed with the "ludus quintannus" of the first century of the Empire, so we find the continuation of Scipio's contrivance, and a link in the Empire

the introduction of the so-called Spanish sword, which led the Romans to the mastery of the civilised world. Suidas, following a lost portion of Polybius, Book XXIX, says that the Celtiberians excelled other nations in the manufacture of swords; their own were well pointed and suitable for cutting with either edge; the Romans at the time of Hannibal abandoned their national sword for the Spanish type.¹ Difficulties of defining the earlier type of Roman sword have led many scholars to reject or modify this passage by supposing that the Spanish sword was not a special type, but only of special quality, like Toledo steel, or that it was a curved sabre. Thus the old theory of a pointed sword replacing a blunt one has been rejected.² P. Couissin however has shown³ that these objections do not affect Suidas' statements. In the middle of the third century the Romans used a short Graeco-Italian sword of the Hallstatt type, which was better for thrusting than cutting. During the Second Punic War the Iberians used a sword of the type of La Tène I; this was admired and adopted by the Romans for its excellence in stabbing and cutting, and it was known as the "gladius hispaniensis." At Cannae the Romans with their short stabbing Graeco-Italian sword met Gauls with long sharp unpointed swords (of the type La Tène II). Afterwards they adopted the Spanish sword, which with its well-tempered steel point combined the best points of both these types. It was in Spain that the Romans encountered this sword, and probably at New Carthage that they first acquired it and practised using it under Scipio's supervision. Again, it has been suggested that the Roman pilum was of Spanish origin and may have been adopted from that country in the

¹ S.v. Μαχαίρα.

² Cf. S. Reinach, *Anthropol.* 1906, p. 336; J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéol. préhist. celtique et gallo-rom.* II; H. Sanders, *The Weapons of the Iberians.*

³ *Les Armes Romaines*, pp. 22 sqq.

Second Punic War.¹ The literary and archaeological grounds for this view are slender, and have been refuted by Couissin, who concludes however that the Spanish javelin (the phalarica), although not the prototype of the pilum, at least considerably influenced the latter's development. So Scipio may have had a hand in the adaptation of the Roman pilum as well as of the sword.

Then the fleet had to be reorganised and kept in fighting trim. The town itself was strengthened, the walls repaired, and Scipio did not neglect the silver mines, which formed so important an item in New Carthage's value. Thus his personal supervision was needed and given in every branch, apart from the general keeping of discipline—a necessity, as is shown by the high feeling engendered by the dispute for the *corona muralis*. Now that the strain was temporarily over, he had to prevent his troops becoming slack. Perhaps his activities may not have been confined to New Carthage alone; he may have tried to open up and secure the way to Baetica for the next year's campaign. Livy (xxvi. 51) refers to his reception of numerous embassies from native tribes while on his way to Tarraco, and to his council with all his allies, old and new, when he got there. Scipio may even have sent out some small military expeditions, for instance, against the town of Baria, some 70 miles south of New Carthage—incidents not important enough to be mentioned by Polybius, but which have left a faint impress in the inferior tradition.² That is, beside consolidating his base, Scipio paved the way for future advance by force and alliance. Finally, having done all that he thought

¹ See A. Schulten, "Der Ursprung des Pilums," in *Rhein. Mus. für Philologie*, LXVI (1911), pp. 573–84. Also Couissin, *op. cit.* pp. 185–91.

² Cf. Feliciani, p. 258. See Val. Max. III. 7. 1, who calls the town Badia. On Baria cf. Cic. *ad Att.* xvi. 4. 2; Pliny, *N.H.* III. 19; Ptol. II. 14. 8; *C.I.L.* II. p. 556; Plut. *Apophth. Sc. Mai.* 3. Aul. Gell. vi. 1, 8 *sqq.* recounts the incident, but does not name the town.

necessary, he garrisoned the now strengthened town, and left with his army, navy, and hostages for Tarraco where he intended to spend the winter.¹

Nothing is known of the three Carthaginian armies during this period except of a negative nature. They did not and could not act. Livy (ch. 51, where, according to Brewitz, we can trace his Carthaginian source, Silenus) says that after vainly attempting to suppress any rumours of the fall of New Carthage, they tried to minimise its

¹ For the events after the fall of the town, Polybius is the chief source. Livy agrees in the main and the relation of the two authors is the same. The minor differences are that Polybius (17. 6) numbers the prisoners at 10,000 in all; Livy (47. 1) gives this number for the males alone. This is probably due to careless reading of Polybius by Livy or his source. (To the same cause is due Livy's (51. 4) attributing the rest day from the exercises to the fourth, not to the third, as Polybius (20. 2).) The captured ships numbered eighteen according to Polybius (17. 13); Livy (47. 4) gives only five; perhaps an error of the scribe. Polybius, relying on Laelius, the naval commander, would give the better figure, if they are really different. Polybius' anecdotes are found in Livy in a changed form; but this is probably due to a different outlook on life and a later type of civilisation rather than to a change of source. In Livy's account there is an annalistic insertion, chs. 47. 5-49. 6 (to 49. 10 according to Brewitz), which includes lists of captured munitions, Scipio's address to his troops and the contention for the *corona muralis*. He has here consulted Valerius Antias and Silenus, but we cannot tell what comes from each author. As it has been said, Münzer has shown the importance of Sex. Digitius, the claimant of the *corona muralis*, and so perhaps this incident can be accepted in its essence as historical. De Sanctis (p. 377) would dismiss it as worthless, deriving from an annalist whose source was perhaps Ennius. But it may equally well come from Silenus and be of more historical value. 49. 7-10 recounts Scipio's treatment of the hostages; he sent messengers to their homes, ordering their friends there to come to take charge of them, except when the envoys of any particular state happened to be present, in which case he returned the hostages at once. According to Polybius (18. 5) Scipio was willing to release them if their tribes would become allies of Rome. If we accept Polybius' account as the more authoritative, it is of little historical importance whether Livy's divergence is due to an error of his source's use of Polybius (Kahrstedt) or to an annalistic account (Brewitz).

importance and show that Scipio would meet a different fate when they advanced against him. Yet they knew only too well the seriousness of their loss, and made no attempt to recover their base. Perhaps they thought that Scipio's position was now too strong, protected as he was by the fortifications of the town and by the fleet. Perhaps they were kept busy and feared to leave their present positions, as the Spanish tribes may well have shown signs of disaffection when the news spread abroad. Whatever the cause, the Carthaginian generals felt they could do nothing immediately to repair their loss. The only counter-blow they could have attempted was an attack on the Ebro, which they feared to venture, and so they remained inactive from the Roman point of view, leaving Scipio time to form his new plans and spread revolt among the northern tribes of Spain.

Thus Scipio's daring was more than justified by its results. The Carthaginian power in Spain received the first great blow, which struck at its very roots. They had lost their main base, the key to their control of Spain, and the loss of Spain would react severely over the waters in Italy, as Hannibal would then be deprived of his chief recruiting ground. By gaining the hostages of the Spanish tribes and his wise use of them, Scipio obtained a hold on the country which was far greater than mere territorial advance. He had strengthened his fleet at the expense of the enemy, and so now more than ever were the Romans masters of the sea. Apart from all the actual property, munitions, and money which he captured, he had won control of the silver mines of New Carthage, and it is from this point that Kahrstedt (p. 513) sees the commencement of the financial difficulties of the Carthaginians, who depended so largely on mercenaries. The loss of this source of revenue reacted widely on the whole war. Finally, Scipio had gained that which the Romans had always

needed in Spain, the control of the coast road and an effective base.

Brewitz suggests that the capture of New Carthage was not such an heroic deed, though it proved *ex ungue leonem*: the position of his camp, the learning of the ebb, the feint on the gate, the march through the lagoon, all show that Scipio was no average conventional general. Also we may add his use of the victory. But surely he did more than this. The mere formation of the plan, which involved a return to the disastrous offensive policy of his house, his disregard of the main armed forces of the enemy and his attack on their base, his hold upon his men, the courage and determination with which he carried it through, all show the greatest spirit and ability. If the ebb in the lagoon was a stroke of luck on which Scipio was not seriously counting, his use of it showed that he was ready for it. Fortune may favour the brave, but it was a question of trusting in God *and* keeping his powder dry. The only objection that can be raised against Scipio's performance was its risk, which was reduced to a minimum. The result far outweighed this, for with the fall of New Carthage a blow was struck at the Carthaginian power in Spain, and indeed at their hopes in the whole war, from which they never recovered.

CHAPTER FOUR

BAECULA

SCIPIO spent the winter of 209–8 at Tarraco.¹ It was not necessary immediately to follow up his first blow, but a short delay was advantageous, because it allowed time for the victory to work its effect on the minds and sympathies of the Spaniards. The confidence and friendship of many had been won, as we saw, by restoring

¹ For the year 208, the chief authorities are P. x. 34–40, and L. xxvii. 17–20. De Sanctis (pp. 479, 639) sees in Polybius' account (and also Livy's) a contradiction between the statement that Hasdrubal wished to fight, and the account of the battle itself; this perhaps does not exist, see below, p. 105 n. 1. Polybius' narrative is straightforward, and is followed closely by Livy, whose account is shorter, though in some cases it supplies details not found in Polybius, e.g. in 17. 7, after describing the transformation of part of the navy into a land army, he mentions how useful the weapons captured in New Carthage and those manufactured since proved to be. This may only be a deduction from Polybius. In 17. 3 he puts the account of Indibilis and Mandonius earlier than Polybius does. But in the battle of Baecula, Livy definitely has more details than Polybius, e.g. the introductory skirmish (18. 2 *sq.*), Hasdrubal's position and the arrangement of his troops (18. 6 *sqq.*), the posting of two Roman cohorts, details of the Roman attack and the number of the Carthaginian dead. Livy then had access, through Coelius as usual, to Polybius' source. Kahrstedt (pp. 300 *sqq.*) points out that it was a Greek source (as the use of Afri—*Αἰβυρ*—of 18. 7 and 19. 3 shows) but was not Silenus, because the events are described from the Roman point of view; perhaps it was Scipio's letter. But if the main pro-Roman narrative derived from Polybius himself *via* Coelius, perhaps the additional details may have come from Silenus, for they would not necessarily betray the colouring of the original context. In fact, according to Polybius, Scipio commanded the Roman right wing, Laelius the left; Livy puts it *vice versa*. May this not be due to a careless reading of a Carthaginian source, from whose point of view, assuming Polybius' statement to be correct, Scipio would be on the left and Laelius on the right? Granted that when you face the enemy's army you do not refer to his left wing as his right, yet a reference to Scipio's attack on their left might be misunderstood as meaning Scipio was on the left wing. Whether it is Silenus or the letter that is at the back of the details which Livy furnishes, they do

their hostages. The change of feeling which spread over the peninsula is seen by the action of Edeco, the prince of the Edetani, a powerful tribe between the Ebro and Sucro. On hearing that after the capture of New Carthage his wife and sons had fallen into Scipio's hands, he immediately headed the pro-Roman movement. As soon as Scipio had settled in winter quarters at Tarraco, Edeco arrived begging for friendship and the restoration of his family; he pointed out how much depended on Scipio's treatment of him, as the other tribes would no doubt take his case as an example. As it suited Scipio's hopes and policy, he granted the prince's requests, handing over the hostages, and giving perhaps not the formal friendship which Edeco was seeking, but establishing a more personal relationship. "In addition he captivated the Spaniard by divers means during the time they spent together."¹ One of the chief of these, we may be sure, was Scipio's own personal charm of manner; he came as a friend as well as a conqueror, and behind his many acts of courtesy lay not only scheming calculation, but the genuine giving of himself on the part of a great man, in his desire to win affection and not mere submission. His romantic personality, like that of Sertorius later, fired the imagination of the natives, so that his action, as Edeco had predicted, not for the most part contradict, but supplement Polybius' account. L. 19. 8 *sqq.* is an annalistic tradition describing the movements of the Carthaginians in the peninsula, etc. Brewitz supposes this to be from the same source as the annalistic part of Livy's description of the capture of New Carthage (xxvi. 47 *sqq.*), assuming that the quaestor at Baecula (19. 8) is the same as the C. Flaminius of 47. 8 and 49. 10. He further sees the work of Coelius in the speeches of Indibilis and Scipio. Dio gives nothing of value; he differs completely from Livy, and here follows a different annalistic tradition. Appian (*Ib.* 24) follows a still different annalist, giving no details of the battle, but saying that Scipio subdued by force those towns which he could not win over by other means, while Hasdrubal made an incursion into the territory of Lersa, which had revolted, intending to besiege some town there.

¹ P. x. 35. 2.

now led many Spaniards, hitherto unfriendly, to embrace his cause.

When Edeco and his family had been sent back home, Scipio prepared for the next year's campaign. After the capture of New Carthage he held the coast and sea, so that his fleet was only necessary to maintain his naval supremacy. This was important enough, but it did not need so large a fleet as he now had, while a navy would not help him to overcome the three Carthaginian armies in Spain. So, beaching the ships at Tarraco, he broke up his navy and distributed the pick of the crews among his land forces, which were thus increased possibly by some 3000 to 4000 legionaries.¹ He had sufficient arms for the new forces, as he had captured a great amount in New Carthage, and also had wisely manufactured many since. With this increased force and with New Carthage as a base, Scipio could now think of a more serious offensive than that of his predecessors, and he planned to strike farther south at one of the Carthaginian armies. So in the spring of 208, after Laelius had returned from Rome, he withdrew from winter quarters and advanced south.

During the winter, the Carthaginians were still misusing their earlier victories. They had regarded their position as undisputed, and continued treating the natives in an overbearing manner even after the loss of New Carthage, thus alienating them still further. So unreasonable were Hasdrubal's demands for money and hostages that the two greatest princes in Spain, Indibilis and Mandonius, who hitherto had been regarded as the most faithful supporters of Carthage, at last one night withdrew from the Carthaginian camp with all their forces to a strong position; their example was naturally followed by most of the other Spanish allies of Hasdrubal. Thus, as soon as Scipio started on his march, he was joined by Indibilis, who had been in

¹ Cf. Kahrstedt, p. 517 n. 1.

communication with him for some time and now came out openly on the Roman side. Scipio returned to him his daughters, whom he appears to have kept and not returned with the other hostages, and made an agreement, the essential part of which was that Indibilis should follow the Roman commanders and obey their orders. "Scipio evidently appreciated the importance of unity of command," comments Capt. Liddell Hart. And further, he got it. He suffered from disobedience among his officers or allies less than did many other generals in Spain. For instance, Sertorius had much trouble with Perperna and Hirtuleius; while Wellington's trouble with the Spaniards at Talavera taught him the lesson never to trust them. Scipio, however, reinforced and guided by these new allies,¹ continued his march southwards, everywhere welcomed by the natives.

Hasdrubal had a very difficult position to face. During the winter his grip on the natives had gradually slackened, while Indibilis had openly revolted. He was still troubled by the opposition and estrangement of the other generals, while the prospect of Scipio's arrival with a numerically superior army caused him great anxiety. After the loss of New Carthage he was cut off from his base and home country, and communication was difficult. Delay meant a gradual decline of his strength through the desertion of the Spaniards, and a consequent increase of his enemies. He must act soon, stop the wastage of strength, and put everything to the test before it was too late. So he determined to fight. If he won, he could then deliberate at his leisure on his next move. Victory would mean a reversal of feeling

¹ The campaigns of the elder Scipios taught the Romans such mistrust of their allies that later the *auxilia* often did not share the Roman camp—for a foreigner to do so became a special honour. It is expressly said of Indibilis and Mandonius (P. x. 38. 6 and L. xxvii. 17. 17) that "iisdem castris tendebant." Scipio sought the loyalty of the natives by courtesy and trust. See W. Fischer, *op. cit.* p. 64.

among the Spaniards; he would regain his strength by reclaiming his former allies or by forced levies if necessary, and then with renewed forces win his way through to Italy. But he was by no means assured of success, as the Romans were considerably stronger. If he failed, he determined to retreat with as many survivors as possible, after collecting all the money he could, and make his way to Italy to join Hannibal, recruiting natives on his route. He would strike the Romans as severe a blow as possible, and then leave Scipio to the care of Mago and the other Hasdrubal. Thus he would only be obeying the command of the Carthaginian State, which he had received seven or eight years previously.¹

Hasdrubal's next thought was to find a suitable ground for his duel. He had spent the winter in Central Spain among the Carpetani—should he turn north or south? He could not hope to reach or find a suitable site in the Ebro district, for the Romans were now supreme there; even the territory south of the river was pro-Roman, since the Edetani had thrown in their lot with the Romans. If he turned to the north, there was now New Carthage on his flank or rear, so he must turn south where the Carthaginian power was still unshaken. The winter was passed in preparing for this plan, especially in raising money—a lengthy business in the exhausted land, as the mines of New Carthage were now lost and only those of Baetica remained. Thither Hasdrubal moved from Central Spain, thus leaving the way open for Scipio to march south unmolested. His headquarters were in the neighbourhood of Castulo, near the town of Baecula (Bailen) and the silver mines—perhaps in the hilly country north of Bailen, near La Carolina, the mining area of to-day.² But on learning that Scipio was approaching Castulo, he prepared for battle. He had to choose his

¹ According to Livy in 216, while Dio says in 215.

² On the topography of Castulo, Baecula and the site of the battle, see Appendix II, "The Site of the Battle of Baecula," pp. 300 *sqq.*

ground carefully and find a strong position by which he could counteract the numerical superiority of the Romans.¹

¹ Hasdrubal, after the defection of so many native troops, can scarcely have had more than 25,000 men, while Scipio's force may have numbered 35,000-40,000. So Kahrstedt estimates the number. In the previous year Scipio had 27,000 and, as the losses at New Carthage were more than compensated for by the enrolling of some of the sailors, he crossed the Ebro with 28,000-29,000 men; while the Spanish troops, which joined him on the way, may have numbered anything from 6000-12,000. It is not necessary to follow Livy (18. 2) who describes a skirmish between Hasdrubal's cavalry outposts and the Roman advance guard, who carried their standards almost to the gates of the Carthaginian camp; at which Hasdrubal changed his camp to a stronger position in the night. There may have been a preliminary skirmish, but Scipio's mere approach would be enough to cause Hasdrubal to change his position. Cf. W. Fischer (*op. cit.* pp. 90-1), who also rejects this "Vorpostengefecht" because of the unusual nature of the troops mentioned. De Sanctis (p. 478) says Hasdrubal withdrew to a naturally strong position, resolved to await his colleagues, and not to give battle unless he had the advantage of the ground. He further sees a contradiction in Polybius and Livy; Polybius, 37. 4-5, says Hasdrubal wished to fight, which contrasts with the account of the battle itself, where Hasdrubal had no intention of fighting and was not prepared; so we must distinguish between the facts given by Polybius and his judgment of motive. But these statements are not in contrast. Hasdrubal wanted a fight but not a fiasco. Fearing the strength of the enemy, he took up a strong position against which he hoped Scipio would throw himself. He was forced back to the defensive for the moment, but he still wished to fight and hoped Scipio would not decline his challenge. He was unprepared for the attack, it is true, but that was because he under-estimated the strength and seriousness of the Roman movement. The account of the battle itself does not imply Hasdrubal had changed his intention of fighting, but merely that he was forced to relinquish the offensive. He may have been waiting for the arrival of his colleagues, as De Sanctis says, but it is unlikely. Polybius, 37. 2, definitely states that one of the grounds of Hasdrubal's anxiety was τὴν ἀντιπαραγωγὴν καὶ τὴν ἀλλοτριότητα of the other generals. But Polybius, 38. 10, says Scipio attacked for fear of the arrival of Mago and the other Hasdrubal—but his fears may have been groundless. The στάσις motive, and its denial, is once more apparent. As it seems to have been reliable before, it is perhaps safe to accept it here. In this uncertainty, it is not safe to assume that Hasdrubal retired to this hill to await his colleagues, and gave up his intention to fight. He preserved the latter, whatever his attitude to the former.

He advanced to the south-east of Bailen and camped probably on a height near Ahorcado, where he had in his rear the effective protection of a river (Rio del Rumblar), and in his front a stretch of level ground, defended by a ridge, of sufficient depth for safety and of sufficient width for deploying his troops. Strategically also he was in a strong position. For the valley of the Guadalquivir (Baetis) is bounded on the north by the Sierra Morena, on the south by the Sierra Nevada, while the east end is blocked by the Sierra Sagra. The only entrance from the east through these mountains into the fertile valley of Andalusia is through the valley of the Guadalquivir and its tributary the Guadalimar; and these are commanded by the district around Bailen, especially by the heights of Jabalquinto. These heights, however, were occupied by Scipio on his arrival. This hardly implies, as it might seem to do, a serious tactical mistake by Hasdrubal, for the only position which Scipio could occupy opposite him, though strong, suffered from inadequate water supply. Scipio was thus forced to fight on Hasdrubal's ground.

In this position both armies waited for two days. Scipio was eager for battle, but hesitated in face of the strength of the enemy's position. On the third day, not knowing whether the other two Carthaginian armies might not come up, in which case his situation would be desperate, he determined to put all to the hazard. On the morning of the battle, Scipio detached two cohorts, one to hold the entrance of the valley through which the river ran (probably where the Bailen-Malaga road crosses the Guadiel, just by Bailen station; for here the river valley begins to widen out), and the other to block the road which led from the city along the slope of the hill into the country (L. xxvii. 18. 10). This is more difficult to identify, as it is not known where the ancient road ran; possibly

the detachment went up the Guadiel a little beyond where the Bailen-Linares road crosses it, or somewhere along the modern road running out of Bailen to the north-east. After getting his forces ready for battle in the camp, Scipio launched an attack of his velites and of a picked force of infantry, against Hasdrubal's covering force of Numidian cavalry and Balearic and African light-armed infantry, which was stationed on the terrace. These men carried out the order with great gallantry, crossed the stream which is not more than waist deep, and pressing up the slope on the other side under a hail of weapons and stones from the enemy, struggled to the more level ground where their superior efficiency told. Hasdrubal, who had at first kept his main troops in the camp, relying on the strength of his position and not expecting a serious attack, was forced to the conclusion that he must now try to hold the terrace with all his forces; for in itself it was a strong position, if adequately guarded. So he began to lead his men out of the camp down towards the ridge. Scipio, who doubtless had in the meantime been leading out his troops, sent the whole of his light-armed troops to support the first attack, and to keep the enemy's attention directed to their front where the battle was now raging. Then he divided the main part of his army,¹ and led one part himself up the Arroyo de la Muela on the enemy's left, while Laelius was sent, with the other half, up the Arroyo de Cañada Baeza on his right. Hasdrubal was still busy deploying his troops and had not yet occupied the ground on his wings, when the two Roman divisions swept up on to the terrace on both wings, and fell on the flank of the Carthaginians,

¹ There is no reason to suppose, with Veith, that this division was made actually in the camp, but more probably it took place in face of the enemy, while the battle was in progress, as Livy expressly says; Polybius, x. 39. 3, in no way contradicts this view (cf. Brewitz, p. 62 n. 3).

while they were still trying to form up. Broken on the wings and fearing to be surrounded, the Carthaginians fell back, and the Roman centre gained the plateau on the top. Hasdrubal saw that the day was lost, and decided not to fight to the death, but in accordance with his original plan hastily collected as many troops and elephants, and as much of his money as he could, and fled to the north. Scipio captured and plundered the enemy's camp, taking prisoner in all some 10,000 foot and 2000 cavalry, according to Polybius (x. 40. 1). These figures may not be much exaggerated, if they include the population of Baecula. Livy foolishly gives, beside this total, a Carthaginian casualty list of 8000. If, as is possible, this should represent the number of both dead and prisoners, as given by a source other than Polybius (e.g. Silenus), it is perhaps to be preferred to the Polybian tradition. Hasdrubal must have retired with half or two-thirds of his army.


The tactics employed by Scipio at Baecula were a complete break with the traditional movements of a Roman army, and mark a real turning-point in military development.¹ The Roman army, which was traditionally drawn

¹ Scipio's tactical reforms are discussed more fully in relation to their historical setting in Chapter ix. pp. 266 *sqq.* Laqueur has advanced a theory concerning the tactics of the battle, on the assumption that Polybius' account is contradictory and has been falsely expanded in one place. When Hasdrubal's advance guard was weakened by the Roman attack, he decided to lead out his whole force to the ridge, πιστεύων τοῖς τόποις (§ 2). Then Scipio strengthens his attack and sends out the two encircling detachments on the wings (§§ 3-4). During this, Hasdrubal leads out his men, for till now they had remained there πιστεύων τοῖς τόποις, not expecting the enemy to attack (§ 5). But when we reach § 5, where has the trust in the position gone? Did Hasdrubal lead out his whole force as in § 2, or hold them back as in § 5? So πιστεύων κτλ. is a doublet and the bit in between, on the wing attack, must be eliminated as unhistorical, except that doubtless Laelius did lead one of the regular wings. The true account, then, is that, when pressed, Hasdrubal led his forces on to the ridge, trusting to the position and thinking that the enemy would not attack. But the Romans did attack

up in three lines, suffered from two chief weaknesses. It relied mainly on its weight, and while able to advance with devastating force, or to retire, it could not wheel easily and so could be outflanked and surrounded by a more mobile enemy, as had happened at Cannae. Secondly, inadequate training of the individual precluded separate action by any of its component parts; it must act as a whole. These weaknesses Scipio tried to remedy by training his troops to new methods. At Baecula he abandoned the traditional tactics of the old three lines—namely,

severely, mounted the ridge, and caught the enemy on their flank, as they had not yet occupied the ground on their wings. That is, if Hasdrubal led the whole force on to the ridge trusting to the site, he starts from the assumption that his whole force, when placed on the hill, would exclude an attack on it; this is so, for it was contrary to Hasdrubal's expectation that the Romans did attack and that he should be defeated by a flank attack. Another hypothesis is that if Hasdrubal held his troops in the camp, not expecting an attack on the camp, and if, when the attack started, he came too late, then he starts from the assumption that the covering force would preclude an attack of the main body of Romans on the camp. Laqueur prefers the former assumption. Hasdrubal's tactics are explicable, if he decided, trusting in his position, to keep his advance guard there, and so render an attack on the Carthaginian camp unlikely. The reversal of this conviction was caused by the difficult position of the advance guard, who were hard pressed by the Romans' courage (according to first source, § 2), or, according to Laelius, by the strengthening of the attack and the flank attack. Polybius tried to combine two accounts, in themselves possible, trusting the view of Laelius and yet not rejecting the kernel of his first draft.

Yet is it necessary to dismiss §§ 3-5a as unhistorical, to make Polybius' account clear? Even if the doublet does indicate an insertion, may it not be historical? Surely this analysis is rather over-fine and the account runs smoothly enough. Hasdrubal first waited at the top in his camp *πιστεύων τοῖς τόποις* (i.e. the hills as a whole), and not thinking he would be attacked (i.e. the camp would be stormed), but when the covering force was being seriously weakened by the Roman attack, he began to lead (*ἔξηγε*, note the imperfect) his troops on to the ridge, *πιστεύων τοῖς τόποις* (i.e. on the position there, when he got all his troops to the ridge). Meanwhile, Scipio and Laelius led their encircling attacks on the wing, and so Hasdrubal got his troops out too late and was thrown into disorder.



that each line should reinforce the one in front of it by filling up gaps caused by casualties. Instead, he placed his light troops with some infantry in the centre, while the really effective legionaries were posted on the wings to act as independent bodies. With his centre of light troops he held the enemy's light-armed, and directed all attention to the front. His chief attack was launched by his best troops against the flanks of Hasdrubal's best troops, who were rushing forward to join what they thought would be the main battle. The weak point of Scipio's move was that his light troops were not holding the enemy's main body. He had not yet learnt completely the lesson of Cannae, where the Romans were so held on their whole line that they could not face or withdraw from the Carthaginian flank attack. At Baecula, Hasdrubal met Scipio's flank attack by sacrificing his light-armed troops, and at the same time withdrawing his main troops, who still had freedom of movement and were not held by the Romans. Thus the battle, which was a tactical victory for Scipio, was a strategic defeat. He could not hold the whole body of the enemy till it was surrounded, and so Hasdrubal was able to follow his original plan of withdrawing to Italy with the loss of only a part of his troops. The only criticism which can be offered is that the Romans might have rolled up more effectively from one flank only, with double the force, as was done for instance in the battles of Magnesia and Tigranocerta. If this had been carried out on Scipio's right wing, Hasdrubal might not have been able to withdraw easily, and so have been forced back to the river in the rear. However, if Hasdrubal intended to retreat if the day went against him, it is probable that he would have done so, even if Scipio had tried to roll up the line from the one flank only, and that Scipio's attempt to surround him was the better manœuvre. But though it was not a complete victory for Rome, Scipio had set in motion the

rock which was to crush Hannibal. The new weapons and, above all, the new tactics had won the day. Ilipa, the Great Plains, and Zama were only further developments of the same tactical principles, and merely confirmed the verdict of Baecula.

Though Scipio won the battle by such brilliant tactics, nevertheless Hasdrubal withdrew northwards towards the Tagus, and marched along it towards the Pyrenees. Scipio sent a detachment to the pass over the Pyrenees to watch Hasdrubal's movements, or as Livy puts it, "to occupy the passes of the Pyrenees." This force probably prevented Hasdrubal from taking the easier road to the east, for he was forced northwards; but it did not prove a serious obstacle. Livy says that on his way Hasdrubal was joined by the son of Gisco, and Mago, and that a council of war was held in which it was decided that Hasdrubal should proceed to Italy, and that Mago should hand over his army to Hasdrubal, the son of Gisco, and go to the Balearic Isles to hire mercenaries, while Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, was to retire far into Lusitania and avoid any collision with the Romans; a force of 3000 horse was given to Masinissa with which to scour Western Spain, helping the friendly tribes and reducing those who were hostile. This arrangement of the Carthaginian forces probably represents what took place, though it is possible that Hasdrubal Barca did not join the conference. Before giving battle he had determined to go to Italy in case of defeat, and so he might not waste time conferring with his colleagues. Besides, it is not clear that he was on friendly enough terms with them to confer. If they had intended at last to act with him, as Livy implies, why did they not arrive a few days earlier, to help him crush Scipio once and for all? Hasdrubal carried out his original purpose, while the other two Carthaginian generals made their own arrangements, perhaps independently of their colleague.

Scipio did not follow Hasdrubal, as he was afraid of being attacked in the rear by the other generals; it is true that he knew of their dissensions, but he could not tell how long they would remain on bad terms. But it is clear that he did fear their movements, because he transferred his army to the Carthaginian camp, which was a stronger position than his own.¹ Many of the Spanish tribes went over to the Roman side. Towards his 12,000 (?) prisoners Scipio adopted his usual policy of clemency and conciliation—"parcere subiectis". He dismissed all the native Spaniards without ransom, and left them free to return home, though he sold the Africans! He treated his allies generously, giving Indibilis 300 of the horses, while he distributed the rest among those who had none. An episode followed after the battle in which he was acclaimed by all as king. He had been so called previously by Edeco and Indibilis, but had dismissed the matter lightly. Now it seemed more serious. He assembled the Spaniards and told them he wished to be kingly, but not to be called by the name of *rex*, so hateful to Roman ears; *imperator* was the only title he sought, and this is the first example we have of a general being acclaimed thus by his troops. Scipio was far too careful to accept a title which would afford his political opponents such a good handle against him when he returned home. But we are not justified in supposing that this was the only motive which influenced him ("l' ambizioso proconsole" of De Sanctis!); the admiration of Polybius and Livy may not be unfounded.

¹ Dio 57. 48 (Zon. ix. 8), reading ἐν τῷ instead of ἐν τῇ, says that before the battle Scipio had predicted he would encamp in the enemy's camp—a prediction due to divine inspiration or chance information. The Scipionic Legend is again evident; Dio's account is probably Coelian. Appian's account of Baecula (*Ib.* 24) is brief and implies that Hasdrubal (son of Gisco, according to Appian's error) did not want to fight. After the battle the Romans captured Baecula itself, which is quite probable.

Doubtless this anecdote derives from Laelius, and of its truth we cannot judge. It is not safe to reject it entirely, as one cannot tell how far a people may be carried in the joy and enthusiasm of a great victory, for such Baecula must have seemed at the time, whatever be the later verdict of history. Livy tells yet another anecdote, how Scipio treated Masinissa's nephew who was among the prisoners. He had been forbidden by his uncle to join in the fight, but had done so, and unfortunately been captured. Scipio showed him the greatest kindness, giving him many presents, and returned him to his uncle in safety. Then after sending the force to watch Hasdrubal's movements, Scipio retired to Tarraco to winter quarters.

Next comes the problem of the historical importance of the battle of Baecula and of Scipio's generalship. Has its value been altogether over-rated? Was it a mere rear-guard action of Hasdrubal on his way to Italy, or a severe blow at the Carthaginian power in Spain, after which the latter rapidly failed? Scipio let Hasdrubal pass through, and ultimately reach Italy, in an attempt to join his brother Hannibal. On this charge Scipio is arraigned and often condemned. Scipio may have taken New Carthage, and have inflicted a slight defeat on Hasdrubal, but he did not stop him from reaching Italy. Led on by the idea of Scipio's inefficiency and failure, some critics have come to regard the battle itself as in the main unhistorical (see L. Keller, *Der 2 punische Krieg*, pp. 67-77), or at the most as a Carthaginian rear-guard action of no importance, comparable to the encounter between the Roman and Carthaginian cavalry at the Rhone in 218 (cf. Ihne, II. p. 380 and Feliciani, p. 266 *sq.*). It was, as has been said, a tactical victory but a strategic defeat.

Attacks were levelled at Scipio by ancient as well as by modern critics. Livy¹ puts in the mouth of Q. Fabius Maximus a long attack on Scipio's policy of carrying the

¹ XXVIII. 40-2.

war into Africa a few years later. The old general glances at his Spanish campaigns; after mentioning that the attack on New Carthage was carried out without the slightest interruption, and damning with faint praise the rest of Scipio's operations in Spain, he goes on to describe the alarm of Rome at the appearance in Italy of Hasdrubal, "after you had allowed him to slip through your hands—you who are going to blockade not Carthage only but the whole of Africa with your army! You will say that you defeated him. Then I regret all the more, both on your account and on behalf of the Republic, that you allowed him after his defeat to invade Italy." To this attack on his Spanish campaigns Scipio does not deign to reply. "It would be a long and uninteresting discussion to follow the example of Q. Fabius, and, as he has depreciated my exploits in Spain, thus to ridicule his fame and extol my own." It would be well if many modern commentators had avoided Fabius' example. It is possible to criticise Scipio's tactics at Baecula, but a condemnation of his conduct after the battle can only rest on false assumptions. It is easy to condemn, but more difficult to construct an ideal policy which he ought to have followed. Strong criticism under-estimates the dangerous situation in which Scipio was, even after his victory, and over-estimates the danger to Rome of Hasdrubal's arrival in Italy.

In the first place, it is quite clear that, when once Hasdrubal had slipped through his grasp at Baecula, Scipio made no serious attempt to stop him reaching Italy. The object of the detachment, which Scipio sent to the Pyrenees, was probably to observe Hasdrubal's movements (P. x. 40. 11), not to block the passes of the Pyrenees, as Livy states, which so small a force could obviously not do effectively. As Brewitz emphasises, it was dispatched merely to reconnoitre, to keep in touch with the retreating enemy, otherwise Scipio would not know where Hasdrubal was, and might, if Hasdrubal should change his plan, have

to face an attack from an unexpected quarter. Probably Scipio's order was less precise, and he merely bade the force watch Hasdrubal, which, as a matter of fact, did lead it to the Pyrenees; Scipio did not know Hasdrubal's precise direction, but Polybius, knowing the result, formulates the order as it was actually carried out. Scipio did not try or intend to hold Hasdrubal in Spain but only to know where he was. This, however, does not exculpate Scipio in the eyes of the unfriendly critic, but merely condemns him the more.

Ought Scipio in the circumstances to have tried to stop Hasdrubal? There are three main reasons why he ought not—it was far too dangerous and difficult, his object was to hold Spain at all costs, and Hasdrubal's arrival in North Italy was not an overwhelming disaster. Could he risk following Hasdrubal when in his rear were two Carthaginian armies who would exploit his absence, if they did not actually attack him from behind? Still less could he risk a division of his army. Even if he did venture to keep on Hasdrubal's track, would he be able to stop him from reaching Italy? Assuming he could have overtaken him, he could not have blocked the Pyrenees effectively. Hasdrubal could have slipped across somewhere, for there are more than the two passes at the east and west. Even if all except these two were too difficult and so could be neglected, Scipio would be in an awkward position, for if he stopped in the east, Hasdrubal would go to the west, while, if Scipio went to the west, he would be cut off from his base and the coast. When Wellington held the three main valleys of the Western Pyrenees, he had to trust them to divisional commanders who nearly lost their heads. How then could Scipio guard east and west? Such a move was too dangerous to risk.¹

¹ On the barrier of the Pyrenees from the military point of view, see Sir Charles Oman, *History of the Peninsular War*, 1. pp. 72 *sqq.*

Secondly, what was Scipio's object in Spain? Surely to subdue and to hold the country, to break the Carthaginian power there, and win over their resources. Would he have achieved his object by a wild-goose chase after a fleeing enemy? True, his object was also to stop reinforcements reaching Hannibal in Italy. But was it better to let pass 10,000 men whom, even if he exerted his whole strength, he probably could not have stopped, or to hold on to Spain and try to defeat the two remaining armies? To follow Hasdrubal would be to expose the whole of the country to Carthaginian influence, and to lose what advantages he had already gained. When Hannibal had slipped past the elder Scipio at the Rhone, the latter saw the value of sending on his army to Spain and realised that the war must be won there. His son now entrusted the defence of Italy to others and, true to his father's policy, determined to maintain his hold on Spain at all costs, whether Hasdrubal slipped through or not. Indeed Scipio had been sent to Spain to fight out the war there merely as a "*privatus cum imperio*," so that, unless he was recalled, it was his duty to stay there—a point often overlooked by his critics. He was a servant of the State, and though we may wonder what he would have done, had he thought that military necessity clashed with Republican form, his action was here justified from the legal as well as from the military point of view.

Finally, was it such an extraordinarily false move to let Hasdrubal reach Italy? The danger has been over-emphasised. Scipio did not let Hasdrubal pass with his full force, but inflicted a serious defeat on him, which deprived him of over half his army, even though the larger part of these may have been his Spanish allies rather than his best African troops. As Kahrstedt has shown, the danger of Hasdrubal's arrival in Italy was far less now than it would have been a few years earlier. The Sicilian War

was over, and Rome was operating in fewer theatres of war, so she could concentrate more strength at home, especially as Scipio was making the Spanish War self-supporting, and did not need to drain her strength by demanding fresh reinforcements and supplies. The situation in Italy was not so desperate as it had been. Further, Hasdrubal would arrive in North Italy, and it is no easy task to invade Italy from the north. He could not come by sea to the south, and he had to join Hannibal before he could be of much use, and the Metaurus intervened. Rome could and did cope with the situation which doubtless appeared to her more dangerous at the moment than it actually was. The patriotic Roman, who extolled the dramatic and crowning mercy of Metaurus, unwittingly depreciated Scipio's work in Spain, and opened a channel for criticism which in the main is false.

After Baecula Scipio found himself in a very difficult situation, and it is idle to blame his conduct, unless any alternative constructive plan is advanced. He solved the difficulty with marked success, and Hasdrubal's arrival in Italy was the lesser of two evils, both of which Scipio could hardly avert. His action was justified by after events, for he would have ill served Rome if he had lost his hold on Spain. There were still two unconquered Carthaginian armies there—a fact which cannot be overlooked, and is indeed given by Polybius as the reason for Scipio's conduct. He had to take a risk and the result justified his choice, which was the mark of a great, not a small general. To carp at his policy is as short-sighted as to follow Q. Fabius Maximus in his attack on Scipio's policy of carrying the war into the enemy's territory a few years later.¹

¹ Laqueur has condemned Scipio by curious means. He believes that Scipio knew of Hasdrubal's intention of joining Hannibal, because he sent a detachment after him, and that if Scipio himself had followed, it would not have been difficult for him to hinder Hasdrubal from

crossing the Pyrenees. In 39. 9 Polybius says Scipio did not follow Hasdrubal, as he was afraid of being attacked by the other Carthaginian generals, and the situation described in 7. 6-7 might occur again; it assumes that the other Carthaginian generals would join Hasdrubal, which would mean catastrophe for Scipio. This view Laqueur condemns as false, for the other generals never thought of joining Hasdrubal, and Scipio knew this. Yet Scipio sent troops to the Pyrenees to meet Hasdrubal, and so the catastrophe which he feared for his whole army threatened this weaker force. But in 40. 11 Laqueur sees a second and quite different view, which derives from Laelius or Scipio's letter, and is the official explanation. After the battle, Scipio encamped in a good position, because he thought that the other generals would not join Hasdrubal, but would operate against himself. Scipio divided his force, sending part to look after Hasdrubal, and waited with the rest, not to avoid fighting but to fight. The official explanation deriving from Scipio's headquarters is that the plan was to divide the army, to hold Hasdrubal at the Pyrenees, and to fight both Carthaginian armies. This plan failed, as the two Carthaginian armies did not come, and the troops sent to the Pyrenees were too weak. The official account thus explains the situation, though it does not clear Scipio. It is difficult to follow Laqueur here, for it is doubtful whether Scipio at first knew Hasdrubal's object, and unlikely he could have blocked the mountain range. Also does the reason given in 39. 9 ("Scipio did not think it advisable to follow Hasdrubal, as he was afraid of being attacked by the other generals") differ from that in 40. 11 ("Scipio changed the position of his camp")? Though the latter does imply an unexpected attack on it by the two Carthaginians, does the former necessarily imply that they would join Hasdrubal?

CHAPTER FIVE

ILIPA AND THE LAST STEPS IN SPAIN

AFTER Hasdrubal Barca's departure for Italy, Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, had retired to the coast near Gades, leaving the Mediterranean seaboard and nearly all Eastern Spain in the hands of the Romans. However, the Carthaginian government made a fresh effort and sent out reinforcements under Hanno, to compensate for the loss of Hasdrubal Barca. But the Carthaginian leaders, who, after Hasdrubal's departure, had at their disposal only some 30,000 men, and even after Hanno's arrival not more than 40,000,¹ felt the need of greater strength, and so Hanno was sent with part of the army to recruit among the Celtiberians. After the fall of New Carthage they could not count on their subjects, and so were now forced to seek help from the more barbarian and neutral tribes of the interior, where Hanno succeeded in raising some 9000 men.²

¹ Kahrstedt, p. 530.

² For the events of the year 207 we have unfortunately to depend on Livy (xxviii. 1-4), as Polybius here fails. It has been supposed, e.g. by De Sanctis, that these chapters are a partial repetition of 12. 10-17, and that Livy or his source, Coelius, draws on Silenus for them and on Polybius for the later chapters, while these two authors are in reality recording the same events. This view, which involves the transference of Ilipa to 207, is closely bound up with the chronological difficulties of 207-6 and is discussed more fully and rejected below (pp. 304 *sqq.*). Kahrstedt concludes from the Greek forms of Orongis (3. 2) and Maessessum (3. 3) that it is here that the direct use of Polybius by Livy begins. Brewitz thinks this conclusion hazardous, as Polybius is not extant and as Livy may have received the Greek forms from Coelius, who worked from a Greek source. And so, on these four chapters of book xxviii, Brewitz passes a judgment of 'not proven,' although he grants the possibility of a direct use, if support can be

The Romans were not in quite so strong a position as they could wish, for notwithstanding their command of the coast road, the sea, and the old Carthaginian headquarters of New Carthage, they could not prevent reinforcements reaching the enemy in Celtiberia. Action must be taken there at once to stop the recruiting, because it would not be safe to operate in the south with the enemy in their present position, from which they could execute a flank attack on the Romans, or even let them pass and then cut their communications. But Scipio could not have been over-anxious at this fresh move of the enemy, as he did not personally direct operations there, but sent M. Silanus with a force of some 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry against Hanno. Silanus made a forced march, notwithstanding the bad state of the roads, and the narrowness of some of the mountain passes, and reached the enemy before news of his expedition had time to filter through. He learnt that they were lying across his road some ten miles distant, divided into two camps, the one on the right being occupied by the new Celtiberian recruits, the other by the Carthaginians. He decided to attack the former first, as it was not guarded so carefully, the new recruits being less disciplined. After advancing to within three miles of the camp and feeding his men, he proceeded in battle order. When he was within a mile, the enemy saw him. Mago rode across from his camp to take command, stationing his main strength of 4000 men and 200 cavalry in front, with the light-armed in the rear. Livy's description of the battle which followed is interesting, as

found from the later chapters, which support he does in fact find. He also sees Polybian matter in the military details and the extraordinary praising of L. Scipio. The tradition in these chapters is good, as is shown by the reasonable numbers of the troops in 1. 5 and 2. 4; Kahrstedt believes that this is substantiated by the good position of the Carthaginian troops in 1. 2 as contrasted with that described by the bad annalistic passage in XXVII. 20.

Brewitz points out, as an example of Roman methods. The Romans advanced in close ranks, hurled their javelins and received the answering fire on their shields. Then, drawing their swords, they fought hand to hand, each man tackling the opponent opposite him; only occasionally the roughness of the ground forced them to break their ranks and fight singly as in duels. The men trained by Scipio were beginning to realise that the strength of the phalanx, without any individual initiative, was not adequate in a rough country like Spain, and so we find some individual action; yet it is true that the day was won by the solid ranks of the Romans, while the enemy found their agility useless on the broken ground. Nearly all the Celtiberian heavy infantry was destroyed, while the Carthaginian light troops, which came up from the other camp, suffered the same fate. Not more than 2000 of the infantry escaped. Mago fled with the cavalry, which had taken little part in the battle, and joined Hasdrubal at Gades some ten days later. Hanno was among the prisoners, and the Celtiberian levies scattered to their homes. Thus the Carthaginian attempt to raise more troops in the interior failed, and the way was now open for the Romans to advance in safety to the south.

After giving Silanus his full meed of praise, Scipio hopefully determined to advance south. Hasdrubal had by this time been forced to camp in Baetica to secure his hold on his allies, who would be very restless after the result of the battle of Baecula. The last thing he wanted was a decisive battle; he was now on the defensive and had been driven back nearly to the coast itself. His only hope was delay, and so he turned to a strategy of exhaustion. He retreated to Gades, and distributed his army in the various towns near by, knowing well that Scipio desired a battle but would hesitate to spend time storming one town after another. Also by placing detachments of his army in the various towns he could be sure of the fidelity

of those towns at least. His plan succeeded, for Scipio saw that the loss of time involved in a number of sieges would not be compensated for by the results, and so retired; the organisation involved in keeping a large army in Spain claimed his time and attention.

But he could not retire and leave the district entirely in the enemy's hands, without making some demonstration. Not wishing to spend the time himself, he sent his brother Lucius with 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry to attack the richest city in that part, Orongis by name, which lay (according to Livy) in the country of the Maessesses, whose soil was fertile and rich in silver mines, and which had been used by Hasdrubal as a base for making incursions "circa mediterraneos populos."¹ After trying in vain to win over the town, Lucius soon carried it by assault. The citizens, fearing the fall of the town and the subsequent massacre, burst out; but their action was misunderstood and they were cut down. The Romans entered the town, but Lucius stopped any plunder or massacre, in accordance with his brother's usual policy. On his return, he was praised by Publius Scipio, who compared the exploit with his own capture of New Carthage. As the winter was coming on, Scipio retired to Hither Spain, and after sending the troops to their winter quarters, and his brother with Hanno and other prisoners to Rome, he retired to Tarraco.

Brewitz thinks that this exploit has been exaggerated, and that Orongis was not so important as Livy makes out.

¹ The exact position of this town is not known. Meyer says (p. 405) "the Maessesses are naturally the *Μασσιανοί* of Polybius III. 33. 9, who are called *Μασσιανοί* in Theopompus (Stephen Byz.). They are called Bastuli and Bastaetani by the Romans however, and in Zon. ix. 8 Lucius Scipio is sent *εἰς Βαστιτανίαν*. Orongis must be south of the neighbourhood of the source of the Baetis and the Segura, somewhere near Basti (= Baza) or farther north by Huescar, south of the Sierra Segura and its silver mines. It probably is equivalent to Aurinx in the bad annalistic account of Livy xxiv. 42. 5, but has nothing to do with the Oningis of Pliny III. 12."

For if it was so valuable, why did not Scipio make it a base for further operations instead of retiring to Tarraco? The exaggeration may be due to the prejudice of a follower of Lucius. However, it is unlikely that Scipio would definitely settle in the south for the winter, for he did not even think of doing so at New Carthage, where he could be more certain of his communications. He probably used his victory to the full by exploiting the wealth of the place, and by the moral effect its capture would have on the natives of the district, who would be more inclined to go over to him the next year, when they saw how carefully Orongis had been treated. Further, if he made no demonstration, or one on a weak or unimportant town, an opposite result would have been produced among the natives and the Carthaginians. A strong determined attack upon an important position was needed to establish his moral superiority, and so doubtless the incident and the importance of the town have not been unduly exaggerated.

By the beginning of the year 206¹ Hasdrubal, son of

¹ For the events of this year see P. XI. 20-24; L. XXVIII. 12. 10-16. Livy's account corresponds in the main with Polybius', although he has evidently misunderstood some of the military details. He has additions to Polybius, which may be due to his use of Silenus or other Greek writers (through Coelius), e.g. his number of the Carthaginian troops (12. 14) is more reasonable than Polybius' (20. 2). He mentions that a native prince Culchas ruled over twenty-eight towns (13. 2), that there were Balearic slingers among the Carthaginian forces (15. 1), the position of the Carthaginian elephants and their likeness to towers (14. 4), and more details of the retreat (15. 10). Other differences are due merely to a misunderstanding of Polybius by Livy or by his source, e.g. the place of the battle (13. 4-5; P. 20. 5), the preliminary cavalry skirmish (13. 8; P. 21. 4), the time when the order was given (14. 6; P. 22. 4), the mention of the three cohorts (14. 17; P. 23. 1). The distance of 500 paces (14. 13) is better than Polybius' stade (22. 11), but Polybius' text may be corrupt. Livy says the elephants ran to the centre (15. 5), Polybius only says *πανταχόθεν*. These details will be discussed when they arise. The reference to Hasdrubal rushing from his tent (14. 10) may be due to Coelius; cf. Brewitz, p. 17.

Gisgo, had probably learnt of the fate of the other Hasdrubal. No longer must he try to protract matters until the war was won in Italy, for a mortal wound had been inflicted on the Carthaginian hopes there, and Hannibal, though still formidable, was isolated in the south. For Hasdrubal to act on the defensive any longer merely meant delaying matters without helping Hannibal, except in the negative way of holding Scipio in Spain. Hannibal needed help urgently, and it was for Hasdrubal to try to force the issue and stake all on a last throw; if he won, the long-looked-for help could be sent to Italy, while, if he failed, the Carthaginian hold on Spain was for ever lost. He knew that if he did not take the field, his opponent would storm one town after another, gradually winning over the whole district which yet remained to the Carthaginians, either by force or by his wise treatment of those who submitted. Possibly, if this seemed too slow a method, Scipio might even entrust the command to Silanus or his brother Lucius, who had so ably carried out his plans the year before. For even now Scipio was looking across the waters to Africa for the ground of the final duel, and was impatient to force Hannibal's hand. Hasdrubal was ready to risk all to avoid seeing his power slip from him little by little, as one town after another was won over by the enemy. In this decision he was supported by Mago. Early in the year he left Gades with all his forces and crossed Further Spain, recruiting as he went, till he reached Ilipa, where he encamped with a total force of 50,000 infantry and 4000-5000 cavalry.¹

¹ L. 12. 14; he adds that certain writers state that the infantry amounted to 70,000. P. XI. 20. 2 gives 70,000 for the infantry, 4000 for the cavalry and 32 elephants—presumably *ad maiorem Scipionis gloriam*. Livy probably goes back to Silenus through Coelius. Polybius' source is inferior; originally an oral tradition, according to Kahrstedt. Brewitz thinks Polybius for once prefers an annalistic source; this is likely because Appian (*Ib.* 25) also gives the larger figure for the

Scipio also began to concentrate his forces, dispatching M. Junius Silanus to collect the 3000 foot and 500 horse which the native prince Culchas had gathered for the Romans during the winter. He advanced south with the rest of his allies and was joined by Silanus and Culchas near Castulo and Baecula. His whole force then amounted to 45,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, some 10,000 men less than the enemy's total.¹

The two armies met in the valley of the Baetis to fight to the death for the final supremacy of Spain: for such would be the victor's prize. The site of the battle, however, is not given with any certainty by our authorities. The manuscript of Polybius gives 'Ηλίγγα; Livy names Silpia as the place of the Carthaginian camp, and Baecula as that of the Roman; Appian gives Carmona as the rallying-place of the Carthaginians before the battle. It has been supposed that Silpia is the same place as the Ilipa mentioned by Livy in xxxv. 1. But then there arises the absurd situation of the two armies being encamped over 150 miles apart; for Ilipa is identified with Alcala del Rio, a village a few miles to the north of Seville. This obvious absurdity has led

infantry, 5000 cavalry and 36 elephants. Livy's figure for the cavalry splits the difference of Polybius and Appian. Kahrstedt's calculations (p. 531) support the lower figure for the infantry; after Hasdrubal Barca's departure, the other two Carthaginian generals had only some 25,000-30,000 men, who were reinforced in 207 by a force of 20,000 from Africa including the elephants. Of these 45,000 (roughly), some thousands had been lost in the Celtiberian expedition and a few hundreds at Orongis, and so at the beginning of 206 they could not have numbered more than some 35,000-38,000. To reach Livy's figure of 54,500, we must suppose that they raised some 20,000 men in Baetica, now that they were forced to recruit among the Turdetani after the unfortunate episode among the Celtiberians.

¹ Appian, who gives the higher Polybian estimate for the Carthaginian strength, lowers the Roman still more to less than 25,000. Thus we see in the early annalists the proportion of 3:2; while after the material had been handled by the later annalists, the proportion drops to 3:1; also *ad maiorem Scipionis gloriam*.

some scholars to suppose that Silpia is some unknown town near Baecula, and Mommsen, Ihne and Droysen call the engagement the second battle of Baecula. Unfortunately, this conclusion has been reached by taking Livy at his face value, while actually his account rests on a misunderstanding of Polybius, who says that "Scipio drew near Castulo and the neighbourhood of Baecula, and there joined Marcus and the troops sent by Colichas...he left with his whole force...when he drew near the Carthaginians and was in sight of them, he encamped on certain low hills opposite to the enemy" (XI. 20. 5, 8, 9). "Hasdrubal camped not far from the town called Elinga, entrenching himself just under the hills with level ground in front well suited for battle" (XI. 20. 1). The former passage in no way implies that the battle was fought near Baecula, because it in no way conditions the length of Scipio's march from that neighbourhood. It has been hastily read and misunderstood by Livy or by his source, with the result that his version is: Scipio reached Castulo, where Silanus joined him; then he advanced to the city of Baecula and pitched his camp. This view is quite without support in the original source, which leaves the matter entirely open. We may suppose Scipio to have marched any reasonable distance from Baecula to meet Hasdrubal. The next task is to see whether there is any evidence for locating the site, other than supposing Silpia to be an unknown town near Baecula, a hypothesis formed to support Livy's careless use of his source. What of Polybius' Elinga? Very probably it is, as Schweighäuser conjectures, a corruption for ΙΛΙΠΑ which is not dissimilar from ΗΛΙΓΓΑ. That the battle was fought at Ilipa has been finally confirmed by Ed. Meyer (p. 406), who shows that Livy's Silpia does in fact equal Ilipa. For in those passages of Livy which agree with Polybius and which go back *via* Coelius to the Carthaginian source, Silenus, the names are frequently altered

and given in the forms current among the Romans. In particular, words which in the original begin with H (η) are often changed to S, e.g. Egesta = Segesta, the Edetani = the Sedetani, and finally the Ἰλιπα of Polybius (for such Meyer supposes it to be) is changed by Livy into the more usual Roman form of Silpia. That the battle was fought near Seville is further supported by Appian, who mentions Carmona, which is only a few miles distant. Also Livy, in his account of Hasdrubal's retreat, implies that the battle itself was fought not so very far from the sea,¹ an implication which obviously suits Ilipa better than Baecula. There can be little doubt that the battle, which decided the fate of the Romans in Spain, and ultimately Hannibal's chance of success in the whole war, was fought near the little village of Alcala del Rio. Its position admirably suits Polybius' description: round to the north are low sloping hills which conform well with the mental picture that Polybius' account evokes. The whole lie of the site can be seen well from the top of the famous Giralda of Seville, or again, still nearer, from the amphitheatre of Italica (Sante ponce). There is not enough evidence to fix the site more precisely, but it must have lain by the hills beyond Alcala del Rio.

Scipio had advanced southwards with such speed that the upper Baetis fell into his hands without any show of resistance; from here he marched with his full force to near Seville, where he encamped on certain low hills opposite the enemy and in full sight of them. The situation which he faced was difficult, for, discounting his allies, he had not enough troops to risk a battle; while the fate of his father had taught him how dangerous it was to rely wholeheartedly on Spanish allies. So he devised a plan of using his allies to impress the enemy, and of leaving the real fighting to his own legions; how well this worked out the

¹ xxviii. 16. 8, 13.



ILIPA

PLATE II. View taken from the Amphitheatre of Italica (Sante ponce) looking towards Alcala del Rio. The low hills mentioned by Polybius (xi. 20. 9) can dimly be discerned on the horizon.

coming engagement proved. While Scipio was pitching his camp, Mago and Masinissa launched a cavalry attack in an attempt to surprise him. But they fell into a trap, for Scipio had foreseen such a possibility and had placed his own cavalry behind a hill. These charged out so unexpectedly that many of the enemy's horsemen, in pulling up and wheeling, were thrown from their saddles, but the rest rallied for a time till they were finally forced to retire.¹ The engagement had its natural reaction on the spirits of both sides. For the next few days they drew up their forces on the level ground between the two camps, but only cavalry and light infantry skirmishes took place.

After several days, during which Scipio intended that Hasdrubal should become quite familiar with the order of the Roman formation, he determined on action. He had seen that Hasdrubal always placed his African troops in the centre, and his allies on the wings, with the elephants in front of them. He himself had been in the habit of placing his Roman troops in the centre and his Spanish allies on the wings, that is, in a formation which corresponded with his opponent's. On the critical day, however, he reversed his usual procedure.

The previous evening² he had ordered his men to take

¹ Livy (13. 6-9), misunderstanding Polybius (XI. 21), assumes that the skirmish was undecided till the Roman cavalry was supported by the main troops; in this he is followed by Kahrstedt (p. 532). Brewitz takes Polybius' account to mean that the Roman cavalry showed the greatest dexterity in leaping from their horses during the battle, holding their manes in one hand and stabbing the enemy's horses in the bellies with the other, and then springing back again. This view is supported by Appian (*Ib.* 25), who says Scipio sent only his own cavalry; but in this account the episode is a general skirmish rather than a definite Carthaginian attack. Cf. W. Fischer, *Das Römische Lager*, p. 95.

² Livy, xxviii. 14. 6. Polybius (22. 4) says that the order was given on the morning of the battle itself; this discrepancy is noted by Kahrstedt (p. 317) and Soltau (*Hermes*, xxvi (1891), p. 422). Brewitz (p. 17), however, would solve the difficulty by taking the ἀμα τῷ φῶτι

their morning meal early, arm themselves and march out of camp as soon as it was light. This they did, and Scipio then launched an attack of the cavalry and light-armed troops against the enemy's camp. As the sun was rising, he advanced his main troops to the middle of the plain, and drew them up in the new order he had planned, placing the Spaniards in the centre and the Romans on the wings. By this clever alteration, Scipio tied the enemy's hands; for not only did it secure the fidelity of his own Spanish allies (for they would not now take any real part in the battle, and would not be tempted to desert to their fellow countrymen who were no longer opposite them), but it stopped the enemy making use of his best troops, the Africans of the centre. The attack on the Carthaginian camp also accomplished its aim, for the Carthaginians hardly had time to arm themselves, and Hasdrubal was forced to lead out his men before they could take their morning meal. He at once dispatched his cavalry and light infantry against those of the enemy, and hastily drew up his heavy infantry on the plain near the foot of the hill. In the face of the sudden Roman cavalry attack, he had to act too quickly to be able to alter his usual formation, even if he thought of doing this, and so he led out his men in their accustomed order. Probably it was some little time before he realised the changed Roman formation, and when he did, it was

with ἐξάγειν, not with διαπεμψάμενος, thus making the actual order be given the previous evening. This seems rather to strain the natural order of words. But if it was only when it was light that Scipio ordered his staff-officers to bid the men breakfast and arm, it is unlikely that there would be time for the order to be carried out, for the cavalry attack to be launched and for the main body to advance just as the sun was rising, especially in the south where the dawn is briefer than here. It is better to refer Polybius' remark to the previous evening and so agree with Livy. W. Fischer, *op. cit.* p. 118, would retain the Polybian morning order, on the ground that Livy, reading hurriedly, has given the usual custom instead of an exceptional method. Cf. Hesselbarth, p. 557.

too late for him to re-arrange his own troops. The Romans remained inactive for a time, waiting till the Carthaginians should begin to feel their lack of nourishment, and till they were still further fatigued by standing in the heat of the day. The sun rose higher and higher while the cavalry engagement and skirmishers surged to and fro. At last, about noon, Scipio felt the time for action had come. He received back his skirmishers through the gaps in his line, and placed them on the wings behind his infantry and in front of his cavalry. He then prepared to deliver the final blow at the Carthaginian power in Spain.

The Polybian account of the battle which followed is somewhat complicated; the Livian, which is based on it, confuses and misunderstands much. Kahrstedt (p. 317) comments, "The Polybian account of Scipio's operations is so difficult that only by great trouble, careful and exact translation and by drawings can the evolutions described become clear; and I gladly admit that I am not clear on every part of the passage. If Livy cuts it short, rejects all military details and so deranges much, it may not be good from the point of view of accuracy, but I sympathise with him." Veith remarks in the same strain, "Polybius' account is open to doubt; either the performance of the manœuvre was more complicated than necessary, or this reproach affects the account itself: one must be so." These views seem much exaggerated, for if Polybius' account is followed step by step, it is in the main perfectly clear. It is difficult to describe succinctly in words a complicated evolution, but there is no reason to blame either Scipio or Polybius, as Veith does; for the five stages of the manœuvre, as distinguished by Brewitz, could hardly have been simpler *per se*, and one can hardly expect them to be described in as many lines. Yet the account has given much trouble. Droysen thinks the evolution of P. xi. 23. 2, 3,

was made in the form of a curve, an unusual military formation, which would overstrain the discipline and ability of the troops, and would surely lead to confusion. Neumann, realising this, has made Droysen's curve into a right and left incline, which does not agree with Polybius' statement (23. 7) that the cavalry and light-armed troops changed positions on the wings. This move seems also to have confused Kahrstedt (p. 533), who speaks of the displacement of the sequence of the maniples, while Polybius expressly refers this to the cavalry and light-armed.

After placing his skirmishers on the wings behind the infantry, but in front of the cavalry, Scipio advanced to within half a mile of the enemy.¹ He then ordered his centre of Spanish allies to continue their advance slowly, while he himself commanded the right wing, and Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius the left. These wings carried out an identical movement, and it will be enough to follow the right wing, if it is realised that the left wing did exactly the same; though naturally the movements to either side were in exactly opposite directions for each wing, e.g. when the right wing wheeled to the left, the left wing wheeled to the right and *vice versa*.

After a short advance forward in line, the right wing turned to the right (second movement; P. 23. 1, 2). The rear ranks (i.e. light-armed and cavalry) did the same, but when they started to march, the head of their columns would be slightly in advance of that of the front rank (i.e. in this case further to the right) in order to prevent confusion in wheeling. The wing then marched out to the right in column, parallel to the Carthaginian line till its head was level with or stretched beyond the end of the Carthaginian left wing. This move was necessary because

¹ We must read *τετραστάδιον*, not *στάδιον*, as it is inconceivable that the manœuvre could have been carried out within 200 yards or so of the enemy; this agrees better with Livy's 500 paces (14. 13).

the enemy's front originally was longer than that of the Romans. Then the wing wheeled sharply to the left and marched toward the enemy in column (third movement; P. 23. 3). When it was near the enemy, it once more formed a line, the infantry carrying out a left form, the cavalry a right form (fourth movement; P. 23. 5, 6). It is inconceivable that a column of such length could merely have wheeled into line, the one rank swinging out to the left, the other to the right; such a movement would have invited a flank attack. They must surely have formed sections first, and then carried out the left and right form by sections. By this move, as Polybius says and as can be seen from the diagram, the relative positions of the parts of the infantry line remained unchanged (i.e. its left was still on the left), while the cavalry and light-armed line was now reversed, its original left being on its right and *vice versa*.¹ Meanwhile the Roman left wing had carried out a similar move, so that Scipio had brought his line up to the enemy's, which was at the same time outflanked. The final movement (the fifth) was the actual outflanking of the enemy's line by the Roman cavalry and light-armed on both wings.

The Carthaginian elephants, which were placed in front of the two wings, became frightened and stampeded, doing as much harm to their own side as to the enemy. The superior training and ability of the Roman troops on the wings soon told against the Spaniards opposed to them. The latter put up a gallant fight, but were worn out by the heat of the day, especially as they had not eaten before leaving their camp in the morning. About 140 years later, Hirtuleius was to realise the effect of the sun on his army in South Spain, only a few miles from this spot, at Italica; while the heat of the sun at Bailen, the scene of Scipio's earlier

¹ See p. 135. Note that the infantry line *ab* remains the same, but that the cavalry *aβ* is reversed to *βa*.


victory, was one of the causes of the capitulation of the Napoleonic army in 1808, after it had stood exposed all day.¹ So the Carthaginian wings gradually retreated, till they reached the foot of the hill, where they evidently hoped to make a stand, but when the Romans pushed their attack home, they fled in disorder to the camp. Meanwhile the Carthaginian best troops in the centre had been helpless and inactive; for they feared to send help to the wings in face of the enemy's centre, which would not give battle. At last the struggle was terminated by a cloud-burst which forced the Romans to return to their camp; the historicity of which occurrence there is no good ground to question.² Thus Scipio had managed to "fix" the enemy's best troops, while he used his own against the weaker part of the enemy and by a clever manœuvre succeeded in outflanking them.

It is, however, easier to explain the stages of Scipio's manœuvre than some other difficulties which arise from Polybius' account. Nothing is said of the Carthaginian cavalry. Could they not have taken the Roman wings in the flank or at least have made an effort to prevent the Roman outflanking movement? Obviously they must have received some check, though this is not mentioned in any of our authorities. Polybius (ch. 24) says: "because of this attack (on the wings), the elephants (who were drawn up before the Carthaginian wings), assailed by the missiles of the cavalry and velites, and harassed on every side, suffered severely and did as much damage to their own side as to the enemy. As for the infantry...." Probably it is here that the solution lies. The Carthaginian cavalry, when withdrawn from the skirmish, would be posted on the



¹ Cf. Sir Charles Oman, *op. cit.* I. p. 192.

² Dio (Zon. ix. 8) says the Romans captured the Carthaginian stronghold, and used the provisions which they found there. Three days before, when their own supplies were short, Scipio had prophesied that on a certain day they would make use of the enemy's. The Legend, mediated through Coelius, is again apparent.

FIRST STAGE



MOVEMENT OF ROMAN RIGHT WING



LAST STAGE

ILIPA

wings or behind them. Or if the elephants were drawn up in advance of, but beyond the left and right of the Carthaginian wings, as is suggested in Veith's plan of the battle, the cavalry might be posted behind these. When the Roman cavalry attacked, the elephants stampeded back and damaged their own troops: these must have been not only the Spanish infantry, but also the cavalry. Thus the Carthaginian cavalry was thrown into confusion at the first shock, and the Roman cavalry in its outflanking movement had no difficulty in beating them off the field. Another difficulty is to explain the inactivity of the Carthaginian centre. If they had charged home, the result might have been like that of Austerlitz. That is, there were two weak points in Scipio's manoeuvre—the risk that when his main forces marched out they might be outflanked, and secondly, the isolation of his centre and its having to refuse battle. The first was avoided through the fate of the Carthaginian horse; the second was acute and a grave risk. The only defence is that Scipio managed to carry it off. Hasdrubal did not dare attack the Roman centre, for if his own centre advanced, his wings would be still more exposed. Scipio ran the risk, hoping that Hasdrubal would hesitate, which, in fact, he did.¹

¹ Six objections against Brewitz's account of Ilipa are raised by Grosse (*Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1914), though they apply for the most part rather to the Polybian account itself. (1) Scipio's first movement, the withdrawal of his cavalry and light-armed from an undecided fight, is inconceivable. He needed them as a screen, behind which to carry out his critical infantry manoeuvres. (2) Why did the Carthaginians do nothing when Scipio was exposed at a distance of only 700 metres? Did the Carthaginian cavalry withdraw from courtesy? The nature of the ground, which naturally was unchanged from the first, cannot explain their inactivity, because the distance was so short. (3) Were the Carthaginian wings really so contemptible that Scipio should risk attacking them in column and deploy during the battle? (4) Why did the Carthaginian centre not try to break the enemy's centre by a sudden onset, for they must have known that the Spaniards were opposite them? This inactivity, which cannot be

The tactics were only a further development of those employed at Baecula. The army once again operated in three separate divisions—the centre and the two wings; while Scipio temporarily abandoned the control of the whole, and led in person one of the wings. It was on the wings that the battle was won, and by the self-reliance and unity of smaller bodies of men. The manœuvre needed training and discipline, especially the fourth move, the forming line from column, which probably was carried out by sections. By this time Scipio had got an army not only devoted to their general but one which had imbibed and practised his lesson, and had outgrown the old deficiency in mobility and in individual action. The lesson of Cannae had been taken to heart by Scipio, and was now applied with great brilliance against the enemy. Not only had he remedied the defects of his own army, but by

excused, can be explained only if the fate of the wings was decided extraordinarily quickly. This is unlikely as the Romans were in column and would arrive breathless; also Hasdrubal, as the stronger, could send help to the wings and had kept a corps in reserve. (5) The Carthaginians were tired by long standing. But what of the Romans, who also stood and then had a long double? The fact that they had breakfasted merely compensated for their extra exertions. (6) Was Hasdrubal as foolish as he appears? Brewitz thinks he could not form a plan quickly, though as a matter of fact the cavalry skirmish continued for some time.

The second and fourth alone of these objections are serious and have been discussed. Grosse's first objection is absurd, as most Roman battles were preceded by a preliminary skirmish, after which both sides withdrew their skirmishers preparatory to the real struggle. Scipio may have wanted a screen, but he could not have it, for these very horsemen were the troops who had to carry out the most important part of his manœuvre—the outflanking of the enemy. (3) It was not through contempt of the enemy that Scipio carried out his manœuvre, but from calculation; it would have been risky for the enemy's Spaniards to attack the Roman troops even in column, when these troops consisted partly of cavalry which by its rapidity of movement might easily be able to turn the tables. (5) and (6) are unimportant. Hasdrubal was in a fix, and could not change his position in face of the enemy; once he had drawn up his troops, he had to keep to his original plan.

a stroke of genius had been able to compensate for his inferior numbers by a measure which also prevented any disorder among the less trustworthy of his troops. Capt. Liddell Hart (p. 62) comments: "Military history contains no more classic example of generalship than this battle of Ilipa. Rarely has so complete a victory been gained by a weaker over a stronger force, and this result was due to a perfect application of the principles of surprise and concentration, that is in essence an example for all time. How crude does Frederick's famed oblique order appear beside Scipio's double oblique manœuvre and envelopment, which effected a crushing concentration *du fort au faible* while the enemy's centre was surely fixed. Scipio left the enemy no chance for the change of front which cost Frederick so dear at Kolin." Such a eulogy overlooks the two weak moments stressed above, but nevertheless Ilipa was a great advance on Baecula. For here Scipio held with his inferior troops the enemy's main troops of the centre, not merely the light-armed men; at the same time, he flung his own main strength against the enemy's wings—a move brought about during the battle itself. He had overcome the weakness of Baecula and, as Hannibal at Cannae, held the enemy's chief force while he encircled the wings. One defect still remained, that the Carthaginian centre was not actually engaged and so not held securely; Hasdrubal could have withdrawn his chief strength. That defect was remedied in Africa. Yet Ilipa was the justification of Scipio's military reforms and methods, and of his whole policy, for by it the fate of Spain was sealed and the Carthaginian cause there for ever lost. The whole war took on a different aspect.

During the night after the battle, the Carthaginians were forced to strengthen their camp instead of taking the rest they so badly needed. The moral effect of the battle soon began to tell, and the Spaniards commenced to desert the

Carthaginian cause. This movement was headed by Attenes, chief of the Turdetani, and followed up by the surrender of two towns to the Romans. Not knowing how far this movement would spread, Hasdrubal determined not to make a stand at his camp and see his forces slip away. So he retreated. Scipio sent on his cavalry and followed with the rest of the army, with which he blocked the passage of the Baetis. Hasdrubal, unable to cross the river, headed for the sea, but was so harassed and retarded by the Roman cavalry, that at last he was overtaken by the main Roman army. His force suffered great loss, until he escaped with some 6000 men to a stronghold in the hills. On an impregnable height, but without adequate food or water, he saw more of his troops desert, and so at length he fled by night to the sea near by, where ships awaited him. On reaching Gades he was soon after joined by Mago. The army was left to its fate, which was only a question of time. Scipio left Silanus with 11,000 men to complete the victory, while he himself returned to New Carthage.¹ After Mago's departure, the rest of the Carthaginian army broke up, part deserting to the Romans, part dispersing. Silanus was soon able to join Scipio at New Carthage and report that the war was over. Capt. Liddell Hart comments on Scipio's pursuit: "Masterly as were his battle tactics, still more remarkable perhaps were the decisiveness and rapidity of their exploitation, which found no parallel in military history until Napoleon came to develop the pursuit as the vital complement of battle, and one of the supreme tests of generalship." But Scipio did not stand alone in his glory. What of Alexander in 331, or Caesar after Pharsalus, or Lucullus after Tigranocerta?

"Such was the way in which, under the conduct and auspices of Publius Scipio, the Carthaginians were expelled

¹ Probably to New Carthage, not to Tarraco as Livy says; see Appendix III, "The Chronology of the Spanish Campaign," p. 308 sq.

from Spain," says Livy (xxviii. 16); for at Ilipa the Carthaginian cause in Spain was finally shattered. Yet there remained much to do, and Scipio spent one of the busiest years of his life—so busy, in fact, that some scholars question whether he could have accomplished so much in the same year as Ilipa, and, deciding that he could not, have transferred Ilipa to the previous year.¹ The field was won, but Scipio had now to turn to diplomatic arrangements and punitive expeditions.

He was now able to think seriously of the ideal to which he had long been struggling. He had seen that the solution to the first part of the war lay in Spain, and had seen beyond—that the only way to force Hannibal from Italy was to strike at the enemy's heart, Africa. Foreseeing that the war must be fought in Africa, and hoping that he would be able to convince the conservative government at home of this truth, he began to build up as strong a position as he could by attempting to win over the native princes. The two most important of these were Syphax and Masinissa, the former being the more powerful, the latter the more able. Soon after Scipio had left the south, Masinissa, who had supported the Carthaginians in Spain, came to a secret agreement with Silanus, and crossed over to Africa to try to win over his people to the Roman cause.² But at the moment, Scipio was after bigger game than Masinissa. Laelius was sent over to Africa to approach Syphax who was nominally in alliance with Carthage. But Scipio knew that a treaty would not stand in the way of Syphax' interest, if the prince considered that to lie with the new conquerors of Spain. Syphax, though receiving Laelius in a friendly manner, would not commit himself beyond granting Scipio a safe-conduct if he would come to discuss the matter in person, an act on which Syphax

¹ See Appendix III, pp. 304 *sqq.*

² L. xxviii. 16.

insisted. Meanwhile Scipio had been at New Carthage, whence he had dispatched his brother Lucius to Rome in charge of many prisoners of rank to announce the subjugation of Spain. On Laelius' return he committed the charge of Spain to Lucius Marcius at New Carthage and M. Silanus at Tarraco,¹ and determined to sail to Africa.

This attempt was undoubtedly a risk, but Scipio was not the man to undertake a venture unless he thought it worth while. Mommsen's judgment is surely unjust to Scipio—"a foolhardy venture, which was not warranted by any corresponding advantage, however much the report of it might please the curiosity of the citizens of the capital at home." Scipio knew how risky it was to expose his person to a country in the enemy's sphere of influence, and to trust the promises of safe-conduct from Syphax who might well play him false. But he saw clearly that some attempt must be made to build up a strong pro-Roman party in North-west Africa, preparatory to carrying the war over there, especially as Syphax' territory was dangerously near Spain and would give the Carthaginians a base of operations and source of supplies, if only they could be sure of his support. So weighing the risks, Scipio set sail for Africa, taking only two quinqueremes. The danger proved even greater than he had anticipated, for after a calm voyage he was just off the harbour when he sighted Hasdrubal with seven triremes. The Carthaginian had also come to seek the support of Syphax, and now saw the victor of Ilipa in his grasp. He made a desperate effort to get his ships under weigh, but the wind suddenly freshened and Scipio sailed into the harbour before Hasdrubal could intercept him. Once within the port Scipio was safe, for Hasdrubal was afraid to interfere lest he might alienate Syphax. Soon afterwards the men, who had faced each other at Ilipa, met under Syphax' roof and dined together

¹ See Appendix III, p. 308.

with the king. Surely one of the most dramatic incidents of the whole war! What occurred can only be imagined; all we know is that Scipio's personal charm and tact seem to have won the day. Not only was Syphax won over, but even Hasdrubal was amazed at Scipio's personality, which impressed him more in private life than it had after his military successes. He saw with alarm what an impression Scipio's adroitness and charm in conversation might make on Syphax. No definite results were reached by the meeting—indeed none could have been, for Scipio did not come as an ambassador of Rome with full powers, but in a private capacity. But that does not mean that "the venture was not warranted by any corresponding advantage." Even if a treaty had been ratified, which Livy says was done, no one would know better than Scipio how formal it would be. What Scipio gained was a great moral advantage. He impressed Syphax with the might and grandeur of Rome, and struck a severe blow at Carthage, who feared nothing more than the consolidation of the tribes in the west, with Syphax at their head and a pro-Roman policy. After a stormy voyage of four days, Scipio reached New Carthage, confident that he had done all that was possible to win a foothold in Africa. He could not foresee that the charms of Hasdrubal's daughter would counteract the impression he had made, and that Syphax would be won to Carthage by more subtle means.¹ In the same way, some hundred years later another great aristocrat, Sulla, was to risk his personal safety by interviewing a Numidian sheikh, and so bring the Jugurthine War to a successful conclusion.

With the way paved for future advance in Africa, Scipio could turn to those Spanish towns which must be punished for their past conduct.² He marched first to Ilurgia

¹ P. XI. 24 a. 4. L. chs. 17, 18.

² The chief of these were, according to Livy (xxviii. 19), Iliturgi and

(Ilorci), which he found prepared for a siege, and the inhabitants, who feared the worst, prepared to sell their

Castulo. Appian, however, gives Ἰλúργια, and Κάσταξ. In Steph. Byz. we find Ἰλούργεια, πόλις Ἰβηρίας. Πολύβιος ἐνδεκατῇ (XI. 24. 10); and so in Polybius' lost description of the town, we may assume the name to be the same as Appian's. This can hardly be equivalent to Livy's Iliturgi, and probably we find here an example of a not uncommon practice of Livy or Coelius, of substituting the names of known for unknown towns. Meyer (p. 445) rightly identifies Ἰλούργεια with the town Ilorci, which Pliny (III. 9) mentions as the place where Gnaeus Scipio had met his fate, the "rogum Scipionis." This town, Ilorci, was situated on the Tader (now the Segura), as Meyer shows by correcting the punctuation of Pliny (see above, p. 50 n. 1). Unfortunately, Meyer then goes on to equate Ilorci with the modern town of Lorca some 70 km. west of Cartagena. Lorca lies by the river Guadalentin near where it flows into the Sangonera, which in turn joins the Segura (the Tader) at Murcia. Thus Lorca is not on the Tader; and it cannot be the ancient Ilorci, for it is generally supposed to have been named Eliocroca. The site of Ilorci (or Ilurgia) is surely to be found in the modern name Lorqui, a village which does lie on the Segura and is situated 21 km. by rail to the north of Murcia. This identification is supported not only by Pliny's evidence and the similarity of name, but also by the fact that Lorqui was definitely a Roman town; P. Madoz (*Diccionario geogr. hist. de España*, under Lorqui) points out that the discovery of Roman tombs, inscriptions and other objects is often made there. Here was the "rogum Scipionis" and also the town to which Publius Scipio now turned his attention. Livy says that Scipio took action against Iliturgi because at the defeat of the Scipios its inhabitants had gone over to the Carthaginians and had put to death some refugees of the disaster. It is far more probable that those who fled from the field would take refuge in the neighbouring town of Ilorci rather than make their way deeper into the enemy's country by fleeing to Iliturgi, which lay on the south bank of the Baetis, to the west of Menjibar, 30 km. west of Castulo (not at Cuevas de Lituergo on the north bank, 11 km. east of Andujar; cf. Schulten, p. 289, n. 4). A further objection to Iliturgi is that in a straight line it is some 200 miles from New Carthage, and we are told that Scipio reached it in five days; actually the country between is very mountainous and it is inconceivable that Scipio could get there so quickly. If his objective was Ilorci (Lorqui), which is 87 km. from New Carthage, the march would be at the rate of just over 10 miles a day, which is more reasonable than the 45-50 miles a day we should have to suppose if he went against Iliturgi. He would march fairly slowly to let the news of his approach reach the town, which might

lives as dearly as possible and to fight with the courage born of despair. The Romans may have been less eager to turn against Spaniards alone, but were encouraged by Scipio, who harped on the treachery and cruelty of which the town had been guilty. He delivered a double assault, Laelius being in command of one division. The town resisted desperately, even the women and children. At one moment Scipio had to attempt to scale the walls himself, to re-inspire his men, but the action was sufficient and he was called back.¹ At length the double attack succeeded and the walls were taken. Some African deserters, who were serving with the Romans, succeeded in scaling the precipitous citadel with the help of iron hooks, and so the last resistance crumbled. Scipio's treatment of the town was brutal in the extreme. The whole population was massacred, and the town itself utterly destroyed. He knew that an example was necessary, and did not flinch from giving it in all its horror, and from departing for once from his usual policy of clemency. The incident recalls the great blot on Caesar's military career, when in 55 B.C. he repaid treachery with treachery and massacred a whole German tribe. Yet Scipio, still more perhaps than Caesar, had the excuse that a severe lesson was necessary. No wonder that Livy knew but little of the town and muddled it with

surrender through fear without attempting any resistance. So doubtless here Livy or his source has substituted the well-known name of Iliturgi for the lesser-known town of Ilorci. Schulten rightly sees that the town which was stormed is not Iliturgi on the Baetis, but he follows Meyer in identifying it with Lorca. What then of Livy's Castulo and Appian's Κάσταξ; unfortunately there is here no Polybius to support us. These are different towns, because elsewhere Appian (*Ib.* 16) mentions Καστολῶν—Castulo. Presumably here too Livy has given the better-known for the lesser-known; it seems rather illogical to suppose a change in one and not in the other, as Meyer does.

¹ Dio (*Zon.* ix. 10) says Scipio scaled the wall and was wounded. Cf. Appian, *Ib.* 32. This addition shows Dio is here using not Livy but Coelius.

Iliturgi, when it was thus razed to the ground. Capt. Liddell Hart comments on how "consistently Scipio executes a convergent assault—his force divided into independently manœuvring parts to effect surprise, and strain the enemy's defence, yet combining on a common objective. How strongly does his appreciation of this, the essential formula of tactics, contrast with its rarity in ancient warfare, in modern also, for how often do commanders wreck their plan either on the Scylla of a divided objective or on the Charybdis of a feint or 'holding' attack to divert the enemy's attention and reserves from their main blow." Scipio was not alone in favouring a converging attack, for it was a favourite manœuvre of Agrippa and Augustus, and was carried out successfully, for instance, against Sex. Pompeius. Yet such a method involves risk. In his attack on Drogheda, Cromwell apologised for investing only the south of the town, because a division of his army would have shown such a want of "correspondency" as to afford the enemy a chance of defeating them in detail. Scipio however succeeded. Again Moltke at Sadowa showed the value of converging attacks; Sedan also bears witness ("getrennt marschieren, vereint schlagen"). Moltke had good chiefs of staff for his separate armies, and Scipio may have owed much to the efficiency of Laelius and Marcius.

Marcius, who had been sent by Scipio with a third of the army against the unknown town of Castax, had apparently made but little progress. When Scipio marched there, after settling his debt with Ilurgia, the town was still resisting. But the news of his approach, and still more the news of the fate of Ilurgia, caused the Spanish element in the town to surrender, though some Carthaginians, who were there, counselled resistance. The necessary example had been given, and so Scipio could treat Castax with clemency. He then returned to New Carthage, while

Marcius was sent to reduce any tribes which were still obstinate. This was soon done, for when he crossed the Baetis two cities surrendered without any attempt at resistance. But one city, Astapa,¹ which had always been hostile to the Romans and had constantly harassed any small bodies of Roman troops in the neighbourhood, thought there was little chance of safety in surrender, and so resisted desperately. The armed men made a vigorous sally and almost turned the Roman line, which only rallied when the veterans came up. Being unable to beat back the attack, the Romans made use of their superior numbers to extend their line and outflank the enemy who were killed to a man. At this, all the women, children and property in the town were immolated by a guard told off for this purpose. Such was their hatred that they preferred death to surrender. After this Marcius rejoined Scipio at New Carthage.²

Meanwhile Scipio had been holding gladiatorial shows at New Carthage, perhaps on the site of the ancient amphitheatre and the modern bull-ring, to honour the memory of his father and uncle. These differed from the usual type, as the participators were not slaves but volunteers who wished to display the prowess of their race or settle private disputes; native princes were among the combatants. These contests were followed by funeral games, on which Scipio lavished all the resources of the province and his camp. During this time Mago had been defending Gades, the one town which still held out against the Romans, and had succeeded in collecting a considerable force by recruiting from the native tribes and from the African coast. Deserters reached Scipio from Gades,

¹ Astapa is the modern town of Estepa, not far from Osuna (Urso).

² Appian (*Ib.* 33) says that Marcius spared the houses in admiration of the Astapians. This version is somewhat more honourable to the Romans, but the act was rather purposeless if all the inhabitants were really killed.

who promised to betray the city. Marcius was sent off with some light-armed troops by land, while Laelius went by sea with seven triremes and a quinquereme to conduct joint operations against the town by land and sea, as Laelius and Scipio himself had done against New Carthage. Possibly Scipio himself intended to follow with more troops if they were necessary, as in fact they proved to be; but he was prevented by illness.

This illness, which laid him low in New Carthage for a short time, was serious. Rumours began to spread throughout the land that it was likely to prove, or indeed had proved, fatal. This was the opportunity for which all the discontented elements in the country had been waiting. Mandonius and Indibilis began to ravage the territory of tribes allied to Rome, while even more serious was the outbreak of a mutiny among the Roman troops on the Sucro, which prevented immediate action from being taken against the rebellious Spanish tribes.

The 8000 men stationed on Scipio's lines of communication at the Sucro¹ had been demoralised through a long period of inactivity. They were deprived of the plunder which active service involved, and were even suffering from arrears of pay. It is a little surprising that they were short of pay, now that the mines of New Carthage were in Roman hands, but doubtless Scipio had more pressing

¹ The place and numbers are not given in the long Polybian fragment on the mutiny (xi. 25-30), which omits the beginning. Livy, 24. 5, says these troops were protecting the tribes on this side of the Ebro. Kahrstedt (p. 322) says if there was a Sucro north of the river, the mutiny would have been settled from Tarraco not from New Carthage; so either Livy is corrupt or he is slavishly following a very old source which looked at things from the point of view of Scipio's camp and knew nothing of the distinction of Hispania Interior and Ulterior. But if Livy can say that Hannibal broke the treaty of 226 by crossing the Ebro and attacking Saguntum, which lies 100 miles south of the Ebro, perhaps he may have blundered also on the position of the Sucro.

claims on his resources than those of these troops. The festering sore came to a head when the news of Scipio's illness reached them, and they broke into open mutiny, driving out the tribunes and placing the supreme command in the hands of two common soldiers.¹ Soon, however, they began to realise that their assumption had been rather hasty, and seven military tribunes arrived in the camp, sent by Scipio to announce his recovery. These officers wisely avoided all criticism, and went about the camp trying to find out in a sympathetic manner the causes of the discontent. Scipio was faced with one of the most trying episodes of his life, for on his handling of this affair hung all his future hopes; he must crush the mutiny, but feared to alienate the loyal troops by harsh measures. As the unrest was showing signs of decreasing, he hit upon a masterly plan to punish the ringleaders and win back the rest to allegiance. He sent round officers to collect tribute from various tribes, and ordered the mutineers to come to New Carthage to receive their arrears of pay. This they were ready to do, as their courage was turning to fear, especially as Mandonius and Indibilis had retired to their own territory on the news of Scipio's recovery. On their arrival at New Carthage they found the army about to start on a punitive expedition against the revolted Spanish tribes, and so they hoped to be able to dictate

¹ By name C. Albius of Cales and C. Atrius, an Umbrian, according to Livy, 24. 13. None of the ringleaders is named by Polybius. Kahrstedt, De Sanctis, etc., reject these names as inventions, because the men are not Romans but Italians (which is to exculpate and credit the Roman element in the army), and because it can hardly be imagined that the Roman army would choose two Italians as their leaders. Brewitz thinks the invention is due to Coelius, or perhaps to the younger annalists, on the ground that Appian has not the names. The coincidence of White and Black makes it unlikely that the real names have been preserved, although if one leader was really named Albius the other might have been nicknamed Atrius. Appian (*Ib.* 34) adds that the mutineers received financial support from Mago.

terms, when once the general was separated from his army. The ringleaders were decoyed into accepting the hospitality of certain tribunes, while the rest of Scipio's army guarded the gates instead of proceeding against Mandonius. The next morning Scipio summoned an assembly in the Forum, but as soon as they were gathered together, and that unarmed, they realised that there was a ring of loyal troops around them. Their spirits were still further cowed by Scipio's healthy appearance and foreboding expression. After sitting on the tribunal in silence for some time, he came forward and addressed the frightened men. His speech is given by Polybius and Livy, and in both accounts the substance is the same, but the spirit is different. "I greatly doubt," says Prof. Conway, "whether any mutineer who had heard the speech which Polybius gives would have been influenced by any motive but that of fear; whereas the speech, as Livy gives it, is an appeal to the warmest personal feelings of the soldiers, their old loyalty to Rome, their sympathy for their general, newly recovered from illness, and their gratitude for the forgiveness which he promises. Livy shows us Scipio entering into the feelings of the mutineers with a quite divine comprehension." Polybius saw only the deliberate working on their fears and its successful issue; but why should we deny Scipio tact, which was both real and sympathetic? A sympathetic understanding of all men was not perhaps one of the ideal attributes of the great man in Polybius' eyes; the Stoic rationalist did not see the whole man.

The hush which followed Scipio's words was broken by the surrounding troops clashing their swords on their shields, while the voice of the clerk was heard reciting the names of the doomed. The thirty-eight ringleaders were brought in bound and naked, and then scourged and executed before the frightened gaze of their late followers.


Scipio had followed up his words with a terrifying appeal to the emotions and senses. The mutineers, now assured of forgiveness, came forward singly to take the oath of obedience, and receive the pay due to them. By his adroit handling, Scipio had averted a great danger and now had an even more devoted army. Capt. Liddell Hart sees a close parallel to Pétain's methods of quelling the mutineers of 1917.

While the folly of a few troops had endangered the Roman cause in Spain, Laelius and Marcius had been attempting to win over the last Carthaginian stronghold in the peninsula, Gades. This was essentially a commercial city, and drew its wealth very largely from the hinterland, acting as middleman between Baetica and Carthage. If the Baetis valley fell into the hands of the Romans, economic ruin would overtake the traders of Gades; their Spanish commerce would be lost, unless they looked to the support of the new ruler. Also they were irritated by the residence of Mago and his troops, and by the consequent demands made on their resources, which must have been in low water after the economic drain of the war. They might even hope for good terms from the Romans who perhaps would be satisfied with the rest of Spain, if indeed they wanted any more territory or if the idea of economic exploitation of a conquered land ever entered their minds. So, as we have seen, deserters had approached the Romans, and Scipio had sent on Laelius and Marcius before his illness. Marcius fared well, for he stopped the Carthaginians recruiting further. He fell on the camp of Hanno, who had been entrusted with this task, captured it and cut down a large part of the newly raised force. More deserters reached Marcius, but their plot to betray Gades miscarried. The conspirators were arrested and sent to Carthage on board a quinquereme under the command of Adherbal who followed with a convoy of eight triremes.

Meanwhile Laelius did not penetrate to the Atlantic but stationed the fleet at Carteia, which lay just within the Mediterranean near Gibraltar. From here he saw the Carthaginian convoy passing through the straits, and bore down on it. An engagement followed, but the strength of the current outweighed the tactical plans of either side. Laelius sank two triremes and disabled a third, but the rest reached Africa in safety. On returning to Carteia, Laelius learnt of the failure of the plot to betray Gades, and he and Marcius decided that they ought not to waste time in besieging Gades, which was situated on an island and so difficult of approach, but to return at once to Scipio; on this decision they acted. Why they did not attempt a converging attack on Gades, is not clear, unless they were under orders from Scipio to return if they did not meet with instant success. The north was more dangerous at the moment, and Gades could wait for the day of retribution. The expedition had proved abortive, except that the Carthaginians had been prevented from gaining further recruits by land. The two Roman generals were not alone in finding the town difficult of approach. In 1800 another abortive attempt was made on Cadiz by Sir Ralph Abercromby and Lord Keith. The latter's refusal to take the responsibility of saying whether the anchorage would be safe, led to a muddled attempt at disembarkation and the abandonment of the enterprise.

When at length the mutiny had been quelled, Scipio could turn to the less serious danger of the incursions of Mandonius and Indibilis. These princes felt that no mercy would be meted out to them, and so decided to make one last bid against the new conqueror of Spain. Collecting a force of 20,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry, they marched into the territory of the Edetani. From Scipio's point of view this was not without its bright side, as he now had an objective and a unifying purpose to set before his men.

He pointed out¹ to them that there were no Spanish allies in the Roman army, for he wished the rebellious tribes to be crushed by Romans alone. The army, eager to blot out its past disgrace, crossed the Ebro on the tenth day after leaving New Carthage², and four days later came up with the enemy. We have no evidence to fix the site of the battle which followed, beyond that it was four days' march up country from the mouth of the Ebro. It is not even clear



on which side of the river it was fought. Polybius (XI. 32. 1) and Livy (ch. 33) say the Romans crossed to the north of it; but Livy (ch. 31) says the Spaniards had crossed into Sedetania, which is south of the river. So either the Romans crossed back to the south, or the Spaniards back to the

¹ Brewitz sees in the speech, which Livy (XXVIII. 32) assigns to Scipio, the rhetoric of Coelius, and thinks all the embellishments on the Polybian account are not due to Livy himself, e.g. phrases like "turn se haud secus quam viscera secantem sua...".

² A march at this rate is unlikely, notwithstanding the enthusiasm of the men, cf. above p. 67 n. 1.

north on hearing of the Roman approach, or Livy is wrong. But the general position is significant. It is possible to minimise the importance of this last victory of Scipio in Spain; but geographical considerations should make one careful. The rebel tribes had a strong force some way up the Ebro in the highlands, possibly in Celtiberia, and this seriously imperilled the Roman cause. In 76 B.C. Sertorius occupied a similar position, and caused Pompey and Metellus the greatest embarrassment; it is true that Sertorius had command of the sea through his understanding with the pirates; but, even without that, a strong force on the upper Ebro could endanger the Roman lines of communication and control the coast road. It was imperative that Scipio should punish his former allies, to maintain his safety as well as his prestige. Although he never really mastered the interior of Spain, which required years of guerilla warfare, he did win nominal allegiance from the tribes of the interior in the north, which it was essential to hold. The generalship of Alexander is sometimes depreciated by regarding his foes as Asiatic hordes; it is also possible to under-rate Scipio's opponents. The native tribes, skilled in guerilla tactics, might have given the Roman army much trouble. But Scipio was able to force on them a pitched battle on level ground. He might belittle the foe to his men—according to Livy (ch. 32) he did: they were mere brigands who could ravage their neighbours' lands but had no courage in a pitched battle, when they would trust to flight rather than to their arms. But these are just the dangers Scipio himself must have feared. Did the Romans of the next century really subdue the interior? Viriathus and Sertorius show the difficulty of successfully combating guerilla warfare.

Scipio found the enemy encamped on a hill, and took up his own position on another hill opposite, with a level stretch of ground in front of his camp. The ends of this

valley were shut in by mountains. The next day he drove into the valley, as a bait, some of the cattle which accompanied his army.¹ The Spaniards descended into the plain and were attacked by the Roman light troops. As each side sent up reinforcements, a sharp infantry skirmish ensued. Laelius had meanwhile been posted ready with the cavalry, according to Livy, behind a projecting mountain spur. He now led a charge which cut off the Spaniards from their hillside and camp, and at the same time he launched a frontal attack. The preliminary skirmish merely infuriated the Spaniards who determined to fight a pitched battle. Thus Scipio had cleverly drawn his opponents to a decision, in which the superiority of Roman training and equipment would count.

Next day they drew up in battle array on the plain; but this was too narrow for their whole force. The cavalry and infantry were drawn up in line, although some of the cavalry was probably behind the infantry line; the light-armed troops, consisting of a third of the whole force, were posted on the hill-side. This was what Scipio needed; for the enemy could not employ his full strength, and the cavalry massed with the infantry would be useless. Scipio's usual outflanking tactics were precluded by the confined space, but he hit on a brilliant extension of this plan. Laelius was detached with the cavalry. As soon as the battle commenced and the enemy's attention was engaged, he was to attempt a wide sweeping outflanking move, as far as possible under the cover of the hills. The Roman light troops were sent against those of the enemy on the hill-side, while the infantry line of four cohorts (there was room for no more) fell on the enemy in the valley. Laelius

¹ So P. 32. 2. Not the enemy's cattle which he had rounded up from the neighbouring fields, as L. 33. 2. For, as Kahrstedt (p. 323) says, the enemy were prepared for Scipio's arrival and so their cattle would be in safety, and only fell into the hands of the Romans after the victory.

executed his turning movement and caught the enemy's cavalry in the rear, which, not having enough space to operate in, was faced by the Roman infantry in front, and was pressed on by its own infantry in the flank. The greater part of the Spanish infantry, which had relied on the help of the cavalry, was cut to pieces.¹ The light troops posted on the hills succeeded in escaping to a strong position; among these were Indibilis and Mandonius. The Spanish camp and 3000 prisoners were secured.

As his cause was now lost, the only course open to Indibilis was to throw himself on Scipio's mercy. So he sent Mandonius to plead his case. Scipio showed him how completely he was in his power, and then granted the Spaniards security,² demanding no hostages, but exacting indemnities sufficient to supply the arrears of pay for his troops. Those who minimise the importance of this revolt,³ find support in Scipio not having exacted any hostages. This, however, was probably due to policy, not to its

¹ Livy (34. 2) puts the Roman losses at 2000, Appian (*Ib.* 37), at 1200. Livy suggests that two-thirds of the whole Spanish force was destroyed, i.e. 15,000 men. Appian gives 20,000 for the Spanish losses. This is due, according to Brewitz (p. 24), to the middle annalist, who takes for the number of the fallen, the total number of the infantry. The figure, as it stands, is obviously too large. Even Livy's "ad unum omnes" is an exaggeration of Polybius' *σχεδὸν ἅπαντες*. We may suppose some half of the whole force was destroyed.

² Livy (ch. 34) says that it was the traditional practice of the Romans not to treat with a conquered nation with whom no friendly relations had previously existed either through treaty or community of rights and laws, till all their possessions and arms had been surrendered, hostages given, and garrisons placed in their towns; while now Scipio did treat with them. This passage undoubtedly derives from the lost chapters of Polybius, who must have made one of his usual digressions on Roman methods. Has Livy quoted unwisely, without giving the full context? For we have here a case which is not quite parallel, as friendly relations had previously existed between the Romans and Indibilis (P. x. 38. 4), and so there was no need for Scipio to apply the traditional Roman procedure.

³ E.g. De Sanctis, p. 503.

unimportance. He had taken hostages from Indibilis before, and still held them, we may presume, for we do not hear of their return. But this had not stopped the revolt of the Spaniard, and there was no guarantee that more hostages would restrain him in the future. Scipio made a virtue of necessity, and tried to appeal to the loyalty of his former allies by granting them easy terms. He knew that the worst move he could make was to leave an embittered enemy behind him in Spain, especially one that commanded such an important strategic position. Short of a real reduction of the highlands, for which he had not time, as the needs of Italy were calling, he did all that was possible. By brilliant tactics he administered a severe defeat on his opponents, and then tried to win their friendship. Harshness would merely have alienated them, and have left behind a festering sore.

Marcus was sent to South Spain, and Scipio followed in a few days with a light-armed force, after settling the question of the indemnity to be paid by the Ilergetes. He overtook Marcus near the Atlantic. The object of this journey was to meet Masinissa who was at Gades but desirous to go over to Scipio. The African prince persuaded Mago that his horses needed exercise on the mainland, and so found an opportunity of meeting Scipio. At a secret conference, Masinissa seems to have been astounded; like Syphax, at Scipio's personality, and promised Scipio all the help he could give, especially in Africa. He then returned to Gades while Scipio hastened back to Tarraco.¹

¹ Such is Livy's account (xxviii. 35) and there is no reason to question it; it corresponds to the earlier story (xxvii. 19) of Scipio's treatment of Massiva, Masinissa's nephew, after Baecula. Neither of these stories is directly supported by Polybius' extant narrative, but it is probable he related them. The corresponding visit to Syphax is only supported by a chance fragment of Polybius. Scipio knew the value of these African princes, and would endeavour to secure them as allies in his hoped-for African campaign; he realised the great import-

It may be that on this journey Scipio also busied himself with the founding of the city of Italica, near Seville and the site of Ilipa, where he settled some of his veterans, including the sick and wounded.¹ He may have inaugurated this scheme when he was at New Carthage earlier in the year, and now went to see how it was progressing. He had now brought his army with him and could spare more of his troops to carry out this enterprise. Some of them were settled down here, while he himself returned to Italy. Alexander, with whom Scipio had much in common, was not the only founder of cities. Is it too fanciful to see in Scipio's act a conscious imitation, or is it merely the same need producing the same result through two men of genius? Scipio had conquered Spain and knew it must remain Rome's, and so he tried to give it a small Italian community which might act as leaven in the Baetis valley, teaching the natives something of Roman thought and methods. This plan shows not only Scipio's care for his troops, but also his boldness in experiment, for it marked a new departure in Roman colonial history, and its success is seen in the fact that Italica provided Rome with many good citizens, including two Emperors, Trajan and Hadrian.² His work now done, Scipio returned to Tarraco and sailed with ten ships to Rome in time for the consular

ance of Masinissa and his cavalry, an arm in which the Romans were always weak, and might think it worth a hurried journey to the south to try to secure his friendship. The only reason for rejecting the incident as annalistic or deriving ultimately from Ennius, is that Polybius' (x1. 33. 7, 8) account of Scipio's return to Tarraco follows next to the account of the defeat of Indibilis. But there is evidently a gap in the narrative here—the second paragraph is to be placed after some missing portion which may well have included the episode of Masinissa. To reject it would simplify the chronology of this congested year, but this is not justifiable or necessary.

¹ Appian, *Ib.* 38.

² Cf. Dr B. W. Henderson, *Hadrian*, pp. 9–13, and J. S. Reid, *Municipalities of the Roman Empire*, p. 84.

elections for 205, leaving the Spanish command to Marcius and Silanus.¹

Spain was conquered; only Gades held out, and it now surrendered. Mago's hopes had been raised by the mutiny and Spanish revolt, but after their failure, he despaired of effecting anything in Spain, and prepared to leave the country. At this moment, orders reached him from Carthage to join Hannibal in Italy, recruiting Gauls and Ligurians on his way. He was sent some money and raised more by plundering Gades, thus alienating the last shreds of the inhabitants' sympathy for the Carthaginian cause. Next he planned a surprise attack on New Carthage, hoping that there might be a pro-Carthaginian party in the city, and that it was held by a weak garrison. He landed by the canal, but was surprised by a sally and escaped with difficulty by sea, after losing 800 men. Thus his last attempt had proved abortive. Mago had acted too late; his intention was admirable but he had missed his opportunity. While Scipio was engaged with the mutiny and revolted Spanish tribes, Mago should have tried to win a base on the east coast or in one of the islands off it, from which he could help the discontented Spaniards. Gades was useless to him; he should have applied all his force where it had some chance of being useful. It was too late in the day to try slowly to rebuild the Carthaginian cause in the

¹ P. xi. 33. 8. Livy (xxviii. 38. 1) says Scipio left the command to L. Manlius Acidinus and L. Lentulus. Probably Polybius is correct, and Scipio's successors did not arrive before he left. Dio, 57, 56 (Zon. ix. 11) adds that two praetors were sent to call him home, for fear that he might become a tyrant. This is probably an invention of the compiler's (not of Livy or Coelius), due to the tendencies of his own day. Dio himself is perhaps responsible for the erroneous statement that Scipio could not have been elected consul in the year after his return. This is because he has transferred Baecula to 209, Ilipa to 208 and so has to finish the war in 207. Appian (*Ib.* 38) says Scipio left a reduced force in Spain, and Livy (xxix. 2. 9) mentions two legions there in 205.

south. He should have staked all on a last desperate throw, if he was to maintain the Carthaginian cause in Spain. It is, of course, possible that Livy has confused the order of events and that Mago's attempt on New Carthage took place during, not after, the revolt. In that case it was a brilliant counter-attack which failed. As it stands, it is merely a forlorn venture to get a base in East Spain, which was launched too late.

On returning to Gades, Mago found that it had at last deserted the Carthaginian cause and had closed its gates to him. He sailed off to the island of Pityusa, where he got supplies to make an attempt on the Balearic Isles. He was repulsed by Majorca through the sturdy efforts of the native slingers, but won over Minorca and wintered there, leaving his name permanently enshrined in its capital, Mahon. Had his strength been adequate, the position was good. When based on Minorca, Sir Charles Stuart was urged by Dundas and Lord St Vincent to make an attempt on Cartagena, but he refused because of its difficulty. Mago's forces now were far too weak to attempt any such action again. Meanwhile Gades was relieved of its Carthaginian garrison, and turned to the Romans by whom it was well treated, as its continued prosperity shows.¹ The last Carthaginian stronghold in Spain had fallen, and Scipio was returning to Rome in triumph.

¹ Cf. Strabo, III. 168 *sq.*

CHAPTER SIX

THE INTERLUDE

SCIPIO returned from Spain in triumph to Rome, and in the temple of Bellona before the assembled Senate gave a report of his conquest of Spain. He hoped he would be granted a formal triumph, which as a mere "*privatus cum imperio*" he could not claim. But as the Senate showed no sign of setting aside its traditional policy, he wisely did not press for the outward show. He was just in time to stand for the consular elections. Crowds flocked, we are told, to the Capitol to see and vote for the new conqueror, while rumours were rife that he ought to have Africa for his province—as if the war in Italy was ended. He was easily elected with P. Licinius Crassus, the Pontifex Maximus, as his colleague, and entered his new office in 205. Party politics had favoured his election, for his successes and those of Fabius had caused the overthrow of Fulvius Flaccus and the Claudian party in the elections of 208. Again the old connection between the Aemilii and Scipios was strengthened, for they had found a leader in M. Livius Salinator, who was the old enemy of Claudius Nero and the kinsman of Veturius, and also related to Scipio's father-in-law, Aemilius Paulus. He had been recalled from his retirement and elected consul in 207, with his rival Nero. After their joint victory at Metaurus, Livius with Fabius overthrew Nero, and thus the old Aemilian-Scipionic party was in power with a leader of consular rank. With the friendly Veturius Philo conducting the elections, with the revival of his party and the enthusiasm of the people, Scipio entered his consulship on a flood of popularity.

The question of the day was the allocation of the provinces. According to Livy, there was a rumour that Africa was to form a new province and be allotted to Scipio without voting. If Africa was not granted him by the Senate, Scipio would carry out his proposal by the authority of the people. In two magnificent speeches Livy then gives the reasons of the Senatorial opposition to the African project, as set forth by Fabius, and by Scipio in his reply. Fabius then challenged Scipio before the Senate to state whether he would abide by the Senate's decision, or intended to refer it to the people. Scipio replied that he would act as he thought best in the State's interest. Fabius called on the tribunes to intervene. Scipio asked for a day's grace, and then submitted the matter to the Senate's decision, which was that one consul should take Sicily with the right to sail to Africa if he thought the interests of the State demanded it; the other consul was to operate against Hannibal in Bruttium. As the other consul was Pontifex Maximus he was not allowed to leave Italy, and it was obvious to whom Sicily must fall. Scipio had won. The prolonged Senatorial opposition and final compromise was merely a cloak to hide its weakness and defeat. Scipio had the support of the people behind him; and the Senate, in so far as it supported Fabius, had to yield. Yet it is not clear how far this account of Livy may be trusted. The intervention of the tribunes and their apocryphal decree (which reminds one of the false documents of Valerius Antias in the trials of the Scipios) may well be dismissed.¹ All that is certain is that the Fabian policy was discredited, and Scipio with his African project won the day.

The one fact which emerges clearly from this episode is the reality of two diametrically opposed schools of thought. The differences were more fundamental and lay

¹ Cf. De Sanctis, p. 645.

deeper than appeared on the surface. Rome was at the cross-roads and had either to continue in the old direction or strike out boldly in the new. Naturally such a crisis involved ill-feeling, which found expression in the Senate. Fabius represented, as we have seen, the old agrarian outlook. Such men wished to stem the tide of Hellenistic ideas which was beginning to flood Rome, and had no sympathy for the new class in the State which looked to commerce and expansion. They wanted to finish the war as quickly as possible, and then to heal the wounds which it had inflicted on the countryside of Italy. Their object was the freeing of Italy, the re-conquest of the lost valley of the Po and its colonisation by farmers.¹ Perhaps, as Ed. Meyer suggests,² by 205 they might even have come to a compromise with the enemy, and been ready to grant Carthage her African possessions in exchange for peace. The other party saw that Rome was being forced to become a world power, and that the days of a purely Italian policy were numbered. It was in this atmosphere that Scipio had been born and bred. The elder Scipios had aimed at thrusting the Carthaginians out of Spain, and must have realised that the conquest of the peninsula was inevitable, though they had not lived to see their policy successful. Africanus carried it out to its triumphant conclusion.

¹ Cf. W. Schur, p. 47.

² *Meister der Politik*, I. pp. 101, 131 *sqq.*; cf. also *Kl. Schr.* II. p. 353 n. 2. The evidence for this disputed question is Scipio's statement to Hannibal before Zama (P. xv. 8, 4) that if Hannibal had evacuated Italy before the Romans crossed to Africa, he might have secured peace. E. Groag (*Hannibal als Politiker*, 1929, pp. 99 *sqq.*) defends Hannibal's policy, and believes that Rome was not prepared to treat in 205, that Hannibal may have been so prepared, and that the opposition to Scipio's African project was entirely personal. But even if the Senate as a whole was not ready for peace in 205, it is possible that a section of it was—whatever view is taken of the value of Scipio's statement. Perhaps Groag (p. 103 n. 3) scarcely does justice to the Die-Hard principles of Fabius.

Further, he knew that the way to beat Carthage was to invade Africa, and so must have foreseen that, in the event of victory, Rome would have both Spain and Africa on her hands, and the Western Mediterranean, the older "mare clausum," would become virtually a Roman sea. Rome must expand beyond Italy.

Hand in hand with political and imperial went military views. Here too the contrasting policies stand in deep relief. "Pericles' object in the Peloponnesian War was strictly 'limited,' while that of the Spartans was more nearly 'absolute,' i.e. the destruction of the enemy's power," writes Dr Henderson.¹ Fabius' object likewise was strictly limited. He only wanted to get rid of Hannibal with all speed so that he could turn to Italy and heal her wounds, especially those of her countryside. Scipio's object was more absolute. He aimed at crushing Hannibal and Carthage. To get rid of Hannibal by defeating him in Italy would only alleviate a symptom. Until Carthage was humbled, Rome would never be safe. It was not primarily, if at all, desire for personal glory, for territorial expansion and empire, or for trade to follow the flag, that led Scipio to his determination to carry the war to Africa, but it was his penetrating vision, which soared above the narrow patriotic view of Fabius and convinced him that Rome's safety did not lie merely in Hannibal's defeat. Carthage itself must be humiliated and fettered—though not destroyed, for the cry of "Delenda est Carthago" had not yet arisen.

Corresponding to these two aims of defeating Hannibal in Italy or forcing him to withdraw to Africa, was the strategy employed by each party. Tactical inferiority forced on the Fabian party a defensive strategy which won for its leader his title of Cunctator. Fabius had learnt the lesson of Cannae—that the Romans could expect only defeat in

¹ *The Great War between Athens and Sparta*, p. 42.

a pitched battle, and so he set himself to avoid one. A "strategy of exhaustion," an "Ermattungs-Strategie," followed, which led to little else than a war of sieges. The object of such purely defensive strategy is to wear out the opponent and to get the opportunity of recovering one's own strength; it may be valuable as a temporary expedient, but is not likely to win a war. Dr Henderson¹ gives two examples of its use; the Periclean strategy in ancient history, and Frederick the Great's in modern times. "At the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, the King of Prussia found himself threatened by Austrians and Russians in a great superiority of numbers. For two years he fought battle after battle. He could no longer afford to lose the numbers which his victories cost him. He fell back on the rival strategy. The military folly of the Austrian generals and the lukewarmness of their Russian allies (due to political reasons) allowed him the chance of its use. The Austrians played about, ravaging the country and looking at its fortresses. Frederick skilfully avoided battle. The war 'fizzled out' and the Prussian triumphantly escaped from the terrible dangers which had seemed to threaten the weaker side." Generally such a strategy cannot win a war. "The trench warfare of the Great War was stalemate for both sides. The final victory was won when the war of movement became possible again and was directed by Marshal Foch." The utmost Fabius could expect was that the war might "fizzle out" and Hannibal retire. He had succeeded hitherto and might hope to continue successfully on the same lines, especially as Spain was won. Carthage he could never conquer.

Scipio's strategy was entirely different. In the first place, he did not fear to meet Hannibal in the field. He had trained up an army in Spain in tactical methods which he hoped would succeed against Hannibal himself. The only

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 48, 51.

question was where to face him. He could employ the more straightforward type of strategy, that of "annihilation," the "Niederwerfungs-Strategie" of the Prussian Clausewitz. This means setting first and foremost the attempt to discover and destroy in a pitched battle the main armed forces of the enemy, and allowing no side issues to interfere. It has been said of Cromwell that he never besieged a fortress whilst there was an unbeaten army in the field. But Scipio applied this doctrine of Clausewitz only in a limited way. He saw that he must adopt the principle, as opposed to the Fabian strategy of exhaustion; but he knew that if he beat Hannibal in Italy the war would be regarded as finished, and so he would not be able to stir up the people to carry it against Carthage itself. A reaction to the purely Italian policy would follow immediately, and the danger of Carthage would remain. He saw that the best way to thwart Hannibal was a counter-offensive at the enemy's base. For the moment, he would disregard the main armed forces of the enemy, leaving these to the Fabian strategy, and strike at Africa whither he knew Hannibal would follow. There he could apply to the full his new strategy of "annihilation." Africa offered a better battlefield for him than Bruttium, for there he could give the enemy a taste of what Italy had been suffering. Fabius accused Scipio of wanting to send this expeditionary force from a purely personal desire for glory. Scipio, according to Livy, did not deny that he aimed at this. But it must have been a secondary issue with him. He was convinced of the superiority of his strategy. The view that Pericles started the Peloponnesian War for personal reasons refutes itself, because he intended to carry on that war in an unpopular way. Similarly, unless Scipio was quite convinced he could win, he would hardly have ventured on a course which was unpopular with a large section of the State, and in which failure would mean

the end of his political career. It was not a mere bid for a spectacular finish to the war, by which he would cover himself with glory, but a carefully prepared move, which as it succeeded, naturally enhanced his fame. Livy's gibe can be little more than the catchword of Scipio's political opponents, or a mere "vaticinium post eventum."¹

After obtaining the command of Sicily, Scipio had to make extensive preparations for his expedition to Africa. Unfortunately these are shrouded in doubt. Livy says that the government, unable to thwart Scipio entirely, tried to hamper him by not granting permission to levy troops,² though it allowed him to enlist volunteers of whom he raised 7000. The Italian allies, especially Etruria, rallied round, providing corn, timber for ships, and munitions of war. Scipio was thus enabled to build a fleet of thirty ships (twenty quinqueremes and ten quadriremes), which was completed only six weeks after the timber had been hewn. With this force he sailed to Sicily. There he began to organise and drill his new army. His great weakness was one from which Roman armies had always suffered, lack of cavalry. We are told that he began to overcome this by recruiting 300 Sicilian nobles to form into a cavalry corps. When they appeared duly equipped with horses and arms, Scipio said he had learnt that some were dreading the hardship of the campaign; if this was so, he was willing to find a substitute for any one who

¹ The question as to how far the Second Punic War was carried on by "Niederwerfungs-" or by "Ermattungs-Strategie" is discussed by Kromayer in *Roms Kampf um die Weltherrschaft*. He takes the view that Hannibal adopted the former up till Cannae, and then changed over to the latter. Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, I. pp. 384-5, questions these views, and believes that Hannibal and Fabius do not represent the two methods in principle but only in practice, because of the dissimilarity of the weapons at their disposal.

² Dio (Zon. IX. 11) says that, beside being granted the army in Sicily, Scipio was allowed to enrol as large a force as he wanted. This is perhaps from Coelius.

hesitated, provided he relinquished his equipment and gave the substitute the necessary training. All gradually availed themselves of this offer, and, needless to say, Scipio had 300 of his best men waiting. Thus, according to the story, Scipio won the nucleus of his cavalry. He then had to face the task of unifying his army—the volunteers he had brought, and all the troops which he found in Sicily, including the two legions who survived Cannae and had been sent there in disgrace. These men, who had tasted Hannibal's tactics, would readily assimilate Scipio's new methods, and be eager to hoist the enemy on his own petard. Scipio wisely fed his troops on corn raised from the Sicilians, and conserved the supplies he had brought from Rome. He refitted the old ships, and sent them under Laelius to plunder and reconnoitre the African coast; the new ones he beached for the winter as they had been hastily built of unseasoned timber. He also spent some time at Syracuse, where certain Italians had seized some private property when the town was captured. Scipio astutely listened to the Greeks who came for redress and granted it, thus obtaining the sympathy of the Sicilians. Sicily was to be his base in the war against Africa, and so he must win the support of the inhabitants. Apart from his adjustment of the wrongs of the Syracusans, his magnetic personality must have won over all he met here, as elsewhere. His troops, the Spaniards, the African princes, Hasdrubal and Philip, all felt his charm. In the congenial atmosphere of Grecian Sicily, it would not be difficult for him to win friendship. In fact, he adapted himself too easily for those who, like Fabius, looked with abhorrence on the gradual adoption of Greek ideas and habits by some of their contemporaries. The Roman general, who walked about the gymnasium in a Greek cloak and Greek slippers, who spent his time among rhetoricians and athletes, and whose whole staff was

enjoying the attractions of Syracuse,¹ was likely to win local sympathy as easily as he alienated that of his sterner contemporaries.

It is difficult to know how far we may trust this account of Livy. De Sanctis² thinks that the description of Scipio's preparations (xxviii. 45. 13-46. 1) is of the best Roman tradition; though he rejects as annalistic the anecdote of the Sicilian knights, because the claim contrasts with the conditions imposed on Sicily by the *lex provinciae*, and appears to be the arbitrary attribution to Scipio of a stratagem of Agesilaus (Plut. *Ages.* 9; cf. Xen. *Hell.* iii. 4. 15). Kahrstedt³ believes Coelius was Livy's source, and proceeds to reject as thoroughly annalistic the government's refusal of troops, the raising of volunteers in Italy and Sicily, and the use of the two Cannine legions as the nucleus of the African army, together with Laelius' African expedition. The naming of Coelius as Livy's source is not very helpful, as we do not know Coelius' source here, or how far to rely on it. As so often in source criticism, the only ultimate court of appeal is what appears reasonable; in other words, common-sense. It is a little difficult to believe that the Senate compromised to such an extent as to forbid levies, and that, when once committed to the war, they did not try to back it up. But perhaps the general exhaustion after thirteen years of war made them chary of official support if they thought Scipio could make adequate preparations in a more private way—as indeed he proved himself able. Rejecting the anecdote and allowing for exaggeration, we may cautiously accept Livy's account.

Laelius' expedition reached Hippon Regius (Bone), where it disembarked and plundered the neighbourhood. This alarmed Carthage, where it was reported that Scipio himself had landed. The inhabitants prepared for a siege,

¹ L. xxix. 19.

² Pp. 645 *sqq.*

³ Pp. 328-9, 539.

raising a levy and equipping a fleet. Meanwhile news came that it was only a raid by Laelius, not the landing of Scipio and his main force. Meanwhile Laelius was met by Masinissa, who complained of Scipio's delay and urged that Syphax' continued friendship was doubtful. If Scipio would but come, he himself, though exiled from his kingdom, would do all he could to assist him. After this interview, Laelius returned to Sicily, his ships laden with plunder.¹

During Scipio's preparations in Sicily he saw an oppor-

¹ Livy's account is once more assigned to Coelius and set aside as unreliable by Kahrstedt. Perhaps this is too drastic, although there are difficulties. The chronology is awkward, for it is difficult to crowd all Masinissa's adventures, as related by Livy (xxix. 29-33), into the time between his departure from Spain (late 206) and this expedition. Livy (33. 9) says Masinissa was between Emporia and the land of the Garamantes, that is, in the interior of Tripolis, some 400 miles from Hippo Regius (see Gsell, p. 206). How then did he know of Laelius' arrival? Would he undertake so long and perilous a journey? Might he not miss Laelius who was there for a hurried raid? Why should there be such a panic at Carthage? The mere distance of Hippo Regius from Carthage has led some to suppose it is a mistake for Hippo Diarrhytus (Bizerta: e.g. Weissenborn and Meltzer, II. p. 489), and Zielinski (p. 6) to imagine an unknown Hippo on the coast of Byzacium, between Leptis Minor and the island of Cercina, i.e. somewhere near Thapsus. Gsell sets aside these objections and suggestions, and considers that if, as Livy says, Masinissa was in exile, he might be at Mt Bellus near the shore and Hippo, where he could easily find Laelius (on Mt Bellus cf. L. xxix. 31. 7). The anxiety at Carthage is quite natural, however far from the city the landing took place, as long as it was believed to be an expeditionary force under Scipio. The raid is probable enough in itself. Hippo Regius was a Phoenician or Punic colony, at the head of the land of the Massyles and near that of the Masaesyles (cf. Gsell, p. 207). Scipio wanted to impress the natives with the might of Rome and the weakness of Carthage. Also small raids on the enemy's coast had been carried out in many previous years of the war, unless these too are rejected, with Kahrstedt. The real object may have been to reconnoitre, to try to learn the state of feeling in Africa, whether the promises of Masinissa and Syphax still seemed to be holding. Scipio knew how little he could rely on his earlier arrangements if any of the native princes thought self-interest and the Roman cause were at variance, and so he tried to test their feelings.

tunity, which had been overlooked by the Romans, of recapturing Locri which was now in Carthaginian hands. Some Locrians had been captured by a raiding party and carried off to Rhegium. There some Locrian nobles, who had taken sanctuary in the city, recognised some of the artisans among the prisoners. These promised to betray Locri, an offer which the exiled Locrian nobles readily accepted. They ransomed and sent the prisoners back to Locri, and then communicated with Scipio.¹ He quickly seized the opportunity and sent two military tribunes back to Rhegium with orders to march to Locri with 3000 men, while Q. Pleminius was given command of the expedition. These troops, equipped with specially long ladders, stormed by night one of the citadels of the town; for Locri lay between two hills crowned by citadels. The town itself was still held by the citizens, notwithstanding the sorties and skirmishes of Pleminius and the Carthaginian commander, Hamilcar. On the news of the approach of Hannibal himself, the Locrians, tired of the tyranny of the Carthaginians, went over to the Roman side. But Scipio feared for the safety of his garrison, and leaving his brother Lucius in command of a detachment at Messana, sailed for Locri. This step was not within the letter of the law; the consul was not permitted to interfere in and enter the sphere of his colleague, Crassus; but Scipio did not let mere formality stand in the way of extricating a Roman force from an awkward situation, and inflicting a blow on his enemy. Meantime, Hannibal sent orders to Hamilcar to attack the Romans and Locrians, while he himself hoped to assail their rear, though as he had not brought scaling ladders he had to delay a day. The same day the Roman fleet arrived and the whole force entered the city before

¹ Dio (Zon. ix. 11) attributes the surrender of Locri to the fact that the Locrians received no satisfaction from Hannibal; probably this is a point from Coelius.

nightfall. As Hannibal was advancing to the assault on the next day, Scipio made a sudden sortie, which surprised the Carthaginians and forced them to withdraw. That night Hannibal retired, not being prepared for a long siege, and the Carthaginian garrison soon joined him. Thus Locri again fell into the hands of the Romans. But beside depriving the enemy of another of his footholds in Southern Italy, Scipio had taught his own troops a moral lesson, that Hannibal was not the unconquerable general he had seemed, or to use Capt. Liddell Hart's metaphor, this "side-show" had "blooded" Scipio's troops against Hannibal, and proved a moral tonic.

The sequel was not quite so successful. Scipio treated the town severely, by executing the pro-Carthaginian leaders, but left its political status for the Senate to decide. Then leaving Pleminius in command of a garrison,¹ he returned to Messana. This man proved quite unworthy of his trust, and the unhappy Locrians, who had looked for better times under Roman control, found that their change of masters was for the worse. For Pleminius, that "*pestis ac bellua immanis*," proved a forerunner of Verres, and far surpassed Hamilcar in crime and vice. He held absolute power in the town, which meant absolute license. The crime which impressed the Romans most was his sacrilege in plundering the treasury of Proserpine, which had previously only suffered at the hands of Pyrrhus, whose impiety had led him to such misfortune that he had hastily returned the treasure. Unfortunately, Pleminius' example spread among his men whom he had brought from Rhegium. He was opposed by the two military tribunes and the other Roman troops. The cause of this friction is obscure. One of his men, who was stealing a silver cup, was stopped by the tribunes. Either the latter were trying

¹ Zon. (IX. 11) says the command was left to two tribunes—a mistake due probably to Dio or himself.

to keep a semblance of law and order in the town, or they were merely quarrelling over the booty. Possibly the sequel points to the latter. In any case, Pleminius was furious and had them scourged. Their men retorted by seizing Pleminius and mutilating him. On learning this, Scipio returned to Italy and held an enquiry. Pleminius was acquitted and retained his command, while the tribunes were imprisoned. This judgment is unexpected, and Scipio, from what evidence we have, seems to stand condemned. Capt. Liddell Hart tries to excuse him on the ground of pity for the mutilated Pleminius, combined with anger at the insubordination of his own men; or because of his own scrupulousness to hold the balance fairly and to avoid partiality to his own men, or because he wished to give Pleminius more rope with which to hang himself. From our limited knowledge, Scipio seems to have been guilty of folly and of lack of humanity. He was on the eve of launching his African expedition and may well have been too busy to give the matter full attention; this may explain but does not excuse. As we find no similar case in his career, it is perhaps safer to return a verdict of "Not Proven." If Scipio was trying to give Pleminius a second chance to find himself, he badly misjudged the man; for no sooner was his back turned than Pleminius broke out into even greater excesses. He tortured the hapless tribunes to death and then turned on the chief citizens of Locri, continuing his course of lust, avarice and cruelty.

At length the Locrians could endure this conduct no longer, and sent an embassy to Rome to plead their case before the Senate. Q. Fabius and his party were glad of the chance to criticise the absent Scipio, whose part in the affair was severely handled in the House. The resentment against Scipio was further kindled by religious scruples at Pleminius' sacrilege, and by moral scruples at Scipio's Greek mode of life in Sicily, as well as by pity

for the Locrians. All the opposition to Scipio and his policy broke out. Fabius had found a handle, and even proposed to recall him. At length the Senate decided that Pomponius, the praetor-elect of Sicily, should proceed thither with a board of enquiry consisting of ten Senators chosen by the consuls, two tribunes of the Plebs and an aedile. If this commission found that Scipio was not privy to, or had not ordered, the outrages of which the Locrians complained, he was to retain his command, but otherwise he was to be ordered from his province, or if he had already crossed to Africa, the tribunes should bring him back, while two Senators took temporary command. The Senate was also anxious to expiate with due rites the desecration of Proserpine's temple. The commission proceeded to Southern Italy and arrested Pleminius (or, according to another account, of which Livy speaks, Pleminius was arrested by Scipio himself). The outraged Proserpine was requited, the disputes of the individual Locrians settled, and justice re-established. The Locrians wisely declined the opportunity of charging Scipio himself, on the ground of his personal integrity and misjudgment of Pleminius; they preferred Scipio's friendship to his enmity. The commission was doubtless relieved, as it would have been no easy task to depose Scipio when he was surrounded by his new army. Pleminius and two others were sent in chains to Rome. Then the Board turned to investigate Scipio's doubtful Greek morals. Scipio skilfully turned the tables by impressing it with his own military preparations. Its members were conducted round the arsenals and magazines, and witnessed manœuvres of the army and fleet, which were so impressive that they forgot their object and returned to Rome in a burst of patriotic enthusiasm, bidding Scipio sail to Africa with the blessing of heaven.¹

¹ L. XXIX. 6-9 and 16. 4-22. Kahrstedt (pp. 330 *sqq.*, 541) drastically rejects much of the Livian account of Locri and Pleminius. The whole

After Scipio had averted this danger from home, he was faced by a further difficulty. Syphax, who had nominally been won to the Roman side, was approached by Hasdrubal, and Scipio's diplomatic mission proved in

tenor of P. xv. 5, on the meeting of Scipio and Hannibal at Zama, is that they met there for the first time. So we must suppose that Scipio did not make the attempt in person or we must reject Hannibal's unlucky attempt to win back Locri. Hence Polybius cannot be Livy's source for their meeting at Locri. Similarity with Dio and Appian point to Coelius, though we cannot tell whether he followed a purely annalistic or a local tradition. For the arrest of Pleminius, Livy had variants in his sources (21. 1. f.). If this variation is due to a parallel account, and the context to only one of the versions (i.e. the two versions do not diverge here only for a moment), then we can see from Diod. xxvii. 5, that the second variation (22. 2) belongs to the chief account and 21. 1 is the addition; for Diodorus's account is similar to Livy and follows 22. 2. The similarity of Livy, Dio and Diodorus, point to Coelius as their source. But Kahrstedt's main objection to attributing the Locrian passage to Polybius is not very strong. The meeting of Scipio and Hannibal at Zama was the first one of real importance and, as De Sanctis (p. 647) emphasises, a reference to their previous meeting would spoil the dramatic effect of their great duel. Polybius would naturally not refer to the earlier one, though his account of Zama does not necessarily exclude it. In addition, Polybius had a peculiar interest in Locri (xii. 5 *sqq.*), while the military details of the account itself are foreign to an annalistic source. When would a Roman annalist, asks De Sanctis, have written, in honour of "Graeculi," a phrase like: "Nec sustinuissent Romani nisi Locrensium multitudo exacerbata superbia atque avaritia Poenorum ad Romanos inclinasset" (6. 17)? Polybius would naturally favour the Locrians, to whom he had rendered important services. So the account (chs. 6-9) in the main may well go back to Polybius who depended on a local tradition. The account of the Locrian embassy etc. (chs. 16-22) may also in essence be attributed to Polybius, though it is doubtless enriched by annalistic tradition (cf. Livy's two sources of 21. 1, 2), and the speeches may be the work of Livy or Coelius. Cf. De Sanctis, p. 647, who traces Polybius' hand behind Livy.

Assuming that Polybius, rather than Coelius, is behind Livy, what of the latter's two versions of Pleminius' fate: that he was arrested by the commission or by Scipio himself? Diodorus xxvii. 5 gives Livy's second version, namely the arrest by Scipio, and omits the incident of Scipio's earlier intervention to confirm Pleminius in his command. De Sanctis (p. 668) suggests that Diodorus gives more accurately than Livy the version of Polybius which was favourable to Scipio, and that

vain. For Syphax was in love with Hasdrubal's daughter, Sophonisba, and their marriage soon followed. Syphax turned once more to Carthage, with whom he now drew up a treaty. Hasdrubal persuaded him to send an embassy to Scipio, telling of his new alliance, and breaking off all previous obligations with the threat that, if Scipio did not carry on the war with Italy but invaded Africa, he, Syphax, would feel bound to fight for his country and his wife's native city. The arrival of this embassy was a blow to Scipio; for it might have far-reaching effects if his new army got wind of it. Scipio could not prevent the Numidians walking about the city and being seen at his headquarters, so, before the truth leaked out and the army was discouraged, he announced that Syphax had sent, urging him to attack at once.¹ As his preparations were completed, Scipio mustered his whole force, perhaps some 35,000 men,² at Lilybaeum, where he superintended in person the embarkation. Supplies of food and water for forty-five days were put on board, and when all was made ready and Scipio had offered prayer for success, amid a great crowd of spectators the expeditionary force set sail for Africa in the spring of 204, conquering and to conquer.

Livy has glossed Polybius with annalistic sources, noting the discrepancies on the arrest and inserting the episode of the return of Scipio to confirm Pleminius' command. But the sources, which Livy contaminated, agreed in giving only one intervention, one source to confirm Pleminius, the other to arrest him. The latter, which is the inferior one, may however be the Polybian which glorified Scipio.

¹ Gsell (p. 208) asks how Scipio proposed to explain this deception when his troops landed in Africa and found Syphax' men opposed to them. But it was less important when he had once got his troops to Africa.

² See note of Scipio's forces, Appendix v. pp. 318 *sqq.* Appian's account (*Lib.* 13) of Scipio's embarkation contrasts favourably with the exaggerated Coelian tradition.

CHAPTER SEVEN

FIRST YEARS IN AFRICA

THE theatre of war, to which Scipio was going, was a comparatively small part of North Africa; in Spain also he had operated in only a small portion of the whole country. It consisted of the northern half of modern Tunisia, bounded on the north and east by the Mediterranean, on the west by Algeria, and on the south by a line from El Djem to Thala. The district is divided by the great chain of mountains, which runs from the interior towards the north-east to Cape Bon. The part south of this chain hardly comes into the question, except as forming a base for Hannibal when he landed. The northern part is again divided into two distinct halves by the river Bagradas. North-west of the river is mountainous highland, very difficult to operate in; the south-east is more varied, consisting of small mountain chains and isolated peaks between which lie plains. It is this district, stretching from far inland to the bay of Carthage, that is the chief area involved. Into this territory there are many ways of penetrating; up the valley of the Bagradas and the Muthul; from Hadrumetum by the Ou. Nebaana to the valley of the Siliana; or via Kairouan and the valley of the Marguellil into the plain of Zouarines. The important valleys running south are those of the Ou. Miliana and el Kebir, the Siliana, and the Ou. Tessa. The climate was not excessively hot and did not cause operations to be broken off for a period in the summer; but in the winter there was a regular cessation of campaigning, at least before Caesar's day, partly owing to the difficulty of getting fresh supplies by sea in the stormy weather. The chief obstacle to be surmounted

was lack of water, as in the summer many of the Oueds dried up; yet compensation was not entirely lacking, because, when dry, they would hinder the movements of troops less. Such natural features and climatic conditions made the movement of armies in North Africa possible only in certain well-defined directions.

A brief consideration of the methods adopted by other ancient generals, who wished to attack Carthage, is instructive for the light it throws on Scipio's campaign. The earliest expedition of importance against Carthage was led in 310 B.C. by Agathocles, the soldier-prince of Syracuse, whom Scipio is said to have admired greatly (P. xv. 36. 6). He landed at Cape Bon, on the west side of the promontory at some quarries near Anquillaria, advanced westwards through the unexpectedly fertile plain, and after winning two cities and a pitched battle, he captured Tunis. This city formed the natural base from which to attack Carthage, and at the same time offered a good harbour. For Carthage stood at the end of a peninsula, the isthmus of which was both blocked by a range of hills and was also commanded by Tunis. So by occupying Tunis, Agathocles had cut Carthage off from her rich hinterland. The first counter-stroke of Carthage was an attempt to relieve Tunis, while Agathocles was busy storming towns on the east coast, but it was thwarted. After winning Neapolis, Hadrumetum and Thapsus in the fertile lowland along the east coast, and then another pitched battle, Agathocles turned to the west of Carthage. He intercepted supplies coming to Carthage from Sardinia and Sicily by capturing Utica and Hippo (Bizerta), which formed a good naval base; for he had realised his great weakness, an inadequate fleet. The native Libyans welcomed him as a deliverer from their Punic masters. Soon after he had left Africa, his army was cut off at Tunis; and on his return he was beaten in battle and had to fight against fire, the element

which Scipio used so successfully later. The failure of Agathocles was caused partly by lack of an adequate staff and by the unwilling spirit of his men, but the chief reason was the lack of a strong fleet. Carthage had wisely adopted a Fabian strategy; after unsuccessful pitched battles, she settled down to a policy of inaction. The war had proved that a campaign in Africa could seriously embarrass Carthage, but could not threaten her very existence, unless the invading army commanded the sea.

In the First Punic War the Romans had their first experience of Africa as a theatre of war. Regulus was sent to invade it in 256 B.C. He landed, as Agathocles had done, at Cape Bon, but on the eastern side at Clupea. After ravaging the open country, he won a battle and then took Tunis; officialdom recalled his colleague to Rome with half the army and nearly the whole fleet. Carthage sued for peace, but Regulus offered too severe terms. At the critical moment Xanthippus came to the front, and led the Carthaginians to victory, on ground which suited their elephants and cavalry. This expedition again emphasises the value of Tunis and the need for a fleet. It failed because Regulus lost part of his fleet, had insufficient forces, especially cavalry, would not strengthen this arm by alliances with native princes, offered too severe terms and fought on unfavourable ground.

Then came the revolt of the Carthaginian mercenaries, which once more showed the important strategic points. They occupied Tunis, strong points on the hills behind Carthage, and the mouth of the Bagradas at the north end of the hills, thus completely cutting off Carthage from the mainland. At the same time they besieged Bizerta and Utica. By a brilliant move, Hamilcar forced the abandonment of the siege of Utica, and turned their flank by winning a battle at the mouth of the Bagradas. Then followed marches and counter-marches and the sudden

revolt of Utica and Bizerta, which had remained faithful when Agathocles and Regulus landed. Hamilcar's victory at Prion won for him the command of the open country, and he could besiege Matho at Tunis from the south, while Hannibal did so from the north. At length the mercenaries lost the decisive battle. Carthage had undergone a grave danger, and lost control of the open country through the capture of Tunis, but she maintained the control of the sea, and so pulled through, notwithstanding the disloyalty of Utica. Two hundred years later, Curio followed in Agathocles' footsteps and landed in the same place. It is hardly necessary to follow his campaign in detail, but it showed the difficulty of storming Utica, even when in command of the strong site known as the Cornelian camp.

In Northern Africa, at the time of Scipio's invasion, there were, beside the empire of Carthage, certain native kingdoms. These were formed when one tribe imposed itself on others by successful wars, and the chief became king, and in favourable circumstances the founder of a dynasty.¹ In the west, where Morocco lies to-day, lived the Moors, whose power was bounded on the east by the river Molo-chath (Moulouia).² Next, opposite Cartagena,³ lived a tribe, whose power was much more extensive, the Masaesydes. Under their king Syphax, who resided at Siga,⁴ they controlled the coast as far as Cape Treton (Bougaroun), while in the interior Syphax ruled at Cirta.⁵ The next tribe, the Massyles, was of less importance; it lived between the Masaesydes and the borders of the Carthaginian possessions, which included Sicca (El Kef) and the Great Plains. These native kingdoms flourished by the side of Carthage, sometimes in alliance with her, sometimes

¹ Cf. Gsell, p. 175.

² Strabo, xvii. iii. 9.

³ L. xxviii. 17. 5.

⁴ Strabo, πόλις Σίγα... βασιλείον Σόφακος.

⁵ L. xxx. 12. 3.

at war. In the main, Carthage did not interfere with them; it was better for her commerce and easier to draw mercenaries from them, if they were united under one prince than if they remained separate tribes under petty chiefs.¹

Gaia, king of the Massyles and father of Masinissa,² was allied to Carthage from 213–208. Syphax however was warring against Carthage in 213, and perhaps even entered into relations with the two Scipios in Spain. The next year peace was again established (App. *Ib.* 16). The Massyles remained faithful to Carthage, and Masinissa served her well in Spain from 211–206. But soon both the native princes, Syphax and Masinissa, began to doubt whether friendship for Carthage was wise in face of Rome's successes, and so they turned to Scipio, who was looking beyond Spain to a war in Africa, and recognised their value. To win them both over, would be to gain a valuable base against Carthage, as well as to deprive her of their material help. Besides, he would have the use of their cavalry, an arm which needed strengthening. After Ilipa, as has been told, he even visited Syphax in Siga, whither Hasdrubal also had repaired. The importance of this chief is emphasised when two such generals are seen coming to win his support. For the moment Scipio won, but later Hasdrubal was able to win back Syphax by giving him his daughter Sophonisba³ in marriage. On the eve of his

¹ Cf. Gsell, p. 177.

² On the names Gaia, Masinissa and Syphax, see Gsell, pp. 177 n. 4 and 178 nn. 1 and 5.

³ On the name see Gsell, p. 197 n. 3, and De Sanctis, p. 532, who gives Saphanba as the real name. For her charms, see Dio, frg. 57. 51 (Zon. ix. 11), Diod. xxvii. 7. Hasdrubal may have promised her to Masinissa, but if so, this was not the cause of Masinissa's rejection of the Carthaginian cause, as Dio and Appian say: chronology forbids this—see below. Diodorus (xxvii. 7) alone, in contradiction to L. xxix. 23. 4, says she was married to Masinissa. Livy (xxx. 12. 11) implies she saw Masinissa for the first time at Cirta in 203; cf. Gsell, p. 197 n. 5.

departure for Africa, Scipio learnt that the ally on whom he had been counting had gone over to Carthage. Syphax had played a double rôle, and waited to see where his interest lay; not till he saw that clearly, as he thought, did he come out very definitely on one side or the other.

Scipio was more successful with Masinissa, who had learnt in Spain the measure of Scipio and his army. His nephew had been well-treated by Scipio after Baecula, and he himself had been worsted in the prelude to Ilipa. He realised that Scipio might carry the war to Africa, and being discontented with the Carthaginians¹ negotiated with Scipio, who visited him, as has been said, near Gades. He promised that, if Scipio did cross to Africa, he would lend him all the support he could, and Scipio, who realised the importance of Masinissa's cavalry, saw his journey had not been in vain.

While Masinissa was still in Spain, his father Gaia died.² The throne passed, according to the Numidian custom, to the late king's brother, Oezalces, who also died soon after, and was succeeded by his son, Capussa. On learning this, Masinissa sailed for Africa. Meanwhile Capussa was overthrown by a noble Mazaetullus, who acted as regent for Oezalces' other son Lacumazes. This noble allied himself to the Carthaginians by marrying Oezalces' widow, a niece of Hannibal's, and also sought the friendship of Syphax against the day when Masinissa should return. In the autumn Masinissa arrived in Africa, but had to pass through Syphax' territory to reach his

¹ L. xxviii. 16. 12 says the reason which prompted Masinissa's change of side is not clear. Appian (*Ib.* 37 and *Lib.* 10) and Dio (Zon. ix. 11) say that Hasdrubal had promised to give his daughter to Masinissa in marriage, and that when she was married to Syphax, Masinissa was naturally alienated. However, the marriage did not take place till later; certainly after Scipio's visit to Syphax. But Masinissa had entered into negotiations with Silanus before that.

² L. xxix. 29. 6. At the beginning of 206. For the chronology, see Gsell, p. 189 n. 3.

own. He obtained a safe passage by getting an escort of 4000 Moors by permission of their king, Baga. On reaching his kingdom he defeated Lacumazes, who, with Mazaetullus, came to an agreement with him, which he readily accepted, as he foresaw a future struggle with Syphax. Hasdrubal urged Syphax to crush Masinissa before he became too strong, which was done. Masinissa fled to Mt Bellus,¹ where he occupied a strong position and carried on open brigandage, plundering Carthaginian territory in particular. Syphax sent an officer, Bucar, to dislodge him. Masinissa was defeated and escaped, after some romantic adventures, with two others to a cave, where he was able to recover from a wound which he had received. Then once again he returned to his kingdom, where he was welcomed back. He provoked Syphax to a further battle by ravaging his territory, and took up a strong position between Cirta and Hippo. The battle was hotly contested, till the scales were turned by Syphax' own son, Vermina, who led an attack on Masinissa's rear. Masinissa again fled, this time with sixty troopers to exile to Syrtis Minor. Perhaps later he went to Mt Bellus, as Gsell suggests (p. 207), where he would be able to communicate more easily with Laelius, when the latter arrived.

Such was the condition of Northern Africa, when the Roman expeditionary force put to sea with orders given on

¹ The site of Bellus is unknown. Livy implies it was near Carthaginian territory, the sea, and extensive plains, where was a large river. Gsell, p. 193, says it must be in north-east Algeria or north-west Tunisia, and suggests the river was the Medjerda and the plains those of Dakhla des Ouled Bou Salem, and so it would be in Khoumirie. He rejects Tissot's view, that it lay to the south of the Gulf of Tunis, and concludes that the Clupea of L. xxix. 32. 6 is not Clupea (Kelibia), situated to the south-east of Cape Bon.

Possibly Livy or his sources have been guilty of a re-duplication, and the two exiles of Masinissa from his kingdom are to be reduced to one, the pursuit by Bucar corresponding to that by Vermina; cf. *De Sanctis*, p. 519.

the previous day by Scipio to make for Emporia. Scipio himself, with his brother Lucius, commanded the right division of twenty war ships, while Laelius and Cato were in charge of the left line. During the afternoon the wind had dropped, and a thick fog came up, which continued throughout the night. Next day this dispersed and land was seen, which the pilot said must be the headland of Mercury. Scipio gave orders to anchor further south, but meantime the fog came down again, and little progress could be made during the night. When day broke, the fog again dispersed and the nearest headland was Pulchrum. On learning its name, Scipio hailed it as his Cape of Good Hope, "I accept the omen," he said, "steer for it." And here the troops disembarked.

Such is Livy's (XXIX. chs. 25, 27) account, but it presents numerous geographical and strategic difficulties. Where was Emporia? Did Scipio intend to land there? Where did he actually land, that is, where were the promontories of Mercury and Pulchrum? The Carthaginian trading towns known as Emporia lay in the neighbourhood of the Little Syrtis;¹ but it is doubtful whether Scipio ever

¹ This, and the fertility of the territory, we learn from P. III. 23. 2 and XXXII. 2. 1; L. XXIX. 39. 8; XXXIV. 62. Also it is distinct from Byzacium, the eastern coast of Tunisia (P. III. 23. 2). One of the cities included in the name was Leptis (L. XXXIV. 62. 3). But does this refer to Leptis Magna or Minor? Zielinski argues for Leptis Minor, which lies near Hadrumetum, on the ground that (1) Leptis Magna is as far from Syrtis Minor as from Syrtis Major and (2) Leptis Magna is not fertile. It is true that Leptis Magna is far from Syrtis Minor, if the statement is taken strictly. But De Sanctis (p. 579) argues that under the phrase *κατὰ τὴν μικρὰν Σύρτιν* should be included all the homogeneous territory between the Tritonian Marsh and Leptis Magna, however much it may have been outside Syrtis itself, as it is understood in this sense by Callimachus, quoted in Pliny, *N.H.* v. 28. De Sanctis denies the truth of Zielinski's statement that Leptis Magna is not fertile and that its importance is shown by its ruins. The most fatal objection to Leptis Minor is that it is in Byzacium, which contradicts our evidence. Also L. XXXIV. 62. 10 implies that it lay on the road which ran from Cyrene to Numidia, which applies to Leptis Magna,

intended to land there. Zielinski (*Rivista di Storia Antica* III. No. 1, 1898, p. 86) ingeniously suggests that Scipio announced his intention of landing at Emporia to mislead the Carthaginians, thinking they would learn of it through spies and not protect adequately the neighbourhood of Utica, where he really intended to disembark. Gsell (p. 213 n. 2) dismisses this, because Livy says Scipio told the pilots his project only on the eve of his departure. But does Livy's remark contain the whole truth? Scipio would naturally give his pilots precise orders before sailing, but he may also have in general announced his plan to land at Emporia. It seems clear that whether the ingenuity is Scipio's or Zielinski's, Scipio could never have aimed at Emporia. If he did, why should a fog shake his purpose, when he had provisions on board for six weeks, especially when the same fog would temporarily screen his movements from the enemy? A landing near Syrtis Minor would seriously endanger his communications. He would be further from his base in Sicily, and the Carthaginian fleet could cut across his lines there. His object was to attack Carthage, and it would be useless to start from a place, between which and his objective lay a stretch of desert, when other equally good bases could be found closer at hand. Kahrstedt (p. 334) adds a further reason, that the country could not have supported his army for a fortnight. This De Sanctis (p. 580) denies, asserting the fertility of the district. Further, Scipio might get fresh supplies from Sicily, and had with him a large store from which to draw in case of necessity. He might hope to take the towns of this district easily, as they were far from their mistress' protection. They paid tribute to Carthage and were

but not to Leptis Minor. There can be little doubt that Emporia covers the district round Syrtis Minor, stretching to the east to include Sabratha, Oea, and Leptis Magna. On its position see De Sanctis, pp. 579 *sqq.*, Kahrstedt, p. 334, and Gsell, II. p. 127.

prosperous. Scipio could thus cut off one of the areas of her strength. But it would take time to storm town after town, and would give the Carthaginians a breathing space in which to collect an army. Also, there were no good harbours on the coast, in which the Roman fleet could shelter from storms or from the Carthaginian fleet (cf. Gsell, p. 211). The risk of endangering his communications without any valid recompense, may lead to the belief that Scipio never seriously intended to land at Emporia, so far from his objective.¹

The first land sighted was the Hermean Promontory (Cape Bon), the eastern of the two horns which project to the north, and between which lay Carthage. Scipio gave orders to sail south from here. Does that mean to the headland itself, or does it derive from the source who imagined that Emporia was his objective?² Perhaps Scipio may have thought of landing at Cape Bon. He had before him the examples of Agathocles and Regulus, both of

¹ Weissenborn supposes Scipio intended to land at Emporia to join Masinissa. But Masinissa had no troops and probably had left this district. Cf. Gsell, p. 211 n. 2.

² Livy's source here is probably Coelius, cf. Kahrstedt (p. 334). Scipio's intention to land at Emporia (25. 11) does not appear again, and belongs to a source which is used no more after the actual landing. According to Livy, 27. 14, Coelius told of a stormy crossing which explains the alteration of the course to near Utica. So the passage which shows that Scipio did not intend to go to Utica, belongs to the same author who shows that Scipio only went to Utica against his will, i.e. Coelius. As to Coelius' source, De Sanctis (p. 647 *sq.*) thinks it unlikely that Polybius attributed Scipio's landing at Utica to chance; this is more probably Silenus' work, who attributed the fall of New Carthage also to Fortune. Perhaps also the mention of Pulchrum, with its bad translation of the Greek name ('Pulchri' is probably from *καλοῦ Ἀκρου*, which was in the genitive in the context), and the un-Polybian story of the omen, derive from Silenus. The storm described by Coelius does not accord well with a fragment of his (no. 41) describing the orderly landing. De Sanctis (p. 648) thinks the discrepancy is only superficial, and that originally, without Livy's embroidery, Coelius described only a stormy passage, but not a stormy landing.

whom landed there, Agathocles in the south-west of the promontory, and Regulus in the south-east towards Kelibia. Here Scipio would be able to secure a base, and need not fear for his communications with Sicily. As the Carthaginians did not know where he intended to land, or had been deceived as to his direction, he need not fear to disembark near Carthage, for the enemy had no large army collected, and the risk of a sudden attack was small. He may have thought of Tunis as a possible base, but it is more likely that he hoped from the beginning to win Utica, and that he deliberately landed near it. His order to sail south when off Cape Bon would in that case belong to the source which thought he intended to make for Emporia—and so can be dismissed. He aimed perhaps at what he did actually attain, to land on the western promontory somewhere near Utica. Livy's account will then be correct for the actual events, though wrong on Scipio's motives. After moving from Cape Bon, Scipio found himself, when the fog lifted, near his destination, Cape Pulchrum, the Promontory of Apollo, and here he disembarked. Livy's account is quite plain, and there is no need to suppose his source was deliberately ambiguous so as to obscure the fact that Scipio made a mistake and landed where he did not intend;¹ such a view depends on the identification of Pulchrum with the Promontory of Mercury in the east.² But Livy distinguishes the two; we can hardly

¹ Zielinski, pp. 15 *sqq.* Cf. Veith, p. 578.

² It has been assumed above that the Promontory of Mercury (the Hermean Cape of Greek writers) corresponds to Cape Bon (Ras Adar) in the east, and that the cape called Pulchrum was the same as Cape Apollo (Ras es Terfa, Cape Farina) in the west. Zielinski however, followed by Veith, identifies Pulchrum with Cape Bon, on the evidence of Polybius III. 22. This contradicts Livy's account. Polybius also knew the term Cape Hermaeum, and though he may have called the same cape by two names, it is strange that he does not record the two names in the passage to which Zielinski refers. It refers to the early treaty of Rome and Carthage, and says that Καλὸν Ἄκρον lies in front

suppose the same cape would be described to Scipio on two consecutive days by different names without some further comment. It is possible that Scipio may have thought of either headland as a possible landing place, and been guided by circumstances to an extent. But if he really wanted to follow literally in Agathocles' footsteps, it is unlikely he would let the fog change his plan; the loss of a day would not be fatal. Agathocles too, though he had landed in the east, had realised the value of Utica as a base. To sum up, it is almost certain that Scipio was not diverted by adverse conditions from going to Emporia, and unlikely that he aimed at Cape Bon; most probably he intended to land near Utica, where he did, and, securing a base there, to press on with all his might the war against Carthage itself.

of Carthage to the north, and that the Carthaginians stopped the Romans sailing south of it, because they did not want them to learn of the fertility of the territory of Byzacium and Syrtis Minor. De Sanctis (p. 581) points out that Cape Farina is as much to the north of Carthage as Cape Bon; in fact from Carthage it looks more to the north and Cape Bon more to the east. Also the exclusion of the Romans from Byzacium is only Polybius' opinion (cf. Kahrstedt, p. 335 n. 1). Difficulties of navigation excluded the Romans sufficiently from south of Thapsus. It was more important to keep them from establishing themselves on the coasts of Numidia and Mauritania, where the Carthaginian dominion was only nominal and the traders would clash with Roman and Etruscan soldiers, i.e. south, not of Cape Bon, but of Cape Farina. Zon. (ix. 12), following a parallel tradition, makes Scipio land at Cape Apollo which is usually identified with Pulchrum. De Sanctis thinks this may correspond to Ras Sebib, the cape which closes the Gulf of Bizerta on the east, and the ground between this and Terfa is suitable for Scipio's disembarkation. This identification is not necessary, as the ships would be more protected from the north-east winds under the shelter of the protecting headland of Terfa, than by the more open Ras Sebib. The actual site of the landing may have been Porto Farina, which would be protected, and Scipio's first camp lay on the hills behind. Pomp. Mela, i. 34, mentions a *Castra Delia* between Cape Apollo and *Castra Cornelia*. Tissot, ii. 88, places this at Porto Farina. His suggestion of a corruption of *Delia* for *Laelia* is attractive; the place would then have been named after Laelius who was in command of the Roman fleet.

When the disembarkation was completed, Scipio formed a camp on some hills near by, which probably were near Porto Farina, some sixteen miles from Utica.¹ From here he plundered the neighbouring territory and defeated a cavalry squadron, 1000 strong, sent against him under Hanno, who was killed. He captured a fairly rich city, and shipped his plunder and prisoners to Sicily.

This incident (L. xxix. 29. 1) is similar to one recounted a few chapters later (ch. 34-35). In both, the Romans win a cavalry engagement, in both a Hanno is killed, in both Scipio captures a rich town, in the second case named Salaeca, and in both the booty is sent to Sicily. Obviously a doublet! But Livy (ch. 35. 2) says "all the authorities do not say that two Carthaginian generals of the same name were killed in two cavalry engagements, fearing, I think, to be misled into repeating the same incident twice over. Coelius, anyway, and Valerius say Hanno was taken prisoner." Kahrstedt (p. 337 n. 2) writes "Livy used Polybius for both engagements and so all discussion is stopped," i.e. both accounts are to be accepted. De Sanctis (p. 582) calls Kahrstedt's remark characteristic of modern "polibiolatria"; the first incident, he thinks, is by no means certainly from Polybius, as it is connected with the preceding account of the terror felt by the Carthaginians at the Roman landing, which is not Polybian. Indeed, if it had been from Polybius, it would truly stop all discussion, as there are examples of re-duplication in Polybius.² Livy does not in any way say, as it is claimed, that Coelius and Valerius had rejected one of the engagements. The criticism he makes is personal, or from a source which is not Valerius or Coelius. These two authors may have given one account because they only found one in their sources.

¹ L. xxix. 28. 1: "in proximis tumultis." Cf. Veith, p. 579.

² E.g. in his account of Duilius' victory at Mylae, I. 21; see De Sanctis, III. pt I. p. 128.

But it is hazardous to reject completely the incident in face of Livy's evidence. He knew of the similarities and the confusion which might arise, yet he repeats both accounts. We may believe, with Kahrstedt, that he is following Polybius, to whom he adheres closely in his account of the African campaign. Would Livy, knowing the doubt on this point in other historians, repeat both incidents from mere confusion, or unless he had Polybius' authority? If Polybius only recounted one incident, Livy would hardly accept other evidence in preference to his. For once Livy, whom modern critics tend to blame for lack of critical insight, attempts to weigh his evidence and reject a "doublet," and the result is that he is accused (e.g. by De Sanctis) of falling into the mistake himself. It is possible, but unlikely, that Polybius himself may have been guilty of a re-duplication. If two similar incidents occur, there are never lacking critics to reduce them to one. Yet, in circumstances which remained roughly the same (i.e. Scipio established in a strong position, harassing the land, and opposed by hurriedly collected cavalry squadrons), one might reasonably expect similar results. Livy (35. 1) says that on the very day on which the second action was fought, the ships which had carried the plunder of the first action to Sicily happened to return with supplies. This miraculous return is used by De Sanctis to support his view. But what else could be expected? If two actions took place, the ships would be sent to Sicily with plunder and would return to Africa and would be used thus again. Surely, it is natural enough. The only ground for rejecting the incident is the coincidence of the leader's name, Hanno—all the rest is perfectly natural. But Hanno was a common name in Carthage.¹ Indeed, the coincidence of the name may be the whole cause of the

¹ Cf. Gsell, p. 216 n. 4.

confusion, which led some of Livy's authorities to reject the incident.

Meanwhile, Carthage was in a state of alarm. The country-people flocked for protection to the towns, which led to great confusion, especially in Carthage itself. They had no reliable general and no effective army at hand. Hasdrubal may have raised some 13,000 men, but was away somewhere in the interior. At the moment, the Carthaginians had to rely on hastily-raised cavalry squadrons.¹ Appeals for help were sent to Hasdrubal and Syphax, while the town was made ready for a siege and there was a general call to arms. After the first force under Hanno had been defeated, as told above, a fresh one was collected by another Hanno, Hamilcar's son. Scipio had sent his fleet on to Utica, and after his initial success moved his whole force against the town, encamping near the fleet about a mile from the city walls. Utica stood at the end of a line of hills, Djebel Menzel Roul, on which Scipio pitched his camp, to the south-west of the town, just north-east of the modern road over the hills.² Meanwhile he had been joined by Masinissa, who, true to his promise, arrived with 200 horsemen.³ Scipio then prepared to check Hanno, whose recruiting efforts had secured some 4000 men. He planned that Masinissa should engage Hanno and gradually retire till he had drawn him past a place where Scipio would be ambushed with his cavalry.

The topography of the cavalry engagement which followed is very clear. Livy (xxix. 34) names Salaeca as the place where Hanno was and where Masinissa first engaged him. This town was fifteen miles from the Roman camp, and is probably to be identified with Henchir El Bey

¹ See note on forces, Appendix v, pp. 318 *sqq.*

² Cf. Veith, p. 579.

³ L. 29. 4. Cf. P. xxi. 21. 2 (xxii. 4). Livy says most authorities give 2000. Probably here, in giving the lower figure, he is following Polybius. Cf. Gsell, p. 215 n. 3, and Zielinski, p. 104.

to the west of Utica.¹ According to Appian (*Lib.* 14), the battle itself took place at the Tower of Agathocles, which was thirty stades from Utica. The exact site of this building is not known. Tillyard² suggests that it is to be seen in the small ruin near the coast road from Tunis to Bizerta; this lies near a well to the south of the road, and east of the entrance to the pass leading up the Djebel Menzel Roul range. Whether or not this is the site of Agathocles' Tower, it is almost certainly that of the battle. The literary evidence, which seems accurate (for Livy and Appian supplement each other), is supported by the nature of the ground. For here is found exactly the type of hills which would cover such a manœuvre as Scipio performed. The Djebel Menzel Roul, at the north-eastern end of which stands Utica, gradually broadens out as it runs to the south-west and west, and then narrows to a neck where it joins on to the Djebel Douimis, which in turn also broadens to the west. It is on this neck or saddle of the hills that the site of Agathocles' Tower is fixed. Salaeca lay to the west, and Masinissa could decoy Hanno thence past this saddle behind which (i.e. to the north) Scipio lay concealed. The saddle is, according to Veith (p. 582), broad, flat, sloping gently on both sides, of hard but not very rocky soil; it could be quickly crossed by a cavalry squadron with a broad front. The level ground in front is, at any rate to-day, marshy in parts; if this was the case then, the spot was still more suited for the ambush, for it would make it more difficult for the enemy to withdraw to the south.

Masinissa, according to his instructions, rode up to Salaeca where Hanno was—a position which drew, we are

¹ Cf. Veith, p. 581.

² *Agathocles*, p. 157; cf. Veith, p. 582 n. 2. Tissot (I. 554) places it where a gorge cuts the Djebel Menzel Roul, south-west of Utica by the modern road Bizerta-Tunis, but this is only about 1½ miles from Utica; cf. Gsell, p. 47 n. 7.

BATTLE AT THE TOWER OF AGATHOCLES

UTICA

ROMAN FLEET 6000

CASTRA CORNELIA
SCIPIO'S CAMP

ROMAN CAMP

Dj. DOUMELIS

SCIPIO

HANNO

MASINISSA

Dj. MENZEL ROUL

THE BURNING OF THE CAMPS

LAELIUS

MANTOUMA

SCIPIO

Dj. TOURA

MASINISSA

CAMP OF SYRAX

HASDRUBAL'S CAMP

THE BURNING OF THE CAMPS

Laelius

Mantourea

Mantourea

Camp of Syphax

Hasdrubal's Camp

Mantourea

Based on Kromayer-Veith

Based on Kromayer-Veith

told, from Scipio the remark: "Cavalry in houses in the summer! Let there be more of them, so long as they have such a leader!" Here Masinissa drew out the enemy's forces, and when no longer able to endure their attack he retired slowly along the south of the hills, past the saddle where Scipio had come under shelter of the north of Djebel Menzel Roul. Masinissa continued his retreat to Utica round the south of the hills, the easiest way.¹ When Hanno was passing the ambush, Scipio broke forth and fell on his flank, while Masinissa wheeled round and attacked his front. Hanno's front ranks, 1000 strong, were surrounded and killed. The rest of the force fled, but lost another 1000 men, including Hanno, in its retreat.² Possibly, as many escaped, Scipio's attack was delivered a moment too soon and fell slightly too near the head of Hanno's column, failing to surround the rear and block the retreat. This might easily occur through Hanno pulling up his force sharply when he saw the attack coming, more sharply in fact than Scipio had allowed for. After rewarding all who had distinguished themselves in the engagement, in particular Masinissa, Scipio garrisoned Salaeca and plundered the neighbourhood, returning to his camp in a week's time laden with booty.³

¹ Cf. Veith, p. 582.

² They were pursued for more than 30 miles, according to L. ch. 34. 16. This figure has been called into question. Veith (p. 582) says they would flee to Salaeca, 10 miles away, and also find refuge in other possible directions at a much shorter distance. Cf. Gsell, p. 217 n. 2. Besides, the Carthaginian horse would be tired out already, and could hardly endure a 30 miles' pursuit.

³ Dio, 57. 65 sq. (Zon. ix. 12) and App. *Lib.* 14 give a different account from Livy's and similar to each other, but not identical. Dio probably used Coelius, while Appian used, as earlier, a source which was in part Coelian, in part not, and originally Polybian; cf. Kahrstedt, p. 337. Dio tells how Masinissa was still nominally allied to Carthage, and formed the plan of the ambush. But it was some of Scipio's men who drew on Hanno, while Masinissa lagged behind in the rear. Then Scipio left his ambush and fell on Hanno's

After this first victory Scipio could turn all his attention to winning Utica as a base, hoping, perhaps, to storm it before winter set in. The fleet operated from the north side of the town which faced the sea, while the army moved up to part of the hill which commanded the walls themselves, very likely that part which was later crowned by the amphitheatre.¹ The Romans had adequate siege engines, as Scipio had brought some with him, while others were sent from Sicily and still more were being manufactured in an arsenal. But Hasdrubal soon collected a large army, and was joined by another one under Syphax; they advanced from Carthage to near Utica, threatening Scipio; while the town itself put up a gallant resistance. Winter was approaching and, as Utica had not fallen, Scipio

front, while Masinissa was at his rear. Hanno was captured, but was exchanged for Masinissa's mother, whom Hasdrubal had arrested. According to Appian also, it was Masinissa who formed the plan, and who advised Scipio to place the ambush. Then he got Hanno sent out to reconnoitre and to protect Utica, and so led him into the trap. In both Dio and Appian, Masinissa is made the inventor of the plan, and in the battle itself he attacks the enemy's rear. In Livy, Scipio forms the plan, and it is he who falls on the enemy's rear. The Livy-Polybian tradition puts Scipio in the foreground, while Appian puts Masinissa there. Veith (p. 581) thinks this is because Appian used Juba as his source. Gsell (p. 202, n. 5) rejects this. Both Appian and Dio give only one battle and tell of Hanno's capture, not death; cf. L. XXIX. 35. 2. Kahrstedt (p. 339) rejects Valerius Antias as Appian's source. App. *Lib.* 15 tells of the capture of a town, Locha, by Scipio, the barbarity of the Roman troops in their victory, Scipio's punishment of them, and a further victorious battle fought by Scipio and Masinissa against Mago. Gsell, p. 218, n. 2, suggests Locha may be identified with Salaeca (cf. Meltzer, II. p. 489, and contrast Tissot, I. p. 555). More probably Locha is the "urbs satis opulenta" of L. XXIX. 29. 2, taken after the first cavalry engagement; and the second battle in Appian represents the Coelian version of the second fight in Livy, with the difference that the Carthaginian leader is called Mago not Hanno. Cf. De Sanctis, p. 664.

¹ L. XXIX. 35. 7, "ab imminente prope ipsis moenibus tumulto." Cf. Veith (p. 580). Gsell, p. 219 n. 1, suggests another height, a little more to the south-west.

could not risk prosecuting the siege any longer, but had to look elsewhere for his winter quarters.¹ If he stopped where he was, he would be separated from the fleet. He found an admirable spot about two miles to the east of Utica, where he could collect his whole force. Near Utica there is a long narrow line of raised ground, stretching some nine miles in a south-south-westerly direction. At the northern end now stands the village of Galaat el Andeless. The first mile or so from here, in Scipio's time, projected into the sea, which came much further south than it does to-day. Utica was on the coast, but it is not known exactly how far the sea reached to the east of the town; probably the coast ran almost due east and west here, and terminated in the sharp headland where Scipio encamped, which was later known as the *Castra Cornelia*. The ground between the camp and the town was marshy; to-day, it is crossed by the *Ou. Medjerda*, which has changed its course since Roman times, and by its deposits has caused the coast-line to recede. In the middle of this ridge opposite Utica, at the base of the part which projected into the sea, Scipio placed his legionary camp. The ships were beached to the north, enclosed by the same lines as the military camp. The cavalry lay on the south slope towards the other side. And here, after abandoning the siege of Utica, Scipio passed the winter.²

¹ P. xiv. 1. 2 is taken by Livy (xxx. 3. 3) to mean that the Romans definitely continued the siege during the winter. Polybius does not say this; nor indeed could Scipio have done so, when cooped up in the *Castra Cornelia*.

² On *Castra Cornelia* see L. xxix. 35. 13, P. xiv. 6. 7 and *Caes. B.C.* ii. 24. 2; Veith, pp. 583 *sqq.* The description given above of Scipio's camp is in accordance with L. xxix. 35. 13-14. Veith, however, thinks that as Livy himself did not know the place and worked in a superficial manner from his source, and considering the frequency of errors of orientation in ancient writers, he may have given the wrong order. The main camp is rightly placed on the highest part of the ridge, just at the base of the actual promontory, where the slope on the west is not quite so steep as on the east (cf. *Caes.*). The fleet lay to the north,

The first season's campaign had led to small, or at any rate unspectacular, results, and Scipio was driven to an awkward position. Positively, he had effected a safe landing, gained the support of Masinissa and his invaluable cavalry, beaten all the forces sent against him, and won certain towns. But he had failed to win a base in Utica, and was now driven back to winter on a barren rocky peninsula, where he was carefully watched by two hostile armies, together stronger than his own force. He had accumulated much corn from plundering the neighbouring country, and drew fresh supplies of food and clothing from Sicily, Italy and Sardinia. But his communications were somewhat precarious; winter had set in, and he had to fear

but this may either be directly north on the west of the promontory, or slightly to the east on the other side. It is in the latter place that Veith puts the naval camp, as on the west side the ships would be exposed to the west or north-west wind, especially in winter, while they would be protected from it on the east. But here they would be exposed to the east winds, which blew in winter as well as in spring. There can be little doubt that they lay to the west, where they may have been sufficiently protected, as Gsell (p. 220, n. 2) suggests, from the north-west winds by the heights which surround the gulf. L. xxx. 25. 6 describes a Roman ship returning from Carthage which, after passing the mouth of the Bagradas, rounded the promontory. This can only refer to the promontory of the *Castra Cornelia*, and so the camp must have lain to the west. Because Livy implies the cavalry camped opposite the fleet, Veith places their camp to the west of the main camp; also because the south, where Livy puts it, would be too exposed to attack. But as the fleet lay directly to the north, we must place the cavalry to the south "on the gently sloping plain which the line of hills forms from the little plateau of the chief camp to the south" (Veith). Gsell favours the south, because on these slopes the camp would be built in a manner to render surprise difficult, and to allow a retreat to the main camp, in case this camp was captured; also, naturally the cavalry would be placed in front of the rest of the forces, to allow frequent sorties for plunder and reconnaissance. It is difficult to see why a camp in the west, where Veith places it, should be much better protected, as it too would lie on the enemy's main line of attack; though the sea protected its north side, it was on the level, while, if the camp lay to the south, the slope of the hills would afford some protection from attack.

loss from storms and wrecks, even apart from the threat of the Carthaginian fleet. He was even temporarily cut off from those towns which he had won.¹ But doubtless he had the confidence of his troops and of the Roman people, for his command was prolonged; while, above all, he trusted in his own ability and genius. He had acted cautiously, and was feeling his way, seeking a secure base and adequate strength and supplies. His caution has been compared with that of Gustavus when he landed in Germany.² "Both were justified not only by the result, but by the science of war... alike unable for reasons outside their control to adjust the means to the end, they displayed that rare strategic quality of adjusting the end to the means. Their strategy foreshadowed Napoleon's maxim that 'the whole art of war consists in a well-ordered and prudent defensive followed by a bold and rapid offensive'."

The Carthaginian allied forces, which had caused Scipio to withdraw from Utica and effectively protected the interior from a sudden attack on his part, passed the winter not far off. Their numbers are uncertain, perhaps in all some 30,000 infantry and 3000-5000 cavalry.³ They encamped on high ground, 60 stades (10½ km.) from Scipio's camp, and 10 stades (1¾ km.) from each other; Hasdrubal to the east, Syphax to the west.⁴ Here they would be able to cover and communicate with Carthage itself, while Syphax also could keep in touch with his kingdom in the west. Veith⁵ places Hasdrubal's camp at

¹ App. *Lib.* 18 mentions an inland town, Tholous, where Scipio had a large store of materials and food. This was captured by Syphax by treachery. It is unlikely Scipio would try to hold a town in the interior, from which his communications were sure to be cut. If he got any supplies from the interior, it would be by sudden cavalry raids. Cf. Gsell, p. 222, n. 1.

² Capt. Liddell Hart, p. 128.

³ See note on forces, Appendix v. pp. 320 *sqq.*

⁴ P. xiv. 4. 1 (= L. xxx. 5. 3) and xiv. 1. 14.

⁵ Pp. 586 *sqq.*

the extreme southern end of the range of hills, at the north end of which Scipio himself was encamped. The range terminates in a peak, 59 metres high, called the Koudiat Touba, which is connected by a narrow neck with another hill to the west, on which stands the village Douar Touba. This almost isolated hill is some $2\frac{1}{2}$ km. in circumference, and is exactly $10\frac{1}{2}$ km. from the site of Scipio's camp, if measured along the way to the east of the hill, the route which Scipio followed; this corresponds to the Polybian figure. Three km. further west, lies an isolated broad flat hill, some 5 km. in circumference, the Koudiat el Mabtouha; here Veith places Syphax' camp.¹ For, though the Ou. Medjerda runs between these two hills, in antiquity it flowed to the east of them.

During the winter Scipio began to negotiate with Syphax,² hoping he would throw over his alliance with Carthage. He knew that Syphax might have tired of his new friends and possibly also of Sophonisba, his main link with the Carthaginian cause. But if he hoped to win over the prince himself secretly, he failed; for we find Syphax negotiating for peace between Carthage and Rome as an intermediary. Syphax remained loyal to his allies, and would not treat with Scipio personally. The main clause of the treaty, which he tried to bring about, was that

¹ The distance between these two hills is nearly double that given by Polybius. Veith suggests that Polybius is only giving round numbers, and that the camps (especially the parts assigned to the cavalry) may have spread partly over the plain. The two camps might have been on the Koudiat Touba and the hill connected with it; these are nearly $1\frac{1}{2}$ km. apart. But this distance is too short, and if the camps spread towards one another they would almost seem as one, which is not the impression conveyed by the narrative.

² App. *Lib.* 17 and Dio, 57. 72 (Zon. ix. 12), say it was Syphax who started the negotiations. They also say that Syphax did not definitely come out on the Carthaginian side till after the cavalry engagement. Valerius Antias said Syphax came in person to the Roman camp to negotiate—L. xxx. 3. 6.

the Carthaginians should evacuate Italy, and the Romans Africa, each side keeping the places they held between these two countries. Carthage was clearly tired of the war, and ready to end it. She had lost her empire in Spain, Sicily and Sardinia, and wanted peace to revive and extend her commerce, Africa itself offering sufficient scope for the moment. Many in Rome doubtless were ready for peace, especially old Fabius and the conservative agrarian party. But Hannibal, though at bay and almost powerless, was still in Southern Italy, while Mago was in Liguria. Until these hostile forces had been driven out, the wounds inflicted by the war on the countryside could not be healed. And here was the opportunity of a peace, which meant no loss of territory, the removal of the thorn in her side, and the prospect of a quick agricultural recovery. But this view was not representative of the new thought of Rome. She was like "a noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep and shaking her invincible locks." Dimly the imperial idea was being conceived. She began to realise that it was her destiny "*regere imperio populos*." She had won Sicily and Spain and the command of the sea, she, a nation of farmers! She had resisted the genius of Hannibal with dogged perseverance, and saw the end at hand. Was she now to return to a *status quo* after all her sufferings? It was only Hannibal's inborn hate for her that had sustained him all these years, and the enmity of his house that had so largely brought on the war. What guarantee had she that, if he evacuated Italy, she would be secure in the future? It was Scipio who personified this new feeling of power, and who saw clearly that real peace necessitated the defeat of Hannibal himself. So he rejected the proposals of the enemy, and trusted that his genius would find some way out of the difficulties in which he was for the moment.

He soon conceived a plan, as daring and unexpected

as the one after his first winter in Spain when he struck at Cartagena. Learning that the Carthaginian camps were made of branches and reeds without any earth, he planned to set them on fire. As in Spain he spent the winter learning all he could about the position of New Carthage, so now he deliberately held out hopes of reaching an agreement with Syphax, to enable frequent embassies to be sent, with officers and spies disguised as slaves, to explore the approaches, entrances and position of the two hostile camps. By the spring of 203 he had collected enough information, and prepared to break off negotiations. He launched the fleet against Utica, and sent 2000 men to occupy the hill by the town, which he had held during the previous autumn. This move was not a serious attempt to blockade Utica again, but merely to give that impression, which would lull any suspicions Hasdrubal might have, and also protect Scipio's rear against sorties from Utica when he suddenly struck south. He sent more envoys to Syphax, this time with orders not to return without a definite answer. Syphax, believing Scipio was ready to make peace on his terms, sent them on to Hasdrubal. The Carthaginians ratified the terms, and Syphax sent the embassy back to Scipio, who was now ready to strike. Scipio replied that he was ready for the peace, but that some of his staff were dissatisfied. He did this, according to Polybius (xiv. 2. 13), in order not to appear to have broken off the truce if, while formal negotiations for peace were in progress, he committed any hostile act; in other words, to save his face. It is difficult to draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate strategic tricks and ruses, but Scipio evidently felt that he had gone as near the border-line as possible, and that some explanation was necessary. Livy (xxx. 4. 8) patriotically goes further, and invents an excuse: Syphax at the last moment added some unacceptable conditions to the treaty. As Polybius does

not give this explanation, it is obviously due to the Roman colouring of Livy or of his source.¹ Both Syphax and Hasdrubal were disappointed at their failure, and, with no suspicion of the shadow which hung over them, they concluded that they should try to bring on a pitched battle. But before they had time to act, Scipio launched his attack, and they were taken off their guard. The speed with which Scipio acted again calls to mind his similar surprise dash on Cartagena.

Scipio's preparations and orders led his troops to believe they were going to renew the siege of Utica, but at mid-day he disclosed his real plan to the most efficient tribunes, and ordered them to draw up the troops after supper, when the buglers had sounded the retreat as usual. He then took counsel with the spies who had been to the enemy's camps, but left the decisions largely to Masinissa owing to his personal knowledge of the ground. The army started from the *Castra Cornelia* at the first watch of the night, and marched along the east side of the hills, where it would be protected

¹ Probably the latter, as in these earlier chs. (3-11) of xxx., Livy seems to supplement Polybius with Roman sources, as is shown by his quotation from Valerius Antias. Cf. De Sanctis, p. 650. Appian (*Lib.* 17-23) says Syphax attempted to win over Masinissa or, failing this, to murder him; at this point he joined the Carthaginians openly. He planned with the Carthaginians a general attack on Scipio by land and sea. Masinissa learned of this, and informed Scipio the night before. Scipio determined to take the offensive, and that night advanced against the enemy's camps. Appian does not mention Scipio's fictitious negotiations and spies. In Appian, the attack on the enemy's camps is made the result of a sudden inspiration of Scipio, not of careful forethought and deliberation. Appian had treated the wading party at the siege of New Carthage in the same way, and is probably following Coelius.

Dio (*Zon.* ix. 12) mentions Scipio's spies, but gives him a real excuse for breaking off the negotiations—the attempted murder of Masinissa. This account, which makes the attack deliberate, is Polybian rather than Coelian in origin, and contrasts with Appian.

from the enemy.¹ North of the Koudiat Touba,² where the modern road crosses the range in a narrow cutting, Scipio called a halt. Laelius and Masinissa were detached, with half the legionaries and all the Numidians, to attack Syphax' camp. When they approached this, they divided. Laelius at once sent forward men to fire the camp, while he himself held back to cover the operation. Masinissa, who knew the exits of the camp, surrounded and guarded them, to cut off the fugitives. As soon as the fire had spread, Laelius attacked. Neither Syphax nor his troops supposed the cause of the fire to be anything but accidental, and so rushed out from their huts unprepared. Many were trampled to death in the passages, others were burnt by the flames, while some fled in panic into the hands of the enemy. The Carthaginians in the other camp also thought that the Numidian camp had caught fire by accident, and so rushed unarmed from their own, to help or come to look at the sight. Scipio, who had been waiting till their attention should be directed towards the blazing camp, now came up over the Koudiat Touba, and, falling on their camp, set fire to it also.³ The whole camp was soon aflame

¹ This march is referred to in a fragment of Coelius, quoted by Nonius Marcellus: "Coelius, *Annali* vi: Ipse cum cetera copia pedentim sequitur." See Plan, p. 193.

² Cf. Veith, p. 588.

³ Livy (xxx. 6) says that the Carthaginians rushed out of their camp to help the Numidians, and fell straight into the hands of the Romans. This means, according to Veith, that Scipio and his detachment were between the two camps; and Livy, through lack of knowledge of the nature of the ground, has made a false deduction from Polybius. But possibly the Romans, whom Livy mentions, were some of Laelius' or Masinissa's men, and not Scipio's. For Masinissa's cavalry had covered all the exits of Syphax' camp, and there would be an exit facing Hasdrubal's camp, which was the direction the excited Carthaginians would take. Or they may even have been Scipio's men, for though he fell on the camp from the north, he obviously swept round to the front. P. xiv. 5. 3. A different version is given by Appian (*Lib.* 21-2);

and the Carthaginian troops endured an ordeal no less terrible than that of the Numidians. Hasdrubal soon realised the meaning of the disaster and, making no attempt to save the doomed camps, fled with a small body of horse, and was joined by Syphax who had also escaped. A large part of their armies was destroyed.¹ The horror of the night can hardly be conceived. Polybius believed that no other disaster, even if exaggerated, could be compared with it. For the Romans, the success was complete. By a daring stroke with practically no loss, Scipio had delivered a vital blow at the superior forces of the enemy. Instead of being confined to the narrow peninsula of the *Castra Cornelia*, he had gloriously taken the offensive, and dispelled the gloom which may have oppressed some of his followers during the winter.

Hasdrubal tried to rally the survivors at the nearest fortified town, possibly named *Anda*,² which he hoped to hold. But at daybreak Scipio left the camps in pursuit. Seeing that the citizens of the town would not remain loyal in face of Scipio's attack, Hasdrubal fled with all his forces, 2000 infantry and 500 cavalry, to Carthage. *Anda* (?) surrendered to Scipio and was spared, but two neighbouring towns were pillaged. Scipio then returned to the *Castra Cornelia*, and, after distributing the booty among his men, recommenced the siege of *Utica*.

Scipio attacks and fires the Carthaginian camp first. Thus the first place is given to Scipio, rather than to Masinissa. Seeing the flames, Syphax sent some cavalry to help, but these were defeated by Masinissa. Next day Syphax saw the extent of the disaster and fled. His camp was captured by Masinissa. Dio (*Zon.* ix. 12) appears to have given a similar account, and also recounts an anecdote that, before the attack on the camps, Scipio had captured a Carthaginian ship but released it when those on board pretended to be an embassy, although he saw through the trick. This is only an altered version of an incident about the return of Carthaginian envoys from Italy, and is probably Coelian.

¹ See note on forces, Appendix v. pp. 320 *sqq.*

² See below, pp. 206 *sqq.*

At Carthage alarm prevailed. The tables had been turned with dramatic suddenness. Instead of being cooped up in his camp almost besieged, Scipio now had command of the open country. This was a serious blow to the Carthaginian communications; for the Romans, virtually in command of the seas, could now impair their land supplies also. Worse still, their only army in Africa was lost, and the city itself endangered. Some were for recalling Hannibal, others for approaching Scipio. But the bolder opinion of the war party of the Barcids prevailed. All hope was not extinguished. For the disaster had not shown the superiority of the Romans in the field, but had resulted from a ruse. If they could collect the fugitives, and raise new troops beyond the reach of Scipio's grasp, they might hope soon to lead a fresh army to relieve Utica or to face the foe in battle. So Hasdrubal was allotted the task of recruiting, which was started in the town and country districts.¹ It was also feared that Syphax, who was near by at Abba, might desert them if unsupported, so an embassy was sent to urge his continued loyalty. He had, in fact, started to return home, but near Abba he met 4000 Celtiberian mercenaries on their way to join the Carthaginians. This altered his purpose, which was finally changed by the continued entreaties of his Carthaginian wife, Sophonisba. The news of the arrival of the Spanish mercenaries, whose courage was known and whose numbers were doubled by rumour, together with the knowledge of the loyalty of Syphax, encouraged the Carthaginians to renew the war. Within a month of the disaster, Syphax and the Celtiberians had joined together and concentrated, with the force raised by Carthage itself, at the Great Plains, with a total strength of perhaps some 20,000.² This plain, five days' march from Utica, lies around Souk el

¹ L. 7. 8, "in urbe agrisque."

² See note on forces, Appendix v. pp. 321 *sqq.*

Kremis, on the upper reaches of the Bagradas.¹ It is about 15 miles long, 12 miles broad, and 75 miles distant from Utica. The place was well chosen, for it was some distance from Scipio, and from it Hasdrubal could keep in touch with Carthage, while Syphax would be nearer his own kingdom, and could more easily draw reinforcements thence. Both leaders imagined Scipio was busy with the siege of Utica, and that if they chose a spot far inland they might be left undisturbed for the moment.

These incidents, between the burning of the camps and the battle of the Great Plains, have given rise to some difficulties, chiefly topographical. Polybius' account has been followed above, except that neither he² nor Livy names the town, which Hasdrubal occupied after the Carthaginian disaster and then evacuated. Appian (ch. 24) says that Hasdrubal fled to Anda, where he collected some of the fugitives; on learning that he had been superseded in his office by Hanno because of his bad generalship, he started to gather together an army by himself. As Appian's account is unserviceable and even omits all mention of the battle of the Great Plains, it is generally rejected with the exception of the name Anda, which is used to compensate for Polybius' silence, i.e. Hasdrubal fled to and evacuated Anda.³ But the place is otherwise unknown.⁴ Livy's account follows Polybius closely, except that he gives Abba under the form Obba, and follows the deputation sent to Syphax in more detail. The embassy reported to Syphax that it had met the Celtiberian mercenaries near Obba,

¹ Cf. Tissot, I. pp. 61-3; 556-7; Veith, p. 590; Gsell, p. 230.

² There is a gap between chs. 5 and 6, in which it may have been named. Yet Livy, who follows Polybius closely here, omits it.

³ E.g. by De Sanctis, p. 528 and Gsell, p. 227.

⁴ Tissot (I. p. 556) suggests Henchir Merkeb en Nabi, on the right bank of the Medjerda, to the west of Djebel Ahmar. Gsell (p. 228) suggests Henchir Bou Djaoua, 7 miles south of Douar Touba; perhaps there was a bridge there, over which ran a road to Carthage; it is in good communication with Carthage and the valley of the Medjerda.

whereas Polybius says Syphax himself met them near Abba. Also Syphax was, according to Livy, in a "locus munitus," about 8 miles either from the town which Hasdrubal had evacuated (Anda?) or from the two towns which Scipio had plundered and which were near Anda; the context does not make clear which of these is meant. Abba (Obba) also is unknown. Gsell (p. 228 n. 5) tentatively suggests the town Thubba, which existed in Roman times at Henchir Chouegui or Henchir Tobba, north-west of Tebourba; this is 12 miles from the suggested site of Anda, which is not very different from Livy's eight. The name Thubba may preserve the name Obba, the "th" being a feminine prefix in Berber. There is no objection to locating these sites so near Utica, unless it is considered that one or both of them was made the centre of the re-organisation of the Carthaginian forces. In this case, they must be sought further inland, nearer the Great Plains beyond Scipio's reach.

Saumagne¹ suggests that the place which Hasdrubal made the centre of his recruiting operations is Anda, where the wounded general fled with 500 cavalry. It is at Anda, far from Carthage, that he regrouped the scattered mercenaries and wandering Numidians, and by hard work got an army of 3000 cavalry and 8000 infantry. That is, Anda should not be identified with the unnamed town in Polybius, because what Hasdrubal did at the latter (i.e. evacuated it) does not correspond with what he did at Anda (i.e. recruited). Therefore Saumagne wishes to identify Anda with Abba. The chief objection is Polybius' statement, that it was Syphax, not Hasdrubal, who fled to Abba. But, replies Saumagne, this is not a statement of objective fact by Polybius, but is only contained in an argument by which the Carthaginian war party enforced its proposals. When Polybius says they said Syphax was at Abba, he only

¹ *Rendiconti della R. Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei*, 1925.

gives a true report of their argument, not a fact. Syphax, then, fled to a fortified place from which he started to retreat; on his way he met near Abba the Celtiberians, who were coming in the opposite direction, and this caused him to change his plan. His original movement was from the "locus munitus" of Livy and Polybius, and not from Abba, for it was there that he changed his plan. Livy's version of the deputation is a more accurate copy of his original source; for Polybius, who used the same source, has compressed it by eliminating the embassy, and so has to put Syphax in direct contact with the Celtiberians (but did Livy have access even through an intermediary to Polybius' source here?). In short, it is not certain that Syphax was ever at Obba, but as that town was important in the allies' preparations, and as what took place there had an effect on the morale of the Carthaginians and of Syphax, and was of great importance, and not more important than what Hasdrubal did according to Appian, it may be admitted that Abba-Anda,¹ a city in the centre of Zouarines, was a base of re-organisation of the African army, of which the Celtiberians were the centre and of which Hasdrubal had command. Syphax was in Numidia (so Saumagne interprets L. 7. 11) with Sophonisba, who had come from Cirta; the embassy brings news of Carthage, of Obba and of Hasdrubal, and establishes a liaison between the three groups of the Carthaginian forces. Saumagne rejects Gsell's reconstruction, because it puts the concentration too near Carthage, and by distinguishing Anda from Abba places the latter 8 miles from the former, that is, in unsuitable territory.

This theory, which is based on the reliability of Appian apart from a textual corruption (the one point generally considered sound), on the inferiority of Polybius to Livy in reproducing his source, and on the strained interpretation

¹ = Ebba, which lies a few kilometres west of Zouarine.

of Polybius' reference to Syphax' whereabouts, stresses one vital fact—that the Carthaginian forces must have re-organised at some distance from Scipio's neighbourhood. But if Anda is not identified with Polybius' unnamed town, there is no difficulty; for he does not specify where Hasdrubal re-organised after his evacuation of this town and his later departure from Carthage. Hasdrubal raised his forces probably far inland, at an unknown place near the Great Plains. Syphax meanwhile had fled to Abba, which was near the town which Hasdrubal had evacuated. There is no statement that he ever concentrated his forces finally here; he only rallied the troops scattered by the night attack on the camps, and then proceeded to retire homewards. Soon after starting, he met the Celtiberians and changed his purpose, but it is not said that he returned to Abba. He may have gone on to Numidia to raise peasants (L. 7. 8), or these may have been summoned to join him; later he joined Hasdrubal, as did the mercenaries. All three forces encamped together at the Great Plains, with the intention not of giving battle but of further recruiting out of Scipio's reach. This would suggest that Hasdrubal may have been in the neighbourhood all the time, and was joined there by the other forces. The place may even have been named Anda, for Livy only says Obba was 8 miles from the town Hasdrubal evacuated, which has no relation to the place where he collected his forces after leaving Carthage.

The Carthaginians were gathering strength in the quiet of the desert, when suddenly Scipio struck. He would not let the enemy prepare for an offensive undisturbed, but determined to take this himself. Leaving part of his force to continue the siege of Utica, he set out with the rest (perhaps 12,000–15,000 men in all) in light marching order, and arrived on the fifth day at the Great Plains, where he found some 20,000 of the enemy opposed to

him.¹ Encamping on a hill nearly 4 miles from the enemy, he came down to the plain on the next day, and drew up his forces within a mile of the Carthaginians.² For two days the armies faced each other, and only skirmishes took place. Next day they advanced to battle.

The Carthaginians at first were no doubt surprised that Scipio should dare to divide his force to stop their recruiting, and that he had moved so quickly to the offensive, which they hoped themselves to take. But they determined to fight, probably with good hopes of the issue. For they were numerically superior, and had a very effective weapon

¹ See note on forces, Appendix v. pp. 318 *sqq.* See Plan, p. 193.

² Veith (pp. 590 *sqq.*) places the battle in the plain around Souk El Kremis. Here the Medjerda, which forms the natural route for Syphax to retreat along to the west, and for the Celtiberian mercenaries to follow on their march from the west to Carthage, is joined by four tributaries—on its right the Ou. Mellegue and Ou. Tessa, on its left the Ou. Bou Heurtma and Ou. Kasseb. The last two are short but full. Veith comments, "the exact fixing of the battle in the Plain is somewhat problematic, as more or less in all battles in which the lie of the ground plays no rôle." Polybius says Scipio camped on a hill and then descended to the plain. This hill, Veith thinks, was one of the heights on the left bank of the Ou. Kasseb, which enclose the east of the plain. The enemy's camp lay 5½ km. to the west of this, in the plain near Ou. Bou Heurtma. Scipio then moved his camp to within 1–2 km. of the enemy, which would be just north of Souk El Kremis. Between this and the enemy's camp the battle was fought.

This exact identification has been rejected by Kahrstedt (p. 551 n. 1), Sann (p. 10 n. 1), and De Sanctis (p. 531 n.). Veith (*Schl.-Atlas*, col. 37), however, still maintains that the hill named is the only possible one, because "an advance on the South bank of the Medjerda is excluded by all considerations of the ground and archaeological researches on the ancient road (Tissot, II. p. 243). It is precluded on military grounds that Scipio would have pitched his first camp on a hill which lay further West and on the Northern border of the plain, for he would thereby have yielded the line of his retreat and reinforcements."

As the ground made no difference to the actual course of the battle (for it was fought in the plain), the exact fixing of the camps or of the site of the battle is comparatively unimportant. Would the Carthaginians have encamped on the plain, as Veith makes them, and not rather on some hills?

in the Celtiberian mercenaries. They had better knowledge of the ground and the surrounding country, while Scipio was far from his camp, from which they might hope to cut him off. But it is just here that their weakness lay. They ought to have made better use of these circumstances, and learnt the bitter lesson which Hannibal was receiving at the hands of Fabius. If they won an open battle, they could make it awkward for the survivors to escape. But the issue must be uncertain, in face of Scipio's tactical brilliance. If on the other hand they avoided battle for a time, they knew that Scipio could not hold on indefinitely if his supplies were threatened, or risk leaving his army at Utica weakened, and so he would be forced to retire. On his retreat they could have harassed him severely, with little loss to themselves. The Romans were always non-plussed when faced by guerilla tactics; if these had been applied here, it is difficult to know how Scipio would have faced them. As it was, Hasdrubal hoped his numerical superiority would outbalance Scipio's tactics, and so determined to fight.

Scipio advanced to battle with his infantry in the centre, drawn up in the usual three lines, *hastati*, *principes* and *triarii*; the Italian cavalry was placed on the right wing, Masinissa's horse on the left. The enemy's centre was held by the Celtiberians, the right wing by the Carthaginians, and the left by the Numidians. At the first encounter, the cavalry squadrons on both Carthaginian wings were routed by the Roman wings. The Celtiberians stood firm, and put up a good fight; their ignorance of the country reduced the safety of flight, while they feared Scipio's attitude if they were captured. But their flanks were exposed, and Scipio took advantage of this. The *hastati* engaged them in front, while the *principes* and *triarii*, under cover of their first line, turned into column, half to the right, half to the left, and then marched out to encircle the Celtiberians.

These were soon surrounded and cut to pieces, but their heroic resistance had given Hasdrubal and Syphax the necessary time to escape, the former back to Carthage, the latter to his own kingdom.¹

Scipio's tactics were a still further development of those used at Ilipa. Previously the principes had stood behind the hastati, ready either to come up into the first line to strengthen it in the actual attack, or to fill any gaps in it. In the same way, the triarii were the reserve to the second line. Now the principes and triarii no longer directly supported the first line. The old triple line was still preserved, yet each line was no longer distinct but qualitatively the same as the others, and formed a self-dependent unit, ready to come up and prolong the line at each end. Thus the outflanking of the enemy could be carried out to a still greater degree than before. For it was not to the cavalry and the light-armed troops that this was assigned, but to the legions themselves; Scipio was able to use his best troops to carry out his manœuvre. This reform by Scipio marks a real turning-point in Roman military history, and prepares the way for the use of the reserve, as it is now understood. Scipio did not form a detached reserve which could be hurried to any necessary point, but an offensive reserve to prolong his lines, when necessary, and to outflank the enemy. Also the enemy's centre was not now merely held at bay, as at Ilipa, but was actually engaged, and that on its whole front, which meant that the possibility of a sudden retreat was minimised. At Ilipa there had been no attempt at enclosing the enemy, but merely at outflanking him. Now Scipio could encircle the

¹ Appian does not recount this battle. According to Zonaras (ix. 12), on the day after the firing of the camps, the Spanish allies, who were coming to the help of Carthage, fell on the Romans, inflicting considerable damage. Appian has probably followed Coelius alone, while Dio adds an unimportant and muddled account of the battle from the Polybian tradition.

foe, as Hannibal himself had done at Cannae with his more risky crescent formation.

A council was held to determine the next move, and it was decided to divide the Roman forces. This could be done in safety, now that Syphax had fled, the Carthaginian force was checked, and the Romans were masters of the interior. Laelius and Masinissa, with the Numidians and part of the Roman legions, were sent against Syphax to strike a decisive blow before he had time to recover, and incidentally to regain Masinissa's own kingdom. Scipio himself went round to several cities, storming those which did not surrender; but many did, as they were tired of the hardships which they had endured at the hands of Carthage. Much of the booty taken on this raid was dispatched to the *Castra Cornelia*. Scipio himself did not return to his camp, but determined to follow in the steps of Agathocles and Regulus, and seize Tunis. On his arrival there the garrison fled, and the town fell into his hands. At Tunis he was in full view of Carthage itself, which he thought would naturally dismay the inhabitants; also he could command the enemy's land communications better than at Utica. This probably was the object of his move, rather than the desire for a base, whence to start the actual siege of Carthage itself.

The battle of the Great Plains, following so quickly on the heels of the disaster of the burning of the camps, naturally produced the greatest despondency at Carthage. But she did not lose heart in her hour of need. Some may have thought that the terms of a peace should be considered, but not many.¹ Rather a counter-offensive was suggested,

¹ P. XIV. 9. 10-11 says all the proposals were adopted, presumably including the *βουλευέσθαι περὶ διαλύσεως καὶ συνθηκῶν*. But he evidently means to include only those relating to the actual preparations, not any discussions of the peace party. Livy (XXX. 9), who follows Polybius very closely here, says, "few ventured to mention the word 'peace' in the Senate."

to send the fleet against the Roman forces at Utica, raise the siege, and engage the Roman fleet which was unprepared. They saw that the time had at last come to recall Hannibal, and certain Senators were dispatched on this mission. The city itself had to be strengthened and prepared to withstand a siege, while the fleet was equipped for its expedition. But, with Scipio in command of the interior, it was a difficult and slow task to raise men to man the vessels, which would fall to the lot mainly of the Carthaginians themselves. Before the fleet was ready, Scipio had reached Tunis and could forestall the enemy's plan.

While the Romans were settling down in Tunis, they saw the Carthaginian fleet under weigh on its route for Utica. Scipio, knowing that his own fleet was unprepared and off its guard; at once broke up his camp and marched at full speed towards the *Castra Cornelia*. His warships were quite unready for a naval action, as they had been loaded with artillery and siege weapons to invest Utica. Seeing the futility of attempting an open fight, he drew them in near shore, and lashed the transports together four deep in front of them, leaving only small intervals between the transports for dispatch-boats to pass in and out. These lines of moored vessels formed a barrier through which it would be almost impossible to force a way. One thousand picked men were placed on board them, with an adequate supply of ammunition.

The Carthaginian fleet seems guilty of culpable delay at this point. They may not have been able to start the expedition before, because their preparations were incomplete or because contrary winds retarded them. This was unfortunate, for the essence of the plan was a surprise attack, preferably while Scipio was still engaged in the interior. But now, when all depended on swift action, they did not attack at once, while the Romans were still pre-

paring. Instead, they anchored the first night off the harbour of Rusucmon, near Porto Farina.¹ Next day they put to sea in battle array, and, as the Romans did not put out against them as they had expected, they attacked the transports. The engagement in no way resembled a naval action, but it looked as if the ships were attacking walls, for the transports were higher than the Carthaginian ships. At last the Carthaginians threw poles fitted with grappling irons on to the Roman ships, and in this way succeeded in breaking up the first line. They retired at length to Carthage with some six transports in tow. This partial success caused great joy in the city, especially as the whole Roman fleet had narrowly escaped destruction—an escape due, says Livy, to the Carthaginian commander's slackness and Scipio's timely arrival. This arrival was in time, it is true; but Scipio seems to have been guilty of slight negligence, in not making sure of the movements of the Carthaginian fleet, before converting his own navy into a weapon of siege warfare only.²

Scipio seems to have stopped some time at Utica, without being able to take it; for he had not returned to Tunis when Syphax was sent to him, and when Laelius and Masinissa

¹ See Gsell, II. p. 146.

² Dio (Zon. IX. 12) gives a different version. The Carthaginians sent a fleet against the Roman winter camp, to capture it or anyway to force Scipio to withdraw. The Romans easily repelled the Carthaginian attack on the first day, while on the next they had the worst of it owing to the enemy's grappling irons. The Carthaginian fleet then withdrew. Appian gives two naval engagements. First (*Lib.* 24, 25), Hamilcar goes against the Roman camp with a hundred vessels, hoping to destroy the twenty Roman ones. The attempt is thwarted by Scipio by means of the use of transports, and the narrative resembles Polybius and Livy. In ch. 30 we hear of another attempt of Hamilcar on the Roman fleet. Obviously a doublet. The success of the Roman fleet, which contradicts Polybius and Livy, comes direct from Appian's source, probably Coelius. Dio has compromised by making the Romans successful one day (as Coelius) and the Carthaginians on the next (as Polybius and Livy).

came back. It was only after these incidents that he returned to Tunis, possibly after an unsuccessful attempt to storm Hippo Diarrhytus.¹

Meantime, Laelius and Masinissa followed on the track of Syphax. When they reached Masinissa's old kingdom, the Massyles expelled many of Syphax' garrisons, and gladly welcomed back their prince.² The people had never been really contented with Syphax, and, now that his fortune had changed, turned back gladly to their hereditary ruler. Although practically driven back to the borders of his old kingdom, Syphax did not despair. Urged on by his wife's entreaties, he raised a fresh force, as large as his previous one, though composed in part of raw recruits. With this force he marched out and camped near the enemy, probably a little to the east of Cirta or near the Ampsaga.³ Cavalry skirmishes soon brought on a general engagement. The Roman cavalry had great difficulty in withstanding the charges of the enemy's numerically superior cavalry. But their line was reinforced by light-armed troops, who checked the enemy's wild rushes. By the time that the legions were coming up, the Masaesyles were routed and in retreat. Syphax rashly tried to rally his men, but his horse was shot under him. He was taken prisoner and handed over to Laelius. Many of the

¹ This attempt is mentioned by App. *Lib.* 30; his further account of Hanno's unsuccessful attempt on the Roman fleet at Utica is merely a doublet of the attack on the naval camp given by Polybius and Livy. For Scipio's return to Tunis, cf. L. 16. 2.

² L. xxx. 11 says they entered Numidia after fifteen days. But probably the territory of the Massyles stretched up to the Great Plains themselves. From here to Cirta, Syphax' capital, is some 200 miles, which would take about a fortnight to traverse. After leaving the Plains, Masinissa passed through his own country and reached Syphax' real territory in this time. Further, P. xv. 4. 4 tells how later Masinissa set out to recover his paternal kingdom; so probably at this time the whole of the country did not go over to him, but only part. In the main, Livy doubtless follows Polybius for this episode.

³ App. *Lib.* 26 says "near a river."

survivors fled to Cirta, others to their camp. The losses were not heavy; according to Livy, some 5000 casualties in the battle, and less than half that number was captured in the storming of the camp which followed.¹

With Laelius' permission, Masinissa hastened on to Cirta, which he hoped to surprise in the general confusion; Laelius followed more slowly with the infantry. Masinissa called the citizens of Cirta to a conference, but they were unmoved by threats or thoughts of their defeat, until Syphax himself was brought in bound. At this, the town surrendered and was fortified by Masinissa, who then hastened to the palace, where he was met by Sophonisba. He soon yielded to her entreaties, and was so struck by her charms that he promised her safety. The only way he could secure this was to marry her at once. When Laelius arrived, he expressed strong disapproval and, as no agreement could be reached, the matter was left over for Scipio to decide. Laelius and Masinissa then recovered some other cities, but do not seem to have advanced beyond Cirta. Thus Syphax' defeat did not involve the fall of all Numidia; his son, Vermina, tried to save what he could, and in the east were rivals of Masinissa like Mazaetullus. But Carthage could no longer expect any help from Numidia.

When Syphax arrived in the Roman camp, Scipio treated him courteously, and could not but remember how,

¹ In Appian's account (*Lib.* 26) Syphax and Masinissa meet face to face in the battle, and, when Syphax is thrown from his horse, Masinissa captures him with his own hand together with a son, who is falsely named Vermina, by Dio (*Zon.* ix. 13). This capture is told in a fragment of Coelius in Nonius Marc.: "*Coelius Annali. Lib.* vi: *Ipse regis eminus equo ferit pectus adversum; congenuculat percussus, deiecit dominum,*"—unless, indeed, this fragment refers to an invented duel of Masinissa and Hannibal at Zama; cf. Gsell, p. 237 n. 1. Cf. *Lyd. de Mens.* iv. 63, 102,—Syphax on an elephant shot by one C. Rutilius (*Rutulus* according to Silius Italicus xvii. 121 *sqq.*). Appian's exaggerated figures for Syphax' losses are 10,000 killed and 4000 prisoners.

only a few years before, he himself and Hasdrubal had been Syphax' guests. Syphax, a true son of Adam, excused his conduct by blaming his wife, that "pestis ac furia." When Masinissa arrived, Scipio blamed him privately for his lack of self-control, and for appropriating Sophonisba, who was now part of the booty of the Roman people. Masinissa, duly abashed, concluded that the only way to prevent his wife from falling into the hands of Rome was to send her a cup of poison. This she accepted gladly and drank. Next day, to divert Masinissa's mind from this tragedy, Scipio assembled all his troops, and honoured Masinissa before them, calling him king. Syphax was sent with other prisoners under Laelius' escort to Italy, where he was imprisoned at Alba, then at Tibur where he died. An embassy from Masinissa also accompanied Laelius, to beg the Senate to ratify the title of king and the honours which Scipio had granted him; this the Senate did.

The above story of Sophonisba, as told by Livy, is rejected by most critics because it is romantic. This is hardly fair to Livy, for, though romantic, there is nothing very improbable in it, when allowance is made for his artistic handling. It is perhaps too drastic to reduce, with De Sanctis (p. 532 n.), the underlying truth merely to Sophonisba's suicide to avoid capture.¹

The joy caused by the Carthaginian naval success was short-lived. On the news of the fall of Cirta and the capture of their ally Syphax, the Carthaginians turned their thoughts to peace. Scipio had, it is true, failed to take

¹ It cannot be determined whether Livy's source is Polybius or annalistic. Other versions of the story are given by App. *Lib.* 27, 28, Dio (Zon. ix. 13), Diod. xxvii. 7. They recount that Masinissa himself gave the poison to Sophonisba; but Livy, who is blamed for romanticism, makes Masinissa send it by a slave. If the wall-painting at Pompeii does refer to Sophonisba's death, the figure before the couch cannot represent Scipio himself; cf. W. Helbig, *Wandgemälde der Städte Campaniens*, p. 313, *Archaeol. Anz.* 1910, pp. 470-2, and O. Jahn, *Der Tod der Sophonisba* (Bonn, 1859).

Utica, but he was now encamped in full view at Tunis; he was master of the open country, cutting off their supplies; while Syphax' defeat meant no further recruits from that quarter. Hannibal and Mago had been recalled, but were still far from home. The fleet and the garrison of the town alone were left. Naturally the peace party came to the front, headed by the aristocracy of rich landowners, who were tired of seeing their property ravaged, and who had always been at enmity with the Barcids. Even the war party would welcome negotiations, if they could be prolonged till Hannibal returned, assuming he was not prevented by the Roman fleet; if that blow fell, few would hope for success in continuing the war. So, partly as a genuine peace move, partly to play for time, an embassy of thirty members of the Council came to Scipio, to sue for peace. At the Roman headquarters they prostrated themselves in Oriental fashion, and, throwing all the responsibility of the war on Hannibal and his party, professed themselves ready to submit. Scipio, too, was ready for peace, for in any case there would be a lull in the hostilities, as winter was at hand; the war was won in a manner sufficiently glorious for a large part of the home government; Italy was to be freed from Hannibal and Mago, and would be able to recover her lost agricultural prosperity. If Hannibal could be securely guarded, nothing remained to be done. Scipio did not aim at the destruction of Carthage itself, as the conditions he offered now and after Zama show.¹ Even if he had, its reduction by famine would take time, as long as the Carthaginians kept their fleet; while he could hardly expect to reduce it easily by storm, when he had failed at Utica. Besides, Hannibal's return must be considered, before attempting a siege. He wanted, it is true, more than the conservative party, but

¹ Traditionally Scipio is said to have acknowledged this aim: L. xxx. 44. 3; cf. L. xxix. 1. 13.

only to deprive Carthage of her European empire, and to ensure future peace by crushing the war party. The terms of the peace he proposed would accomplish his aim. He saw too that Hannibal would return, and, however confident in himself, he could not know how the issue would lie if they came into contact. He was ready to strike while the iron was hot. It is unnecessary to ascribe to him motives of personal ambition,¹ in wanting to finish the war in his own period of office and not to let the glory fall to a successor, after the spade-work had been his own. Naturally, his rivals at home might seize on some such fiction as this, and Scipio would be more than human, if some such fear did not cross his mind. But it is unwarrantable to assume he was seriously influenced by such thoughts. He treated for peace, because he saw that the season was ripe.

The terms he proposed were these: the surrender of all prisoners, deserters and refugees; the evacuation of Italy and Gaul and of all islands lying between Italy and Africa, and the abandonment of all action in Spain; the surrender of the whole navy, except twenty ships; an indemnity of 5000 talents. Also two further clauses, doubtless of a temporary nature, till the treaty was definitely made: double pay to be furnished for his troops, and a large quantity of barley and wheat. By these last two claims, Scipio ensured supplies for his own men, and also crippled the Carthaginians in a corresponding measure. Three days, in which to decide, were granted to the enemy, who sent to conclude an armistice with Scipio, while an embassy was dispatched to Rome to obtain official ratification of these terms. The conditions would successfully reduce Carthage to a purely African power, limited by the territory of Rome's ally Masinissa, deprived of the great resources of Spain and of her carrying trade, crippled in her recovery

¹ As, for instance, De Sanctis allows (p. 535), following Livy.

by a heavy indemnity, and above all robbed of her fleet, the means of regaining or holding any distant territory. Nominally she was to remain independent, but really her future lay in Roman hands, and she would be little else than a client state.¹

Scipio himself probably remained at Tunis, while negotiations were proceeding, but later he returned to the *Castra Cornelia* (P. xv. 2. 5 *sqq.*). The winter was probably passed at both these places; he would hardly abandon his important hold on Tunis, while on the promontory he could more easily maintain his communications. Masinissa left, with his own forces and ten cohorts of Roman infantry and cavalry, to complete the recovery of his own kingdom, and to gain Syphax' territory. The Roman assistance made it clear to all that Masinissa was acting as a Roman ally, and that Roman power was supreme in Africa.

At Rome all rejoiced. The arrival of Laelius, with his prisoner Syphax, was a tangible proof of Scipio's victory. Next came the Carthaginian envoys, under the escort of one of Scipio's staff, Q. Fulvius Gillo, to seek ratification of the terms agreed on by Scipio and their government. These were confirmed by the Senate and Roman people, though after some delay, perhaps at the beginning of the

¹ On the peace negotiations see L. xxx. 16. Cf. P. xv. 1. 6-8; 7. 8; 8. 7. Livy says some authors give the indemnity as 5000 talents (cf. P. 8. 7), others as 5000 pounds of silver. Cf. Plut. *Reg. et Imp. Ap. S. Maj.* 5. App. *Lib.* 32 adds that the Carthaginians should, after this, hire no mercenaries, that they should restrict themselves within the so-called "Phoenician trenches" (unless *ἐκτός* is to be read for *ἐντός*; for, as De Sanctis, p. 536, says, the treaty certainly did not cut them off from Emporia) and that Masinissa should have the kingdom of the Massyles, and as much of Syphax' dominions as he could take. He also gives thirty ships, as the maximum to be retained by Carthage; as Polybius vaguely says that all warships were to be surrendered, we do not know whether this figure is preferable to Livy's twenty.

consular year 202. After this the embassy returned with Laelius to Africa, which they reached just before Scipio was starting his campaign of 202.

The cause of this delay is obscure, but there is no doubt that the Senate did ultimately approve the peace.¹ The Roman annalists, however, did not like the idea of the Senate thus calmly accepting the terms. So Livy (chs. 21–23) patriotically tells how the Carthaginian embassy, as if knowing nothing of the terms offered by Scipio, proposed a peace on the basis of that of C. Lutatius after the First Punic War. When the Senate asked some awkward questions, the Carthaginians avoided the difficulty by stating that they were all too young to remember exactly what took place. After deliberation the ambassadors were sent back “pace infecta ac prope sine responso,” and Scipio was ordered “ne bellum remitteret” (ch. 23). This account is very contradictory, for if no peace was settled, why should there be any uneasiness at Rome at the later breaking of the truce (38. 6)? Also in ch. 17, the Senate determines to keep Laelius in Rome till the Carthaginian embassy should arrive, while in 21. 11 they appear not to know of the embassy till it actually arrives, and so have to recall Laelius who had left Rome.² Dio (57, 74) gives a more reasonable account, but still one savouring of a too patriotic Roman source—the Senate refuses to treat while there is still an enemy on Roman territory; but after the departure of Hannibal and Mago and after a long discussion, the Senate ratifies the terms. Yet this may not be too theatrical to be true, for, at the beginning of the Great War, the Tsar took a solemn oath never to make peace while an enemy remained on Russian soil. Appian’s (*Lib.* 31, 32) version is that the Senate, after hearing the embassy was in difficulties, sent to Scipio,

¹ See P. xv. 4. 8; 8. 9; 1. 3. On the date see Gsell, p. 246 n. 1.

² Cf. De Sanctis, pp. 652 and 544.

who arranged the terms, after which ambassadors were sent to Rome and Carthage to obtain formal ratification. This account is more reasonable than Livy's, but it is probable that below Livy's confusion there lies a genuine record of the strife of the rival parties.

Livy's account of the debate in the Senate on this question of peace represents a new grouping of the parties.¹ During Scipio's absence in Africa, the various noble families of Rome formed a coalition against him, which was led by the Claudian-Fulvian party, now that old Fabius had outlived his colleagues. The chief accession to their strength was the Servilii, who seceded to their side from the Aemilian-Scipionic group. Even Livius Salinator and the younger Aemilii began to turn from Scipio, and the only loyal supporter left to him in Rome was Metellus. In the censorship of Livius Salinator and C. Claudius Nero in 204, the Claudii regained their position. The consuls for 203 were Cn. Servilius Caepio and C. Servilius Geminus, and by the end of the year their desertion to the Claudii and Fulvii was made clear. In the debate on the peace, Livius Salinator proposed that, as both consuls were absent, the discussion should be adjourned. Metellus, Scipio's supporter, urged that Scipio's decision should be accepted. M. Valerius Laevinus, the Claudian, said that the good faith of the embassy should be questioned, and the war carried on; by this proposal and criticism an indirect blow was struck at Scipio, while Livius showed his sympathy with the Servilii by not wishing the two consuls to be excluded from the debate. Thus from Livy's confused account of the whole peace proceedings in Rome, two main facts emerge: the re-grouping of the parties against Scipio, and the ultimate acceptance of the treaty, whatever the cause of the delay.

¹ L. xxx. 23. On the political history of Rome during Scipio's absence, see especially W. Schur, pp. 62 *sqq.* and 129 *sqq.* and Münzer, pp. 143 *sqq.*

It may be well to anticipate slightly here, and to follow the growth of this political animus against Scipio. After consolidating the parties, the consul, Cn. Servilius Caepio, determined to make a direct assault on Scipio's position. He crossed over to Sicily, and intended to sail from there to Africa.¹ But this was going too far, and the Senate could not allow it. So the other consul, C. Servilius Geminus, appointed a dictator, whose power would be adequate to check Caepio. The dictator was P. Sulpicius Galba, the old Claudian, and he in turn chose the consul's brother, M. Servilius Geminus, as his Master of the Horse. The consular elections were held by the dictator or by C. Servilius, with the result that M. Servilius Geminus and Ti. Claudius Nero were appointed.² The position of the Claudii and Servilii was clear. A fresh attack was made on Scipio, when, in March 202, the two new consuls convened the Senate to allocate the provinces for the next year.³ Both wanted Africa. Metellus, Scipio's supporter, intervened and got the Senate, through the tribunes, to ask the people who they wished to conduct the war in Africa. Although they unanimously voted for Scipio, the Senate let the consuls ballot for it—here we may follow Livy with some suspicion—and Africa fell to Ti. Claudius. He was given fifty ships, and was appointed Scipio's fellow-commander, but, owing to his procrastination and the tempests he encountered, he did not get to Africa before his year of office expired. This incident is very doubtful, but at least shows how the opposition to Scipio was fermenting. The Servilii still continued in power. The consul, M. Servilius, appointed his brother, C. Servilius, dictator, to hold the elections for 201. P. Aelius

¹ L. xxx. 24. This incident is sometimes regarded as annalistic, and so to be rejected. But behind many of Livy's annalistic accounts, lie official accounts of party history.

² L. xxx. 26.

³ L. xxx. 27.

Paetus was Master of the Horse. Though the year passed without the elections having been held, when the consuls were at last appointed, they were Paetus and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, the latter of whom afterwards claimed Africa as his province, but failed. Thus, while Scipio was busy in Africa winning the war, at home a coalition of the chief noble families was trying to undermine his position.

While the peace negotiations of 203/2 were in progress, Hannibal left Italy. He had been recalled after the battle of the Great Plains, but clearly had not left at once, as one of the conditions proposed by Scipio was the evacuation of Italy by Hannibal. In fact, it is possible that his continued presence caused the delay in reaching a settlement, and that the Romans remained true to their tradition of not treating with an enemy while he was still on their soil. At last, in the autumn of 203, he was ready to sail;¹ the necessary transports had been prepared, unless indeed, as Livy says (xxx. 20. 5), he had foreseen what would befall and held them ready. So he yielded to the call of his country, and left reluctantly the shores of Italy, where he had maintained himself for fifteen years unconquered. There is little rhetorical exaggeration in Livy's source when he says that Hannibal left the land of his enemies with more grief than most men feel in leaving their own country for exile. He had failed in an attempt to which he had devoted his whole life. Yet all was not lost, and he must have felt some eagerness in the thought that he was going to meet the most brilliant general Rome had produced, and that, when they parted, the fate of the civilised world would be decided. At the same time, the Carthaginian troops, which had been operating under Mago in Liguria, were also withdrawn and sailed for Africa

¹ See Chronological note, Appendix v. pp. 326 *sqq.*

(L. xxx. 19. 2-5). On the voyage their general died as the result of a wound, but the army itself joined Hannibal who had landed at Leptis Minor, near Hadrumetum.

While peace negotiations were being carried on at Rome, a violation of the truce had caused the war to flare up again in Africa. The Romans were expecting two large convoys of supplies. One, of a hundred transports with an escort of twenty warships coming from Sardinia under the praetor, Lentulus, reached Africa in safety; but the second, of two hundred transports with thirty warships, coming from Sicily under Cn. Octavius, encountered a gale just off Africa. The convoy was scattered. By the exertions of the rowers the warships reached the Promontory of Apollo. But most of the transports were driven on to the island of Aegimurus (Zembra), which is at the entrance to the bay in which Carthage lies; others were carried nearly to the city itself, to the *Aquae Calidae*, on the west of the peninsula of Cape Bon.¹

All this could be seen from Carthage itself, and caused the greatest excitement. For now Hannibal had returned, the city could turn its thoughts to war again. Besides, during the winter they had suffered great hardships and privations. Scipio was master of the open country, cutting off their supplies from the interior, and was also superior by sea. The populace of the over-crowded and ill-supplied city could not let the opportunity slip, when they saw so great supplies within their grasp. Yet not to return them, or not to allow the Romans to fetch them, would mean breaking the truce. The Carthaginian Senate met; but in vain was it objected that interference would infringe the truce and prejudice the peace. The people, who crowded into the Senate house, forced the

¹ Cf. Gsell, II. p. 143. See also Pais, II. p. 470, Tav. xcvi, for the dangerous rocks of Aegimurus.

Senate's hand,¹ and Hasdrubal was sent with fifty warships to collect the transports from Aegimurus and the coast.

Scipio was indignant at this violation of his truce, especially as news had just reached him from Rome that the peace was ratified.² He must have felt that Hannibal's return was ominous, and would prejudice his peace moves. But, for the moment, he still turned to peace. He sent three envoys to Carthage, to inform them of the ratification of the treaty at Rome, and at the same time to demand some reparation for the recent outrage. They spoke with the greatest freedom and haughtiness before the Senate and people, taxing them with breaking the treaty. If this was done, they argued, through reliance on Hannibal, Carthage was trusting to a broken reed: for Hannibal had left Italy in defeat, and had only just succeeded in saving his army, while the Roman armies in Africa had been completely successful. Besides, in defeat Carthage would now find no mercy or pity. The Carthaginians objected to the harsh conditions of the treaty and the bearing of the embassy, and could not endure to give up their freshly gained supplies; while they still trusted in Hannibal, notwithstanding the Roman estimate of him. And so the people were for dismissing the ambassadors without a reply.³ But the government formed a treacherous plan to make

¹ According to App. *Lib.* 34 and Diod. xxvii. 11, the decision was carried by the people in the teeth of the Senate. Livy (ch. 24), probably following Polybius, implies but little resistance in the Senate; the war party was gaining the upper hand.

² P. xv. 1. 3. But L. (25. 1) says that the Senate's decision was not yet known.

³ P. xv. 1 and 2. 1-4. L. xxx. 25, does not give details. Cf. App. *Lib.* 34; Dio, 57. 74. Livy says the magistrates had to protect the embassy from violence at the hands of the mob; Appian, that the people tried to hold the ambassadors till their own embassy should return from Rome, but that Hanno the Great and Hasdrubal Eriphus rescued them from the mob and escorted them with two galleys. Cf. Diod. xxvii. 12. 1.

the renewal of hostilities inevitable. Triremes were sent to escort the ambassadors back to their camp, while Hasdrubal, who was with the Carthaginian fleet near Utica, probably at Rusucmon,¹ was ordered to ambush the Roman ship on its return. When the ambassadors had reached the mouth of the Bagradas the Carthaginian escort sailed back, and soon after, three Carthaginian triremes bore down on the Roman quinquereme. The latter put up a gallant resistance and managed to run ashore, near where some Romans from the camp were foraging along the coast. These saw the danger, and ran to the beach to assist the vessel. The ambassadors themselves escaped safely, but the Roman losses were severe. This treacherous act meant the final termination of any thought of peace, and the war was renewed with greater bitterness on both sides.

¹ Cf. Gsell, p. 249; App. *Lib.* 34 says off Cape Apollo.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE LAST CAMPAIGN

HOSTILITIES recommenced. Scipio took measures to ensure the safety of the fleet, entrusted the command to Baebius, and started on a punitive expedition into the interior. The peace embassy returned from Rome and reached the Roman naval camp. Baebius detained the Carthaginian members, but sent on the Roman envoys to Scipio. They informed him that the treaty had been accepted by the people and Senate.¹ Scipio wisely ordered Baebius to treat courteously and send home the Carthaginian ambassadors, who were fearful for their safety. He repaid evil with good, and so the honour of his country stood out still more clearly against the dark background of *Punica fides*. But in the interior he stormed town after town, refusing submission, selling the inhabitants as slaves, in anger at the Carthaginian treachery! He sent repeated messages to Masinissa, who was engaged in winning back his father's kingdom and as much of Syphax' realm as he could, urging him to raise a strong force and join him with all haste. For he hesitated to take the offensive until he was strengthened by the Numidian cavalry, with whose help he hoped to win the field. Meanwhile he played for time, wishing to avoid an engagement, and, as Masinissa did not appear, he gradually advanced further inland and westwards to meet him. At the same time the Carthaginians, who saw their towns being sacked,

¹ P. xv. 4. 8. But Scipio had known that the treaty had been ratified, before the last Carthaginian outrage (1. 3). Either the embassy in person merely confirmed what he had learnt from the dispatches, which had preceded their arrival, or only the people and not the Senate had ratified it, according to Scipio's first news.

urged Hannibal to bring the enemy to battle at once. He replied, naturally enough, that he himself would judge when the time for action was ripe; for he was still engaged in his preparations. He, too, felt his weakness, and sought help from a Numidian, named Tychaeus,¹ a connection of Syphax, who supported him with 2000 cavalry. He also called to his aid Vermina, Syphax' son, who had not relinquished all hope for his father's kingdom. But soon after receiving the plea from Carthage, Hannibal acted, still perhaps with his preparations uncompleted. He moved his camp from near Hadrumetum, and advancing quickly, encamped near Zama. Though there were at least two towns of this name, corresponding to Jama in the west, and Sidi Abd el Djedidi in the east, it is clearly the western town at which Hannibal encamped.²

Regarding the strategy underlying the movements of Hannibal and Scipio before they actually met on the field of battle, it is generally agreed that Scipio moved to the west and interior with the object of joining Masinissa. He dared not face Hannibal in the open field, until he had strengthened the arm in which he was weakest, by availing himself of Masinissa's Numidian cavalry. The object of Hannibal's move from Hadrumetum was to prevent Scipio joining Masinissa, and to force him to fight without the Numidian cavalry, by cutting his communications with his base at Utica; he may also have hoped to join Vermina, who was raising a squadron of horse for him. Polybius does not say where Scipio was when Hannibal left Hadrumetum. Delbrück and Lehmann suppose he was storming the towns of the Bagradas valley, in good communication with his base; on learning that Hannibal has started, Scipio

¹ He may have been the chief of the Areacidae mentioned by App. *Lib.* 33.

² See Appendix iv, "Zama and the site of the Battle," pp. 310 *sqq.*

coolly decides to retreat to Numidia to meet Masinissa, thus sacrificing his communications; he does so and meets Masinissa, while Hannibal is waiting at Zama trying to get in touch with Scipio; Hannibal is then forced to fight. But it was probably not in the valley of the Bagradas that Scipio was storming the towns mentioned by Polybius (xv. 4. 1. 2); for he had dealt with those the previous year, and there is no reason to suppose he had lost control over them in the meantime. Further, the neighbourhood of the Great Plains was presumably still in Roman hands since its subjection after the battle there (P. xiv. 9). Again, unless Scipio was already in the west, why should Hannibal have marched to Zama and have reconnoitred from there? If he wanted to catch him before Masinissa's arrival, he would march straight towards him, not to Zama unless he was already in that direction. Scipio must already have been in the west, when he was joined by Masinissa. He had gradually advanced inland, storming the towns as he went, as a hostile demonstration to intimidate the Carthaginians, to cut them off from their economic base and source of supplies, and at the same time to secure his own communications. This policy was the one usually adopted by all the enemies of Carthage (e.g. by Agathocles, and by the Mercenaries), who avoided a direct attack on the city itself. This campaign led Scipio far into the interior, to near Naraggara (Sidi Youssef), as the towns of the immediate hinterland had already been reduced. At the same time, he determined to await Masinissa there, in a strong position. When the meeting was accomplished, he moved on to Naraggara itself or to the site of the battle,¹ changing merely from a defensive to offensive position. This view, namely that Scipio was already waiting in the west (as Veith and De Sanctis suppose), is almost certainly more correct than the suggestion of Delbrück and

¹ On this, see Appendix iv, pp. 310 *sqq.*

Lehmann, that it was only after learning of Hannibal's departure from Hadrumetum that Scipio moved to meet Masinissa. By this move Scipio deliberately sacrificed his communications with Utica, and ran the risk of a flank attack. But there are many reasons for rejecting Delbrück's view that Scipio hushed up the fact of his movement, and did not refer to it in his official despatches home: as Veith shows, it is psychologically improbable from what we know of Scipio; the greater the risk the greater the glory; the risk would be overlooked in the joy of victory; and the blame is far greater if it was unwillingly and not deliberately that he made the sacrifice. Scipio may have miscalculated the time necessary for Hannibal's preparations, and hoped to be back again at his base with Masinissa before Hannibal was ready; and Hannibal may have started before he was ready. Each general, relying on his own genius, took in turn a great risk, Scipio to avoid fighting while without his cavalry, Hannibal to bring on the engagement before his enemy's weakness was remedied. And here Fortune favoured Scipio, not his opponent.

When Hannibal was at Zama, he dispatched three spies to gain information about the position and camp of the Romans. These spies were caught, according to Polybius' story, but instead of being punished were conducted round the Roman camp, and shown its exact arrangement; afterwards they were escorted back to Hannibal. At this, Hannibal desired to meet Scipio in person; the latter accepted the suggestion, and said he would fix the time and place of the interview. Then Scipio was joined by Masinissa, and advancing to the site of the battle, which was perhaps in the *Ou. et Tine*,¹ announced he was ready for the meeting. Hannibal moved up, and encamped on the hill opposite; next day both generals met each other in the middle of the plain between the camps. After a

¹ See Appendix IV, p. 316 *sq.*

fruitless discussion they retired and prepared for battle on the next day.

Before discussing these anecdotes, a question arises—why was Hannibal forced to fight? He was weak in cavalry, and had probably started without completing his preparations. Why should he cut himself off from his own base, by advancing towards Naraggara to fight on ground more favourable to the enemy, especially when he knew that Masinissa had just arrived? Veith assumes that his excellent strategic position was useless, unless followed up by a tactical blow. If he waited at Zama for reinforcements, he could not prevent Scipio regaining communications with his base. He must strike before the enemy could withdraw. But, replies De Sanctis, when Scipio was joined by Masinissa, the Roman communications were virtually re-established, and Hannibal's own were endangered, so that the latter's strategic advantage was cancelled. We must correct Polybius' statement, not of fact, but of motive and pre-supposition. Hannibal would only advance from Zama towards Scipio, when the latter had been or was being joined by Masinissa, but before he knew this fact, and in the hope of surprising him. When he had advanced, he learnt the truth, and fought because he could not act otherwise. That is, Hannibal's brilliant attempt at surprise failed, because Masinissa had arrived in the nick of time. This explanation is very reasonable, but De Sanctis perhaps hardly does justice to Polybius. There is no reason to correct him in any way, for his narrative does not necessarily imply that Hannibal was aware of Masinissa's arrival. When the three spies were sent, he was not aware. Scipio advanced and announced that he was ready for the interview. When he heard these things (xv. 6. 2), Hannibal also advanced. By "these things" (ὧν) there need only be understood what Scipio announced and intended Hannibal should know, namely his change of position

and readiness to meet Hannibal in person. If Scipio wished to lure Hannibal to advance to ground favourable to himself, he would hush up the advantage which he had just acquired, and Hannibal may not have had adequate espionage at this point.

Reverting to the anecdotes of the three spies and the interview of the two generals, can they be regarded as historical facts? The first is rejected on all hands,¹ chiefly because of a suspicious likeness to a story of Herodotus (VII. 146. 7), concerning a similar act of Xerxes. In itself the incident is not impossible, and may be accepted with caution. The main object of Hannibal's pause at Zama was to reconnoitre, and doubtless Scipio took care that the spies should only see what he intended them to see; it was not an act of magnanimity, but of deliberate policy aimed at the enemy's morale. The interview of Scipio and Hannibal has been rejected as deriving from Ennius (e.g. by Ihne, Lehmann and Delbrück), because of the similarity between a fragment of Ennius (Vahlen I. 312-13) and Polybius, 6. 8. De Sanctis (p. 594 *sq.*) shows that the similarity hardly exists, and that the fragment may equally well refer to the fall of Syphax. Any attempt to seek Ennius as a source for the later accounts of Zama is equally hazardous (e.g. fragment 465, Bahrens, and App. *Lib.* 39). He probably did recount the incident, but it cannot be proved; probability is the only guide. Polybius, with his intimate knowledge of the Scipionic house, would hardly have repeated the story if it lacked all foundation; he was more than a Greek historiographer aiming at the dramatic. Scipio would not refuse to listen to terms, especially as by doing so he forced Hannibal to fight on ground he himself had chosen. Hannibal was suddenly in an awkward situation, and might well seek to avoid a battle by one last

¹ E.g. by Lehmann, pp. 556-6, 569 and *Neue Jahrbücher*, CLIII. 1896, pp. 574-6; De Sanctis, p. 594.

attempt at peace. A victory might not mean the end of the war, while a defeat would be fatal. The terms, which he offered, showed that he still hoped that his dread name might cause the Romans to hesitate before coming to the death grapple.¹ He was ready to relinquish all the Carthaginian possessions outside Africa. Scipio naturally rejected terms which were worse than those offered before the Carthaginian violation of the truce, for they excluded the surrender of the Carthaginian fleet and prisoners, and the payment of an indemnity. There was no chance that the home government would accept such a peace, which would have ended Scipio's career. He trusted too much to his own genius to accept, and so it only remained to fight.

In the battle, as in the preliminaries, Polybius' account is here followed, and it is perhaps unnecessary to consider in detail the inferior tradition. Appian's account (*Lib.* 33-48) runs thus. After landing at Hadrumetum, Hannibal recruited, and captured a town of Masinissa's, Narce. The Carthaginians broke the treaty, and their ambassadors, who fell into Scipio's hands, were released. Hasdrubal handed over his army to Hannibal, and hid in the city. Scipio blockaded Carthage, and a cavalry engagement took place near Zama; Scipio sent Thermus to cut off supplies coming to Hannibal. In both actions the Romans succeeded. Hannibal, through shortage of supplies, proposed to renew the armistice. The Carthaginians took the opportunity to riot against Hasdrubal, who committed suicide, and the war was renewed. Scipio captured Parthus, and camped near Hannibal, who sent the three spies and then treated in vain with Scipio. Near Killa, Hannibal tried to seize a hill, but was forestalled by Scipio. The next morning, the final battle took place, after which Hannibal took refuge

¹ It is not clear why he made his offer through interpreters, as Polybius says. Both generals knew Greek, and Hannibal also probably spoke Latin. Zon. VIII. 24; cf. Gsell, p. 267 n. 1. But such a minor point hardly need weigh (as it does with Groag, *Hannibal als Politiker*, p. 99 n. 2) in estimating the historicity of the episode.

in a town, Thon.¹ Appian's description of it (chs. 40-48) is full of exaggerations, errors and omissions, and contains single combats between Scipio and Hannibal, and Hannibal and Masinissa. Dio's account (Zon. IX. 14) is similar to Appian's, but much shorter and somewhat less debased.

Zielinski² sees in Appian's account a doublet: a treaty broken, Hannibal defeated at Zama, a new treaty; this treaty broken, Hannibal defeated at Killa, a new treaty. Kahrstedt thinks that the cavalry engagement at Zama cannot be another version of the final battle, as it is too insignificant. De Sanctis sees in this battle not a reduplication, but a pure invention to increase the importance of the last campaign. Whence does Appian derive his account? The single combat of Scipio and Hannibal appears to have been told by Valerius Antias (cf. L. xxx. 29. 7), but is probably much older; the epic tone suggests the work of Ennius. Zielinski suggests Coelius for Appian's source, but De Sanctis thinks a late annalist, who made use of Coelius. Saumagne thinks that the somewhat sudden convergence of Scipio and Hannibal at Zama indicates a gap in Polybius and Livy, which can be bridged by Appian's account. His reconstruction is ingenious topographically, but rests on the assumption that the final battle was fought near Zama, and that Appian is reliable. He thinks that the territory between the two Zamas, that is, the south of the valley of the Siliana, was called the region of Zama. Hannibal could have approached this in three ways over the great hills which cut Tunisia in two: (a) by the defile Dechraa-Bou-Tis, via Djedidi, (b) by Aggar, whence he could branch either north or west, (c) the

¹ Pais, p. 425, suspects Thon, Θῶν = Thucca = Thugga, the ω and ν being confused with ογ and γγ. But Dougga, near Teboursouk, is hardly on the route of Hannibal's retreat to Hadrumetum.

² On this tradition see Zielinski, pp. 73-81; Kahrstedt, pp. 356-7; De Sanctis, pp. 601-4; Saumagne, *Rendiconti della R. Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei*, 1925.

route from Thysdrus to Bulla Regia, via Maktar. He probably tried the second one, but found the Romans blocking the way. Being short of provisions and having to force his way through, he tricked them by an armistice, and so got through to the valley of the Siliana. Once through the defile, he denounced the armistice to profit by the occasion before Masinissa's arrival; but soon his advantage was lost, and he had to fight, resting on Margaron Narke, which was the halting place at the exit of the defile near Killa. This theory rests too surely on the reliability of Appian and on topographical uncertainties, and contradicts the view taken above, that Scipio was in the west near Naraggara, meeting Masinissa, when Hannibal advanced. Besides, why should Hannibal be so desperately short of supplies when, according to Saumagne, he had been nearly a year at Hadrumetum making his preparations?

Both armies were drawn up for battle in three lines. Hannibal's first line consisted of some 12,000 mercenaries—Ligurians, Celts, Balearic islanders and Moors. They were heavy-armed troops, and had, in the main, been raised by his brother Mago. In front of this line were the light-armed troops and many elephants.¹ At a certain distance,

¹ Polybius does not mention the light-armed troops; he gives the number of the elephants as eighty, which is rather high; but the beasts were intended to play an important rôle in the battle and so were probably numerous. It might have been thought that Hannibal would have used the elephants to strengthen his weak cavalry. Possibly he let them fight with the light-armed troops, so as to delay matters longer and be able to break off the skirmish without a battle, if he desired (cf. Delbrück, p. 393); more probably he wanted them to break the Roman infantry so as to bring about a quick decision there. It is perhaps his interest in the elephants that led Polybius to overlook the light-armed troops. Lehmann identifies the mercenaries with the light-armed, because Balearians were famous as slingers, Moors elsewhere served as light-armed (*iaculatores*, L. XXIII. 26. 11), and the Ligurians were famed for their shooting; and because of the evidence of App. *Lib.* 40. But Polybius (12. 7) says that they advanced *σοβαρῶς*, and (13. 1) that the whole battle was *ἐκ χειρὸς καὶ κατ' ἀνδρα*. The line

and distinct from the first line, was the second, consisting of the native Libyans and Carthaginians. They were separated, and were not to reinforce the mercenaries, like the Roman principes usually aided the hastati; but they advanced with them, though keeping their distance. The third line was at a greater distance from the second, more than one stade; it was the Old Guard, the veterans who had fought for so many years in Italy and had crossed over with Hannibal. They were to act as an independent reserve, and halted when the first two lines advanced, thus increasing still more the distance between themselves and the second line. All three lines were of approximately the same strength. On the wings were posted the cavalry, Hannibal's weakest arm, the Numidians on the left, the Carthaginians on the right, perhaps 4000 in all.

The Romans were drawn up in their usual three lines. Between the maniples of the hastati were certain intervals. The second line, the principes, was not in the customary quincunx formation, but its maniples were directly behind those of the hastati, not covering their intervals. The triarii formed the third line. The intervals between the front maniples were filled with cohorts of velites. The cavalry was posted on the wings, on the left Laelius with

which follows (διὰ τὸ μὴ δόρασι μηδὲ ξίφεσι χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἀγωνιζομένους) has caused difficulty. Lehmann wishes to insert an οὐκ before ἐκ χειρός. De Sanctis (p. 607) objects that (1) Polybius would not explain the method of fighting by two negatives, (2) it is arbitrary to refer τοὺς ἀγωνιζομένους to the mercenaries alone, when it refers also to the Romans, (3) why is not Lehmann's οὐκ in Livy? He would see in the phrase (διὰ τὸ μὴ δόρασι...) the absurd comment of a reader, or correct the text to ξίφεσι δέ. Lehmann's alteration, apart from these objections, contradicts the preceding passage, which definitely implies that the mercenaries formed the first line of heavy infantry. The only difficulty is the presence of the Balearians, but De Sanctis suggests that Mago may not have recruited only slingers at Minorca, or Polybius, who was interested in the velites and elephants and omitted the preliminary skirmish of the light-armed, has confused them with the first line of heavy infantry. See plan, p. 193.

the Italian horse, on the right Masinissa and all his Numidians.¹

¹ P. xv. 9. 7 *sqq.* Four main difficulties are raised by this account. Cf. Veith, pp. 688 *sqq.* and De Sanctis, pp. 604 *sqq.* (1) Why this unusual arrangement of the maniples? Polybius says, to leave passages for the Carthaginian elephants. Delbrück (who thinks Polybius is based largely on Ennius) denies this, because the Romans did not know Hannibal would place his elephants in front of the infantry, rather than the cavalry, and because, if there were spaces between the Roman lines, the elephants could see the gaps in the second line, and so the straight passages were unnecessary. This untenable view has been rejected by Veith. The Romans did not know how Hannibal would arrange his troops, but could see in the actual formation where the elephants were, as they were too big to be hidden by the skirmishers. If Scipio made the formation earlier, it was to guard against the beasts, in case they should be used against his infantry. The space between the hastati and principes was so short that the elephants would not turn off along them. Further it is unlikely they could be driven along Delbrück's zig-zag course. (2) The gaps of the first maniples were filled with velites, who were, according to Polybius, to open the battle, and, if forced back by the elephants, to run through the passages to the rear, or failing this to the left or right along the intervals between the lines. Lehmann thinks this refers only to the original position before they advanced; when Scipio addressed his troops, he needed them as close as possible. If it is as Polybius says, the temporary abolition of the intervals would make the formation less precise, and veil the intervals, which the second and third lines must not cover in order that passages might be left clear. The velites usually skirmished in front, as a screen and protection, while the heavy-armed troops formed up. De Sanctis explains: When the velites had retired among the maniples, they did not usually advance again. Here they went in and out against the elephants, and these sorties Polybius confusedly refers to their first position. This is possible, but Polybius may be right, as the intervals could surely be marked by flags or standards, by which the rear ranks could maintain their position. (3) The principes were at a certain distance from the hastati (*ἐν ἀποστάσει*), that is, further than they were from the triarii. Were the triarii a third line, separate from the principes, or did they together form one line? The references in Polybius (9. 7 and 13. 7) have been taken to prove both views. *Ceteris paribus*, a division is more probable, as it involves better control. Lehmann and Delbrück, who argue for one line, have been refuted by Veith (pp. 689 *sqq.*). (4) Polybius (9. 8) says Masinissa and all his Numidians were on the right wing. Does this include Masinissa's 6000 infantry? Lehmann thinks they were on the flanks of the legions; Polybius' silence and the later evolution make this unlikely. De

After a preliminary skirmish of the Numidian horse and presumably of the light-armed troops, Hannibal opened the battle by a charge of his elephants. The noise of bugles frightened these beasts. Some turned back on the Numidians, who were also attacked by Masinissa; thus the Carthaginian left wing was exposed. The rest fell on the Roman velites, and were driven to the rear along the passages, which Scipio had left open, or fled to the right out of the action. Laelius used this disturbance to attack and drive off the field the Carthaginian cavalry. So the enemy's elephants and cavalry were accounted for, and the infantry could close. The Roman lines advanced keeping their usual distance; the first two Carthaginian lines followed suit, but their third line remained still. At first the Carthaginian mercenaries made good headway, but Roman discipline and equipment began to tell. The Carthaginian second rank did not support their first, which thought itself betrayed, and so retreated, attacking all the Carthaginians it encountered. The Carthaginians had to fight against their mercenaries, and then came into contact with the Romans. However, pressing on, they confused some of the cohorts of the hastati. These were supported by the principes, with the result that the greater number of Carthaginian mercenaries were cut to pieces. Hannibal did not allow the survivors to mix with his own men, but forced them out on the wings. As the ground was now in a very bad condition, Scipio recalled the hastati, and a pause ensued, in which he closed their ranks and brought

Sanctis says that light infantry did sometimes fight mingled with cavalry (cf. *Bell. Afric.* ch. 60); but here the case is different. It would not be effective against the enemy's cavalry, and would make the numbers of the two wings disproportionate, which is not recorded. More likely they fought with the velites against the Carthaginian light-armed troops and elephants (cf. Veith, p. 673); part perhaps was posted in the rear to see to the elephants, which ran through the Roman ranks.

up the principes and triarii on their flanks. Hannibal also must have re-organised his troops. Then the second phase started. The lines closed again and fought bravely, till the Roman cavalry returned from pursuing the Carthaginian, and fell on the enemy in the rear. At this, the survivors fled, though few alone escaped. The Roman losses were 1500, the Carthaginian 20,000 and the same number of prisoners.

Such is Polybius' description, but it contains difficulties. To bridge these, various theories have been built, but none can be accepted if it seriously reconstructs Polybius in matters of fact. It is legitimate to try to assign motives to Hannibal and Scipio, where Polybius does not; at the most, it is possible to suppose that where Polybius does assign motive he may sometimes be wrong. But his facts must be accepted, for there is no valid reason to reject them. The earlier theories of Vaudoncourt, MacDougall, Dodge and Morris have been adequately rejected by Veith (pp. 660 *sqq.*); those of Lehmann and Delbrück, who assume much of Polybius rests on Ennius, by Veith and De Sanctis.

Polybius does not say what Hannibal's tactical aims were, which leaves the ground open for modern reconstructions. The data, from which Veith works, are the relative strength of the two sides, what Hannibal could know about the enemy, and the actual arrangement of his troops. As Hannibal was weaker than the Romans in cavalry and stronger in infantry, he would obviously aim at a decision by the latter. If his cavalry had little chance of success, he would wish to keep the victorious Roman cavalry off the field, while his infantry won the day. It is quite probable that he gave definite orders to his cavalry to retreat, and so draw their opponents off the field (cf. Delbrück, Lehmann and Veith). Whether this flight was deliberate or not, the result was the same—the defeat of the Carthaginian cavalry. Scipio doubtless ordered his cavalry

to return as soon as possible, in order to catch the enemy's infantry in the rear; but it would take longer to convert a nominal into an actual flight, than to drive a defeated enemy off the field. Hence, as the Roman cavalry only returned in the nick of time, it is more probable that the Carthaginians deliberately drew them away. After getting rid of the Roman cavalry, though with little hope that his own could rally against them, Hannibal would throw all his weight against Scipio's numerically inferior infantry. The elephant charge, with which he hoped to confuse his foe, miscarried somewhat, partly through Scipio's foresight in leaving passages for the animals to run through, partly because they were always rather a doubtful quantity, and here fell foul of the Carthaginian cavalry. However, they cannot have done much harm to their own side, as their drivers had means of killing them if they got out of hand.

Why did Hannibal place his veterans so far behind his first two lines? Lehmann answers, to protect his rear against the eventual attack of the Roman cavalry. Veith considers this an important but secondary problem. It would be an error to use his best troops for this; they were needed where the battle must be won, i.e. to destroy the Roman legions. Hannibal must have reckoned on winning the infantry battle before the return of the Roman cavalry—especially if his cavalry left the field by order, for then their defeat would take a long time. His plan was wrecked by the necessity for a pause in the battle, which delayed the decision, so that the Roman cavalry had time to return. De Sanctis thinks that Hannibal did not intend to use his veterans in this way, because he did not lead them against the legions, and only used them to resist, when the legions attacked after the first phase. His object was different. He knew from Cannae the effect of cavalry on the rear, and had placed his veterans in reserve to make his infantry

feel secure. A secondary object was to keep his best troops for emergencies. He hoped that the infantry would at least resist until the reserve could support it after defeating the Roman cavalry. Surely rather a negative use for his best troops! Besides he probably had a very good object for keeping the veterans out of the fray for some time.

This object, which was the *raison d'être* of the formation of a real reserve, was probably to meet Scipio's plan, as Hannibal conceived it. Hannibal must have known how Scipio had learnt from him at Cannae and had applied that knowledge with increasing skill at Baecula, Ilipa and Campi Magni. Hannibal's weakness in cavalry would prevent him using his favourite tactics, but he might think that Scipio could and would. And Scipio's plan was doubtless as Hannibal conceived it. The choice of a plain points to Scipio's intention to expose Hannibal's wings with his cavalry, hold the enemy with his first line and send out his two rear ranks on both sides to outflank him. Hannibal tried to thwart this possibility by keeping his third rank as a reserve. It would be protected from the enemy's sight by the first two lines, and when Scipio was once advancing and might see Hannibal's arrangement, it would be too late for him to change. Scipio's attack would be against the first two lines alone, and when that was spent, Hannibal could attack with his reserves. Such are the reasonable aims which Veith assigns to the two generals.

At first, with the exception of the elephants, all went according to programme, until the incident of the mercenaries. Polybius says that they were not supported by the second line of Carthaginians who acted like cowards. Here a correction of motive must be introduced; the second line denied its support to the first, not from cowardice, but under orders. Hannibal intended to keep his lines very distinct. After the elephant charge, each line was to be

thrown against the enemy separately; it was not to be a continuous swell, but one wave beating down after the other. Thus it was not necessary for Hannibal to try to blend the varied elements in his army into one homogeneous whole. Then, after the treacherous retreat of the mercenaries, "the greater part of the Carthaginians and their mercenaries were cut down on the spot, either by themselves or by the hastati" (13. 8), i.e. only the veterans were left. But this is contradicted by 14. 6, where both sides are nearly equal, which would not have been so, if both the first two Carthaginian lines had been scattered. Further, Hannibal needed time to re-organise (otherwise he would not have allowed the pause in the battle), and this would have been unnecessary if the veterans stood alone and untouched. Veith's solution is to omit the "and" (*καὶ*) and so read "the Carthaginian mercenaries" (*μισθοφόρων τῶν Καρχηδονίων*, cf. 12. 9), i.e. he refers it to the mercenaries alone. But then the "by themselves" (*ὑφ' αὐτῶν*), as he admits, has to refer to the Carthaginians, which is very harsh. A more simple explanation is that Polybius exaggerates when he says "the greater part" (*τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος*), and that both lines were engaged and suffered heavy losses, but were not totally annihilated. A further difficulty is the story of the fight between the mercenaries and Carthaginians. This incident, which is of anecdotal character, need not be rejected as legendary and deriving from Ennius, as Delbrück supposes, though it may well be somewhat exaggerated, even in Polybius. The Carthaginians refused to receive the fleeing mercenaries into their ranks, and may have killed some who persisted. Such an incident would easily give rise to the story of the fight. Veith, however, accepts the story fully. It was this stroke of luck, he says, which saved the Romans and wrecked Hannibal's plan. When the front ranks engaged, Scipio saw through Hannibal's plan, and

realised that his outflanking move was impossible in the face of Hannibal's reserve. There only remained a pure frontal attack where the enemy's chances were greater. World history is changed by this moment. The two first lines of the enemy who, united, could have forced Scipio to bring up his rear rank, turned against each other, while Scipio profited by the confusion to let the hastati carry on alone, and then broke off the battle to reorganise. Hannibal accepted the pause, because he too needed time to reorganise.

According to Polybius, the Carthaginian second line had joined in attacking the legions with such vigour that the officers of the principes brought up their ranks to assist.¹ But Polybius does not adequately explain how this second line came into contact with the Romans, or how the hastati succeeded in driving them back—for Polybius (14. 3) suddenly mentions a pursuit by the hastati. The latter difficulty is explained, if the principes temporarily supported their first rank. Veith, however, supposes a lacuna between chs. 13 and 14, which may have contained an account of the re-organisation of the two Carthaginian lines, which alone remained according to his view. De Sanctis thinks Veith's lacuna does not help, for if it existed it would not contain the entry of the principes into action (which is excluded by what follows), but anecdotal matter such as the single combat of Hannibal and Scipio. But how do we know that Polybius recounted such stories, and surely Scipio had his troops well enough disciplined to let the principes support the hastati in the old way, and still be able to recall them after they had turned the tide,

¹ ἐπέστησαν. This could possibly mean "halted their ranks", i.e. in contrast with their usual procedure, where one would have expected them to support the hastati; instead they halted. But whether or no Scipio had now seen Hannibal's reserve and given up the idea of outflanking, it is more probable that the principes assisted. Their temporary help would explain the sudden success of the hastati.

and then let the hastati continue the pursuit alone? De Sanctis further points out that the second Carthaginian line could enter battle either by supporting the first line directly or by coming up on its flanks. The first is excluded by Polybius' story of the mercenaries, and so they must have come up on the flanks. But if the mercenaries fled back on them and were pushed out to the wings, surely the second line might have pushed forward, so that the remaining mercenaries would be left on their flanks, not *vice versa*.

Building on these hypotheses, De Sanctis puts forward a theory: if the principes and triarii came up on the flanks of the hastati in the second phase of the battle, as Polybius says, it left the weakened hastati in the centre, just where the attack of Hannibal's untouched veterans might be expected. So De Sanctis transfers this move to the first half of the battle, which would explain the changed state of the combat. Whether the Romans acted first, or followed a similar move of the Carthaginians, is immaterial. Polybius misunderstood the most important move, and transferred it to the pause. The stopping of the pursuit of the hastati is not justified by Veith with his two miracles, De Sanctis argues. It was necessary, because Scipio saw the intact veterans. But why did Hannibal admit the pause? According to Polybius, the hastati were isolated, with the bloody field behind between them and the other Roman lines. Why did not Hannibal profit by this to attack them? Because, says De Sanctis, they were not isolated, for the principes and triarii had already come up on their flanks. But this explanation is not necessary. The hastati were isolated, but if Hannibal had thrown against them his veterans, the length of whose line was the same as that of the hastati, he would have sacrificed the whole object of his reserve, and have given Scipio the very chance of outflanking him for which he was hoping. If it be objected

that the ground between was slippery, and so the Roman rear ranks would take some time to come up, it would be a race against time for Hannibal to defeat the weakened hastati before he was outflanked—a risk which he was not apparently prepared to take. Scipio, according to De Sanctis, needed time to re-form and rest his men, though not to bring them up on the flanks, which had been done already. But why this desperate need of rest? If the Romans were all in line, with the mercenaries and the Carthaginians retreating before them, why not attack while the enemy was in confusion; for though the veterans were intact, the numbers were about equal, and the Romans outflanked their opponents? Hannibal obviously needed time to extend his line, for the veterans were of their original length in front. This was done by re-ordering the mercenaries and Carthaginians on the flank of his veterans, says De Sanctis, who also asks why the hastati were left against Hannibal's veterans. If the order of battle was as Polybius says, why did not Scipio withdraw the hastati to the flank, and advance the principes and triarii to the centre? But De Sanctis has already admitted the dangerous isolation of the hastati, according to Polybius' account; surely it was still more dangerous to order them to extend to left and right to leave room for the rear ranks to come up in the centre! Would Hannibal let slip such a chance? Scipio's usual double outflanking movement had depended entirely on his centre holding the enemy's centre and acting as a screen for his rear ranks—a movement far less exposed than this suggested one. De Sanctis answers his own question, why the hastati were left opposed to the veterans, by his theory, according to which the Romans had no fresh troops left, as all had by this time been engaged. But it is not certain that the difficulty exists, for it is an assumption that the veterans were in the centre. Polybius is silent about the order of the Carthaginian re-formation. The

mercenaries and Carthaginians had fled to the wings and the open ground beyond (13. 10); they may have re-organised there; but it is quite possible that Hannibal's re-organisation was more fundamental, and that the veterans were ultimately on the wings. If the veterans were in the centre, the wearied remnant of the Carthaginians and mercenaries would then be opposed to the fresher Roman troops. In this case, it is equally as pertinent to ask why Hannibal opposed his wearied troops to the fresher and superior Romans, as why Scipio left the hastati against the veterans. If De Sanctis' idea of Hannibal's re-organisation is correct, as it well may be, it cuts both ways; why should Scipio leave a weak centre, or why should Hannibal risk the defeat of his wings? There is no need to make this point the basis of a fundamental reconstruction, such as De Sanctis ingeniously but unnecessarily has proposed.

In short, after the retreat of the Carthaginian cavalry, which was probably voluntary, and after the pursuit by the Roman cavalry whose speedy return was ordered, Scipio intended to carry through a double outflanking move. The front ranks closed. The mercenaries, driven back by the hastati, were forced out to the wings by the Carthaginians, who would not receive them. The Carthaginians, with the remnant of the mercenaries, gradually forced back the hastati. Perhaps by this time Scipio had seen Hannibal's veterans, and had been forced to abandon his original plan. The principes supported the hastati in the normal way till the Carthaginians were driven back, pursued then by the hastati alone. Scipio took the opportunity to break off the battle. Both sides re-ordered. Scipio lengthened his front by bringing up the principes and triarii on the flanks of the hastati, Hannibal probably by placing the Carthaginians and mercenaries on the flanks of his veterans, perhaps *vice versa*. Hannibal would need longer to prepare, while Scipio would give him as long as

he needed, hoping for the return of his cavalry. When the two lengthened ranks joined battle again, it was hotly contested, till the returning Roman cavalry swept up in Hannibal's rear, and the day was won for Scipio. Perhaps he did not close in battle again until Laelius and Masinissa were on the horizon; in any case, they arrived in time to decide the course not only of the battle, but of the world's history.

The losses were severe. A great number of the Carthaginians were cut down in their ranks, while few of those who fled escaped, owing to the superior speed of the Roman cavalry. The casualties are numbered at 20,000, the prisoners the same, while the Romans only lost 1500.¹ After pillaging the enemy's camp, Scipio returned to his own, while Hannibal fled without halt to Hadrumetum. Scipio then returned to the *Castra Cornelia*, whence he dispatched Laelius with news of his victory to Rome.² Meanwhile P. Lentulus had arrived off Utica with a great convoy of supplies—twenty warships and one hundred transports.³ These warships, with the thirty which Octavius had saved from the storm in the spring, and Scipio's original fleet of forty ships, gave the Romans considerable naval strength. With his combined forces Scipio decided to make a demonstration against Carthage; while the

¹ P. xv. 14. 8–9. Appian (*Lib.* 48) gives 25,000 killed and 8500 prisoners for the Carthaginians; the Roman loss was 2500 and that of Masinissa still more. These, or the Roman losses at least, are perhaps more reasonable than Polybius' figures.

² Polybius fails here, but Livy (xxx. 36) no doubt follows him closely.

³ L. ch. 36, says fifty warships, though the previous year Lentulus commanded only twenty (24. 5). Livy's figure represents these twenty with the thirty which Octavius had saved. As has been said, according to Livy (27. 5; 38. 6), Ti. Claudius Nero was sent to reinforce Scipio with fifty quinqueremes, but he did not get to Africa before his year of office expired. Dio's version (*Zon.* ix. 14) differs somewhat from Livy's. The incident, which is annalistic in origin, is doubtful, and in any case led to nothing.

legions marched thither under Octavius, he himself sailed with the whole fleet in the same direction. On the way he was met by a Carthaginian vessel bearing envoys, who came to sue for peace, and who were ordered to meet him at Tunis. After making a demonstration at Carthage, he finally encamped in his old position at Tunis, where a peace conference was held.

Meanwhile, news reached the Romans on their march to Tunis that Syphax' son, Vermina, was coming up to the help of Carthage. Part of the Roman infantry and all the cavalry were sent against him, and completely routed his force on the first day of the Saturnalia (December 12), leaving 15,000 casualties on the field, though the prince himself escaped. Such is Livy's account (36. 8), but it is not above suspicion. The rest of the chapter is thoroughly Polybian, but the enormous number of killed and prisoners, the method of dating, the dispatch of only part of the Roman troops, the lack of any reference to the site of the battle or to Masinissa, who would naturally be involved, and above all, the fact that all the references to Vermina are of insecure foundation,¹ tend to make the episode doubtful. It may be of annalistic origin—all points to it—but even so, allowing for exaggeration, it may not be without a basis of truth. A verdict of "Not Proven" must be passed.

Hannibal had left Hadrumetum, and returned to Carthage after an absence of thirty-six years to plead for peace, and had prevailed. Thirty Carthaginian delegates presented themselves at Tunis to beg for peace. What else could be done? Hannibal, indomitable even in defeat, had, like a lion, turned to the mountain fastnesses of South Italy, and was only driven thence because a genius had arisen among the enemy. Scipio's counter-stroke had

¹ Gsell, pp. 282-5, after examining the exploits of Vermina in more detail than can be done here, comes to this conclusion.

forced on the final struggle, after which Hannibal himself counselled peace. Carthage might still resist; she had still the strength of her walls and position. Fury, born of despair, might beget still further strength, as happened in the hour of her doom fifty years later. Hannibal's genius was unimpaired, and she might rally the native enemies of Masinissa. She might win as an ally Philip of Macedon, who would look to her for help in his coming struggle with Rome. But Philip had looked on while Greek Syracuse fell; would he interfere for a foreigner? The risk of further resistance was, as Hannibal saw, too great. Carthage was exhausted in all her strength, in men, in food, in equipment and in her treasury. Spain was lost, and the hinterland of Africa cut off. Above all, she had lost control of the sea, and so all hope of help or supplies from abroad was gone. And the house of Barca, which had taken so large a share in causing and supporting the war, now counselled peace. Resistance might mean death, so peace was sought.

Scipio also was ready for peace. At first, his staff wished to avenge the broken treaty of 203, but the general's sane desire for peace prevailed. The main reason, on military grounds, was the strength and position of Carthage, and the extreme difficulty of besieging it. True, he had complete command of the sea, and could invest the city on all sides and prevent supplies from reaching it. Also the city's extreme exhaustion made it less impregnable than in 146. But if Scipio destroyed it, he would alienate the other African powers; he had appeared as a saviour, but if he turned oppressor they might regard him in that light. To storm it would take time, men and money, all of which would involve making fresh demands on the home government. These would, doubtless, be met in the enthusiasm caused by his victory, for Rome as a whole was friendly to him. This alone is enough to discredit the charge, which

Livy brings against him, of wishing to finish the war quickly, for fear of being superseded in his command and losing the glory of terminating the war. Even Mommsen, not Scipio's most friendly critic, rebuts this ridiculous charge.¹ It can only have been the baseless rallying cry of his political opponents. Scipio could have stormed Carthage, but did not wish this, if he could get his terms accepted without doing so. It was not only the military difficulty which deterred him, still less fears for his personal ambition and career, but because he had a wider vision of Rome's need and mission. Italy desperately needed rest to heal the wounds of seventeen years of war. Her strength was drained, her countryside depopulated, her fields ravaged. A period of peace was essential for her recovery. Fresh efforts could have been made, but they were not necessary, and Scipio was patriotic enough to wish to spare her. If his terms were accepted, Carthage would be disarmed, and, however imperialistic his aims may have seemed to the narrow-minded Roman of his day, the time had not come when Rome's expansion could be summarised by "*solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.*" Scipio wished to disarm but not to destroy, and in this showed himself the champion of Rome's protectorate mission in the world.

The terms of the peace, which Scipio propounded to

¹ "Secret spite and official pedantry might contend for the view that an opponent is only vanquished when he is annihilated, and might censure the man who disdained vigorously to punish the crime of having made Romans tremble. Scipio thought otherwise, and we have no reason and therefore no right to assume that he was in this instance influenced by vulgar motives rather than by the noble and magnanimous impulses which formed part of his character. It was not the consideration of his own possible recall or the mutability of Fortune, nor was it any apprehension of the outbreak of a Macedonian war that prevented the self-reliant and confident hero, with whom everything had hitherto succeeded beyond belief, from completing the destruction of the unhappy city." Book III, ch. vi.

the Carthaginian embassy, are not proclaimed in a unanimous voice by the authorities.¹ For not only does Livy differ in some detail from Polybius, but Appian supplies clauses not given by either, but which seem reliable through their inherent probability and are supported by other references.

Four clauses refer to the preliminary armistice alone, and do not form part of the final peace treaty. They are: (a) A three months' armistice is granted, during which the Carthaginians are to send no embassy except to Rome, and receive none without Scipio's permission and knowledge.² (b) Reparation to be made for the injustices committed during the truce,³ by restoring the transports and their contents;⁴ this was fulfilled by the equivalent payment of 25,000 pounds of silver⁵ (equals 312 talents). This sum seems excessive, as the support of all Scipio's troops for six months would cost only some hundred talents (cf. De Sanctis, p. 617). (c) The Carthaginians to supply to the Romans both corn for three months, and pay, until Rome ratified the treaty.⁶ The pay, according to Appian, was to amount to 1000 talents; this cannot be the pay for three months (as Nissen), for De Sanctis reckons it would pay

¹ P. xv. 18; L. xxx. 37; App. *Lib.* 54; Dio, 57. 82. Cf. H. Nissen, *De pace anno 201 a. Chr. Carthaginiensibus data*, and De Sanctis, pp. 616–23. E. Taubler's theory (*Imperium Romanum*, I. pp. 190 sqq.) that Polybius and Livy give the terms as defined in preliminary negotiations, and Appian the definite treaty, is rejected by De Sanctis. All three authors must record the real terms, because there would be no interest in preliminaries, the terms were not questioned as were those of 241, and Polybius, who was especially interested in treaties between Rome and Carthage, would have given any differences, if he had known of them. Besides, Appian (53 *fin.*) says that they are the terms proclaimed by Scipio after the victory, on which the Senate would decide; and Livy (xxx. 43. 10) that the terms he gives were accepted, i.e. were not preliminary but final.

² L. 38. 3.

³ P. 18. 3.

⁴ L. 37. 6.

⁵ L. 38. 1–2.

⁶ P. 18. 6. Livy erroneously says 'to the auxiliaries only.'

200,000 men for that time. Taubler (pp. 69, 70) suggests it might be the first instalment of the indemnity, but more likely Appian's figure is wrong. (d) One hundred hostages were to be chosen by Scipio from the Carthaginians between the ages of fourteen and thirty.¹ Appian mentions 150 hostages, who were to be released when the treaty was ratified. Probably these statements are complementary, the former being a clause of the peace, the latter of the armistice. For there were Carthaginian hostages in Rome after the peace,² whom Nissen suggests were finally restored when the whole of the indemnity was paid.

The terms of the peace were as follows:

(a) The Carthaginians were not to be injured, but to be governed by their own laws and customs, and to receive no garrison; that is, their autonomy was granted.³

(b) Carthage to retain all the cities, which she possessed formerly in Africa before entering on the last war with Rome, all her former territory, all her flocks, herds, slaves and other property.⁴ Appian defines the period more clearly than Polybius' τὸ παλαιόν, or Livy's "ante bellum," by "the city itself and as much territory within the Phoenician trenches as you had when I (i.e. Scipio) sailed for Africa." This geographical and temporal precision seems reliable. Possibly Appian is explaining rather than quoting the terms, but this is less likely. There is no need, with Taubler, to refer the "ante bellum" clause to the preliminaries, and the Σκιπίωνος διαπλέοντος to the treaty.

¹ P. 18. 8. L. 37. 5.

² L. xxxii. 2. 3, and xl. 34. 14.

³ P. 18. 2. L. 37. 2. Nissen rejects this autonomy clause, because Carthage was tributary; Taubler rejects it, because autonomy was never granted by treaty explicitly, but was a pre-supposition of the treaty. De Sanctis rejects the first objection, because the tribute was only temporary; the second, by quoting treaties in which autonomy is guaranteed.

⁴ P. 18. 1. L. 37. 2 says cities, territory and frontiers which she had "ante bellum."

The return to the *status quo ante* was limited to the north of the Phoenician trenches,¹ in which area Masinissa also would establish his rights (cf. De Sanctis, p. 618).

(c) The Carthaginians to be friends and allies of Rome on land and sea. This important clause is given by Appian alone, but its validity is shown by De Sanctis (p. 619). It is checked by Appian himself (*Lib.* 83), and also by the help given by Carthage to Rome against Philip, Antiochus, and Perseus. For instance, Livy (xxxvi. 4) mentions an unaccepted offer of ships in 191 ("de classe Carthaginiensibus remissum praeterquam si quid navium ex foedere deberent"), and also (xxxvi. 42 and 44) Carthaginian naval help against Antiochus. Thus Carthage was reduced to the condition of a dependent ally, and although she did not have to recognise Rome's supremacy in the formula of a "*foedus non aequum*" she did in effect, by not being allowed to make war or peace. The omission by Polybius of this clause is explained, not by referring it to the preliminaries, but through its lack of practical importance. Carthage's dependence on Rome was enforced by circumstances, though Rome could expect little effective help from her. Polybius is accustomed to regard the reality of facts, rather than words and formulae.

¹ For the Phoenician trenches, see Gsell, II. pp. 101-3, 289 sq. De Sanctis, III. pt. 1. p. 37 and pt. 2. p. 620. Zielinski, p. 14 n. 1.

Hesselbarth (pp. 256-7) and Kahrstedt (pp. 358 and 591 n. 1) reject the existence of these trenches at this period, identifying them with those dug by Scipio Aemilianus in 146, to mark out the Roman province of Africa from the Tusca to Thénac (Pliny, *N.H.* v. 25); so the clauses relating to them must be forgeries to exculpate Masinissa's later exploits. But this overlooks the evidence of Eumachus, a contemporary of Hannibal, who mentions them (cf. Phlegon, frag. 47, Müller). They probably marked the official frontier of the Carthaginian empire at this time, which stretched from the north coast near the frontier of Algeria and Tunisia to the east coast of Tunisia, perhaps north of Syrtis Minor, and embraced the Great Plains and the district around Thugga.

(d) The Carthaginians not to make war (πόλεμον ἐπιφέρειν) on anyone outside Africa, and on none in Africa without consulting Rome.¹ This clause did not forbid defensive wars in Africa, but Livy's version inaccurately implies that it did—"bellum gererent." But in a later passage (XLII. 23. 3) he says that all military action outside Africa was forbidden ("prohiberi enim extra fines efferre arma"), and also war on the allies of Rome ("illo haud ambiguo capite foederis—quo diserte vetentur cum sociis populi Romani bellum gerere"). This is covered by Livy, *Epitome*, lib. XLIX, for in declaring war on Carthage in 149, Rome objects "quod exercitus extra fines duxissent, quod socio populi Romani et amico Masinissae arma intulissent." The passage above (XLII. 23), where Livy probably followed a different source from xxx. 37 (i.e. Polybius), is very important as it gives another version of the clause, one which Appian (54) also gives—"μήτε Μασσανάσση μηδὲ ἄλλω Ῥωμαίων φίλῳ πολεμεῖν, μηδὲ στρατεύειν τινὰ Καρχηδονίων ἐπ' ἐκείνους ἀπὸ γε τοῦ κοινού." Appian's version and the second one of Livy, with πολεμεῖν and "bellum gerere," in place of πόλεμον ἐπιφέρειν, though apparently only amplifications of Polybius' clause, are, according to De Sanctis, a trap. For, as it was useless to forbid the Carthaginians to make war on the allies of Rome, when they could not make war on anyone outside their borders, the clause with its treacherous wording aimed at stopping the Carthaginians resisting any aggression; and because such resistance was inevitable, it offered Rome a *casus belli*. But the addition of ἀπὸ γε τοῦ κοινού, which may have sprung from the insistence of the Carthaginians, did provide them with a loophole, as they could disclaim public and official action. That is, they were implicitly allowed to resist those aggressors who had not been allies of Rome—but those alone. If Rome threw the

¹ P. 18. 4.

aegis of her alliance over the aggressors, then Carthage must not resist. If, as seems probable, Appian's clause was part of the original treaty not quoted by Polybius, it was harsh, though it hardly displays "perfidia" (cf. De Sanctis), assuming that the wording was fixed, and that the Carthaginians had the opportunity of carefully studying it. "Vae victis!" Treachery was apparent only when "Delenda est Carthago" rang in Rome's ears, and it is doubtful whether the mere wording of any clause would then deter her from her course.

(e) The Carthaginians were to restore to Masinissa, within the boundaries which would be assigned, all houses, land, and cities, and all else which had belonged to him or to his ancestors.¹ This clause, which includes "to his ancestors" in Polybius' version only, might give grounds for future disturbance. Livy omits reference to Masinissa's ancestral property, and falsely adds that the Carthaginians were to have a treaty with him, which would be contrary to Rome's procedure.

(f) Appian adds that the Carthaginians were to withdraw their garrisons from all cities beyond the Phoenician trenches, and that their hostages were to be surrendered. Is this clause valid? The limits of the Carthaginian territory were fixed, by the second clause, to the Phoenician trenches. But Carthage retained control of Emporia which lay beyond the trenches. In fact, when later Masinissa seized this region, the Carthaginians complained that it was contained within the limits assigned by Scipio to their territory (L. xxxiv. 62. 9-10, "Carthaginienses iure finium causam tutabantur, quod intra eos terminos esset quibus P. Scipio victor agrum, qui iuris esset Carthaginiensium, finisset"). The solution of the difficulty lies perhaps in Polybius' phrase in Clause (e), ἐν τὸς τῶν ἀποδειχθησομένων ὁρων αὐτοῖς. The tense is future because Polybius, who found

¹ P. 18. 5.

an aorist in the actual text of the treaty, altered it, thinking that the proposals would have to be accepted by the Carthaginians and then by the Senate. But the phrase shows that an enquiry was set up, and Livy's statement proves that an agreement was reached before the treaty was signed. It assigned Emporia to Carthage, but this clashes with Appian's clause. De Sanctis cuts the knot by emending Appian's text to ἐκ τῶν <Λιβυκῶν> πόλεων, i.e. Carthage had to abandon the African cities, but was allowed to keep the Libyan-Phoenician coastal cities.

(g) All prisoners of war and fugitive slaves to be surrendered; Livy, Appian and Dio, add deserters. Kahrstedt defends Polybius, not very happily, by asserting that all deserters had been killed at Zama; probably the fuller version is the more correct. Reasonable are the additions of Dio—ἥτοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἢ τῶν συμμάχων—because each class received different punishment (cf. L. xxx. 43. 13); and of Appian, that the restitution should be made within thirty days after peace was declared; because some limit would be set.

(h) The Carthaginians to surrender all ships of war, except ten triremes, and all their elephants. Livy and Dio add that they were not to tame any more elephants (cf. the treaty with Antiochus, P. xxi. 43. 12).

(i) Appian adds that within sixty days Mago should evacuate Italy. But he had already died. De Sanctis suggests there is only an error of name in Appian's source, and that there was a clause referring to Carthaginian garrisons in Italy; certainly Carthaginian officers remained in Italy to stir up the Gauls against Rome. There may have been a clause forbidding the levying of mercenaries in Italy—μήτε ξενολογεῖν ἀπὸ Κελτῶν ἢ Λιγύων ἐτι (App. *Lib.* 54).

(j) Finally, an indemnity of 10,000 talents to be paid

in fifty years, 200 Euboic talents being paid each year. The annual payment was not only a concession to the weakness of Carthage, but kept her dependent on Rome for the fifty years (cf. L. xxxvi. 4, where Carthage tries to pay a larger lump sum, and is refused).

(*k*) The Romans to evacuate Africa within 150 days—a reasonable clause, though only given by Appian.

The treaty was naturally more severe than that proposed before the armistice was broken; the indemnity was doubled, the number of ships left to Carthage was halved. But more sinister was the limitation of her military rights. She was definitely humbled to the condition of a client state and a dependency of Rome, and no security was given for her future. If Rome wished to interfere, the pretext would not be lacking. Masinissa was left to watch and check her, which he would do out of self-interest; while, if necessary, Rome could use him as a means of aggression. Vermina, however, was left to check Masinissa in turn, lest he became too powerful. So a balance of client states was established. Nothing was lacking in this arrangement, if both sides acted fairly, which Carthage did and Rome did not. Carthage made no attempt to kick against the pricks, but through years of quietness recovered something of her old prosperity. But when Scipio's ideals were forgotten and Rome had degenerated, commercial jealousy, voiced by Cato amid the idle protests of Scipio Nasica, began to threaten the safety of Carthage. Rome stirred up Masinissa, but could not control him, and, fearing he might occupy Carthage, she destroyed it. Scipio's treaty contained the seeds of Rome's aggression, but if she had retained something of Scipio's high vision and something of the loyalty of Carthage, no suspicion could ever have attached to the clauses of a peace, which humbled the capital of an old empire to a dependency, and which confined but did not crush.

The rest of the story is soon told.¹ When the Carthaginian embassy brought the terms before their assembly, Hannibal protested, even with personal violence, against those who still rejected them, so that the peace was accepted and Scipio notified. The terms of the truce were carried out, while important Carthaginian ambassadors were sent to Rome, accompanied by Scipio's brother and two other members of his staff. The victory was officially announced at Rome, the temples thrown open and public thanksgivings ordered for three days. The embassy was granted an audience in the Senate by the new consuls, one of whom, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, prevented the House from passing a resolution until he should be granted Africa as his province. Party opposition was still rife against Scipio. But Lentulus failed, for two Plebeian tribunes intervened and brought the matter before the people, who supported Scipio. The Senate, in face of the consular veto and the tribunician intercession, compromised that Lentulus was to have command at sea, while Scipio was to retain full command on land. As the war was over, Lentulus gained but little. After the Carthaginians had spoken in the Senate, and Hasdrubal Haedus, who had always opposed the Barcids and the war policy, had made a good impression, all turned to peace, except the consul Lentulus. Once more, so runs the account, he stopped the House passing a resolution, but again two Plebeian tribunes brought the matter before the people, who decided unanimously that peace should be granted and that Scipio should bring his army back. So the Senate, a greater part of which must have favoured peace, especially considering the state of the East, decreed that Scipio should, with the help of ten commissioners, make peace. The Carthaginian

¹ P. xv. 19; L. 37. 7-10. After this Polybius fails, and Livy (38. 6-45) forsakes him, generally to follow a good annalistic tradition, with glosses from other sources including Polybius himself (45. 5; which is confirmed by P. xvi. 23).

ambassadors were allowed to visit those of their fellow-countrymen who were imprisoned at Rome, and of whom later 200 were released without ransom. Then they returned to Africa, where the treaty was formally concluded. Its conditions were fulfilled. The ships were surrendered and were burnt at sea by Scipio. The elephants, deserters, refugees and prisoners were handed over. One of the prisoners, Q. Terentius Culleo, later showed his gratitude by following Scipio's chariot in his triumph. The deserters were punished with the greatest severity. Carthage prepared to pay the first instalment of her indemnity in the hour of her great exhaustion. Masinissa was rewarded with Cirta and other districts which had belonged to Syphax, and also with part of the surrendered elephants. The Carthaginian ambassadors once more were sent to Rome, where the Senate and people ratified the treaty and the arrangements which Scipio had made with the ten commissioners. The fleet was dispatched under Cn. Octavius to Sicily, where the consul Cn. Cornelius took over command. Then, sailing from Africa with his victorious army, Scipio landed at Lilybaeum, whence he travelled to Rome by land amid the joyful acclamations of the whole countryside. After reaching Rome, he celebrated the most brilliant triumph which had yet been witnessed, and his greatness was acknowledged by the conferment on him by his troops or by the people, of the title of the land he had conquered—Africanus. But the future was casting its shadows before it. Would Scipio be content to sink back to the private life of an ordinary citizen and sit under the consuls in the Senate, or would he seek to retain a position which war had given him, but for which there was no place in the life of Republican Rome? Would he oppose the will of the Senate? Even in the hour of his victory, the sounds of political opposition began to ring in his ears, and before his feet there stretched that glorious path, which led to defeat but not to dishonour.

CHAPTER NINE

SCIPIO, THE SOLDIER, THE MAN, AND HIS WORK

A. THE SOLDIER

"If once we grant that the fate of kingdoms—nay of whole continents—may turn on the appearance of a great military figure, and on his application of strategy and tactics and organisation to the problems of his day, we cannot refuse to concede that not only his personality but his methods of war must be studied as an important item in world-history. To ignore them and to hand them over to the study of the military specialist is unphilosophic and unworthy of the self-respecting historian."¹

It is Scipio the soldier who dominates the scene in the period under consideration. "As an officer," wrote Mommsen, "Scipio rendered at least no greater service to his country than Marcellus." Such a judgment completely under-estimates the vast importance of Scipio's work. He found a city militia and left almost a professional army. For Rome had to face a new situation in the Hannibalic War, and had to meet a really first-class general, whose army was the product of his own training. In Spain, the Barca family had formed what was virtually a professional army, and long years of practice had given it a freedom and elasticity of movement which the Romans entirely lacked. Till this time Rome had produced many generals of mediocre ability, but the whole attitude of the State was that her sons should prove good magistrates and efficient soldiers, should fulfil her bidding during their years of

¹ Sir Charles Oman in "A Defence of Military History," *Studies in the Napoleonic Wars*, p. 28.

office, and then sink back into private life. Soldiering was part of a citizen's duty, but it was not to be his life-work. So, when Hannibal appeared over the Alps, Rome could oppose him with an army of good material but of insufficient training, led by annual magistrates who lacked little but brilliance. Rome fought well, but without success, until Cannae exposed all her faults and at the same time the greatness of her dogged perseverance and her "will to conquer." But she could not win the war until she produced a general who would burst through her Republican formalities, adapt her army to the need of the moment, and prove himself worthy to meet the genius of Hannibal in the field. Conservatism and constitution alike must yield, for her liberty was at stake.

The need produced the man, and, as Napoleon said, "in war it is not men, but the man, that counts." It is always remembered how Hannibal maintained himself for so many years in the enemy's country, without reinforcements and with little support from the home government, and how the war was borne almost on his shoulders alone. Equal emphasis is not always laid on the difficulties which Scipio faced and overcame, for Hannibal's romantic figure overshadows them. Hannibal may have warred against Rome for eighteen years, and have nearly overthrown her by his own efforts; but Scipio overthrew the barriers which the Republic laid on her citizens, and became the first general and the first individual to overtop the State. He had to find the weakness of the Roman army, to understand the causes of its defeat and then to build up a new force which could face Hannibal; above all, his tactical reforms and strategic aims received only half-hearted support from the home government, for many mistrusted their outcome. Scipio had to face Rome as well as Hannibal.

Rome's first need had been to sacrifice her system of yearly commands. This was done, and the consulship had

been held for consecutive years by the same man. It was realised that, when a competent man was found, his command must be prolonged. The elder Scipios had been sent out to Spain, and were only superseded after their death. The idea was born that efficient generals ought to serve for the duration of the war—"donec debellatum foret." Still more revolutionary, the best man must be chosen, irrespective of his technical qualifications. Dismissing the perhaps unhistorical case of Marcellus in the year 215, Scipio was the first man to step over the limits of the State. At an age which did not qualify him for a big command, without having filled the office of consul, praetor or dictator, he was sent to Spain with proconsular power, and not for one year only, but until the Carthaginian power there should be broken. On returning from Spain he was elected consul, and fought in Africa as proconsul, but the spirit of the office had changed. He was not an annual magistrate carrying out the will of the Senate, but had been carried by popular enthusiasm over some Senatorial opposition to a command which once more should last—"donec debellatum foret." This meant he could form a professional army, with no annual change of officers: an army which could be trained to his methods and experimented on, and which would look to him as its general. The ordinary annual officer could never have carried through the necessary tactical reforms, nor perhaps could even a great general have done so with an ordinary citizen army. The old form of the Republic was to last many years longer, but the first shadow was cast over it by the man who was invested with proconsular *imperium*, who continued in a long command at the will of the people, and who won a devoted and professional army. The imperial conception was nascent in Republican Rome.

Scipio's personality was doubtless one of the causes of his success. He gained the devotion of his men, some

of whom may have regarded him with religious fervour.¹ His staff was equally loyal. No rumour reaches us of any jealousy or neglect of his aides-de-camp; even his political opponents did not attribute any of his success to them, though he himself was the first to acknowledge their help. The loyalty of his friend and right-hand man not only inspired Polybius with his conception of Scipio's greatness, but later even became proverbial, as the friendship of the legendary heroes—"felicia, qualia magnus | Scipio longaevisque dedit sapientia Laeli."² Napoleon may have been jealous of his marshals, Caesar have met with a Labienus, and Alexander have made enemies through his fierce temper, but Scipio seems only to have inspired his lieutenants, both Roman noble and Numidian sheikh. Like most generals, Scipio had to deal with one mutiny, but his handling of it bound most of his men still closer to him. This loyalty of officers and men was a tribute to his great faith in himself, which in turn kindled the enthusiasm of others. The discipline, which he exerted, was moral as well as military, and Napoleon has said that in war moral force is to physical as four to one.

On his arrival in Spain, he had to blend the various elements of his army—the shattered remains of the earlier disasters, his new troops and the Spanish allies; each part would have special needs and require special treatment. Again, in Africa he had to form the volunteers, the legions in Sicily and the native African troops, into a homogeneous whole. His magnetic personality was doubtless as much of a unifying influence as the common devotion to the same cause. His bravery cannot be questioned (even if the rescue of his father is only an anecdote), for no coward wins a devoted army. If he did not expose himself as readily as Sir John Moore, it was because he valued his

¹ Cf. Plut. *Apophth. Reg. et Imp. Sc. Maior.* 4.

² Ausonius, *Epist.* XXVII. 45.

own generalship. Polybius often emphasises this duty of a general. He commends (x. 24) Philopoemen for riding, not at the head of his troops where he is seen by all but sees none and where he merely displays his military rank, but at front, rear or centre, as occasion should demand. He also takes the opportunity, afforded by the death of Cl. Marcellus through culpable self-exposure, to stress the point (x. 32 and 33)—Marcellus acted more like a simpleton than a general; for what is the use of a commander, who does not realise that he must personally avoid all partial engagements in which the fate of the whole army is not at stake? Hannibal is especially commended for his sanity in not risking all by exposing himself and so depriving the ship of its pilot. The three men, who carried shields before Scipio at Cartagena, did not shelter a coward but the directing force which would win the day. When necessary he took personal risks, as in his perilous visit to Syphax. The Legend exalted his physical prowess, but he was nearer the modern staff commander than the Homeric hero. He was brave enough to value his own genius.

The gradual development of Scipio's bold reformation of traditional Roman tactics has been traced above, but it must now be considered more fully in its historical setting. The Roman army in early times was drawn up as a triple line, which was both its strength and its weakness. Each line was divided into ten units known as maniples, between which spaces were left for skirmishers to advance and retire. These maniples were drawn up in quincunx order, so that the openings of the front line were covered by the maniples of the rear. Although this arrangement presented a slightly less serried rank than the Macedonian phalanx, the maniples were not real units. This method had served Rome well enough when she was fighting on favourable ground against her worse trained neighbours in Italy; it relied on

mere push and weight, on the serried lines of the phalanx. Yet here was its weakness—it could advance or retire but it could not wheel or turn with any ease, and tended to become a mere compact and awkward mass. Further, it could only act as a whole; individual initiative was not sought for, or necessary. But the time had come when this would not suffice. The units did tend to become smaller, and the maniples gave a certain freedom of movement, but the whole security of the army was based on the necessity of its remaining in close order. All went well, if the ranks remained unbroken, but, as Dr Grundy¹ points out, “for an army trained to close formation, defeat spelt disaster. It broke because it could not bend.” And this is precisely what had been happening in the Hannibalic War in Italy. Hannibal had an army which could wheel, could lengthen its wings and make a flank attack. The battle of Cannae had shown that the Roman army could not face such an enemy, but was outflanked and surrounded. Unable to turn or retire, it became a mere awkward mass of struggling humanity, and was cut to pieces. Against this mobile enemy and his new methods, the Romans could do nothing, and wisely realised that they must avoid another open battle at all costs. So Fabius advanced his strategy of delay, of a war of sieges and guerilla methods, which succeeded in confining Hannibal to South Italy and avoiding another defeat like Cannae. Complete victory could not be won until someone had forged a weapon which could meet Hannibal on his own ground. Scipio spent all his free time in Spain, possibly during his first winter there, and certainly after the fall of New Carthage, in trying to train his army in new methods. He had good material, for some of his troops had been serving for ten years and had almost become a professional army, and he himself had the requisite genius. He must have learnt

¹ *A History of the Graeco-Roman World*, p. 312.

the lesson of Cannae, that if the two opposing armies were drawn up in two parallel lines in the traditional manner, there was the gravest danger of one being out-flanked, if the other possessed greater mobility and could execute a flanking movement. The remedy must be applied.

Scipio saw the two weaknesses of the Roman army—its inability to act in separate units, and the insufficient training of the individual to make him effective when he broke away from the compact mass. The third great weakness, lack of cavalry, hardly came into the question among the mountains of Spain, but was faced and remedied when Scipio had to fight on the plains of Africa. At Baecula Scipio's first attempt to remedy these weaknesses and to cope with the Hannibalic tactics was put to the test. He entirely threw over the close maintenance of the triple line, and put his light troops with some of his infantry in the centre, while his really effective legionaries were posted on the wings. It is difficult to appreciate what a complete revolution this was in method. Not only was the form different, but also the spirit; for it meant the independent action of three separate units, acting on their own with no central command after the battle had once commenced. No longer did one man direct and control the whole battle, overlooking the ranks from one wing to the other, but each section now became a small army in itself, operating with different objects and orders. By making the maniple the unit, Scipio could alter his formation without utter confusion, even perhaps in face of the enemy, as he certainly did two years later at Ilipa. Such a change as this must have involved much practice and training, but the discipline of the previous year had given his troops greater tactical freedom, and more self-reliance as units and individuals. Further, Scipio tried to counteract the weakness of the individual in the use of his weapons. "The

experience of warfare of all ages," says Grundy (*op. cit.* p. 312), "has shown that an army, which has been trained in such a way that the men composing it can, if occasion arise, use their weapons with skill in single combat, is an infinitely better fighting machine than the army composed of soldiers trained to look for defence in the maintenance of close order with the men to the right and to the left of them. Hannibal led an army drawn from those fighting races of the West, whose very barbarism had accustomed them to live with weapons in their hands...." Realising this, Scipio spent some time after the capture of New Carthage in drilling his army, particularly in arms drill (P. x. 20). The adoption of the Spanish sword, with its well-tempered point, involved practice in using it. Scipio started a reform in the handling of weapons, which was completed at length by Rutilius Rufus and Marius, who turned to the gladiatorial training schools as an example of the efficiency necessary in the regular army.

Thus Scipio had forged and proved a New Model Army. It is true that he was fortunate in having his command in a country where he could develop his reforms far out of Hannibal's reach. In Italy his attempt might have fared otherwise, if he had had to meet Hannibal in the initial stages, at Baecula for instance. Yet this reformation was brought about in the teeth of the conservatives at home like Fabius, and when Scipio returned he had to answer for his methods. Cromwell also had to face much opposition in building his New Model; his Fabius was the Earl of Manchester, "the chief representative of the old school of society, politics, religion and war which had begun but could not end the Great Rebellion."¹ Scipio was happier in having to face Fabius only when he returned to Rome in victory. Cromwell's New Model was unified by true religious fervour. If this was lacking in Scipio's army, it was

¹ Prof. G. M. Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts*, p. 263.

compensated for by a real devotion to their general on the part of his men. His complete self-confidence inspired them, while their superstitious, if not religious, enthusiasm was kindled by the vague rumours of his divinity, which were circulated among them after the mysterious ebb at New Carthage. As Cromwell won Marston Moor on the wing against Prince Rupert, so Baecula was won on the wings, and proved the worth of the new weapon. Ilipa and Naseby were the natural sequence. At Baecula, Scipio had succeeded in holding only the enemy's inferior forces. At Ilipa he held their main force, but not securely enough. At Campi Magni the weapon was perfected, for he held the enemy's main force along the whole of the front with his first line, while the two rear ranks marched out on the flanks. It was possible now to hold the enemy firmly, while outflanking and surrounding him. Hannibal's tactics at Cannae could now be carried out by a Roman army. At the final duel at Zama, where Scipio brought his newly perfected army against the master from whom he had learnt the tactics, Hannibal thwarted him by the use of a real reserve. Thus, at one blow, the carefully elaborated tactics of Scipio were destroyed. But Scipio had done the Roman army an immense benefit, even though his precise tactics could not be a lasting possession. He had broken its stiffness, he had made the units more self-reliant and the individual soldier better able to use his arms, he had improved the equipment by adapting the Roman sword to the Spanish pattern, and possibly also the *pilum*, and above all he had created independent lines, which remained, even after their tactics (the Treffentaktik of German writers) had perished, and which led naturally on to the next development of Roman tactics, when the cohort became the unit.

The strategic aims by which Scipio hoped to win the war are clearly two-fold. In the first place, he held the

firmest conviction that Spain was the key to the whole war and must be held at all costs. It was there that the enemy's power must be undermined, while Hannibal was held at bay in Italy. Further he believed, as had his father and uncle, that it was not enough merely to hold Spain and prevent supplies leaking through from it to Italy, but the offensive must be taken, and the Carthaginian power in Spain must be shattered, not shackled. While this ideal was being realised, gradually there must have developed in Scipio's mind the thought that, when victory was gained, Spain would be left in the hands of Rome, and that Rome would have to face a new situation and fresh responsibilities. And Scipio may have begun to see visions and dream dreams for his country's future, such as could never have come to the provincial mind of a Fabius. The second part of Scipio's plan, his determination to carry the war to Africa after the subjugation of Spain, showed the greatest insight. The battle of the Metaurus may have ensured the actual safety of Rome, but Fabius' strategy of exhaustion would never secure a peace on terms adequate to recompense Rome for all her sufferings, even if it did at last drive Hannibal from Italy. It was shortsighted, for it aimed at the quick recovery of Italian agriculture, but gave no security against Hannibal's possible return, which would destroy any fresh efforts of the farmers. Scipio saw deeper, that Hannibal must be beaten in the open field as well as driven from Italy. Only thus could Rome dictate terms which would secure her future safety. For these reasons, Scipio forced through his African projects, and not because he wished to reduce Carthage to a tributary of Rome. Yet he must have seen that, if he succeeded, Africa like Spain would fall beneath Rome's sway, and something of the path that Rome would tread must have unfolded before his eyes. But whether imperial advance was good or bad, military necessity and Rome's

safety enforced the correctness of his strategy, and as Rome's dominion had spread over Italy more by accident than design, so now she was forced to stretch her hands beyond the seas.

Scipio's strategic methods have already been examined. He had solved the problem of invading Spain, on the lines laid down by his father and uncle. He knew that he must win a base and control the coast road, that it was dangerous to penetrate into Baetica until a base further south than Saguntum had been secured. His swoop on New Carthage secured his future advance, as well as inflicted moral and economic loss on the enemy. The way now open, his march to Baecula, to engage one of the Carthaginian armies separately, was strategically sound. After the battle, his conduct was that of a great not of a small mind; he chose the lesser of two evils, knowing well that Spain must be held, and the two other Carthaginian armies crushed, which was done by a brilliant blow against their strategic flank at Ilipa. Having reached Africa, he did not fall into the mistake of trying to storm Carthage itself, especially when Hannibal might return. Instead, he tried to secure an adequate base, to cut Carthage off from her source of supplies, and to build up an army against the return of Hannibal. To this end he won over Masinissa so that, with Numidian cavalry and his own flexible army, he could face Hannibal in the open field. Meantime, he moved with extraordinary rapidity against the gathering forces of the enemy, both in his swoop on their camps and at Campi Magni. Then, his retreat into Numidia to meet Masinissa, which at the same time drew Hannibal from his base, was a sound if risky strategic move. He had forced Hannibal to fight on ground favourable to himself.

Scipio's organising ability must have been considerable, for we hear of no breakdown of his Intelligence or his commissariat—a great tribute, especially in a country as

notoriously difficult for campaigning as Spain. Sir Charles Oman writes¹ that "one of the cardinal blunders of Napoleon's whole scheme for the conquest of the Peninsula was that he persisted in treating it as if it were German or Italian soil, capable of supporting an army on the march. But in Spain there are only a few districts where this can be done; it may be possible to go forward without an enormous train of convoys in Andalusia and the coast plain of Valencia, etc....but over four-fifths of the Peninsula an army that tries to feed on the countryside will find itself on the point of starvation in a few days and be forced to disperse in order to live." Scipio may have been fortunate in not having had to penetrate far into the mountainous centre of Spain or very deep into the heart of North Africa, fortunate too in having the command of the sea, but for his two campaigns to have been carried through so smoothly implies a vast amount of organisation. If critics are inclined to ask why he was idle for so long on his arrival in Spain and after his first year's campaign, it must be remembered that he had not only to train and re-form an army, but also to secure its physical well-being.

His treatment of the natives of the countries in which he fought was good. In Spain he followed his father's example, and tried by every means to conciliate the inhabitants. He admitted the princes to his fellowship, and won the people by his clement policy of restoring the hostages who fell into his hands. Many an anecdote was told to illustrate this attitude—his generosity to the hostages in New Carthage, to Aluccius, to his Spanish allies and Masinissa's nephew after Baecula. Indeed the people of Saguntum in thanking the Senate for its protection told how, whenever Scipio captured a Spanish town, he always picked out the Saguntines from the mass

¹ *History of the Peninsular War*, I. p. 87.

of prisoners and sent them home.¹ Purpose might underlie his humanity, and he could pose as the deliverer from the hated Carthaginian yoke, but it was not mere pose. His romantic personality, like that of Sertorius later, combined with his mild treatment, won the hearts of the Spaniards. He was not of the type of stolid brutal Roman, who was so often sent to Spain in the next century, but sympathetic and alive to the native point of view. Foreseeing that Spain would have to bow to Rome, he tried to foster in her devotion to her future mistress. There are few blots on his record, and these may not have been so in a strict strategic sense. He could be cruel, as Ilurgia and some of the towns of the African hinterland found to their cost, but not without a purpose. When a severe lesson was necessary, Scipio did not flinch from inflicting it. But he could say with more truth than could Napoleon, that "laurels are no longer so when covered with the blood of citizens." There was no senseless waste of life; he struck to punish and to deter.

Such was Scipio the soldier, the strategy he adopted and the tactics by which he fulfilled his strategic aims. If the importance and meaning of his work is recognised, it is perhaps unnecessary to try to assign his exact place in the list of the world's great soldiers. Such an attempt has been made by Capt. Liddell Hart, who dubs him a "greater than Napoleon," while admitting the latter's superiority in purely logistical, as opposed to grand, strategy. Although perhaps rather unfair to Hannibal and Caesar, and unduly eulogistic of his hero, he rightly exalts two

¹ L. XXVIII. 39. An inscription from Saguntum records Scipio's help, unless indeed it refers to that of his father (*C.I.L.* II. 3836):

P. SCIPIONI. COS.
IMP. OB. RESTITV
TAM. SAGUNTUM.
EX. S. C. BELLO. PV
NICO. SECVNDO.

aspects of Scipio above those of his other heroes, Scipio's character and his insight into the object of war. "By any moral test Scipio is unique among the greater captains, possessing a greatness and purity of soul which one might anticipate...among the leaders of philosophy or religion, but hardly among the world's supreme men of action." "Scipio could administer military beatings...but he saw beyond the beating to its object. His genius revealed to him that peace and war are the two wheels on which the world runs...Scipio's claim to eternal fame is that he was the staff not the whip of Rome and of the world."¹ In war it is the man that counts!

B. THE MAN, AND HIS WORK

The world misunderstands many of its great men and neglects others. Scipio has in part suffered both these fates. During his lifetime he was bound to be misunderstood by some. The dazzling imaginative Greek hero would necessarily blind many of his sober fellow-Romans. Clouds of myth and legend clustered around his romantic figure, a tribute from Greek writers, who honoured one whom many Romans mistrusted and feared. The cold shafts of rationalism were then hurled by another Greek to dissipate the clouds: but Polybius only succeeded in illuminating a different side of the picture, not in giving a complete portrait. In later days Scipio has suffered neglect, it may be partly from his mere success. "*Victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni.*" Here, whatever the divine attitude may be, perhaps Cato becomes mankind's epitome. The losing cause, nobly fought, tends to overshadow the cause which triumphs. Conquered Hannibal has captivated the world's imagination, but the victorious Scipio stands aloof in his triumph.

¹ Capt. Liddell Hart, pp. 275, 279.

Two qualities perhaps single out Scipio as a new type of Roman—his conscious superiority and his enthusiasm, both of which were irritating to Romans of the old school, like Fabius and Cato. A century earlier he would perhaps have been only an active soldier and magistrate, whose purpose was to express the sovereign will of the Senate and People of Rome. But he was born at a time when Roman life was taking a new direction, and he himself shared largely in the shaping of it. Greek literature, philosophy and thought, Greek manners and customs were entering Rome. It is to Scipio's glory that he recognised the value of Greece and tried to combine the best of Greek with the best of Roman life. It is to Rome's shame later that she rejected the better, and ultimately assimilated only the worse side of Hellenic culture. But it was because Scipio personified the new age, and saw his ideal not in ancient Rome alone, that he stirred up so much antagonism. His enthusiasm for things Greek, combined with his belief in himself, transfigured him in the eyes of his admirers into the typical Greek hero, the spiritual descendant of Achilles and Alexander.

This attitude of mind was even deeper; it was perhaps a religious conviction. As has been said earlier, it represented a mystical approach to life, a feeling of dependence on external and higher Power, a deeper and more personal belief. At times there arise men who by sheer genius transcend the limits usually placed by society on the individual, whether they are prophets, statesmen, or artists. Scipio seems to have been one of this circle, a man of genius and of prophetic insight, and Rome found she had no room for him. But, besides the dreamer, there was the intensely practical man of action, the reasoning and calculating hero of Polybius. Not many combine both these attitudes to life, but Scipio was numbered among the few. Why should the deeper side be denied to Scipio?

In one sense Alexander combined both, in another Socrates did, and in yet another did Cromwell. The last shows, at least, that one man can have deep religious convictions and yet be a soldier and a man of action. The result of this fusion of mystic and man of action was that Scipio had supreme confidence in himself, in his ability and in his mission, and it was this almost superhuman self-confidence which so impressed and irritated his contemporaries. They naturally resented the superior bearing of one who always seemed to do and speak the right thing at the right time, and who inspired so many with confidence in himself. Again, any outward expression of his religious feelings might seem theatrical. But that is no reason to deny his genuine belief, or to assert his charlatanism. It may be objected that, if this feeling was genuine, it would have been expressed in private, not in public, where seeds of suspicion of Pharisaism and trickery would be sown. But even apart from the fact that practically the first eight years of his public life were spent abroad, where his daily visit to the temple of Capitoline Jupiter was impossible, Scipio may have felt the genuine desire for the outward expression of his inner feelings in an act of public worship. The present-day emphasis on personal religion tends to strengthen rather than to abolish public worship, while ritualism for some fills a gap which mere private devotion cannot do.¹ He was no doubt clever enough to use the impression he made on others to his own ends. He may have encouraged, or at least not discountenanced, stories of his visions and his daily prayer to Jupiter. But that does not make him a vulgar charlatan, as Polybius unwittingly would make him, because Scipio believed in them himself. He did however by mere force

¹ On Scipio's emphasis on individualism in religion, a Greek rather than a Roman attitude, cf. Warde Fowler, *Religious Experience of the Roman People*, pp. 354-5.

of personality deal successfully with dangerous situations in ways which in a lesser man would have seemed mere bombastic melodrama, as witness (if we may assume a kernel of truth at the heart of the anecdotes) his tearing up of the account books in the Senate, when the shadow of misappropriation fell on his house, or how on the anniversary of Zama those who came to mock remained to pray. However, it need not be supposed that he deliberately staged effects, as did Sertorius with his hind, but he may have seen that the best way of inspiring men was to make them believe in something which he believed in—himself.

This outwardly superior attitude suggests a parallel with another great imperialist, Lord Curzon, who was not averse to historical parallels, however imperfect they may be, as witness the one he himself drew between Germanicus and General Gordon. Both Scipio and Curzon were essentially aristocrats, and it is significant to see to whom the latter's thoughts turned when visiting the Forum. He was most moved, we learn from his notebooks, by the Via Sacra, for here he was gazing upon "the unmistakable paving stones in their original beds, which echoed to the chariot wheels of Scipio, Sulla, Caesar Germanicus, Titus and Trajan." The impression he made on the public through numerous caricatures and parodies was that of "a most superior person." But behind this external aloofness there was another Curzon. "To the public he appeared as a pompous and even arrogant figure—cold, haughty and aloof; to his intimate companions, as an emotional and sensitive being, warm-hearted and impulsive, within whose frame there lurked eternally the spirit of incorrigible youth," although "it seemed that he never passed through a stage of immaturity at all."¹ Our thoughts turn to the young Scipio

¹ These and the following quotations are from the Earl of Ronaldshay's *Life of Curzon*, I. Introduction and pp. 73, 60, 58, 187.

who sprang forward to volunteer for the Spanish campaign. Again: "throughout Curzon's life, the man outwardly so complacently self-confident was curiously dependent on spiritual aid. He once confided to one of his closest friends that he never embarked upon any undertaking, however trivial, without uttering a prayer for help." Scipio also "nullo die prius ullam publicam privatamque rem egit, quam in Capitolium iret, ingressusque aedem...solus in secreto ibi tempus tereret" (L. xxvi. 19). Both men seem to have been at once outwardly superior, yet inwardly far from self-sufficient. Curzon could be "the most entertaining of mortals and at once became the centre of attraction"; yet when explaining the Indian policy of the government, he has to be warned that he must realise "that he is not a divinity addressing black beetles." Similarly how Fabius must have writhed under young Scipio's confidence! Again, Curzon's extraordinary determination, his charm and his diplomacy, are illustrated by his visit to the Amir of Afghanistan, which only dogged perseverance enabled him to make. The Amir afterwards confessed that "in a humorous conversation in 1894, Curzon began his remarks by a joke and ended them with a most important political question as to who would be my successor. I, having already committed myself in a joke, could not refuse to give my views on the matter more fully than I originally intended. Luckily, however, the conversation took place in a small private room."¹ Scipio showed the same determination in carrying out his will in forcing through the African campaign, the same tact and diplomacy in dealing with the native African princes, Masinissa and Syphax, though with the latter less successfully. Both men had great ambition, but not of a vulgar or personal kind; each believed in the protectorate mission of his own

¹ From the *Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, quoted by Ronaldshay, p. 213.

country. Both correspond in character to Macaulay's estimate of Pitt—"his self-esteem was not that of an upstart who was drunk with good luck or with applause. . . it was that of the magnanimous man so finely described by Aristotle in the *Ethics*—'of the man who thinks himself worthy of great things, being in truth worthy'."¹ Both Scipio and Curzon were *μεγαλόψυχοι*. Both drank deep from the cup of success and of defeat; both spent the last years of their lives in the bitterness of a virtual exile, but both also were great-hearted enough not to thrust their talents on a country which would have none of them.

However overbearing Scipio may have seemed to some of his enemies, most men recognised his worth and came under the sway of his personality. His imagination and romantic outlook kindled the enthusiasm of others. His troops, the Numidian princes, Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, Philip of Macedon, the Spanish chieftains and the common people, even his political opponent Tiberius Gracchus, all acknowledged his greatness. It is difficult to estimate his more personal qualities. The only evidence is the impress which he made on those he met, which is found largely in anecdotes. But, remembering that a false anecdote may be good history, it is perhaps legitimate to assume that, even where the incident described is false, the characteristics assigned may be true. From the anecdotes an impression is gained of kingliness, of moderation, self-control and courtesy, of shrewd calculation and calmness of judgment. Scipio may have been *φιλογύνης*, but his self-control was stronger.² He seems to have been endowed with an extra-

¹ Cf. Ronaldshay, *op. cit.* p. 56.

² The scurrilous verses of Naevius (Aul. Gell. vii. 8. 5) need not be taken seriously. Do they derive from the ribald jests levelled at generals at their triumphs?

"Etiam qui res magnas manu saepe gessit gloriose,

ordinary tact, an ability to penetrate in a sympathetic way to the real feelings of those with whom he was dealing. Prof. Conway illustrates this rich humanity, which is part of Livy's conception of Scipio, both by comparing the parallel versions of two speeches of Scipio, as given by Polybius and Livy (that to the mutineers at the Sucro, and that to Hannibal before Zama), and by quoting three anecdotes: the handing back of the Spanish captive to the young prince Aluccius, the liberation of Massiva, and the story of Sophonisba—incidents which Polybius thought not worth notice. The same sympathetic understanding was doubtless displayed in his private life of which so little is known. His were freer ideals than those of many of his contemporaries, and it was within his home that his daughter Cornelia, the famous mother of the Gracchi, grew up. Few reproaches were launched against his personal character by his enemies, who only attacked his ambition and his Hellenism. Polybius, one of his greatest admirers, has drawn the most damning portrait of him, but it is not complete; Livy comes nearer the truth when he leaves a loophole for genuine piety. Scipio may at times have aimed at the dramatic, or even at the theatrical; the last incident of his public life, when on the anniversary of Zama he led the hostile crowd to the Capitol to give thanks to Jupiter, shows that. Yet it was not mere play-acting, but psychological insight combined with mental exultation and belief in himself.

The driving power of a man's life may be the inspiration

Cuius facta viva nunc vigent, qui apud gentes solus praestat,
Eum suus pater cum pallio uno ab amica abduxit."

Cf. Val. Max. vi. 9. 2 on Scipio's youth, and vi. 7. 1 on a domestic episode which reflects more credit perhaps on his wife than on Scipio himself. Cf. also Plut. *Apophth. Reg. et. Imp. Sc. Maior.* 2. That Valerius Antias has altered the end of the story of the Spanish maiden is a reflection rather on his than on Scipio's morals (Aul. Gell. vii. 8. 3).

he receives from an ideal, embodied in real life or in literature. Whether Scipio, who must have been well versed in Greek literature, consciously tried to follow the pattern of Alexander, cannot be said.¹ His admirers may have seen in him the type of a Greek hero, and invested his actions with an epic air, while the Legend found similarities between him and Alexander; or, when they were not to be found, boldly transferred them from the Greek romance. Parallels abounded: Alexander's siege of Tyre, Scipio's of New Carthage; the driving back of the sea at Mount Climax and the ebb at New Carthage; the visit to Zeus Ammon and Scipio's relations with Jupiter; Alexander's magnanimity towards the mother and wife of Darius, Scipio's towards the wife and children of Indibilis. Others were invented: the birth stories; the leaping into the enemy's town by Alexander among the Malli, by Scipio at New Carthage (App. *Ib.* 22); the single combat between Alexander and Darius at the Issus, and between Scipio and Hannibal at Zama. However much the Legend may connect Scipio with the heroes of Greece, it is

¹ As is suggested by Grenier, *The Roman Spirit*, pp. 139 *sqq.* It is still more hazardous to suppose that his character was greatly affected by Hannibal—as is done by G. P. Baker (*Hannibal*, 1930), whose thesis is that “to defeat a man is to become like him...Scipio was a direct, if unintentional, creation of Hannibal, who was therefore one of the remote fountains of the whole stream of Roman imperial monarchy.” During his early impressionable years Scipio came under the spell of the Carthaginian wizard, so that with every shock of the war “the mind of Scipio was twisted and slanted more and more into the likeness of Hannibal. The Carthaginian smile grew on his lips; the quick Carthaginian mentality grew in his mind—that quality which a gruff Roman took for insincerity, but which more enlightened ages call subtlety.” But though Scipio learnt lessons in the art of war from Hannibal, would his character have been affected? The unflattering estimate of Hannibal which must have been current in Rome during the war would surely appeal less than the heroic figures of Achilles or Alexander. In later years more intimate knowledge of his foe may have won Scipio's respect, but it is difficult to believe in a Semitic smile on young Scipio's lips.

impossible to know whether Scipio was consciously affected by the ideals which they represented. "There is nothing to prove," says Grenier, "that Scipio's conduct was not very often inspired by an imagination keenly susceptible to romantic and literary influences." Yet there is nothing to prove that it was, beyond the Scipionic Legend.

Scipio's effect on the cultural life of Rome was immense, for he heralded the flood of Greek thought thither. In literature he encouraged Ennius, who, though brought to Rome by Cato, was soon attracted by Scipio's munificence. If later Romans regarded Ennius as personifying the spirit of early Rome, it must be remembered how much he was Greek in outlook. He wrote the first epic account of the Romans in Greek hexameters instead of in the old Saturnian verse, thus setting the example for all later Latin poetry; at the same time he championed free thought and rationalism, and popularised the doctrines of Euhemerus. His statue was placed in the tomb of the Scipios, along with those of Publius and Lucius Scipio, which shows how intimate his relations with them must have been. "Carus fuit Africano superiori noster Ennius," wrote Cicero. Hellenism also began to affect art and architecture, and many of the masterpieces of Greek art found their way into the private houses of noble Roman connoisseurs, for instance, the pictures which were stolen from Syracuse in 212. We may be sure Scipio valued those more than did the boorish Mummius after the fall of Corinth. Greek manners also affected Roman society, and luxury undermined her early austerity. It has been seen how Scipio offended the sterner Romans by the way he threw himself into the Greek life of Syracuse, occupying his leisure with literature and gymnastics, and how his daughter in turn brought up her children, the Gracchi, on Greek educational methods and with the help of Greek tutors. What would a Roman of the old school think of a man who could say,

"Numquam se minus esse otiosum quam cum otiosus esset"?¹ The Greek spirit even crept into the political life of Rome, and Greek political theories were discussed freely. Again the old religion of the Romans was gradually corrupted by the influx of Greek and oriental cults, which ultimately had so disastrous an effect on Roman morality. The consultation of the oracle of Delphi, and the institution of the Ludi Apollinares, led the way for the State to restore public confidence before the African campaign by the transference to Rome of Cybele, the Great Mother Goddess, from her shrine at Pessinus in Phrygia. The man chosen to conduct the goddess from Ostia to her temporary home in the temple of Victory on the Palatine was a member of Scipio's house, the young P. Scipio Nasica, the son of Cn. Scipio who fell in Spain in 211.² And it is noteworthy that the goddess came to Rome in the consulship of Africanus. The choice of a member of the Scipionic house to conduct the goddess shows the tendencies of the Scipios, while the adoption of the deity may have had political as well as religious motives, to signify that Rome would rule the nations over whom she presided. And as one of the leaders of this new outlook Scipio stood, seeing the best in Greek life, thought and art, and trying to infuse it into the life of Rome.³

† Scipio, the imperialist, statesman and politician, falls in the main outside the scope of this work, for it was in the second part of his life, when his soldiering was largely over, that he embarked on his political career in Rome. But it must have been during his campaigns in Spain and Africa that there dawned in his mind the ideal

¹ A saying attributed to Scipio, by Cicero, *de Off.* III. 1. 1. Cf. Plut. *Apophth. Reg. et Imp. Sc. Maior.* 1.

² L. XXIX. 14, XXXVI. 36.

³ Through his influence and phil-hellene sympathies, Scipio drew into the life of Rome new families from Grecian South Italy. Cf. Münzer, *op. cit.* pp. 91 *sqq.*

that these countries, which would fall beneath Rome's sway, must be governed for their own good, that Rome was called to a lofty mission, and that common interests might bind the nations of the world into one confederacy with Rome as the head. The imperial conception so magnificently embodied in words by Virgil was dimly adumbrated. Scipio stood forth as a champion of Rome's imperial advance and of her protectorate mission,¹ and in this was the founder of the Empire. He made her supreme in the Mediterranean, and brought to her feet Spain, Africa and the East. He saw, with Hannibal, more deeply into the Eastern situation than did most at Rome—that by the defeat of Philip and Rome's withdrawal from Greece there was created a vacuum, which left the way open for the ambitious Antiochus. He aimed not at destruction, but at expansion and control; he did not crush the life out of Carthage, but left her sufficient freedom to recover under the control of Rome. War was not the tool of unprincipled annexation, but had a moral object—"parcere subjectis." Rome was to expand her civilising influence and not to make a desert and call it peace. But Scipio's views were not unchallenged. During his African campaign, the noble families of Rome had been working against him, so that

¹ Cf. Scipio's letter to Heraclea of Latmos (Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, II.³ 618; Holleaux, *Revue des ét. anc.* XIX (1917), pp. 237 *sqq.* and De Sanctis, *Atti dell' Acc. delle Scienze di Torino*, LVII (1921-2), pp. 242 *sqq.*); his letter to Colophon (Holleaux, *Riv. di Filologia* (1924), pp. 29 *sqq.*); and the inscription found last year at Aptera in Crete (M. Guarducci, in *Riv. di Fil.* (1929), pp. 60 *sqq.*). Also the various inscriptions at Delos relating to the Scipios, which illustrate the generosity of their attitude to the Greeks and to religion, as well as their imperial views (see the inventories of Apollo's treasury—Dittenberger, *Syll.*³ 588, lines 101 *sqq.*; the crowns dedicated by the Scipios—lines 89, 90; the sacred laurel granted to P. Scipio as proxenus of the sanctuary, with the decree on a stele—P. Roussel, *I.G.* IX. 4. 717 and Dittenberger, *op. cit.* 617; and the fragments of the base of a votive offering dedicated by P. Scipio to Apollo at Delphi—Pomtow, *Klio*, XVII (1921), pp. 153 *sqq.* and Hondius, *Supp. Ep. Gr.* I. p. 144).

on his return he had to turn to a political life to maintain his position. Popular enthusiasm for the victor of the war might have carried him over the forms of the Constitution, but he turned aside to private life. The time was not yet ripe for one man to steer the State, but the control was still to swing from one noble to another.¹ Scipio, isolated above the Republican forms, retired, as was necessary for the well-being of the State. His long leadership had united the other noble families against him, and in mere self-defence he had to become a political leader, and to build up a party from the wreck of the old Aemilian-Scipionic house. The revival of the Fabian party through the victories of Flamininus, and the attacks which followed in 195 on Scipio's African policy and on his attitude to the Peace, to Hannibal and to the East, forced him to become a party leader to win the consulship for the next year. Again in 188 he was in the same position, and again he had to rebuild a party. At length, notwithstanding his eastern victories, the attacks became strong under the direction of Cato, and Scipio withdrew to exile at Liternum. "*Silentium deinde de Africano fuit.*" Rome had no place for an uncrowned king. Three times in Spain, it is said, Scipio declined the title of king. But doubtless, as he himself said, he conceived that he fulfilled the ideal. He was kingly, though wise enough to decline the outward title. The individual arose, but the State triumphed; the days of Sulla and Caesar were as yet unborn.

Scipio stands in the centre of the history of Republican Rome. In him were many of her virtues, yet in him also lay the seeds of her decay. A noble of the nobles, born

¹ Cf. Ihne, II. p. 398: "The dominion of Rome over the provinces made it necessary to confer upon individuals from time to time monarchical powers; and upon these temporary powers were the steps to the throne of the Roman Emperors. Spain was the first country that witnessed the autocratic powers of Roman nobles, and it was in the family of the Scipios that this first became apparent."

in one of Rome's greatest families, he shone forth like a star of hope in his country's darkest hour. For nearly ten years the dread Hannibal had swept all before him, but in ten more years Scipio was to bring him to his knees and "talk to him as Jehovah might have done to the defeated Satan in *Paradise Lost*." Half mystic, half man of action, with superb confidence in himself, he unconsciously laid the axe to the root of the Republic, yet adumbrated withal the mighty Empire which was to flourish in its place. Hannibal, however indomitable his courage, however magnificent his resolve, was one who came to destroy, not to build. His life's work was an attempt to overthrow Rome, but what could he have put in her place, had he succeeded? Had Carthage anything to offer the world, which would be worthy to rise from the ashes of Rome? Her choicest bloom was the spirit of the great house of Barca, but she had little else to bequeath to later ages. Yet Scipio's was a creative spirit, one of the fertilising forces in man's progress. A king without a kingdom, he gained for Rome supremacy in the Mediterranean. He conquered Spain, Africa and the East. He championed Rome's imperial and protectorate mission in the world. Vested with proconsular power, the mainstay of the later emperors, he was great enough to inspire a belief in his divinity—a belief accorded to many an emperor only by servile flattery. He developed the Roman army by tactical and strategic ideals, and so forged a weapon to assert Rome's supremacy. But in doing so, he turned a city militia into a professional army, he over-rode the old Republican system of annual commands, notwithstanding his lack of technical qualifications, and he won an army devoted as much to an individual as to the State. The days of Marius, Sulla and Caesar, were fast approaching. With the world at his feet, with the way open for his ideals of Greek culture and Rome's mission, he returned home to the

highest honours, and was for twelve years "princeps senatus." But Rome had not room for an uncrowned king, and all the opposition, which his dazzling personality had aroused, formed in storm clouds around his head. For many years he withstood the bitterness of party politics and personal antagonism, willing to serve his country even as a subordinate to his brother, but at length he bowed his head before the storm. The State had no place for its saviour, so he withdrew to exile and comparative poverty, soon to die, having drunk deep of the waters of success and power, but willing to forgo the outward show in a Constitution which had no place for the individual. "Fling away ambition," cried Wolsey to Cromwell, "by that sin fell the angels." And Scipio here proved himself a little higher than the angels. More than a Roman, he stands at the turning-point of the Republic, pointing men to a direction which many would not follow, and unconsciously lighting up the path which Rome took. Because of the torch which he kindled, the shadow of the Empire fell athwart the Republic. We may say of Scipio and Rome what has been said of Alexander and Asia, "For when all is said, we come back at the end to his personality; not the soldier or the statesman, but the man. Whatever 'Rome' did or did not get from him, she 'felt' him as she has scarcely felt any other; she knew that one of the greatest of the earth had passed."

APPENDIX ONE


(CHAPTER III)

THE TOPOGRAPHY OF NEW CARTHAGE

POLYBIUS (x. 10) gives a clear account of the topography of New Carthage, based as he tells us (11. 4) not on report but on his own careful observation. There can be no doubt that autopsy formed the base of the account, for he sailed there from Massilia with Scipio Aemilianus in c. 133 B.C. (P. xxxv. 4. 8). But behind this knowledge there was literary or oral tradition. For Polybius says that many state the circumference of the city to be forty stades, while he corrects the figure to twenty. Also, when he first met Laelius, and gained so much information from him, he must also have learnt the general lie of the town. Laqueur goes so far as to suppose that Polybius wrote down his early impressions in the first draft of his work, and later corrected them when he had visited the place. Yet whatever Polybius' early sources and impressions were, there is no doubt that the account, as we have it, is his final version based on and revised by his autopsy. His description of the town is clear and straightforward, but the whole passage raises a few difficulties, namely that, although the bay is described correctly, the town is falsely orientated up to some ninety degrees, while the position of the island at the mouth of the harbour is not clear. It is difficult to reconcile these errors with Polybius' usual geographical accuracy and his autopsy. Further difficulties are presented by the changed conditions of Cartagena to-day, especially with regard to the hills, lagoon and coastline. Polybius' account is followed closely by Livy (xxvi. 42), who abbreviates it, drawing on his source not directly but through Coelius. He adds a few details (e.g. ch. 44. 6) which came probably from Silenus via Coelius.¹

Apart from the ancient sources, there is a considerable modern literature on the subject, which will be considered in more detail in describing the town. Droysen (*Rhein. Mus.* 1875, xxx. pp. 62 *sqq.*) was the first to point out Polybius' false orientation.

¹ On Appian's account (*Ib.* 19) see Cuntz, pp. 18 *sqq.*



Strachan-Davidson, who spent a week in Cartagena, gives his results in "*Selections from Polybius*". This valuable article first made the general outlines clear, and must remain the basis of all further work, notwithstanding its neglect by some scholars. Hübner's article in Pauly-Wissowa may be dismissed; as Kahrstedt says, it contradicts Polybius and "ich verstehe die Ansätze gar nicht, die er dort gibt." He keeps Polybius' false orientation; reckons the bay from the Castillo de Galeras to the island, which makes one passage 410 metres, the other 2840, which Cuntz and Brewitz agree in calling false and unnatural; he joins the town to the mainland in the north-west at the Puerta de Murcia, where he puts an artificial dam which is neither extant nor mentioned by Polybius; he puts the sea in the east, which is impossible; and lastly, he identifies the town hill with Castillo de Galeras, and the Asclepias hill with Castillo San Julian, although these hills both lie well outside the town and flank the bay. Cuntz (*Polybius und sein Werk*, pp. 8-20) is based on Strachan-Davidson. Kahrstedt (*Archäologischer Anzeiger*, 1912, pp. 226-235) dismisses all literature on the subject which does not rest on autopsy, as Droysen and Cuntz. In his attempt to identify the five hills of Polybius with the five hills of modern Cartagena, he confuses the issue slightly by adopting new names for these hills in place of the ordinary modern Spanish ones adhered to by other authors; he then proceeds to dismiss one hill and to invent another one. Modern writers, such as Meyer and De Sanctis, seem to accept Kahrstedt, but it is by no means certain that his hypothesis is correct. Brewitz (pp. 47-53) sums up the position well. Laqueur's article in *Hermes* (LVI. 1921, pp. 170-180) rests on his peculiar views of Polybius' method of composition, and reverts in respect of the lagoon and sea to the untenable position of Hübner. Kromayer-Veith (*Schlachten-Atlas*) give a very brief summary. Finally, there is a work which has been neglected, but is based on a very careful study of the local conditions and on the pioneer work of Strachan-Davidson, supplementing and correcting him in many points. It is, to give its full title, *Estudios geograficos-historicos de Cartagena desde los tiempos Prehistoricos hasta la expulsion de los Arabes*, by Manuel F.-V. Canovas, published at Cartagena in 1905. It contains a very instructive series of maps of Cartagena in Roman times, and of its development through the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. I have to thank Sr. Don F.

Casal Martinez, the Cronista of Cartagena, for drawing my attention to this work. Any topographical discussion is complicated, because the names of many main streets have been changed during the last few years. Sr. Martinez' *El Libro de la Ciudad de Cartagena* (1923) will be found useful to meet this difficulty.

Polybius says that the town lay in the innermost nook of a gulf, which faced south-west and was about twenty stades long and ten stades broad at the entrance; at its mouth lay an island, which left only a narrow passage on either side, so that the gulf was perfectly calm except when the south-west wind blew. The city stood on a hill which jutted out into the gulf in the form of a peninsula. It was surrounded by the sea on the east and south (which, correcting Polybius' false orientation, is south and west), on the west (= north) by a lagoon. The isthmus, which connected the city with the mainland, was not more than two stades broad. The town was low in the centre, and on the southern (= west) side the approach to it from the sea was level. On the other sides it was surrounded by hills, two of them lofty and rugged, and the other three, though much lower, yet craggy and difficult of access. The biggest of these hills lay on the east (= south) side of the town, jutting out into the sea; on it stood a temple of Aesculapius. The second was opposite to it on the west (= north), crowned by Hasdrubal's palace. The other three smaller hills were to the north (= east) of the city, the most easterly (= southerly) being named Vulcan's, the next Aletes', and the third Saturn's. An artificial canal had been cut between the lagoon and sea for shipping, and over the canal was built a bridge for carts bringing in supplies from the country. This account of Polybius', with the corrected orientation, gives probably an accurate description of New Carthage as it was in Roman times. How then does it square with modern Cartagena?

To the north of the town now lies the plain of Almajar, which becomes marshy in rainy seasons. This is undoubtedly the lagoon of Polybius; the only doubt is how far it extended. The present shore line reaches a little farther south than it did in Roman times, but the Arsenal Harbour is not entirely artificial; for the sea entered there as lately as the eighteenth century (see maps referred to by Strachan-Davidson), and flowed over much of the west and north-west of the present town. The gulf itself is probably almost unchanged. Thus we may imagine an oval-

shaped lagoon, to the south of which lay a peninsula connected in the east by a narrow neck with the mainland, and in the west just separated from a tongue of land, which widening out formed the mainland opposite. To the south and south-west of the peninsula was the sea in the main gulf.

Strachan-Davidson was misled in his calculations regarding the level of the lake, because he was informed of the discovery of a Roman bridge at the Puerta de Murcia. This bridge, however, was not of Roman construction; Sr. Canovas shows that it was a bridge known as Puentecillo built in the Middle Ages, which was visible and serviceable in the last third of the past century,¹ giving access to the town from across the old Rambla de Santa Florentina. Strachan-Davidson limits the extent of the lake in the east to the actual road of Torre Ciega. Sr. Canovas suggests that it stretched still farther east: a view supported by the flora, the relief of the ground, etc. The action of rain on the hills would easily decrease the size of the east end in the course of centuries, till it reached the line of the present road of Torre Ciega. Further, the Via Aurelia (Praetoria) would hardly run over marshy ground, and no Roman remains have been found to protect it against the marshiness. Further, Polybius expressly says that the lake stretched to the east of the town (Polybius' north). In the north there is a ridge of cultivated earth, which differs greatly in its general appearance from the bed of the morass which surrounds it; it marks the northern shore of the lagoon, and approaches to 700 metres of the city. At one point there was a definite headland projecting into the lake (known as the Molino de Truchao), and this may have been the place from which the wading party started across the lake. In the west, Strachan-Davidson carries the shore up to the foot of the Monte de la Atalaya, including in the lake the basin of the Rambla de Benipila. Sr. Canovas, however, owing to the configuration of the ground and to the difference between the subsoil and flora of Almajar and of Benipila, limits it to a line almost parallel to the actual Alameda de San Antonio Abad.

Where then was the artificial canal, mentioned by Polybius, which joined the sea and the lake? Strachan-Davidson (p. 317)

¹ Presumably the eighteenth century. Sr. Canovas' work was published posthumously in 1905; perhaps he wrote this sentence at the end of the nineteenth century.

shows that it cannot have been in the east, where the isthmus lay, though this is where Hübner places it. The Isthmus is "of solid rock and thirty feet above the sea level; it is quite impossible that it can ever have been cut through"; and so he rightly seeks it in the west. This view is supported by Sr. Canovas who cites further evidence, referring to a reliable historian of the sixteenth century, Geronimo Hurtado by name, whose manuscript is preserved in the library of the Real Academia de la Historia. This writer says that in his day there existed a communication between the lake and sea. Also Sr. Montanaro, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, mentions a bridge at the Puerta de Murcia in 1597, which was repaired in 1600-1602. This canal and bridge probably outline in the main the topographical situation in Roman times. Further, Sr. Canovas says, there was once a hill to the west of the Modern Artillery Park, the latter being part of the lake in Roman times. This hill, which lay outside the Roman town, was razed in the eighteenth century when the Park was built. On its north side it rose from the lake, while on its western slopes during the Middle Ages was los Salitres (where the houses on the north side of the Calle del Salitre are now). The waters of the lake surrounded this hill on the north, and then flowed over the site of the Artillery Park, south to the convent del Carmen Santa Florentina. Here the canal commenced, running between the east of this hill and the west of Mt Molinete down the Calle Florentina (where recent discoveries support this view); then it widened out into the town's south-west coast, which ran along the Calle Major (Isaac Peral), as can be seen from the level of the ground and from the subsoil (on this cf. Strachan-Davidson). The rest of the south shore of the town followed fairly closely the present front, just south of Mt Concepcion.

Turning to the town itself, the next problem is to identify the hills. Droysen started this identification by equating the hill of Aesculapius with Mt Concepcion; there can be no doubt that this is correct. He then said that the *arx Hasdrubalis* was the hill south of Almajar, but this is too vague because all the other hills are south of the plain. The *arx* is, more precisely, Mt Molinete; the others are, in order from south to north (the east to west of Polybius), Vulcan = Cast. Despeña Perros, Aletes = Mt San José, and Kronos = Mt Sacro. The hill outside



CARTAGENA

PLATE III. View taken from the Castillo de Despeña Perros, facing South-West. The dominating hill is M. Concepcion, seen from the back. The hill behind it in the distance is Castillo de Galeras, which flanks the bay. Note the top of the Bull ring (Plaza de Toros) on extreme left.

the town, which Livy names Mercury's hill, is beyond doubt the Cast. de los Moros. This identification, however, which suits what data we have, does not satisfy Kahrstedt. First of all, he dismisses Mt Molinete completely. This hill which, he says, when viewed from the Arsenal, looks as majestic as Concepcion, he sets down as a *mons testaceus*, which has attained its present height only by the heaping up of rubbish, and can in antiquity have been only a low rising which could not compare with the other hills. This view is difficult to accept. First, what evidence we have does not disprove the existence of Mt Molinete, for according to the authorities quoted by Sr. Canovas it clearly existed as far back as the sixteenth century, and so we may suppose it goes back to Roman times. Secondly, the appearance of the hill itself hardly supports Kahrstedt's view, if a layman may form a judgment—it needs the knowledge of a geologist to pronounce definitely on the point. Though the hill does undoubtedly present the appearance of a *mons testaceus* in the amount of broken tiles and rubbish which are scattered over it (which is accentuated by the fact that the modern buildings on it belong to one of the poorest and most squalid parts of the town), yet there are definitely large masses of solid rock over half way up; and it would seem that, even if the summit itself has grown higher in the course of time, there must have been a rocky hill of considerable height on the site in Roman times. After dismissing Molinete, Kahrstedt has to find another hill to take its place. He looks to the ground of Mt Concepcion and not, as one might at first have expected, to the hill which undoubtedly existed in medieval times just to the west of Molinete, but which was razed in the eighteenth century. By Mt Concepcion he traces a hill, the summit of which is crowned by the modern Plaza de Toros, which occupies the site of the ancient amphitheatre.¹ According to A. Schulten (Kromayer-Veith, *Schlachten-Atlas*), this Plaza is not on a hill, but lies low, and so cannot represent Vulcan's Hill. However, Kahrstedt points out that such a hill clearly exists, and is especially obvious if one walks along the Muralla del Mar (now Avenida Muñoz Cobo) in an easterly direction, past Mt Concepcion. It lies between this latter hill and Kahrstedt's Kastell (Despeña Perros), and stretches to the Military Hospital on the south, to the Barracks on the north-

¹ See photograph, p. 294.

east and to the Calle de Duque (now Luis Angosto) on the north-west. This area does constitute a hill, as one can easily perceive if one follows Kahrstedt's course. But it is not clear that it was one of the five Roman hills, for it may well have been part of Concepcion hill. These two hills are only separated by a cutting known as the Calle de Gisbert, which runs down under the sea-wall to the Muelle. It is here that a number of Roman finds has been made. The cutting is not ancient, but appears to have been made, or at any rate greatly accentuated, in modern times. This is clear, because (1) Sr. Canovas, in commenting on the fact that most of the Roman remains have been found on the interior not the exterior slopes of the hills, mentions the discovery of a Roman house, beautifully ornamented but of small dimensions, which was found in excavating Monte de la Concepcion to cut the Calle de Gisbert; and (2) across the cutting there recently ran a street named after Scipio, of which scarcely any traces remain owing to clearing the Calle de Gisbert (see Sr. Martinez, *op. cit.* p. 51). Thus it is probable that the Roman amphitheatre (the Plaza de Toros) lay on the slopes of the biggest hill of the town, namely that of Aesculapius (Concepcion). Indeed the ground between the Plaza de Toros and Cast. de Despeña Perros hardly slopes down at all (when going past the Plaza de Toros across the Plaza del Hospital to Despeña Perros one crosses no trace of a valley—and here I speak from memory alone—but climbs steadily all the way), so that the Roman amphitheatre lay on the outskirts of Mt Concepcion, virtually on a ridge of medium height connecting the two "peaks" of Despeña Perros and Concepcion. Therefore, as there seems no adequate reason for rejecting the existence of Mt Molinete in Roman times, or for believing in a separate hill crowned by the amphitheatre, the usual equating of the modern with the ancient hills holds good.

Kahrstedt's identification is of course complicated by his renaming of the modern hills as follows: Concepcion = Aesculapius; Reservoir Hill (= Mt Sacro) = the *arx Hasdrubalis*; the Tower Hill (= José) = Kronos; Castle Hill (Despeña Perros) = Aletes; his Circus Hill = Hephaistus. Kahrstedt emphasises Polybius' remark that the second big hill lay opposite to the first (*ἀντίκειται*), on the west (= north) side in a similar position, and on it stood Hasdrubal's palace. After correctly equating the first hill, Aesculapius, with Concepcion, he turns to

Mt Sacro for the *arx Hasdrubalis*. These two hills, he says, when looked at from the Puerta de San José in the east, are the two which seem to dominate the town. However, if the town is viewed from the west, e.g. from the Arsenal, the two dominating hills are Concepcion and Molinete, which do lie opposite each other and, as the Forum probably lay between them,¹ would naturally seem to be the two opposite hills of the town mentioned by Polybius. Thus there appears no adequate reason for accepting Kahrstedt's hypotheses on the position of the ancient hills and their equation with the modern ones.

Kahrstedt also assumes the isthmus to have been slightly farther to the south than is generally believed; i.e. he traces its north coast from a few paces to the south of the Puerta de San José, eastwards to near the middle of the Castillo de los Moros, and then round the northern end of the hill. The southern coast line is consequently put a little farther south, thus preserving the breadth of two stades given by Polybius. The alteration means that the main town gate lay between Kahrstedt's Circus Hill and his Castle Hill, instead of between the latter and San José as is usually supposed. It is perhaps better to keep to the identification of Strachan-Davidson, who also examined this ground.

Polybius' errors need not detain us long. His false orientation of the town, with a correct orientation of the bay, has raised much discussion. But his mistake is quite pardonable, when it is remembered that he had no maps or compass. Similar mistakes are common, for instance, Herodotus' (VII. 176, 201) idea that Thermopylae ran north and south, or Polybius' own error on the Rhone (III. 47). Brewitz is much worried by Polybius' false description of the island (Escrombreras), and excuses him on the assumption that on his visit to New Carthage he may have sailed into the harbour between the island and the eastern mainland, a passage of only 410 metres. Strachan-Davidson marks a point in the harbour from which the island seems to be just in the opening of the bay; if Polybius looked back from here, his first impression of the position of the island would be confirmed. Brewitz explains the reason of Polybius not rectifying this error when he reached the town, by assuming that no hill of the town

¹ For the excavation and position of the Forum, see *Boletín de la Real Academia de Historia*, 1909, LII, pp. 490 sqq.

was high enough to give a view of the island over the hills which flank the bay. Actually, however, the west end of Escrombreras can be seen from Mt Concepcion. The island is too far out to protect the harbour very effectively, but Polybius is not wrong in asserting it must afford some protection, even though he may have exaggerated its importance.

Two points alone remain—the starting place of the wading party, and the place where it captured the walls. Whence did the wading party start? Polybius merely says *κατὰ τὴν λίμνην*. This is generally taken to mean ‘from the isthmus itself’; they started for the north shore of it and went through the lagoon along the north side of the town (cf. Kromayer-Veith, *Schlachten-Atlas*). But on this route they would be visible to the Carthaginians fighting on the walls. Possibly in the thick of the battle they might escape notice, but they were a large body of 500 men with ladders. Sr. Canovas suggests that they started from the north shore of the lagoon, and made their way right through the centre of the water. On the northern shore, he traces a large headland jutting into the water, by the Molino de Truchao, which he thinks was the starting place. The distance from here to a point near the Puerta de Murcia would be about the same as or even less than from the isthmus itself. Further, the detachment could not be seen so easily by the defenders near the gate, whose attention would be rivetted to the east. The difficulty of sending the men round to their starting place would not be an objection, if it is assumed that Scipio was counting on an ebb—for he would have done so long before they were needed. But if in any case he was thinking of making an attempt through the lagoon, the isthmus would appear at first a better starting place. Yet even so, Canovas’ suggestion is possible, for there was a ridge in the basin of the lagoon from north to south. It can still be discerned to-day, stretching across the plain of Almajar and dividing it into two distinct halves. So the depth of the lagoon, which one might expect to be greater across the centre than along one side, is not an objection to fixing the Molino de Truchao as the starting point: if Scipio’s topographical knowledge was exact. *Βατὴ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον!*

The point where the wall was scaled is mentioned in the account of how Mago later tried to regain New Carthage. After disembarking his men, he led them to that part of the town wall

where the Romans had captured the town. At this, the enemy drew up their forces within the gate, which faces the sea and lake, between which gate and the sea there was, we infer, a certain stretch of land (L. XXVIII. 36. 5 *sq.*). It is not difficult to fix this gate, because the main gate opening on to the Isthmus can hardly be said to face the sea and lake. It was probably at the Puerta de Murcia, where there was a bridge over the canal, and where we must also assume a gate leading into the town (cf. Kromayer-Veith). Probably the wading party reached the walls just a little to the east of this point, between Mt Molinete and Mt Sacro. Canovas actually assumes that there was a gate in the wall between these two hills, by which the rain water flowing down from the heights of the town would empty into the lake, and which would at the same time give passage to those persons, who left for the country by crossing the lower slopes and extramural parts of Molinete and the bridge mentioned by Polybius. It is here then that the walls were scaled, rather than between José and Sacro, as Kahrstedt suggests, which contradicts the passage of Livy quoted above. It is very probable that there was some stretch of ground outside the city walls between these two hills, as Strachan-Davidson assumes in his map.

APPENDIX TWO

(CHAPTER IV)

THE SITE OF THE BATTLE OF BAECULA

BAECULA was near Castulo, but where precisely is the site of Castulo? It is usually equated with Cazlona, but this is apt to be confusing, as no place of that name can be found on modern maps of Spain. The best map is the 1 : 50,000 now in course of publication by La Dirección general del Instituto Geografico y Estadiastico; section 905 covers this district, but there is no Cazlona. "The old name is preserved in the Chapel of S. Maria de Cazlona, as in the inn and mill of the same name (la Ventas y el Molino de Cazlona)," writes Hübner in Pauly-Wissowa. There is no doubt as to the general position of Castulo; it lies on the north side of the Guadalimar, about 7 km. south of Linares. Just here is the Molino y Casa de Calzona, which perhaps preserves the old name, though enquiry at the cottage itself produced no result. A few hundred yards to the west, on the other side of the railway line, lies the Caserio de la Virgen; does this preserve the name of the chapel mentioned by Hübner? The *C.I.L.* places the site slightly to the north-east between the Casa de la Huelga and Casa Blanca in the neighbourhood of the Caserio y Molino de Dona Salome; it also quotes other corruptions of the name—Cazdona and Castlona. There can be no doubt that the site lay very near here, by the ruins of the Torron de Sta Eufemia. It is placed here by Man. Acedo, "Castulo" (Madrid, 1902), p. 135, who gives a sketch of the site. "We cannot trace," says Hübner, "the extent of the town; the stones of its buildings, walls, theatre, circus, and baths probably are built into the neighbouring town of Linares." Some were used for the construction of a bridge over the river—see H. Sandars, *Notes on the Puente Quebrada, on the Guadalimar river* (Madrid, 1913).

Near Castulo lay Baecula, which cannot be identified exactly (cf. Hübner in P.-W.); inscriptions, the usual source of identification, are lacking here. But it is almost certainly the modern village of Bailen, which lies some 15 km. to the north-west of

Castulo in a strong strategic position, as has been said.¹ Can there then be found in the neighbourhood of Bailen a site which corresponds to Polybius' description—a hill with a small level terrace about half way up, protected in the rear by a river?² Livy describes it more clearly than Polybius, "tumulum...plano campo in summo patentem: fluvius ab tergo; ante circaque velut ripa praeceps oram eius omnem cingebat. Suberat et altera inferior submissa fastigio planities. Eam quoque altera crepido haud facilius in adscensum ambibat." Brewitz was the first to try to identify this spot, but he does so only in a rough way. He corrects Kahrstedt, by assuming that the river mentioned is not the Baetis (for then it would have been named), but a tributary, the Rumblar. Bailen lies, he says, on terraced ground sloping down to the east. The Malaga-Madrid railway goes obliquely over the hills, along a course similar to that of the road mentioned in Livy. Presumably Brewitz does not mean the main line, but the branch line from Espeluy to Linares via Bailen station which is about 8 km. from the village. Actually this line does not run over the hills, but along the Rio Guadiel and the lowest ground there. Also does "Cazlona" lie where he places it? However, it is here that the site of the battle probably lay, but Brewitz suffered from the lack of adequate maps.

Kromayer-Veith identify the site more exactly on the map in their *Schlachten-Atlas*. Hasdrubal's camp is placed on the hill Jarosa, which slopes down to the south-east.³ The flat ridge, which was occupied by the light-armed troops, stretches on either side as far as the gorges of the Arroyo de Cañada Baeza in the east, and the Arroyo del Matadero in the west. The Rumblar flows in the rear, the nearest point being about 6½ km. from Jarosa. This hill is 392 metres high, and its distance from the Guadiel, if measured flat on the map, is just under 3 km. It slopes fairly steeply, and is covered with olive trees and stumps of vines. This site suits the required conditions fairly well, especially when viewed from the Rio Guadiel, but there are

¹ For a description of the surrounding district see Sir Charles Oman, *Hist. of Pen. War*, I. p. 187 sq.

² P. x. 38. 8. ἐκ μὲν τῶν ὀπισθεν ποταμὸν ἀσφαλῆ, παρὰ δὲ τὴν κατὰ πρόσωπον πλευρὰν τοῦ χάρακος ἐπίπεδον τόπον, ὁφρὺν προβεβλημένην ἔχοντα καὶ βάθος ἱκανὸν πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ μήκος πρὸς ἑκταξίν. See above, p. 106.

³ See map, p. 110.

objections to it. The required terrace is not very distinctly marked; there is a belt of lesser gradient than the rest, but it is by no means flat. That is, the required level piece of ground is narrow, and is in itself quite a steep gradient. The plateau at the top is small, while Livy says "*tumulum...plano campo in summo patentem.*" The whole site seems too compact. Finally there is the question of water supply, a vital factor in choosing a camp site. Neither of the two Arroyos mentioned is a stream of any considerable size. They would probably be dried up except in wet weather, and were probably as dry in the spring when Hasdrubal encamped near by, as in the spring when I saw them. The Matadero is the smaller of the two, and its branch, the Arroyo Jarosa, runs just behind the summit. The Cañada Baeza is a little wider but very short. Even if there was some water in either of them, would it be enough for Hasdrubal or would he have to fall back on Bailen, where presumably there is a supply?

Immediately to the north-east of this site lies some ground which appears more suitable, stretching from the Arroyo de Cañada Baeza (now the south-west limit of the field) to the Arroyo de la Muela, with the highest point named Ahorcado (404 metres). Less than a kilometre to the south-east of this height is an unnamed peak only 4 metres lower than Ahorcado; this perhaps was the site of Hasdrubal's camp. The ground, sloping down from here to the south-east, suits the requirements well. Its contours can be seen clearly from Jarosa itself; it presents a gradually sloping hill with a very decided break of almost level ground in the centre.¹ This site may be more straggling than Veith's, and consequently may seem less strong and impregnable. But the distance from the highest point to the Guadiel is actually only about $\frac{1}{2}$ km. more than from this stream to Jarosa, while the height is 8 metres more. But the ridge is wider, more flat, more strongly marked. The plateau also is larger; one has only to compare for instance the space embraced by the 360-metre contour line in both cases. Lastly, there is the water supply. The Cañada Baeza can be dismissed as a constant factor, for it is involved in both sites. But the Arroyo de la Muela, which bounds this site on the north, is a much more considerable stream than the Matadero. It passes the hill about 1 km. distant, and would afford the Carthaginians a supply. It is irrelevant that the Arroyo Jarosa (Matadero) is nearer

¹ See photograph, Frontispiece.

the hill of that name, than the Muela is to this hill, if there was no water in it. If there was water in any of the three, it would be in the Muela. Livy emphasises the steepness of the hill; neither of those two sites could be called precipitous, but no doubt this aspect has been exaggerated by the patriotic Roman. Superficially Veith's site which is the lower hill appears the steeper, but that is because it is accentuated by the sloping terrace, which the description demands should be flatter.

Turning to the Roman camp, Veith places it on the slopes of Jabalquinto, south-east of the Carthaginian camp, on the other side of the Guadiel. If it lay there, Scipio chose a very strong position, for Jabalquinto is some 100 metres higher than Jarosa, and from its summit the hills opposite look very low. But this constitutes another argument against Veith's site, for it is clear that the Roman camp was in a weaker position than the Carthaginian, because after the battle Scipio transferred his camp there *διὰ τὴν τῶν τόπων εὐφυίαν* (P. 40. 11). If the Carthaginian camp was near Ahorcado, the Roman position must be sought more to the north-east than Jabalquinto. From this height to Linares there stretches a range of hills, almost any part of which would offer a suitable site opposite the Carthaginians. The only means of defining the position more exactly is to consider a factor which must have influenced Scipio himself, namely water supply. Unless he camped on the site of Linares (419 metres), he would probably turn to the hills just east of Tobaruela, where a small stream runs down to the Guadiel. In fact, it may have been inadequacy of water that forced him to camp on the Carthaginian site after the battle. He would hardly leave the very strong peak of Jabalquinto, for here there must be an adequate water supply to support the villagers—in fact, on entering the picturesque old village from the north, the first object to strike the eye is an age-worn stone well. But Scipio would readily leave his position at Tobaruela for Hasdrubal's superior one. Certainty cannot be reached. Neither of the two suggested sites can be proved to be the actual ground of the battle, unless the spade should ever reveal traces of Hasdrubal's or Scipio's camp; but they are in the right neighbourhood and represent the type of country. Both agree, more or less with, what topographical details the authorities furnish, but the one which lies to the north-east would seem to agree better.

APPENDIX THREE

(CHAPTER V)

THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE SPANISH CAMPAIGN

SCIPIO'S first years in Spain are less complicated than his last, from a chronological point of view. The capture of New Carthage is set by Polybius in the year 209, and the battle of Baecula in 208. Book x of Polybius, in which these events are related, covers Ol. 142. 3 (210/9) and 142. 4 (209/8). After Baecula, Hasdrubal had wintered in Gaul and reached Italy in 207, so that Baecula must have been fought in 208, which confirms the capture of New Carthage in the spring of 209. Scipio's arrival in Spain was probably in 210, although he was elected in 211, for a successor would not be sent to supersede Nero so soon after his appointment. It is true that we cannot be sure from his extant narrative whether Polybius put Scipio's arrival in 211 or 210, but the latter date is the more reasonable. Livy, however, refers Scipio's arrival to 211. Then, although he knows that some authors put the fall of New Carthage in 209, he himself dates it 210, on the ground that Scipio would not waste a year doing nothing (xxvii. 7. 5-6). This means that Livy has to transfer Baecula to 209. If Scipio arrived in Spain in 210, the mistake is rectified. Dio (Zon. ix. 7. 3 sq.) gives 211 for the arrival, but correctly puts New Carthage in 209. If Dio and Livy both used Coelius here, we must include Coelius, along with Polybius, among those "qui anno insequenti captam tradiderint" (i.e. to 209). The cause of Livy's mistake, which is the false equation of Ol. 142. 3 with the consular year 210/9, and also the difficulty of Laelius' arrival in Rome (after the fall of New Carthage) "exitu anni," when he should have got there by the early summer, are discussed by De Sanctis, p. 468 n. 38.

The events narrated by Livy (xxviii. 12-37) for the year 206 are numerous. They include the battle of Ilipa, the negotiations with Syphax, the punitive expeditions against Iliturgi, Castulo and Astapa, the funeral games, the expedition against Gades, the mutiny of the Roman army, the revolt of the Spanish tribes

and its suppression. So numerous are they in fact, that it is sometimes assumed that they could not all have taken place in one year. This assumption is not necessary, as will be shown. On the other hand, the year 207, as narrated by Livy (xxviii. ch. 1-4), contains very little—Silanus' expedition against the Carthaginians recruiting in Celtiberia, Scipio's march to the south, his demonstration there, the capture of Orongis by Lucius Scipio, and the scattering of the Carthaginian army to various strongholds. The obvious way out of the difficulty is to transfer some of the events of 206 to the comparatively empty year 207. But how does this square with the authorities?

Franz goes further back, and transfers the events of 207 to 208, and divides those of 206, putting Ilipa in 207, and leaving the rest in 206. Soltau and Jumperz rightly do not interfere with 208, but they divide the events given by Livy for 206.

De Sanctis (pp. 496-7) gives the clearest account of how this transference can be made. He regards (as also does Matzat, *Röm. Zeitrechnung*, p. 154 n. 2) L. xxviii. 1-4. 4 as a partial repetition of 12. 10-17. 1, because both sections finish with the dispersion of the Carthaginian army, and the despatch of Lucius Scipio to Rome. As the former passage, he continues, comes from the best Greek source (Silenus), and the latter is Polybian in substance, it is necessary to correct and complete the one with the other. The importance of Ilipa is less in the first source than in Polybius, though the cause of this silence may in part be because Livy has cut down the narrative to avoid repetition. The method by which these two accounts were combined can be seen from Zon. ix. 8 (where there is only a little difference between the enterprise of Lucius Scipio and of Silanus); Zonaras goes back through Dio, not to Livy, but to the writer who used the same sources with greater perspicuity. Matzat rightly notes this, though he falsely considers that the first source was Valerius Antias. It is clear that Livy's source marked the end of one year and the beginning of the next after Ilipa (16. 14); hence we must transpose Ilipa to 207. According to this view, Zonaras is wrong in saying that after Ilipa (207) Scipio wintered ἐκεῖ, because Livy (16. 10) says Scipio returned to Tarraco; unless indeed the ἐκεῖ can refer merely to Spain. By these arguments De Sanctis transfers to 207 the events narrated or implied in ch. 1-4, and refers the rest

to 206. The cause of the Livian error is that in Polybius xi the Spanish events of Olympiad 143. 1 and 143. 2 (208/7 and 207/6) were narrated continuously, which would not be a unique method. But how then are we to explain Livy's statement (ch. 16. 14), that the Carthaginians were driven from Spain in the fifth year of Scipio's Spanish command, and in the fourteenth of the whole war? (Actually it is the thirteenth, as Livy says in ch. 10. 8, and we must here suppose a copyist's error of XIII for XIII). Here the date of the Polybian year Olympiad 143. 2 is precisely 207 (aut.)/206, and the "pulsī Hispania Carthaginienses" refers not to the preceding year, as in Livy's erroneous interpretation, but to what follows. Hence De Sanctis' order of events is, for 207: Silanus' expedition (spring); Mago joins Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo; Silanus joins Scipio at Castulo; Ilipa; Mago goes to Gades and Hasdrubal to Africa; Hasdrubal and Scipio visit Syphax; the storming of Orongis. All the remaining events are referred to 206.

It is on slender grounds that De Sanctis sees a doublet in the two passages of Livy (chs. 1-4 and chs. 12-17), which are so dissimilar. If Lucius Scipio was sent with prisoners to Rome in 207, it is not unreasonable to suppose he might be sent again the next year; Publius Scipio would tend to send a member of his own family to represent him in Rome, and also when he found a man who could perform adequately any task assigned to him, would naturally entrust him with the same task when next the need arose. The second reason has even less support; the Carthaginian armies scattered in 207 for a definite strategic object, in 206 they scattered in defeat. Coincidence of fact does not necessarily imply a doublet, otherwise we might have to question Scipio's movements when he spent successive winters in Tarraco. Livy's first source may have minimised the importance of Ilipa, but would Livy reduce it to nothing in his first narrative? If two such dissimilar narratives have been combined, more evidence must be adduced to prove the fact.

Further, why should Livy (16. 14) necessarily mark the end of a year? Why should it refer to the later events? Why should Livy be wrong in assigning the remark, as he found it in his source, to what preceded? Ilipa was the real end of the war; all later events were merely diplomatic or punitive. An author might well pause, after describing the battle, to remark on the

real expulsion of the Carthaginian power from Spain. The transference of Ilipa to 207, on the ground that the Polybian Olympiad 143. 2 corresponds to 207 aut./206, forces us to place it in the autumn of 207; but then P. XI. 20. 1 ("Hasdrubal, collecting his forces from the towns in which they had passed the winter, advanced and encamped not far from the town called Ilipa") implies that the battle was fought in the spring. The only real support in the authorities for placing Ilipa in 207 is Dio, who does imply that it was fought in the autumn; but if we accept his account, we have to explain its divergence from Livy—for it does diverge, because in the context it strains the meaning to take ἐκεῖ as equivalent to "in Spain."

Thus the transference of Ilipa to 207 involves setting aside either the Polybian chronology or the implications of the Polybian narrative, and the adoption of a hypothesis of a doublet in Livy where there is very little evidence for it. It is simpler to turn to the other alternative for relieving the congestion of 206, i.e. of trying to fit all the events narrated into the compass of one year. Brewitz has attempted this, although his views, according to De Sanctis, "*combattono con poco valida argomentazione*" those of Franz and Jumperz; but De Sanctis does not level any precise objections against them.

Livy provides some data as to the length of time occupied by some of the episodes; where he fails, probability is the only guide. The following table, which allows a minimum of time for each, shows the difficulty of keeping to his narrative—for

Days

70	Scipio leaves Silanus in the south and returns to Tarraco (Livy).
7	Stops in Tarraco.
10	Forced march to New Carthage.
14	Syphax. 4 days voyage (Livy).
14	Waits for Marcius to come from Tarraco.
14	Expedition to Ilurgia. (5, Livy). Takes it in one day. To Castax. Back to New Carthage.
14	Funeral games and rest.
30	Illness and mutiny.
21	Expedition against the Ilergetes. (10 to Ebro; 4 on. Short stay there).
21	To Gades.
21	Back to Tarraco.
236	= nearly 8 months.

Scipio returned to Rome the same year in time for the consular elections.

Hence, if Ilipa was fought at the beginning of April, Scipio could not have left Tarraco for Rome till December, which would be too late for the consular elections.

Livy says that when Scipio crossed over to Africa, he left the defence of Spain in the hands of Lucius Marcius at Tarraco, and Marcus Silanus at New Carthage. This, Brewitz suggests, is probably wrong, for although we do not hear of Silanus again, yet on Scipio's return from Africa, L. Marcius is sent against Castulo. Now if Marcius had stopped in Tarraco and Silanus in New Carthage, Silanus would be the obvious man to have sent against Castulo. So perhaps Livy or his source is confused, and actually Silanus stopped in Tarraco and Marcius in New Carthage, whence the latter is sent against Castulo. This is supported by the fact that Silanus had the Ebro command in 209, and probably in 208, and that he returned to that district in 207 after the Celtiberian expedition, before Scipio left it. It is only at the time of Ilipa that Silanus left the northern district, and that was when Scipio needed all his forces; after the battle Silanus would naturally return there again. In short, the joint commander, who was sent out in 210 with Scipio, was allotted by mutual consent the northern command. Further, Appian (*Ib.* 28) expressly says that on defeating the remnants of the Carthaginian army after Ilipa, Silanus joined Scipio at New Carthage. If the above inference is correct, it is important, because it is then no longer necessary to allow time for Marcius to march from Tarraco to Castulo; he was with Scipio at New Carthage, and would start at the same time.

Brewitz further concludes that Scipio's return to Tarraco after Ilipa is improbable *per se*, and is due to Livy's careless use or misunderstanding of his source. Again, Appian's remark that Silanus joined Scipio at New Carthage contradicts Livy. It is probable that it was only Silanus who was sent back to Tarraco, and that Scipio himself stopped at New Carthage. Why should Scipio go back to Tarraco? He had spent long enough there in 207 to organise his communications and commissariat for the big push of the next campaign. He was needed more in the south, and any necessary organisation could be left to Silanus. As he was about to negotiate with Syphax, he would hardly

journey up to the north first. The cancelling of the journey means that the seventy days' journey to Tarraco, the suggested week there, and the time of the return journey, are all saved, and only a march from near Ilipa to New Carthage and a rest there, are to be set against them, a saving probably of some two months. This, with the fortnight saved, if we suppose the confusion of Marcius and Silanus, means that Scipio would be back in Tarraco ready to sail for Rome by the beginning of October.

April. Ilipa.

Silanus is left, while Scipio returns to New Carthage.

Silanus treats with Masinissa, and Carthaginian army breaks up.

Laelius is sent to Syphax, Lucius Scipio to Rome.

Scipio rests in New Carthage, till Silanus joins him on his way to his northern command.

May, 1st week.

Laelius returns.

2nd and 3rd weeks.

Scipio goes to Africa and returns.

4th week.

Scipio starts with Marcius against Ilurgia and Castax.

June, end of 1st week.

Scipio returns to New Carthage.

2nd and 3rd weeks.

He celebrates games. Marcius returns after capture of Astapa.

4th week.

Marcius and Laelius sent to Gades and Carteia.

They return to New Carthage.

July.

Scipio ill. Mutiny at Sucro. It is quelled.

August.

Scipio's expedition against the Ilergetes.

Marcius is sent south. Scipio stops few days in New Carthage.

September.

Scipio reaches Gades. Treats with Masinissa.

Surrender of Gades. Scipio returns.

October.

Scipio reaches Tarraco. Sails for Rome.

APPENDIX FOUR

(CHAPTER VIII)

"ZAMA" AND THE SITE OF THE BATTLE

WHERE was the Zama at which Hannibal encamped, and which, on the authority of Nepos alone, has been considered the site of, and has given its name to, the final battle of the Second Punic War?¹ There was in North Africa more than one place of that name. This is clear from an inscription (*C.I.L.* VIII. 16442), which was found at Jama, but is no longer extant; it reads: "Aug(usta) Zama M." The M. obviously stands for Major, not Minor; if it were the latter, local patriotism would probably have prevented its insertion. Ptolemy also mentions a *Zάμα Μείζων*. At Sidi Abd el Djedidi, an inscription has been found, referring to a magistrate of the Colonia Zamensis (*C.I.L.* VIII. 12018), which is also mentioned in an ecclesiastical document of the fourth century A.D. This town lies 50 km. north-west of Kairouan on a plateau, and is a naturally strong position (Veith, p. 629, describes and gives photographs of the place). Jama, the source of the first inscription referring to Zama Major, lay 40 km. farther west; its name probably still preserves the ancient one, though this has been disputed (cf. Veith, p. 625). It is a hill town, and one of the strongest positions in the province (cf. Veith's description, p. 621). So the evidence of inscriptions gives two Zamas, one in the east, the other in the west.

Turning to the literary evidence, Sallust (*Jug.* 56 *sqq.*) says that during the Jugurthine War, after the battle of the Muthul, Metellus determined to storm Zama, an important town which was the stronghold of the kingdom (*urbem magnam et in ea parte, qua sita erat, arcem regni*). It lay in a plain, and though fortified,

¹ On the site of Zama, see especially Veith, pp. 617 *sqq.*; Pareti; Merlin, *Journal des Savants*, 1912, pp. 504 *sqq.*; Schmidt, *Rhein. Mus.* XLIV. pp. 397 *sqq.*; Gsell, pp. 255 *sqq.*; Rice Holmes, *Roman Republic*, III. pp. 536 *sqq.*; E. Pais, *Appendice Prima*, pp. 423 *sqq.* The relevant inscriptions and references in the ancient authorities are mentioned in the text.

was not a naturally strong position (in campo situm magis opere quam natura munitum), but near by was a low hill which the Romans seized (Romani...locum cepere paulo quam alii editiorem). While marching against it, Metellus sent Marius to get supplies from Sicca (El Kef), which lies about 50 km. west of Jama. The Table of Peutinger also mentions a Zama Regia, situated on the route from Assures to Uzappa. The title Regia perhaps merely implies that originally it was under the control of the Numidian kingdom and not of the Carthaginians.¹ But in the *Bellum Africanum* (91. 2) Juba is said to have had a palace at Zama, where he kept his wives, children and treasures. This Zama (Jama) was probably the Zama Regia of the Tabula; while Sallust's Zama also must be West Zama (Jama) and not the Eastern Zama (el Djedidi), because of its nearness to Sicca, and is also probably Zama Regia (the arcem regni!). As will be seen later, it is to this town, not to East Zama that Hannibal marched. But unfortunately Sallust's description does not suit either Jama or el Djedidi, both of which are "magis natura quam opere munita." Veith, who explored the district thoroughly, found a site which does fit Sallust's description exactly—Seba Biar, 18 km. south-west of Jama. In fact, it corresponds to the distances given by the Tabula better than Jama does; Zama Regia was 15 km. from Assures, according to the Table, and 30 from Seggo; now Seba Biar is 13 from Assures and 25 from Seggo, while Jama is 30 from Assures and 11 from Seggo. But there is the evidence of the inscription from Jama pointing to a Zama there. So Veith concludes there were two Zamas here, making, with el Djedidi, three in all. He explains that the ruins at Seba Biar are only those of an early date. According to Dio Cassius (XLVIII. 23. 4), Zama was stormed by T. Sextius in B.C. 41, and according to Strabo (xvii. 3. 4), it remained a ruin for a long time. When it was rebuilt, the stronger site of Jama may have been chosen, while a less important settlement continued at Seba, which was only then ironically named Regia to denote the town where the royal residence was in days of a free Numidia; and the town of Jama was known as Maior, which till now had been contrasted with Sidi Abd el Djedidi, and marked the difference between the old royal town and the new settle-

¹ Cf. Cagnat, *Comptes rendus de l'acad.* etc. 1894, p. 43; cf. Bulla Regia, etc.

ment. The old town remained an important meeting place of roads, which explains why the *Tabula* refers to it. Dr Rice Holmes thinks it unlikely that the compiler of the *Table* would overlook the Zama, which Hadrian made a colony, and mention the unimportant non-Roman Seba Biar; he suggests that Seba Biar was an earlier capital, abandoned after the time of Marius, while Jama stands on the site of Zama Regia. Pareti has avoided Veith's conclusion in a different way; the inscription only proves that the place where it was found was in the territory of a town called Zama, but not necessarily that it was the centre of the commune. So De Sanctis (p. 591) thinks that Zama Regia continued to live with the rights of the commune, as it was even made a colony by Hadrian (see an inscription found at Rome, *C.I.L.* VI. 1686—*Colonia Aelia Hadriana Aug. Zama Regia*). Thus the two colonies *Augustae Zamae*, Seba Biar and Jama (for the latter cf. "col. Aug. Zam. M."), were really one city called indifferently Regia or Maior.

All the evidence points to this Western Zama, not to the Eastern Sidi Abd el Djedidi, as the place where Hannibal encamped. Polybius (xv. 5. 3) says it was five days' journey towards the west of Carthage. Jama lies about 140 km. to the south-west of Carthage, Djedidi only 100 to the south-south-west. The former obviously suits the direction better; Polybius only says *ὡς πρὸς τὰς δύσεις*, and the road does in part run to the west, while the road from Tunis to el Djedidi goes due south. The distance also of Jama accords better; 100 km. is rather short for a five days' journey, which Polybius (xiv. 8. 2) elsewhere reckons as some 120 km., for he says that the Great Plains are five days' march from Utica. After the battle, Hannibal fled from the field to Hadrumetum, according to Appian (*Lib.* 47) 3000 stades (530 km.), in two days and nights; Nepos (*Han.* 6) gives the same time but only 300 miles (450 km.). In both authors either the time must have been decreased, or the distance exaggerated. The latter was probably the case, as will be shown later; so the time may be accepted. But two days and nights is a ridiculous time for a flight of only 100 km., which is the distance if the site is placed near el Djedidi; the choice of Western Zama makes it more reasonable.

Few scholars vote for el Djedidi. Schmidt and Wettinghausen however do so, and equate it with Zama Regia. Their views

involve an alteration in the strategy, according to which Hannibal advances from Hadrumetum to East Zama, where he stops to reconnoitre, while Scipio advances up the valley of the Siliana. Veith has shown that the topography of the town and of the actual sites of the battle suggested by them do not fit the facts. Kahrstedt (p. 563 n. 1) also argues for an eastern site because (a) tradition knows only of Zama; but as will be shown soon, the evidence of Polybius and Livy cannot be dismissed in so summary a fashion. (b) The site must be nearer to Hadrumetum than to Carthage, because after the battle Hannibal fled to Carthage via Hadrumetum; but he fled back to his base, and withdrew as quickly as possible in the opposite direction from the enemy. (c) Scipio's object was to join Masinissa; if this was attained at Zama Regia (East Zama), why should he go farther west merely to reach Naraggara? But he did not join Masinissa at Zama; it is only certain that after joining him Scipio moved to Naraggara; so he may equally well have met him farther west. (d) Why does Polybius, contrary to his usual custom, mention Zama if it was unimportant? De Sanctis compares its importance to the crossing of the Rubicon.

It was from West Zama then that Hannibal marched to battle; here, and not in the east, is the site of the battle to be sought. The evidence which makes the search possible is both literary and topographical. Polybius (xv. 13-14 and 6. 2) says that Scipio encamped at Margaron; Hannibal then marched from Zama to within 30 stades of Scipio and encamped also, the ground between the two camps being the actual field of battle. Livy (xxx. 29. 9) follows Polybius almost verbatim, except that he calls the place not Margaron but Naraggara.¹ Margaron is unknown, but Naraggara is the modern village of Sidi Youssef (the field of ruins, Henchir Ksar Jaber, probably is the exact site, rather than Ksiba Mraou which lies 9 km. to the north; cf. Veith, p. 602).

This curious and unfortunate discrepancy can be explained in four ways: (1) Livy may have substituted the well-known name of Naraggara for the unknown Margaron. Both Meyer (p. 408) and Kahrstedt (p. 563) adopt this view; the former saying that most of the modern phantastic reconstructions of Scipio's

¹ So the better manuscripts, e.g. the Puteanus; an inferior reading is *Narcara*.

campaign and of the site of the battle, rest on an uncritical use of the sources, and so are completely worthless. But such a substitution by Livy is impossible, because in Livy's day Naraggara was not an important town. He does not mention it elsewhere, and the next reference to it is a hundred years later by Ptolemaeus—and that only in an Itinerary. It did not flourish till the second and third centuries A.D. To substitute one unimportant and probably unheard-of name for another, is an unreasonable proceeding to attribute to Livy. But was the substitution due to Coelius? As has been seen, Coelius was guilty of this trick in his account of the campaigns in Spain. But Coelius and the Romans of his day must surely have heard of the site of the battle in which the dread Hannibal was defeated, and so the substitution of a false name would be pointless. Besides Livy used Polybius himself direct, and not through the medium of Coelius, as in the Spanish Wars; it is unlikely he would add a gloss from the latter's account in preference to the name he found in Polybius—even supposing Coelius had given a false name. (2) Polybius' text may be corrupt and should be emended to *Ναρράγγαραν*, which is not very dissimilar to *Μάργαρον*. This view is taken by Lehmann, Pareti and Veith. (3) The two words may be different forms of the same name, like *Μακάρα* and Bagradas. (4) Livy's text may be corrupt and Naraggara substituted for the original Margaron at a later period, when the former town became more widely known. If this should be so, any attempt to fix the site must be useless, and we must fall back on the unknown Margaron. But it is more probable that either the second or third suggestion is correct, and that the Polybian-Livian tradition points to Naraggara (Sidi Youssef). Again it may be argued that this last identification is incorrect. In North Africa different places often had similar names, e.g. Zama; and so Sidi Youssef may not be the site of the Naraggara involved. In this case a new site must be sought from purely topographical data, on any suitable ground near Zama.

Appian and Nepos also contribute to the problem. Appian's account of the operations follows a very bad tradition. He tells how Hannibal intended to occupy a hill near the town of *Κίλλα*, but was forestalled by Scipio. It is quite possible that, though the account is weak, the actual name may derive ultimately from a reliable source. But Killa is unknown. Pareti considers

it an error of the amanuensis for Σίκκα, which De Sanctis thinks quite likely on purely palaeographical grounds. But Sicca Veneria (El Kef) was much more widely known than Naraggara, and so if the battle was fought near it, why should it have been mentioned only by Appian? Killa has been identified (e.g. by Tissot) as a town whose inhabitants were called Chelenses Numidia, and which is known from an inscription to have been situated in the Plain of Zouarines, 40 km. south-west of Jama. But the name may derive from "cellae," and be of late Latin origin (cf. Gsell, p. 263). Hennebert has placed the battle in this plain, but has been refuted by Lehmann on strategic grounds, and by Veith for topographical reasons (the district is too well watered). The latter has also shown the topographical weakness of Toussaint's theory, which also builds on Killa. Finally, as has been seen, Appian and Nepos give the distance and time of Hannibal's flight from the field to Hadrumetum. The distance is obviously wrong, as it would lead deep into Algeria, almost to Constantine, and involve a journey of 265 or 225 km. a day—an obvious impossibility. Veith reckons a journey of 100–120 km. a day as the maximum possible on this route. If, as he argues, the time given (two days and nights) is reliable, a distance of 200–240 km. from Hadrumetum is reached. Sidi Youssef is 250–270 km., and so the traditional Naraggara or its neighbourhood cannot be excluded on this evidence.

What data does the topographical evidence afford? Scipio encamped on a good site within a stone's throw of water; Hannibal camped 30 stades away on a hill, which suited his present purpose, but was rather too far away from water, so that his men suffered on this account (P. xv. 5. 14 and 6. 2). Presumably, though it is an assumption, Scipio's camp was also on a hill. Veith goes further and says that as Scipio knew only too well the value of water, he deliberately chose a position where the only opposite point, from which troops could be drawn up for battle, did lack water. As Hannibal came from the east, from Zama, his front must have faced westwards, or possibly north-west, or south-west; the Romans naturally faced the opposite direction. The actual field of battle must have been a plain, for the ground played no part in it. Indeed, this makes the determination of the precise site a matter of interest rather than of historical importance; unless a paucity of suitable sites enforces certain conclusions,

and so supplements the literary evidence. Veith further argues for a plain, because Scipio's initial idea of the battle made two important demands on the land—the possibility of using his superiority in cavalry, and the need of elbow-room for his infantry. So the demands of the site are two hills, 30 stades apart, one near water, the other not, with an open plain between.

Are these data valid in seeking a site in Tunisia to-day? Kahrstedt and De Sanctis answer "no," because the hydrological conditions have changed more in Africa than elsewhere since Roman times; some sources have dried up, others arisen, and streams have altered their courses. This is certain, as many ancient towns lie in places where to-day there is no water. But the question cannot be dismissed as lightly as is done by Kahrstedt, who talks of a few dozen plains within a radius of 20 km. of Zama Regia, many of which would apparently suit. The changed water conditions preclude any final judgment, but if a suitable site can be found, it may be accepted tentatively. Unfortunately, no site near Naraggara is suitable. Those suggested by Brunon and Lewel have been refuted by Veith as inconceivable, because of the hilliness of ground and its well-watered condition. He also shows how an erroneous conception of the mysterious "tableland" of Hannencha misled Lehmann and Delbrück. He suggested two possible sites, one Djebel Lajbel, the other Djebel Harraba. The former suits well, except that the plain is crossed by a water course; if this existed in Scipio's day, the site must be ruled out. The objection to the second is its distance (30 km.) from Naraggara. Pareti, who identifies Appian's Killa with Sicca, finds a site in the plain of Ou. et Tine, south of Sicca. But if Hannibal's camp is placed near Bir et Tourki, Scipio's must have lain in the open plain in a weak position. Again, the nearness to Sicca (5 km.), and distance from Naraggara (45 km.), make it improbable that the latter name would have been ascribed to the battle, especially in the best tradition, as Sicca was the more important place. Veith offers a variant of Pareti's site, 12 km. farther south-west, and only 30 km. from Naraggara. Where the plain of Ou. et Tine is cut off by the hills in the west is a height, Koudiat el Behaima. It is strategically important, for it commands the junction (marked to-day by a track) of the route from Seba Biar (Zama) and the El Kef-Sidi Youssef (Sicca-Naraggara) road, and also controls the stream

Ou. Ras el Ogla; here Scipio may have camped. Opposite, at $5\frac{1}{2}$ km., is the waterless hill, K^{at} Bougrine, which projects far into the intervening plain, Draa el Meinan. Over the hill runs the track to Seba Biar, along which Hannibal may have come from Zama, and seeing Scipio opposite, have encamped on the K^{at} Bougrine. Is it too fanciful to see in the name a survival of the word Margaron? If any weight can be given to Appian's Killa, the site is near enough to Sicca or even the plain of Zouarines where the Chellenses Numidia dwelt, to explain the origin of his tradition. The difficulty is the distance from Naraggara (30 km.). Polybius may have misunderstood his source, and Scipio did not camp finally there (assuming Margaron is another form of Naraggara), but it was his last halting place before his final site. Or, which is more likely, if the Western Zama covered two spots (Seba Biar and Jama) about 20 km. apart, may not Naraggara also have represented a kind of commune, of which the head was Sidi Youssef, and have embraced a distance of 30 km.? Near the site lies the ruined town of Henchir el Chemman; does it represent the site of an ancient town, and if so, of what name? If this question could be answered, it might support a site, which from topographical considerations is as good as or better than any other yet suggested. Finality cannot be reached, unless the spade should one day supplement the literary evidence; but this site is in itself quite possible, and may be accepted with caution rather than a vague one somewhere near Naraggara and the Muthul (Ou. Mellegue).

Note. L. Poinssot ("Zama," *Revue africaine*, 1928, pp. 165-183) reaches no definite solution of the problem, but believes that, if one accepts the hypothesis which substitutes one Zama for the three or four usually admitted, the site of the battle should be sought near Jama.

APPENDIX FIVE

NOTES ON THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

(1) THE FORCES OF THE ROMANS AND CARTHAGINIANS.¹

ON the numbers of the expeditionary force Livy (xxix. 25) found considerable divergence in his sources; some gave 10,000 infantry and 2200 cavalry, others 16,000 infantry and 1600 cavalry (= App. *Lib.* 13), and others again a total of 35,000 infantry and cavalry. Livy avoids committing himself, and follows those authors who give no estimate. We know that Scipio took 7000 volunteers to Sicily (L. xxviii. 46. 1; App. *Lib.* 8, cf. Zon. ix. 11); he could and did use the troops already in Sicily (xxix. 24. 13 *sq.*). These were the two legions who had been sent there in disgrace after Cannae, and whose existence there is no need to question (cf. De Sanctis, pp. 317 *sqq.*). On Marcellus' arrival, the legions in Sicily had been increased to four, but reduced to two again in 209. Any men among these troops whom he considered unfit, Scipio replaced by others from his volunteers. In this way he obtained two legions of 6200 infantry and 300 cavalry of citizen troops. He also chose the Latin contingent out of the army of Cannae; its numbers are not given, but it must have equalled that of the two citizen legions. Thus a total of 26,000 is reached. Perhaps all the volunteers were not used in filling up the legions from Cannae, but another legion could be formed from them, or at any rate enough were left over to bring the total to 30,000.

Scipio's fleet consisted of forty warships (App., *Lib.* 13, gives fifty-two, but later only twenty—ch. 25). Some may have returned to Sicily, but presumably the greater part remained in Africa. The number of sailors or marines can only be estimated; De Sanctis (p. 579) suggests 12,000, of which 7500 remained in Africa. These were separate from the legionaries, whom he reckons at 26,000, and so he reaches a total of 38,000. But the

¹ See especially De Sanctis, pp. 577–9, 583–5, 595–8; Veith, pp. 670–81.

number of marines seems rather large, as there is no specific reference to them; where did they all come from? If we reckon them at some 5000, and the total of the cavalry and infantry at 30,000, we reach an estimate similar to the highest one quoted by Livy.

If any of Livy's figures are reliable, the highest estimate is the most reasonable. We do not know his sources here; according to Veith (p. 670) they were Roman, and so it was their interest to belittle Scipio's forces; hence the higher estimate is probably the most accurate. De Sanctis rejects Veith's suggestion, because falsifications arise from more varied and irrational motives; the proof lies in the testimony of Coelius, who, according to Livy, gave no definite number, but indulged in rhetorical exaggeration ("volucres ad terram delapsas clamore militum ait tantamque multitudinem conscendisse naves ut nemo mortaliū aut in Italia aut in Sicilia relinqui videretur"). But though Coelius exaggerated, all the Roman annalists may not have done so; some, e.g. those whose figures Livy quotes, may well have decreased the number *ad maiorem Scipionis gloriam*. Further, considering the object of the expedition, the lower figure can hardly be accepted. It was not merely a demonstration, but an attempt to force Hannibal to withdraw from Italy, and then to fight him. Unless reinforcements were to be sent, and there is no mention of this, a large force would be dispatched.

It is hazardous to check this estimate by the figures given for the Zama campaign, as the latter are not certain and there are too many unknown factors. We are not told if any reinforcements were sent, the number of men Scipio lost in the fighting prior to Zama, or above all, the number of men which he left at Utica when he went up-country—and this must have been considerable. Yet if Appian's (*Lib.* 4) figure of 23,000 foot, excluding Masinissa's help, is accepted, it corresponds well with the assumption (for it can hardly be more) that Scipio brought over to Africa nearly 30,000 infantry. He must have left a strong force at his base; a full legion, one-fifth of his infantry strength, would not be too much.

While Scipio was preparing in Sicily, Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, on returning from an elephant hunt levied about 6000 foot and 600 horse from the Carthaginians, and the same number of Libyans; he also bought 5000 slaves as oarsmen (App. *Lib.* 9).

This total of 13,200 is quite reasonable, and was doubtless about the size of the Carthaginian force when Scipio landed. But it was, at the moment, some distance from Carthage itself (L. xxix. 34. 2); presumably it had moved from its station of 25 miles from the city (App. *Lib.* 9) into the interior, possibly with the object of meeting Syphax. Appian (*Lib.* 13) then proceeds to contradict himself, by attributing soon after to Hasdrubal 20,000 infantry, 7000 horse and 140 elephants. This second estimate comes from another and inferior source, as can be seen from its close connection with the less reliable account of the cavalry engagement which Appian gives (ch. 14). The inferiority of the tradition is also seen by the number Appian quotes in the same chapter for the Roman forces, which corresponds to the second estimate found by Livy (see above). Appian's first figure (ch. 9) certainly comes from a better source, possibly from Polybius himself (see Veith, pp. 674 *sqq.*). Even this figure of 12,000 infantry may be rather high; it is quite clear that Hasdrubal could not yet risk meeting Scipio in the open field. But this force must have been the bulk of that army with which, when joined by Syphax, he forced Scipio to retire from the siege of Utica in the winter. But when Scipio landed, this force was far off, and the Carthaginians had to rely on hastily-raised cavalry squadrons. The second force raised by Hanno, son of Hamilcar, may have numbered 4000 (L. xxix. 34. 6); but Polybius, Livy's source here, may have exaggerated. Appian (ch. 14) mentions 1000 picked horsemen, but this figure may come from the first cavalry engagement.

When the Carthaginians went into winter quarters, Hasdrubal's forces numbered 30,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, those of Syphax 50,000 infantry (not 15,000, as Veith, who attributes his own mistake to Livy) and 10,000 cavalry—P. xiv. 1. 14. This total of 93,000 is obviously too large, and Polybius' authority must be questioned (cf. De Sanctis, pp. 583 *sqq.*). The Carthaginians never mustered so large an army, and Hasdrubal could scarcely have more than doubled his force since Scipio's landing. As the Carthaginians were willing to offer terms, they cannot have had a force vastly superior to Scipio's. It is impossible to estimate Syphax' force. The whole force may be reckoned at some 30,000 infantry, and 3000–5000 cavalry (cf. De Sanctis)

Then followed the disaster of the burning of the camps. Even

Polybius' vivid picture tends to be rhetorical; he gives no number of the casualties (except *μυριάδες*), but considers it the greatest disaster known. Livy (xxx. 6. 8) says 40,000 were killed or burnt to death, and 5000 taken prisoners. Appian (ch. 23) gives 30,000 dead, and 24,000 prisoners. In a month's time the total Carthaginian and Numidian forces, including 4000 Celtiberian mercenaries, may have numbered 30,000. (This is Polybius' figure for their force at the Great Plains, and is probably incorrect; it may however represent their total force under arms: see below.) This figure shows that the losses at the camps cannot have reached Livy's figure, for it is unlikely that Hasdrubal could raise more than 2000-3000 in the month's interval (cf. Kahrstedt, p. 550 n. 2); while Syphax' reputation would be shaken, and he would find it difficult to raise a large force. Livy's figure is only within the bounds of possibility, if Polybius' absurd total of 93,000 is accepted. The 2500 men who rallied round Hasdrubal after the disaster only represent the nucleus of the survivors, and there must have gradually collected anything up to 20,000 men.

Polybius (xiv. 7. 9) says that the total force of the Carthaginians and Numidians at Campi Magni, together with the 4000 Celtiberians, numbered 30,000. Veith has pointed out the difficulty of Polybius' account: that the whole of the Roman infantry is opposed merely to the 4000 Celtiberians, while the two Roman cavalry corps easily rout the whole Carthaginian and Numidian troops, presumably 26,000. This is explicable, if Syphax and Hasdrubal had not joined the Celtiberians with a large force. In fact, it would be an error for the Carthaginians to proceed to the Great Plains with all their forces, and leave Carthage itself unprotected. Also Syphax had not properly recovered from the recent disaster. Scipio went to the Plains to strike the foe before they could collect. So Veith concludes that only the relatively weak part of the Carthaginian and Numidian forces was sent to the Celtiberians, who formed the chief part of the force. This would not number more than 10,000 in all. Scipio probably took with him only one or two legions, with all his cavalry, because he would leave the rest to keep up the siege of Utica, and because it would be difficult to move quickly and to support a larger force. This explains why he had to use all his infantry to crush the Celtiberians.

If Polybius' figure is correct for the total Carthaginian force, the greater part must have been survivors of the night attack on the camps. Veith believes a good number of these survived (*Schlachten-Atlas*, col. 36), yet he thinks that the figure of 30,000 is wrong for the forces collected at the Great Plains. That is, the Carthaginians had a force something like this number, but did not send a great part of it to the Plains; they left their main forces elsewhere, presumably protecting Carthage itself. But if this was so, Polybius would probably have mentioned it; his narrative implies that the main armed forces of the Carthaginians were collected at the Plains, whether or not his figure is correct. Why should the Carthaginians send a weak detachment to join the Celtiberians? It is true they did not expect to be attacked by Scipio; but they were attempting to raise as strong a force as possible, preparatory to taking the offensive. They had chosen their rallying place carefully, as they thought, and would naturally concentrate their forces there. Besides, the two generals, Hasdrubal and Syphax, went there. If a really large part of their forces was left to protect Carthage, surely one general would have remained in command of it. Granting that a certain proportion of their force was left to protect Carthage, as is possible, surely Veith is wrong in supposing it to be the larger part and that only 6000 of their own troops (i.e. 10,000 with the Celtiberians) were mustered at the Great Plains. Possibly, Polybius has applied the number of the whole Carthaginian force to that involved in the battle. But even so, one would expect the greater part (e.g. 20,000) to be involved in the fight, and not so small a part as 10,000 (as Veith).

Tactical necessity suggests the lowering of Polybius' figure, but there are two other valid reasons against an excessive diminution. If the Carthaginians had mustered 30,000 men in all, and only a few of these fought at *Campi Magni*, why did the result of the battle cause such complete distress at Carthage? Again, would Scipio have dared to divide his troops, if there was still a large body of the enemy covering Carthage?

Assuming the total Carthaginian forces at the battle numbered 20,000, the primary difficulty raised by Veith remains, though not so acutely. Polybius (8. 7) says that Hasdrubal placed the Celtiberians in the centre, the Numidians on the left, and the Carthaginians on the right. Possibly this does not mean that

the Celtiberians formed the entire centre. It may indicate the relative positions, and actually some of the Numidians and Carthaginians may have formed the centre as opposed to the wings, which would be chiefly composed of cavalry. The Celtiberians were the real source of the resistance, and during the Roman attack were left exposed by the flight of the Numidians and Carthaginians on either side of them. Polybius says that the Numidians gave way before the Italian cavalry, and the Carthaginians before Masinissa; i.e. the real wings were routed. But his statement does not exclude the possibility of some Carthaginians and Numidians being with the Celtiberians in the centre, and of their flight with the rest of their fellow-countrymen.

The next year the Carthaginians mustered all their strength for the last struggle. Hannibal's army consisted of three parts, the veterans from Italy,¹ the Carthaginian citizens and Africans, and mercenaries. It appears almost impossible to reckon the strength of each part by tracing its previous history. Polybius (xv. 11. 1) says that the mercenaries numbered 12,000, and Appian (ch. 40) that they formed a third of the whole. On this basis a total of 36,000 is reached; Appian himself gives 50,000 including the cavalry. Polybius (14. 8) says that in the last phase of the battle only a few of those who fled escaped; the casualties amounted to 20,000 killed, and nearly the same number of prisoners. Thus a total of 40,000 is reached. The losses are no doubt exaggerated, and many more men dispersed, but the total is probably accurate. The Carthaginian cavalry cannot be estimated accurately. It was certainly inferior to the Roman. We know from Polybius (3. 7) that Tychaeus brought 2000 horse, and perhaps Hannibal was helped by the chief of the Areacidae, and by Mesotylus and his 1000 horse (App. ch. 33), though not by Vermina. The cavalry raised by Carthage, or brought from Italy, cannot be estimated. The elephants numbered eighty, a rather high figure.

The Romans had an approximately equal force. The numbers since landing had probably remained fairly constant, the losses of 203 B.C. being compensated for by recruiting and reinforcements. A good strong guard must have been left at Castra Cornelia when Scipio went inland, and so perhaps he took with

¹ E. Groag (*op. cit.* p. 100 n. 3) considers that the usual estimate of the number of the veterans (12,000–15,000) is much too high.

him some 30,000 men. In addition he had the help of Masinissa with 6000 infantry and 4000 horse, and perhaps of other natives such as Dakamas (App. ch. 41). For his total of Romans and Italians, Appian gives 23,000 and 1500 cavalry; Masinissa came with many horsemen, and Dakamas with 600. De Sanctis reckons that if the Numidian cavalry numbered 4000 (as Polybius), and if Appian forgot Masinissa's infantry (6000), and if Dakamas brought a proportionate amount of infantry (900), a total of 35,700 is reached.

Both armies numbered some 35,000-40,000, the Carthaginians being slightly stronger in total, although weaker in cavalry.

(2) CHRONOLOGY.

Before discussing the chronology of 203 B.C., the way must be cleared by trying to evaluate the evidence of a much-debated passage of Ovid (*Fasti*, VI. 769):

superat Masinissa Syphacem
et cecidit telis Hasdrubal ipse suis.

Ovid refers this to June 22nd (not the 24th, because, in the pre-Julian calendar, June had 29 days; see De Sanctis, p. 575).

The natural reference in the first line is to Syphax' final defeat near Cirta; the second points to the suicide of a Hasdrubal, possibly in battle. But which Hasdrubal? It is often referred to the son of Hamilcar, who was killed at the Metaurus. But he fell gloriously fighting in battle (P. XI. 2. 1). The son of Gisgo did, according to Appian's account, take poison and committed suicide, not in battle but later on. For after Campi Magni he fled to Carthage, and took no part in the final defeat of Syphax. But it must allude to one or other, and De Sanctis (p. 575 *sq.*) finds the solution in believing the second line does not mean a suicide at all, but merely that Hasdrubal was hoisted on his own petard. (Cf. Lucan, *Pharsalia*, VIII. 559, who says that at Pharsalus, Pompey "cecidit civilibus armis," though Pompey left the field alive.) In this case it can refer to either Hasdrubal. If to the son of Hamilcar, De Sanctis suggests it means that in trying to destroy Rome he destroyed himself; or that hoping to join his brother to destroy the Romans, he met the Romans and destroyed himself; or that his message to his brother to prepare for a Carthaginian victory, served to prepare for his own downfall. If to the son of Gisgo: the same trick by which he had won

Syphax, the love of Sophonisba, was that which led to his destruction, by stimulating Masinissa. De Sanctis inclines to the latter interpretation, and refers both lines to Campi Magni, in which Syphax and Hasdrubal fought on the flanks.

But if both lines refer to Campi Magni, it can be objected that Masinissa fought against Hasdrubal and the Carthaginians, while Laelius was opposed to Syphax on the other wing; so why should Ovid say Masinissa defeated Syphax? Again, if the second line refers not to a suicide but to a *περιπέτεια*, it is more obvious in the case of Hasdrubal Barca, than at Campi Magni where the reader has to drag in Sophonisba. The question turns on whether the two lines hang together. If they do, then De Sanctis must be correct in deciding for Campi Magni and Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo; unless indeed Ovid thinks that Metaurus and the battle near Cirta were fought on the same day of the year—not an impossibility. But if the lines be taken separately, the first naturally refers to Syphax' final fall, and the second to the Metaurus; unless, which is less probable, Ovid believes that Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, committed suicide on the same day in 202. We may then decide slightly in favour of the battle near Cirta in preference to Campi Magni, as fought on June 22nd, 203.

But the application of any results obtained from Ovid's evidence must still be very hazardous. For little agreement has been reached concerning the pre-Julian Calendar. Varese believes that it was three or four months behind, Kahrstedt two or more months in advance of, Pareti approximately in accord with the astronomical year. (Cf. Gsell, p. 237 n. 3). De Sanctis takes this date in Ovid as a good proof of the correspondence of the calendars. As our literary evidence points to about June for the defeat of Syphax, we may believe in this correspondence. But Ovid's evidence is susceptible of such varied interpretations, that it is dangerous to use it in any but a subsidiary manner.

Scipio landed in Africa in 204. The scarcity of events after his disembarkation points to a fairly late date for the actual landing; three months would be quite adequate to cover his operations. But he was clearly there before the summer was over (cf. L. XXIX. 34. 7, "*aestiva sub tectis equitatus*"; and ch. 35. 13 and 15). At the first signs of spring the next year, operations re-started—the renewed siege of Utica, the breaking off of

negotiations, and the night attack on the enemy's camps (P. xiv. 2. 1, ἐπειδὴ τὰ τῆς ἐαρινῆς ὥρας ὑπέφαινεν ἤδη). Livy (ch. 4. 10-12) puts the renewal of the siege after the breaking off of negotiations; this is in contrast to P. xiv. 2. 2-4, and is unlikely, as there would be no time, because the surprise attack was launched immediately after the rupture. As Scipio started operations so early, and the Carthaginians had not yet moved out of their winter quarters, we may place the attack on the camps and their burning at the beginning of March. Thirty days later (beginning of April), Hasdrubal had collected his army at Campi Magni—P. xiv. 7. 9. On getting news of this, Scipio reached there in five days (ch. 8. 2), and the battle was fought four days later (8. 4), i.e., allowing some three weeks for the news to reach Scipio and for his preparations, etc., towards the end of April, e.g. 22nd. Fifteen days later, Masinissa and Laelius are in Numidia pursuing Syphax (L. xxx. 11. 1). Some time after this the battle was fought; the exact length of the interval is unknown, but Livy implies it was short—if we reject his unlikely story of Syphax' reorganisation of his army on Roman models, which would require months. Allowing time for Syphax to recruit, and for Masinissa to go round his own country a little, some two months between the battles should be assumed. Thus the battle near Cirta occurred somewhere round about 22nd June, the date assigned by Ovid.

The remaining events of the year fit in easily. After Campi Magni, Scipio laid waste the interior and then took Tunis, before hearing of Syphax' capture. While he was settling at Tunis, he was recalled to Utica by the Carthaginian naval attack, perhaps some four weeks after the battle, at the end of May. The joy caused at Carthage by this naval success was short-lived; within a month, came the news of Syphax' fall at the end of June. Meanwhile Scipio remained at Utica, where Syphax was sent to him in mid-July, and soon afterwards Laelius and Masinissa arrived. These were then sent to Rome. Scipio returned to Tunis, where there came a peace embassy from Carthage in August. The Carthaginian ambassadors were sent to Rome to ratify the terms, perhaps in September.

Another chronological difficulty is the date of Hannibal's return to Africa. Was it in the autumn of 203 or the early part of 202? He was recalled by the Carthaginians in 203, when

they heard the result of the battle of Campi Magni; but he did not return for some time. It would take time for him to organise the transports for his army. A fleet was sent to him under a Hasdrubal; presumably after the naval battle, for until they had made this venture the Carthaginians would need all their fleet. He was still in Italy when the peace negotiations were opened, for one of the clauses of the treaty was the demand for his return (L. xxx. 16, cf. P. xv. 1. 10 and 8. 12, which imply his absence). It is equally clear that he had returned when the Carthaginians broke off the treaty. At what point between these limits he left Italy is uncertain. Livy (21. 1) assigns his and Mago's departure to the consular year 203/2. He later says (29. 1) Hasdrubal left Hadrumetum with his army "*paucis diebus*," and marched to Zama. This, however, is due to careless reading of his source, Polybius. Between this disembarkation at Leptis, with the march on to Hadrumetum, and the departure for Zama, come the events concerning the breaking of the truce, as told by Polybius. Then Polybius (xv. 5. 3) says the Carthaginians were alarmed and urged Hannibal to move, which he did *μετά τινας ἡμέρας*. This Livy falsely connects with the disembarkation. (On this cf. De Sanctis, pp. 586-7.)

It is not impossible that Hannibal reached Africa in the first three months of 202 (but not later, as Livy says), but it was more probably in the late autumn of 203. Livy (19. 12) implies that he left soon after the news of his recall reached him, and about the same time as Mago. De Sanctis (*ib.*) suggests the year, which terminated with Hannibal's return, may have been a Polybian year, and his next year (Ol. 144. 2 = 203/2), which would normally start with the autumn of 203, opened with the rest at Hadrumetum.

The date of Zama also is uncertain. Book xiv of Polybius refers to Ol. 144. 1 = 204/3, and starts with the spring of 203. As Book xv refers to Ol. 144. 2 = 203/2, it presumably starts with the spring of 202. So the final battle clearly falls within 202. But when precisely? Every month from the spring to December has been suggested and supported by some scholar. It is perhaps better to admit that certainty cannot be reached. The chief argument for placing it late in the year, e.g. October, is that peace was not concluded till the consular year 201/0, when the consuls of 201 had entered office. Presumably then the

preliminaries were carried through at the end of 202 or the beginning of 201, and the battle took place not long before then. For if Scipio won in the spring of 202, why should there have been such a delay? It is not known how long Scipio had to wait for Masinissa, or how long elapsed while Scipio stormed the interior before Hannibal moved against him. There may have been a long pause in the summer for strategic reasons, or because of the heat (cf. Pareti, p. 323); it is not known. Zonaras (IX. 16) mentions an eclipse before the battle, which frightened the Carthaginians. Only one eclipse took place, and that was a partial one on 19th October, 202, which was negligible in North Africa. Is it fact or fiction? No certain answer can be given. Again the defeat of Vermina in December took place soon after Zama; but the incident is too doubtful to afford any evidence. The references to the expedition of the consul Claudius point to late in 202, but again their reliability is dubious. The bearing of the arrival of Lentulus, and of Livy's reference to the *Ludi Apollinares* on this date, is discussed by De Sanctis. Certainty cannot be reached, although the evidence points to a late date in 202, e.g. October, for Scipio's final victory.

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